smb: Work around Clang __bdos() type confusion
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 smb: Work around Clang __bdos() type confusion
Recent versions of Clang gets confused about the possible size of the "user" allocation, and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE ends up emitting a warning[1]:
repro.c:126:4: warning: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]
126 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
| ^for this memset():
int len;
__le16 *user;
...
len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
...
if (len) {
...
} else {
memset(user, '\0', 2);
}While Clang works on this bug[2], switch to using a direct assignment, which avoids memset() entirely which both simplifies the code and silences the false positive warning. (Making "len" size_t also silences the warning, but the direct assignment seems better.)
--- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +1 -1
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, len =cifs_strtoUTF16 (user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);UniStrupr (user); }else { -memset (user,'\0' ,2 ); + *(u16 *)user =0 ; } rc = crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 48 lines · Kees Cook
Recent versions of Clang gets confused about the possible size of the "user" allocation, and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCEends up emitting a warning[1]:repro.c:126:4: warning: call to '
__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe usestruct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]126 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); | ^for this
memset():int len; __le16 *user; ... len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); ... if (len) { ... } else { memset(user, '\0', 2); }While Clang works on this bug[2], switch to using a direct assignment, which avoids
memset()entirely which both simplifies the code and silences the false positive warning. (Making "len"size_talso silences the warning, but the direct assignment seems better.)Reported-by Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +0
-0
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, · line 575
Quoted 5 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +1
-1@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, len =cifs_strtoUTF16 (user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);UniStrupr (user); }else { -memset (user,'\0' ,2 ); + *(u16 *)user =0 ;
Is 'user' guaranteed to be 16-bit aligned?
Quoted 7 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +0
-1} rc = crypto_shash_update(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, --2.34.1
Quoted 44 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 43 lines · Kees Cook
Recent versions of Clang gets confused about the possible size of the "user" allocation, and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCEends up emitting a warning[1]:repro.c:126:4: warning: call to '
__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe usestruct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]126 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); | ^for this
memset():int len; __le16 *user; ... len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); ... if (len) { ... } else { memset(user, '\0', 2); }While Clang works on this bug[2], switch to using a direct assignment, which avoids
memset()entirely which both simplifies the code and silences the false positive warning. (Making "len"size_talso silences the warning, but the direct assignment seems better.)Reported-by Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 12 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, · line 575
Quoted 10 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +1
-1@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, len =cifs_strtoUTF16 (user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);UniStrupr (user); }else { -memset (user,'\0' ,2 ); + *(u16 *)user =0 ;Is 'user' guaranteed to be 16-bit aligned?
It's the first two bytes of a kmalloced address range, which I'm nearly certain will be sanely aligned, as those allocs are commonly used for holding structs, etc.
-Kees
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 59 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 44 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 43 lines · Kees Cook
Recent versions of Clang gets confused about the possible size of the "user" allocation, and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCEends up emitting a warning[1]:repro.c:126:4: warning: call to '
__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe usestruct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]126 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); | ^for this
memset():int len; __le16 *user; ... len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); ... if (len) { ... } else { memset(user, '\0', 2); }While Clang works on this bug[2], switch to using a direct assignment, which avoids
memset()entirely which both simplifies the code and silences the false positive warning. (Making "len"size_talso silences the warning, but the direct assignment seems better.)Reported-by Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)Quoted 12 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, · line 575
Quoted 10 lines
fs/smb/client/cifsencrypt.c +1
-1@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, len =cifs_strtoUTF16 (user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);UniStrupr (user); }else { -memset (user,'\0' ,2 ); + *(u16 *)user =0 ;Is 'user' guaranteed to be 16-bit aligned?
Quoted 4 lines
It's the first two bytes of a kmalloced address range, which I'm nearly certain will be sanely aligned, as those allocs are commonly used for holding structs, etc.
Ah yes, this kmalloc() was carefully hidden in the commit log :-)