bpf: Reject pointer spill with var offset
PATCH 1/1 bpf: Reject pointer spill with var offset
check_stack_write_var_off() does not reject pointer reg, this can lead to pointer leak. When cpu_mitigation_off(), unprivileged users can add var off to stack pointer, and loading the following prog enable them leak kernel address:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-8_w=00000000 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-16_w=00000000 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-24_w=00000000 3: (bf) r6 = r1 ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx() 4: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1_w=P8 5: (37) r1 /= 1 ; R1_w=Pscalar() 6: (57) r1 &= 8 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) 7: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 8: (07) r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16 9: (0f) r2 += r1 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) R2_w=fp(off=-16,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) 10: (7b) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r6 ; R2_w=fp(off=-16,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) R6_w=ctx() fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm fp-16_w=mmmmmmmm 11: (18) r1 = 0x0 ; R1_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) 13: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 14: (07) r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16 15: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3_w=fp0 R10=fp0 16: (07) r3 += -8 ; R3_w=fp-8 17: (b7) r4 = 0 ; R4_w=P0 18: (85) call bpf_map_update_elem#2 ; R0_w=Pscalar() 19: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; R0_w=Pscalar() R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
20: (95) exit
processed 20 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0
The prog first inits several slots, so it later can access, and then adds var-off to fp, where it knows the off is -8. Finally, the prog spills the ctx ptr and leaks it to a map, and unprivileged users can read the pointer through a map lookup:
Leaked Map Address: 0xffff98d3828f5700
Fix this by rejecting pointer reg in check_stack_write_var_off(). Applying the patch makes the prog rejected with "spilling pointer with var-offset is disallowed".
Also add missed newline to error messages in this check.
---
Note that it's hard to add this test to test_progs or test_verifier, as this requires cpu_mitigation_off() setup, currently tested on my local.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7 -2
@@ -4627,6 +4627,11 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, (!value_reg && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) && insn->imm == 0)) writing_zero = true; +if (value_reg &&__is_pointer_value (env->allow_ptr_leaks, value_reg)) { +verbose (env,"spilling pointer with var-offset is disallowed\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +for (i = min_off; i < max_off; i++) {int spi;
@@ -4658,7 +4663,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* later for CAP_PERFMON, as the write may not happen to * that slot. */ -verbose (env,"spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d" , +verbose (env,"spilled ptr in range of var-offset stack write; insn %d, ptr off: %d\n" , insn_idx, i);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -4694,7 +4699,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* them, the error would be too confusing. */ if (*stype ==STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) { -verbose (env,"uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d" , +verbose (env,"uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d\n" , insn_idx, i);return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Eduard Zingerman
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Hao Sun
check_stack_write_var_off()does not reject pointer reg, this can lead to pointer leak. Whencpu_mitigation_off(), unprivileged users can add var off to stack pointer, and loading the following prog enable them leak kernel address:func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp00: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-8_w=00000000 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-16_w=00000000 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = 0 ; R10=fp0 fp-24_w=00000000 3: (bf) r6 = r1 ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx() 4: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1_w=P8 5: (37) r1 /= 1 ; R1_w=Pscalar() 6: (57) r1 &= 8 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) 7: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 8: (07) r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16 9: (0f) r2 += r1 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) R2_w=fp(off=-16,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) 10: (7b) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r6 ; R2_w=fp(off=-16,smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) R6_w=ctx() fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm fp-16_w=mmmmmmmm 11: (18) r1 = 0x0 ; R1_w=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) 13: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 14: (07) r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16 15: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3_w=fp0 R10=fp0 16: (07) r3 += -8 ; R3_w=fp-8 17: (b7) r4 = 0 ; R4_w=P0 18: (85) call bpf_map_update_elem#2 ; R0_w=Pscalar() 19: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; R0_w=Pscalar() R10=fp0 fp-8_w=mmmmmmmm
Quoted 2 lines
20: (95) exit
processed 20 insns (limit 1000000)max_states_per_insn0total_states0peak_states0mark_read0
I tried this example as a part of selftest
(If put to tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_ptr.c
could be executed using command:
./test_progs -vvv -a 'verifier_map_ptr/ctx_addr_leak @unpriv'):
SEC("socket")__failure_unpriv__msg_unpriv("spilling pointer with var-offset is disallowed") __naked void ctx_addr_leak(void)
{
asm volatile (
"r0 = 0;"
"*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0;"
"*(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;"
"*(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r0;"
"r6 = r1;"
"r1 = 8;"
"r1 /= 1;"
"r1 &= 8;"
"r2 = r10;"
"r2 += -16;"
"r2 += r1;"
"*(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r6;"
"r1 = %[map_hash_16b] ll;"
"r2 = r10;"
"r2 += -16;"
"r3 = r10;"
"r3 += -8;"
"r4 = 0;"
"call %[bpf_map_update_elem];"
"r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8);"
"exit;"
:
: __imm(bpf_map_update_elem),
__imm_addr(map_hash_16b)
: __clobber_all);
}And see the following error message:
...
r1 &= 8 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16
r2 += r1
R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=(0x0; 0x8) off=-16
Could you please craft a selftest that checks for expected message? Overall the change makes sense to me.
Quoted 42 lines
I tried this example as a part of selftest
(If put totools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_ptr.c
could be executed using command:
./test_progs -vvv -a 'verifier_map_ptr/ctx_addr_leak @unpriv'):
SEC("socket")__failure_unpriv__msg_unpriv("spilling pointer with var-offset is disallowed")__nakedvoidctx_addr_leak(void){ asm volatile ( "r0 = 0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0;" "*(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r0;" "r6 = r1;" "r1 = 8;" "r1 /= 1;" "r1 &= 8;" "r2 = r10;" "r2 += -16;" "r2 += r1;" "*(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r6;" "r1 = %[map_hash_16b] ll;" "r2 = r10;" "r2 += -16;" "r3 = r10;" "r3 += -8;" "r4 = 0;" "call %[bpf_map_update_elem];" "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8);" "exit;" : : __imm(bpf_map_update_elem), __imm_addr(map_hash_16b) : __clobber_all); }And see the following error message:
...
Quoted 8 lines
r1 &= 8 ; R1_w=Pscalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=8,var_off=(0x0; 0x8)) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 r2 += -16 ; R2_w=fp-16r2 += r1
R2 variable stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=(0x0;0x8) off=-16Could you please craft a selftest that checks for expected message? Overall the change makes sense to me.
Testing this case with test_progs/test_verifier is hard because it happens when cpu_mitigations_off() is true, but we do not have this setup yet. So the mentioned prog is rejected by sanitize_check_bounds() due to ptr alu with var_off when adding it to test_progs, and loading as unpriv.
My local test was conducted: (1) booting the kernel with "mitigations=off" so that bypass_spec_v1 is true and sanitize_check_bounds() is skipped;
(2) running the prog without the patch leaks the pointer; (3) loading the prog with the patch applied resulting in the expected message.
On Thu, 2024-01-25 at 09:34 +0100, Hao Sun wrote:
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
Testing this case with test_progs/test_verifier is hard because it happens when
cpu_mitigations_off()is true, but we do not have this setup yet. So the mentioned prog is rejected bysanitize_check_bounds()due to ptr alu withvar_offwhen adding it totest_progs, and loading as unpriv.My local test was conducted: (1) booting the kernel with "mitigations=off" so that
bypass_spec_v1is true andsanitize_check_bounds()is skipped;
(2) running the prog without the patch leaks the pointer; (3) loading the prog with the patch applied resulting in the expected message.
Thank you for explaining.
I booted VM with "mitigations=off" and tried test as in [1], it passes.
[1] https://gist.github.com/eddyz87/bb517437767a8f01891cc6e6a847d448