selinux: Use kfree_sensitive for certain code paths of security
PATCH 1/1 selinux: Use kfree_sensitive for certain code paths of security
As with kfree_sensitive() it does kfree() and memzero_explicit() internally to clear sensitive data. The patch includes some of the code paths to free data such as keys, hash table and scontext and tcontext of selinux, which would benefit from kfree_sensitive() to replace kfree()
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ima.c | 2 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/selinux/avc.c +2 -2
@@ -723,8 +723,8 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)audit_log_format (ab," permissive=%u" , sad->result ?0 :1 );trace_selinux_audited (sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass); -kfree (tcontext); -kfree (scontext); +kfree_sensitive (tcontext); +kfree_sensitive (scontext);/* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->ssid, &scontext,
security/selinux/ima.c +1 -1
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void) state_str,strlen (state_str), false, NULL, 0); -kfree (state_str); +kfree_sensitive (state_str);/* * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +8 -8
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } length = count; out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }#else
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,selinux_ima_measure_state (); out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, out:mutex_unlock (&selinux_state.policy_mutex); -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, out:mutex_unlock (&selinux_state.policy_mutex); -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }
@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file, ret = count; out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return ret; }
@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, out:for (i =0 ; i < nperms; i++)kfree (perms[i]); -kfree (perms); +kfree_sensitive (perms);return rc; }
@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, out:for (i =0 ; i < nclasses; i++)kfree (classes[i]); -kfree (classes); +kfree_sensitive (classes);return rc; }
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +2 -2
@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)int cond_destroy_bool (void *key,void *datum,void *p) { -kfree (key); -kfree (datum); +kfree_sensitive (key); +kfree_sensitive (datum);return 0 ; }
security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +1 -1
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h) h->htable[i] =NULL ; } -kfree (h->htable); +kfree_sensitive (h->htable); h->htable =NULL ; }
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +3 -3
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int vestatic int perm_destroy (void *key,void *datum,void *p) { -kfree (key); -kfree (datum); +kfree_sensitive (key); +kfree_sensitive (datum);return 0 ; }
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)if (i ==OCON_ISID || i ==OCON_FS || i ==OCON_NETIF || i ==OCON_FSUSE )kfree (c->u.name); -kfree (c); +kfree_sensitive (c); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 5 lines · Ronald Monthero
As with
kfree_sensitive()it doeskfree()andmemzero_explicit()internally to clear sensitive data. The patch includes some of the code paths to free data such as keys, hash table and scontext and tcontext of selinux, which would benefit fromkfree_sensitive()to replacekfree()
What about the data being freed makes it "sensitive"? Generally security attributes are not themselves considered sensitive.
Quoted 167 lines
Signed-off-by Ronald Monthero <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/avc.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ima.c | 2 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)security/selinux/avc.c +2
-2@@ -723,8 +723,8 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)audit_log_format (ab," permissive=%u" , sad->result ?0 :1 );trace_selinux_audited (sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass); -kfree (tcontext); -kfree (scontext); +kfree_sensitive (tcontext); +kfree_sensitive (scontext);/* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->ssid, &scontext,security/selinux/ima.c +1
-1@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(void) state_str,strlen (state_str), false, NULL, 0); -kfree (state_str); +kfree_sensitive (state_str);/* * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +8
-8@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } length = count; out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }#else @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,selinux_ima_measure_state (); out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, out:mutex_unlock (&selinux_state.policy_mutex); -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, out:mutex_unlock (&selinux_state.policy_mutex); -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return length; }@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file, ret = count; out: -kfree (page); +kfree_sensitive (page);return ret; }@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, out:for (i =0 ; i < nperms; i++)kfree (perms[i]); -kfree (perms); +kfree_sensitive (perms);return rc; }@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, out:for (i =0 ; i < nclasses; i++)kfree (classes[i]); -kfree (classes); +kfree_sensitive (classes);return rc; }security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +2
-2@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)int cond_destroy_bool (void *key,void *datum,void *p) { -kfree (key); -kfree (datum); +kfree_sensitive (key); +kfree_sensitive (datum);return 0 ; }security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +1
-1@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h) h->htable[i] =NULL ; } -kfree (h->htable); +kfree_sensitive (h->htable); h->htable =NULL ; }security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +3
-3@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(unsigned int vestatic int perm_destroy (void *key,void *datum,void *p) { -kfree (key); -kfree (datum); +kfree_sensitive (key); +kfree_sensitive (datum);return 0 ; }@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, unsigned int i)if (i ==OCON_ISID || i ==OCON_FS || i ==OCON_NETIF || i ==OCON_FSUSE )kfree (c->u.name); -kfree (c); +kfree_sensitive (c); }/*
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Ronald Monthero
As with
kfree_sensitive()it doeskfree()andmemzero_explicit()internally to clear sensitive data. The patch includes some of the code paths to free data such as keys, hash table and scontext and tcontext of selinux, which would benefit fromkfree_sensitive()to replacekfree()Signed-off-by Ronald Monthero <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ima.c | 2 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
I agree with Casey's comment, I'm not seeing anything in the SELinux code that would warrant the use of kfree_sensitive().
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Thanks Paul and Casey for taking the time to review. I'll let that be, as it may not be needed until further particularity.
BR,
ronald
Quoted 25 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Ronald Monthero
As with
kfree_sensitive()it doeskfree()andmemzero_explicit()internally to clear sensitive data. The patch includes some of the code paths to free data such as keys, hash table and scontext and tcontext of selinux, which would benefit fromkfree_sensitive()to replacekfree()Signed-off-by Ronald Monthero <[email protected]>Quoted 8 lines
--- security/selinux/avc.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ima.c | 2 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)I agree with Casey's comment, I'm not seeing anything in the SELinux code that would warrant the use of
kfree_sensitive().--
paul-moore.com