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kasan: guard release_free_meta() shadow access with kasan_arch_is_ready()

PATCH Andrew Morton 2 participants 3 messages Feb 14, 2024 – Feb 15, 2024 2 messages not in the archive Memory management

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Andrew Morton

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · On Tue, 13 Feb 2024 14:39:58 +1100 Benjamin Gray <[email protected]> wrote:

release_free_meta() accesses the shadow directly through the path

kasan_slab_free
__kasan_slab_free
kasan_release_object_meta
release_free_meta
kasan_mem_to_shadow

There are no kasan_arch_is_ready() guards here, allowing an oops when the shadow is not initialized. The oops can be seen on a Power8 KVM guest.

This patch adds the guard to release_free_meta(), as it's the first level that specifically requires the shadow.

It is safe to put the guard at the start of this function, before the stack put: only kasan_save_free_info() can initialize the saved stack, which itself is guarded with kasan_arch_is_ready() by its caller poison_slab_object(). If the arch becomes ready before release_free_meta() then we will not observe KASAN_SLAB_FREE_META in the object's shadow, so we will not put an uninitialized stack either.

...

mm/kasan/generic.c static void release_alloc_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta) · line 530

Quoted 9 lines
mm/kasan/generic.c +3 -0
@@ -522,6 +522,9 @@ static void release_alloc_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta)
 
 static void release_free_meta(const void *object, struct kasan_free_meta *meta)
 {
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
 	/* Check if free meta is valid. */
 	if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) != KASAN_SLAB_FREE_META)
 		return;

I'll add

Fixes 63b85ac56a64 ("kasan: stop leaking stack trace handles")
Reviewed-by
#2 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 23 lines · Benjamin Gray

release_free_meta() accesses the shadow directly through the path

kasan_slab_free
__kasan_slab_free
kasan_release_object_meta
release_free_meta
kasan_mem_to_shadow

There are no kasan_arch_is_ready() guards here, allowing an oops when the shadow is not initialized. The oops can be seen on a Power8 KVM guest.

This patch adds the guard to release_free_meta(), as it's the first level that specifically requires the shadow.

It is safe to put the guard at the start of this function, before the stack put: only kasan_save_free_info() can initialize the saved stack, which itself is guarded with kasan_arch_is_ready() by its caller poison_slab_object(). If the arch becomes ready before release_free_meta() then we will not observe KASAN_SLAB_FREE_META in the object's shadow, so we will not put an uninitialized stack either.

Quoted 6 lines

---

I am interested in removing the need for kasan_arch_is_ready() entirely, as it mostly acts like a separate check of kasan_enabled().

Dropping kasan_arch_is_ready() calls from KASAN internals and instead relying on kasan_enabled() checks in include/linux/kasan.h would be great!

I filed a bug about this a while ago:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217049

Quoted 4 lines

Currently
both are necessary, but I think adding a kasan_enabled() guard to check_region_inline() makes kasan_enabled() a superset of kasan_arch_is_ready().

Sounds good to me. I would also go through the list of other exported KASAN functions to check whether any of them also need a kasan_enabled() check. At least kasan_unpoison_task_stack() seems to be one of them.

Quoted 5 lines

Allowing an arch to override kasan_enabled() can then let us replace it with a static branch that we enable somewhere in boot (for PowerPC, after we use a bunch of generic code to parse the device tree to determine how we want to configure the MMU). This should generally work OK I think, as HW tags already does this,

We can also add something like CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KASAN_FLAG_ENABLE and only use a static branch only on those architectures where it's required.

Quoted 2 lines

but I did have to add another
patch for an uninitialised data access it introduces.

What was this data access? Is this something we need to fix in the mainline?

Quoted 2 lines

On the other hand, KASAN does more than shadow based sanitisation, so we'd be disabling that in early boot too.

I think the things that we need to handle before KASAN is enabled is kasan_cache_create() and kasan_metadata_size() (if these can even called before KASAN is enabled). Otherwise, KASAN just collects metadata, which is useless without shadow memory-based reporting anyway.

Quoted 19 lines
---
 mm/kasan/generic.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
mm/kasan/generic.c +3 -1
index df6627f62402..032bf3e98c24 100644
@@ -522,6 +522,9 @@ static void release_alloc_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *meta)
 
 static void release_free_meta(const void *object, struct kasan_free_meta *meta)
 {
+       if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+               return;
+
        /* Check if free meta is valid. */
        if (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object) != KASAN_SLAB_FREE_META)
                return;
--
Quoted 2 lines

2.43.0

For the patch itself as a fix:

Thanks!

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#4 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Benjamin Gray
Quoted 4 lines

We can also add something like CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KASAN_FLAG_ENABLE and only use a static branch only on those architectures where it's required.

Perhaps CONFIG_ARCH_USES_KASAN_ENABLED would be a better name.

Quoted 5 lines

That works too, PowerPC should only need a static branch when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled.

Loongarch is also a kasan_arch_is_ready() user though, so I'm not sure if they'd still need it for something?

And UM as well.

We can start with a change that makes kasan_flag_enabled and kasan_enabled() work for the Generic mode, define a kasan_init_generic() function that switches kasan_flag_enabled (and prints the "KernelAddressSanitizer initialized" message?), and then call kasan_init_generic() from kasan_init() in the arch code (perhaps even for all arches to unify the "initialized" message?).

And then we can ask Loongarch and UM people to test the change.

Both Loongarch and UM define kasan_arch_is_ready() as the value of their global enable flags, which they switch in kasan_init(). So I would think using kasan_enabled() should just work (minding the metadata-related parts).

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines

What was this data access? Is this something we need to fix in the mainline?

I don't believe so (though I spent a while debugging it before I realised I had introduced it by changing kasan_enabled() dynamically).

In kasan_cache_create() we unconditionally allocate a metadata buffer, but the kasan_init_slab_obj() call to initialise it is guarded by kasan_enabled(). But later parts of the code only check the presence of the buffer before using it, so bad things happen if kasan_enabled() later turns on (I was getting some error about invalid lock state).

Ah, makes sense. Yeah, these metadata init functions should work even before kasan_flag_enabled is switched on then.