mm: kmsan: implement kmsan_memmove()
Subsystems (3)
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerPATCH 1/3 mm: kmsan: implement kmsan_memmove()
Provide a hook that can be used by custom memcpy implementations to tell KMSAN that the metadata needs to be copied. Without that, false positive reports are possible in the cases where KMSAN fails to intercept memory initialization.
--- include/linux/kmsan-checks.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
include/linux/kmsan-checks.h +15 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size);void kmsan_copy_to_user (void __user *to,const void *from,size_t to_copy,size_t left); +/** +* kmsan_memmove() - Notify KMSAN about a data copy within kernel. +* @to: destination address in the kernel. +* @from: source address in the kernel. +* @size: number of bytes to copy. +* +* Invoked after non-instrumented version (e.g. implemented using assembly +* code) of memmove()/memcpy() is called, in order to copy KMSAN's metadata. +*/ +void kmsan_memmove (void *to,const void *from,size_t to_copy); +#else static inline void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size,
@@ -78,6 +89,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, { } +static inline void kmsan_memmove (void *to,const void *from,size_t to_copy) +{ +} +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_CHECKS_H */
mm/kmsan/hooks.c +11 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,17 @@ void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (kmsan_copy_to_user); +void kmsan_memmove (void *to,const void *from,size_t size) +{ +if (!kmsan_enabled ||kmsan_in_runtime ()) +return ; + +kmsan_enter_runtime (); +kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata (to, (void *)from, size); +kmsan_leave_runtime (); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (kmsan_memmove); +/* Helper function to check an URB. */ void kmsan_handle_urb (const struct urb *urb,bool is_out) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.291.gc1ea87d7ee-goog
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerPATCH 2/3 instrumented.h: add instrument_memcpy_before, instrument_memcpy_after
Bug detection tools based on compiler instrumentation may miss memory accesses in custom memcpy implementations (such as copy_mc_to_kernel). Provide instrumentation hooks that tell KASAN, KCSAN, and KMSAN about such accesses.
--- include/linux/instrumented.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
include/linux/instrumented.h +35 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,41 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from,kmsan_unpoison_memory (to, n - left); } +/** +* instrument_memcpy_before - add instrumentation before non-instrumented memcpy +* @to: destination address +* @from: source address +* @n: number of bytes to copy +* +* Instrument memory accesses that happen in custom memcpy implementations. The +* instrumentation should be inserted before the memcpy call. +*/ +static __always_inline void instrument_memcpy_before(void *to, const void *from, +unsigned long n) +{ +kasan_check_write (to, n); +kasan_check_read (from, n); +kcsan_check_write (to, n); +kcsan_check_read (from, n); +} + +/** +* instrument_memcpy_after - add instrumentation before non-instrumented memcpy +* @to: destination address +* @from: source address +* @n: number of bytes to copy +* @left: number of bytes not copied (if known) +* +* Instrument memory accesses that happen in custom memcpy implementations. The +* instrumentation should be inserted after the memcpy call. +*/ +static __always_inline void instrument_memcpy_after(void *to, const void *from, +unsigned long n, +unsigned long left) +{ +kmsan_memmove (to, from, n - left); +} +/** * instrument_get_user() - add instrumentation to get_user()-like macros * @to: destination variable, may not be address-taken
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.291.gc1ea87d7ee-goog
Re: [PATCH v1 2/3] instrumented.h: add instrument_memcpy_before, instrument_memcpy_after
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko
+/**
+ *instrument_memcpy_after- add instrumentation before non-instrumented memcpy
Spot the cut-and-paste.
Linus
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/3] instrumented.h: add instrument_memcpy_before, instrument_memcpy_after
Quoted 9 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko
+/**
+ *instrument_memcpy_after- add instrumentation before non-instrumented memcpySpot the cut-and-paste.
Linus
Nice catch, will fix.
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerPATCH 3/3 x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
In reply to Alexander PotapenkoMemory accesses in copy_mc_to_kernel() and copy_mc_to_user() are performed by assembly routines and are invisible to KASAN, KCSAN, and KMSAN. Add hooks from instrumentation.h to tell the tools these functions have memcpy/copy_from_user semantics.
The call to copy_mc_fragile() in copy_mc_fragile_handle_tail() is left intact, because the latter is only called from the assembly implementation of copy_mc_fragile(), so the memory accesses in it are covered by the instrumentation in copy_mc_to_kernel() and copy_mc_to_user().
--- arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c +17 -4
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/instrumented.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h>
@@ -61,10 +62,20 @@ unsigned long copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned*/ unsigned long __must_check copy_mc_to_kernel (void *dst,const void *src,unsigned len) { -if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) -return copy_mc_fragile (dst, src, len); -if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ERMS )) -return copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string (dst, src, len); +unsigned long ret; + +if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) { +instrument_memcpy_before (dst, src, len); + ret =copy_mc_fragile (dst, src, len); +instrument_memcpy_after (dst, src, len, ret); +return ret; + } +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ERMS )) { +instrument_memcpy_before (dst, src, len); + ret =copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string (dst, src, len); +instrument_memcpy_after (dst, src, len, ret); +return ret; + }memcpy (dst, src, len);return 0 ; }
@@ -76,6 +87,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check copy_mc_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unif (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) {__uaccess_begin (); +instrument_copy_to_user (dst, src, len); ret =copy_mc_fragile ((__force void *)dst, src, len);__uaccess_end ();return ret;
@@ -83,6 +95,7 @@ unsigned long __must_check copy_mc_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unif (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ERMS )) {__uaccess_begin (); +instrument_copy_to_user (dst, src, len); ret =copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string ((__force void *)dst, src, len);__uaccess_end ();return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.291.gc1ea87d7ee-goog
Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
Quoted 6 lines · Alexander Potapenko
if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) {
__uaccess_begin();
+ instrument_copy_to_user(dst, src, len);
ret = copy_mc_fragile((__force void *)dst, src, len);
__uaccess_end();I'd actually prefer that instrument_copy_to_user() to be *outside* the __uaccess_begin.
In fact, I'm a bit surprised that objtool didn't complain about it in that form.
__uaccess_begin() causes the CPU to accept kernel accesses to user mode, and I don't think instrument_copy_to_user() has any business actually touching user mode memory.
In fact it might be better to rename the function and change the prototype to
instrument_src(src, len);
because you really can't sanely instrument the destination of a user copy, but "instrument_src()" might be useful in other situations than just user copies.
Hmm?
Linus
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
Quoted 11 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 6 lines · Alexander Potapenko
if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) { __uaccess_begin(); + instrument_copy_to_user(dst, src, len); ret = copy_mc_fragile((__force void *)dst, src, len); __uaccess_end();I'd actually prefer that
instrument_copy_to_user()to be *outside* the__uaccess_begin.
Good point, this is doable.
Quoted 2 lines
In fact, I'm a bit surprised that objtool didn't complain about it in that form.
This is because a bunch of KMSAN functions is ignored by objtool:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/tools/objtool/check.c#L1200
Quoted 3 lines
__uaccess_begin()causes the CPU to accept kernel accesses to user mode, and I don't thinkinstrument_copy_to_user()has any business actually touching user mode memory.
Ack.
Quoted 7 lines
In fact it might be better to rename the function and change the prototype to
instrument_src(src, len);because you really can't sanely instrument the destination of a user copy, but "
instrument_src()" might be useful in other situations than just user copies.
Right now at least for KMSAN it is important to distinguish between a usercopy and e.g. a URB submission: both are checked using the same function, but depending on what is happening the report title is different.
The destination parameter is also used by KMSAN to print fancier error reports. For an infoleak we show the target userspace address together with other information, e.g.:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
...
Bytes 34-35 of 36 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 36 starts at ffff8881152e5680 Data copied to user address 00007ffc9a4a12a0
It comes in handy when debugging reproducers locally.
Future debugging tools may also need more insight into the semantics of the instrumented accesses.
Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
In reply to Alexander Potapenkoarch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c unsigned long copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned · line 68
Quoted 12 lines · Alexander Potapenko
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c +4
-4@@ -61,10 +62,20 @@ unsigned long copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned*/ unsigned long __must_check copy_mc_to_kernel (void *dst,const void *src,unsigned len) { -if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) -return copy_mc_fragile (dst, src, len); -if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ERMS )) -return copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string (dst, src, len); +unsigned long ret; + +if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) { +instrument_memcpy_before (dst, src, len);
I feel that instrument_memcpy_before() needs to be called *after* copy_mc_fragile() etc. , for we can't predict how many bytes will copy_mc_fragile() etc. actually copy.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c +4
-0+ ret =copy_mc_fragile (dst, src, len); +instrument_memcpy_after (dst, src, len, ret); +return ret; + }
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
Quoted 18 lines · Tetsuo Handa
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c unsigned long copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned · line 68
Quoted 12 lines · Alexander Potapenko
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c +4
-4@@ -61,10 +62,20 @@ unsigned long copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string(void *dst, const void *src, unsigned*/ unsigned long __must_check copy_mc_to_kernel (void *dst,const void *src,unsigned len) { -if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) -return copy_mc_fragile (dst, src, len); -if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ERMS )) -return copy_mc_enhanced_fast_string (dst, src, len); +unsigned long ret; + +if (copy_mc_fragile_enabled) { +instrument_memcpy_before (dst, src, len);I feel that
instrument_memcpy_before()needs to be called *after*copy_mc_fragile()etc. , for we can't predict how many bytes willcopy_mc_fragile()etc. actually copy.
That's why we have both _before() and _after(). We can discuss what checks need to be done before and after the memcpy call, but calling instrument_memcpy_before() after copy_mc_fragile() is counterintuitive.
For KMSAN it is indeed important to only handle len-ret bytes that were actually copied. We want the instrumentation to update the metadata without triggering an immediate error report, so the update better be consistent with what the kernel actually did with the memory.
But for KASAN/KCSAN we can afford more aggressive checks. First, if we postpone them after the actual memory accesses happen, the kernel may panic on the invalid access without a decent error report.
Second, even if in a particular case only len-ret bytes were copied, the caller probably expected both src and dst to have len addressable bytes.
Checking for the whole length in this case is more likely to detect a real error than produce a false positive.
Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
Quoted 9 lines · Alexander Potapenko
But for KASAN/KCSAN we can afford more aggressive checks. First, if we postpone them after the actual memory accesses happen, the kernel may panic on the invalid access without a decent error report.
Second, even if in a particular case onlylen-retbytes were copied, the caller probably expected bothsrcanddstto havelenaddressable bytes.
Checking for the whole length in this case is more likely to detect a real error than produce a false positive.
KASAN/KCSAN care about whether the requested address range is accessible but do not care about whether the requested address range was actually accessed?
By the way, we have the same problem for copy_page() and I was thinking about
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] . But given that instrument_memcpy_{before,after} are added,
how do we want to use instrument_memcpy_{before,after} for copy_page() ? Should we rename assembly version of copy_page() so that we don't need to use tricky wrapping like below?
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h +8 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <linux/kmsan-checks.h> +#include <linux/instrumented.h> /* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */ extern unsigned long max_pfn;
@@ -59,6 +60,13 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page) }void copy_page (void *to,void *from); +#define copy_page (to, from) do { \ + void *_to = (to); \ + void *_from = (from); \ + instrument_memcpy_before(_to, _from, PAGE_SIZE); \ + copy_page(_to, _from); \ + instrument_memcpy_after(_to, _from, PAGE_SIZE, 0); \ +} while (0)#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL /*
Alexander Potapenko
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86: call instrumentation hooks from copy_mc.c
Quoted 12 lines · Tetsuo Handa
Quoted 9 lines · Alexander Potapenko
But for KASAN/KCSAN we can afford more aggressive checks. First, if we postpone them after the actual memory accesses happen, the kernel may panic on the invalid access without a decent error report.
Second, even if in a particular case onlylen-retbytes were copied, the caller probably expected bothsrcanddstto havelenaddressable bytes.
Checking for the whole length in this case is more likely to detect a real error than produce a false positive.
Quoted 2 lines
KASAN/KCSAN care about whether the requested address range is accessible but do not care about whether the requested address range was actually accessed?
I am not exactly sure under which circumstances a copy_mc may fail, but let's consider how copy_to_user() is handled.
In instrument_copy_to_user()
(https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/include/linux/instrumented.h#L110)
we check the whole ranges before the copy is performed. Assume there is buggy code in the kernel that allocates N bytes for some buffer and then copies N+1 bytes from that buffer to the userspace.
If we are (un)lucky enough, the userspace code may be always allocating the destination buffer in a way that prevents copy_to_user() from copying more than N bytes.
Yet it is possible to provide a userspace buffer that is big enough to trigger an OOB read in the kernel, and reporting this issue is usually the right thing to do, even if it does not occur during testing. Moreover, if dst can receive N+1 bytes, but the OOB read happens to crash the kernel, we'll get a simple panic report instead of a KASAN report, if we decide to perform the check after copying the data.
Quoted 7 lines
By the way, we have the same problem for
copy_page()and I was thinking about
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] . But given that instrument_memcpy_{before,after} are added,
how do we want to use instrument_memcpy_{before,after} forcopy_page()? Should we rename assembly version ofcopy_page()so that we don't need to use tricky wrapping like below?
I think renaming the assembly version and providing a static inline void copy_page() in arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h should be cleaner, but it is up to x86 people to decide.
The patch below seems to work:
============================================
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h +9 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <asm/cpufeatures.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> +#include <linux/instrumented.h> #include <linux/kmsan-checks.h> /* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */
@@ -58,7 +59,14 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page) : "cc", "memory", "rax", "rcx"); } -void copy_page (void *to,void *from); +void copy_page_asm (void *to,void *from); + +static inline void copy_page (void *to,void *from) +{ +instrument_memcpy_before (to, from,PAGE_SIZE ); +copy_page_asm (to, from); +instrument_memcpy_after (to, from,PAGE_SIZE ,0 ); +}#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL /*
arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S +3 -3
@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ * prefetch distance based on SMP/UP. */ ALIGN -SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page) +SYM_FUNC_START(copy_page_asm) ALTERNATIVE "jmp copy_page_regs", "", X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD movl $4096/8, %ecx rep movsq RET -SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page) -EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page) +SYM_FUNC_END(copy_page_asm) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page_asm) SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(copy_page_regs) subq $2*8, %rsp
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