KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit, X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this and X86_FEATURE_IBRS that the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].
Stop making this inference.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0 -2
@@ -677,8 +677,6 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST );kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES ); -if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBPB ) &&boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBRS )) -kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL );if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_STIBP ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP );if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ))
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0.683.g7961c838ac-goog
Quoted 13 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
Quoted 7 lines
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].
AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
(Also checking - IA32_SPEC_CTRL and IA32_PRED_CMD are both still available; is there anything in KVM that keys off just X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? I'm not seeing it...)
-- vs;
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);And, in the other direction,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space.
Quoted 3 lines
(Also checking -
IA32_SPEC_CTRLandIA32_PRED_CMDare both still available; is there anything in KVM that keys off justX86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? I'm not seeing it...)
I hope not. It looks like all of the guest_cpuid checks for SPEC_CTRL also check for the AMD bits (e.g. guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr()).
Quoted 35 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of
X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
Quoted 6 lines
And, in the other direction,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space.
In case it wasn't clear, I contend that any cross-vendor equivalence logic *does* belong in userspace.
Thoughts?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
(Also checking -
IA32_SPEC_CTRLandIA32_PRED_CMDare both still available; is there anything in KVM that keys off justX86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL? I'm not seeing it...)I hope not. It looks like all of the
guest_cpuidchecks forSPEC_CTRLalso check for the AMD bits (e.g.guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr()).
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 41 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 40 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of
X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);And, in the other direction,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
But, perhaps all of this cross-vendor equivalence logic belongs in user space.
In case it wasn't clear, I contend that any cross-vendor equivalence logic *does* belong in userspace.
Thoughts?
Maybe? I generally like punting these sorts of things to userspace, but as evidenced by this patch, all of these mitigation "features" are such a godawful mess that I don't have a problem with KVM doing the heavy lifting.
E.g. I suspect that having KVM enumerate both vendor's bits makes it much easier for QEMU to support pre-defined uarch models while still retaining sanity checks that the features being enumerated to the guest are indeed supported by the host.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 30 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of
X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:
Quoted 8 lines
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);And, in the other direction,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution?
Quoted 36 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 34 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of
X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
And, in the other direction,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution?
I really like the idea of moving all of the cross-vendor capability settings into userspace, but if we want to keep this in the kernel, then I'll send V2.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 39 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 38 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 36 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 18 lines · Venkatesh Srinivas
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26] enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS) and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2], "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's "IBPB may not prevent return branch predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since Linux sets the synthetic feature bit,
X86_FEATURE_IBPB, on AMD CPUs that implement the weaker version of IBPB, it is incorrect to infer from this andX86_FEATURE_IBRSthat the CPU supports the stronger version of IBPB indicated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26].AMD's IBPB does apply to RET predictions if Fn8000_0008_EBX[IBPB_RET] = 1. Spot checking, Zen4 sets that bit; and the bulletin doesn't apply there.
So, with a definition of
X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET, this could be:if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);And, in the other direction,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);Jim, are you planning on sending a v2 with Venkatesh's suggested solution?
I really like the idea of moving all of the cross-vendor capability settings into userspace, but if we want to keep this in the kernel, then I'll send V2.
Unfortunately, that ship has likely sailed for the existing code, because I suspect userspace has come to rely on KVM's behavior. I do think it makes sense to punt all future cross-vendor stuff to userspace, with exceptions for cases like this where we're fixing existing KVM support.