mm-memfd-add-documentation-for-mfd_noexec_seal-mfd_exec.patch removed from -mm tree
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-memfd-add-documentation-for-mfd_noexec_seal-mfd_exec.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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From: Jeff Xu <[email protected]>
Subject: mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 20:35:41 +0000
When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was introduced, there was one big mistake: it didn't have proper documentation. This led to a lot of confusion, especially about whether or not memfd created with the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is sealable. Before MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, memfd had to explicitly set MFD_ALLOW_SEALING to be sealable, so it's a fair question.
As one might have noticed, unlike other flags in memfd_create, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is actually a combination of multiple flags. The idea is to make it easier to use memfd in the most common way, which is NOEXEC + F_SEAL_EXEC + MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. This works with sysctl vm.noexec to help existing applications move to a more secure way of using memfd.
Proposals have been made to put MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL non-sealable, unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is set, to be consistent with other flags [1], Those are based on the viewpoint that each flag is an atomic unit, which is a reasonable assumption. However, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was designed with the intent of promoting the most secure method of using memfd, therefore a combination of multiple functionalities into one bit.
Furthermore, the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL has been added for more than one year, and multiple applications and distributions have backported and utilized it. Altering ABI now presents a degree of risk and may lead to disruption.
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is a new flag, and applications must change their code to use it. There is no backward compatibility problem.
When sysctl vm.noexec == 1 or 2, applications that don't set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL or MFD_EXEC will get MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL memfd. And old-application might break, that is by-design, in such a system vm.noexec = 0 shall be used. Also no backward compatibility problem.
I propose to include this documentation patch to assist in clarifying the semantics of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, thereby preventing any potential future confusion.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to David Rheinsberg and Barnabás Pőcze for initiating the discussion on the topic of sealability.
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
---
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+)
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst renamed from Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst~mm-memfd-add-documentation-for-mfd_noexec_seal-mfd_exec +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ Security-related interfaces seccomp_filter landlock lsm + mfd_noexec spec_ctrl tee
Documentation/userspace-api/mfd_noexec.rst new file +86 -0
86 lines not on this page · raw message
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Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are
proc-pid-smaps-add-mseal-info-for-vma.patch