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KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

PATCH Superseded Amit Shah 5 participants 11 messages Jun 26, 2024 – Sep 10, 2024

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v2 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Amit Shah

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

From: Amit Shah <[email protected]>

Remove superfluous RSB filling after a VMEXIT when the CPU already has flushed the RSB after a VMEXIT when AutoIBRS is enabled.

The initial implementation for adding RETPOLINES added an ALTERNATIVES implementation for filling the RSB after a VMEXIT in

commit 117cc7a908c836 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit")

Later, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT was added in

commit 2b129932201673 ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")

The AutoIBRS (on AMD CPUs) feature implementation added in

commit e7862eda309ecf ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS")

used the already-implemented logic for EIBRS in spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_on_vmexit() -- but did not update the code at VMEXIT to act on the mode selected in that function -- resulting in VMEXITs continuing to clear the RSB when RETPOLINES are enabled, despite the presence of AutoIBRS.

---
v2:
- tweak commit message re: Boris's comments.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +2 -6
index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
@@ -348,10 +346,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 
 2:	cli
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, consumes RDI (@svm) and RSI (@spec_ctrl_intercepted). */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Amit Shah
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +0 -0
index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) · line 213

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -3
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:	vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT

Out of an abundance of paranoia, shouldn't this be?

	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
			   X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE

Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite" flavor for families 0xf - 0x12. I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by whatever on earth EIBRS_PBRSB is.

	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),

	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),
	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -3
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
@@ -348,10 +346,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 
 2:	cli
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
 	/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
 	/* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, consumes RDI (@svm) and RSI (@spec_ctrl_intercepted). */
 	RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
#2 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Amit Shah
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +0 -0
index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run) · line 213

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -3
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:   vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
      /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT

Out of an abundance of paranoia, shouldn't this be?

        FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
                           X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE

Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite" flavor for families 0xf - 0x12. I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by whatever on earth EIBRS_PBRSB is.

Quoted 9 lines
        /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
        VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x10,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x11,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x12,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),

        /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
        VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,      NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,    NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),

Your assumption is correct. As for why the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] doesn't say so explicitly, you need to read between the lines...

Quoted 7 lines
       /*
        * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
        * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
        *
        * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
Quoted 8 lines
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
            !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
               if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                       setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
       }

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -4
      /* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX.  */
      RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
@@ -348,10 +346,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 
 2:   cli
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
      /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
 
      /* Clobbers RAX, RCX, RDX, consumes RDI (@svm) and RSI (@spec_ctrl_intercepted). */
      RESTORE_HOST_SPEC_CTRL
--

2.45.2

maintainer
#10 lore raw
In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson

Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite" flavor for families 0xf - 0x12. I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by whatever on earth EIBRS_PBRSB is.

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html

We could add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to those old families too. Amit, feel free to send a separate patch.

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
author
#3 lore raw
In reply to Jim Mattson
Quoted 80 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 46 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 13 lines · Amit Shah

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------

 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +0 -0
index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)

 7:   vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:

Quoted 8 lines

-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
      /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
-     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
-#endif
+     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT

Out of an abundance of paranoia, shouldn't this be?

        FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
                           X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE

Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite" flavor for
families 0xf - 0x12.  I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by whatever on earth
EIBRS_PBRSB is.

        /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
        VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), VULNWL_AMD(0x10,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), VULNWL_AMD(0x11,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI), VULNWL_AMD(0x12,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),

Quoted 8 lines

        /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
        VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,      NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,    NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB | NO_BHI),

Your assumption is correct. As for why the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] doesn't say so explicitly, you need to read between the lines...

Quoted 11 lines

       /*
        * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
        * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
        *
        * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||

Quoted 8 lines

           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) && !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); }

Quoted 3 lines

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the bug in a good amount of detail:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3

I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.

David, do you agree we don't need this?

Amit

Quoted 1 line
#4 lore raw

[AMD Official Use Only - AMD Internal Distribution Only]

Quoted 105 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 1, 2024 7:52 AM
To: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>; Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Phillips, Kim <[email protected]>; Kaplan, David <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding.

Quoted 47 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 45 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 20 lines · Amit Shah
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1 100644

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +0 -1
@@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 7:   vmload %_ASM_AX
 8:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
      /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit,

before RET! */
- FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S +1 -1
-#endif
+     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
Quoted 1 line

X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT

Out of an abundance of paranoia, shouldn't this be?

FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE

Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite" flavor for
families 0xf - 0x12. I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by whatever on earth EIBRS_PBRSB is.

        /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
        VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x10,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x11,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
        VULNWL_AMD(0x12,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |

NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
        /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches

won't work */
VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF |
NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO |

NO_EIBRS_PBRSB |

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

NO_BHI),
VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF |
NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO |

NO_EIBRS_PBRSB |

Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 1 line

NO_BHI),

Your assumption is correct. As for why the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] doesn't say so explicitly, you need to read between the lines...

Quoted 8 lines

/*
* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the
Intel feature
* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the
whitelist.
*
* Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
host

Quoted 11 lines
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
            !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
               if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB)
&&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                       setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
       }
Quoted 3 lines

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the bug in a good amount of detail:

Quoted 7 lines

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i
d=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3

I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.

David, do you agree we don't need this?

It's not required, as AMD CPUs don't have the PBRSB issue with AutoIBRS. Although I think Sean was talking about being extra paranoid

--David Kaplan

#5 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · David Kaplan
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines

/*
* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the
Intel feature
* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the
whitelist.
*
* Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
host

Quoted 11 lines
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
            !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
               if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB)
&&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                       setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
       }
Quoted 3 lines

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the bug in a good amount of detail:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i
d=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.

David, do you agree we don't need this?

It's not required, as AMD CPUs don't have the PBRSB issue with AutoIBRS. Although I think Sean was talking about being extra paranoid

Ya. I'm asking if there's a reason not to tack on X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE, beyond it effectively being dead code. There's no runtime cost, and so assuming it doesn't get spuriously enabled, I don't see a downside.

On the upside, if some SVM-capable CPU comes along that needs the lite version, then fixing things for that CPU won't need a corresponding KVM change, just a bugs/caps update.

author
#6 lore raw
Quoted 36 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 35 lines · David Kaplan
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines

/*
* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the
Intel feature
* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the
whitelist.
*
* Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
host

Quoted 11 lines
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
            !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
               if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB)
&&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                       setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
       }
Quoted 3 lines

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the bug in a good amount of detail:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i
d=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3

I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.

David, do you agree we don't need this?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It's not required, as AMD CPUs don't have the PBRSB issue with AutoIBRS. Although I think Sean was talking about being extra paranoid

Ya. I'm asking if there's a reason not to tack on X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE, beyond it effectively being dead code. There's no runtime cost, and so assuming it doesn't get spuriously enabled, I don't see a downside.

Ah - I get it now. You want to add this code for parity with vmenter.S so that a future bug like this doesn't happen.

I disagree, though. It's not really dead code - it does get patched at runtime. If a future AMD CPU has a bug that Intel doesn't, we'll have to introduce a new ALTERNATIVE just for that condition - leading to more complexity than is actually required.

Also - reviewers of code will get confused, wondering why this code for AMD exists when the CPU vuln does not.

I get that we want to write defensive code, but this was a very special condition that is unlikely to happen in this part of the code, and also this was missed by the devs and the reviewers.

The good thing here is that missing this only leads to suboptimal code, not a security bug. So given all this, I vote for the simplicity of code, rather than tacking on something.

Sound OK?

Amit

#7 lore raw
Quoted 44 lines · Amit Shah
Quoted 36 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 35 lines · David Kaplan
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 8 lines

/*
* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the
Intel feature
* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the
whitelist.
*
* Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
host

Quoted 11 lines
        * userspace indirect branch performance.
        */
       if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
           (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
            !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
               if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB)
&&
                   !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
                       setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
       }
Quoted 3 lines

Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB bit, even if it is accurate.

The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the bug in a good amount of detail:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i
d=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3

I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.

David, do you agree we don't need this?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

It's not required, as AMD CPUs don't have the PBRSB issue with AutoIBRS. Although I think Sean was talking about being extra paranoid

Ya. I'm asking if there's a reason not to tack on X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE, beyond it effectively being dead code. There's no runtime cost, and so assuming it doesn't get spuriously enabled, I don't see a downside.

Quoted 5 lines

Ah - I get it now. You want to add this code for parity with vmenter.S so that a future bug like this doesn't happen.

I disagree, though. It's not really dead code - it does get patched at runtime.

Eh, we're splitting hairs over what's dead code where.

Quoted 3 lines

If a future AMD CPU has a bug that Intel doesn't, we'll have to introduce a new ALTERNATIVE just for that condition - leading to more complexity than is actually required.

If and only if the bug was mitigated by FILL_RETURN_BUFFER. And if we needed to extend FILL_RETURN_BUFFER, then we'd need a new alternative regardless of whether or not KVM SVM honored RSB_VMEXIT_LITE.

If the hypothetical AMD bug is fixed by a single stuffed return, then the kernel would simply force set RSB_VMEXIT_LITE as appropriate. If the bug requires a mitigation somewhere between RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS and 1, we'd need to add more code somewhere.

Quoted 6 lines

Also - reviewers of code will get confused, wondering why this code for AMD exists when the CPU vuln does not.

I get that we want to write defensive code, but this was a very special condition that is unlikely to happen in this part of the code, and also this was missed by the devs and the reviewers.

Defensive code is only part of it, and a minor part at that. The main "issue" is having divergent VM-Enter/VM-Exit code for Intel vs. AMD. To those of us that care primarily about virtualization and are only passingly familiar with the myriad speculation bugs and mitigations, omitting RSB_VMEXIT_LITE _looks_ wrong.

To know that the omission is correct, one has to suss out that it's (supposed to be) impossible for RSB_VMEXIT_LITE to be set on AMD. And as a KVM person, that's a detail I don't want to care about.

FWIW, I feel the same way about all the other post-VM-Exit mitigations, they just don't stand out in the same way because the entire mitigation sequence is absent on one vendor the other, i.e. they don't look wrong at first glance. But if KVM could have a mostly unified VM-Enter => VM-Exit assembly code, I would happliy eat a dead NOP/JMP or three. Now that I look at it, that actually seems very doable...

Quoted 2 lines

The good thing here is that missing this only leads to suboptimal code, not a security bug.

I don't think we can guarantee that. Obviously this is all speculative (lolz), but AFAICT, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE doesn't imply X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT.

Quoted 8 lines

So given all this, I vote for the simplicity of code, rather than tacking on something.

Sound OK?

Amit

author
#8 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Amit Shah
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · David Kaplan
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

(snipped to what is now emerging as the core of the discussion)

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Also - reviewers of code will get confused, wondering why this code for AMD exists when the CPU vuln does not.

I get that we want to write defensive code, but this was a very special condition that is unlikely to happen in this part of the code,
and also this was missed by the devs and the reviewers.

Defensive code is only part of it, and a minor part at that.  The main "issue" is
having divergent VM-Enter/VM-Exit code for Intel vs. AMD.  To those of us that
care primarily about virtualization and are only passingly familiar with the myriad
speculation bugs and mitigations, omitting RSB_VMEXIT_LITE _looks_ wrong.

Quoted 5 lines

To know that the omission is correct, one has to suss out that it's (supposed to
be) impossible for RSB_VMEXIT_LITE to be set on AMD.  And as a KVM person, that's
a detail I don't want to care about.

OK - I get that. Cognitive overload is a real thing, and the less of it the better.

Since this isn't a discussion about any AMD bug or implementation detail, but rather a uniformity in KVM code across different CPU implementations from different vendors, I prefer someone else code up the patch to add that uniformity. I don't have an objection to that.

I can of course offer a comment in this hunk, though, that says AMD does not have the bug that necessitates VMEXIT_LITE, and that should help in the meantime. You've not queued this patch yet, right? Do you think it's better I do a v3 with this comment update?

Quoted 10 lines

FWIW, I feel the same way about all the other post-VM-Exit mitigations, they just
don't stand out in the same way because the entire mitigation sequence is absent
on one vendor the other, i.e. they don't look wrong at first glance. But if KVM
could have a mostly unified VM-Enter => VM-Exit assembly code, I would happliy eat
a dead NOP/JMP or three.  Now that I look at it, that actually seems very doable...

Sure. I think some of the fallacy there is also to treat VMX and SVM as similar (while not treating the Arm side as similar). They are different implementations, with several overlapping details - but it's perilous to think everything maps the same across vendors.

Amit

#9 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Amit Shah
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson

FWIW, I feel the same way about all the other post-VM-Exit mitigations, they just don't stand out in the same way because the entire mitigation sequence is absent on one vendor the other, i.e. they don't look wrong at first glance.  But if KVM could have a mostly unified VM-Enter => VM-Exit assembly code, I would happliy eat a dead NOP/JMP or three.  Now that I look at it, that actually seems very doable...

Sure. I think some of the fallacy there is also to treat VMX and SVM as similar (while not treating the Arm side as similar).

Bringing ARM into the picture is little more than whataboutism. KVM x86 and KVM arm64 _can't_ share assembly. They _can't_ share things like MSR interception tracking because MSRs are 100% an x86-only concept. The fact that sharing code across x86 and ARM is challenging doesn't have any bearing on whether or not VMX and SVM can/should share code.

Quoted 2 lines

They are different implementations, with several overlapping details - but it's perilous to think everything maps the same across vendors.

I never said everything maps the same. The point I am trying to make is that there is significant value _for KVM_ in having common code between architectures, and between vendors within an architecture. I can provide numerous examples where something was implemented/fixed in vendor/arch code, and then later it was discovered that the feature/fix was also wanted/needed in other vendor/arch code.