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tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth

PATCH In review Jarkko Sakkinen 2 participants 2 messages Jul 1, 2024

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Jarkko Sakkinen

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth

All exported functions lack the check for non-nullity of chip->auth. Add the guard for each.

Cc Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Fixes 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +24 -2
index 907ac9956a78..d833db20531a 100644
@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	u32 len;
 	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
 	 * before computing the HMAC
@@ -449,6 +452,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
 	u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	struct sha256_state sctx;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
 	/* save the command code in BE format */
 	auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
 
@@ -639,6 +645,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
 	int slot;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
 	slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
 	if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
 		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
@@ -705,6 +714,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 	u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
 	int parm_len, len, i, handles;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return rc;
+
 	if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
 		WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
 		goto out;
@@ -824,8 +836,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response);
  */
 void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
-	tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle);
-	memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth));
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
+	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
 
@@ -907,6 +924,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	int rc;
 	u32 null_key;
 
+	if (!auth) {
+		pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 75 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

All exported functions lack the check for non-nullity of chip->auth. Add the guard for each.

Cc Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Fixes 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
---
  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +19 -2
index 907ac9956a78..d833db20531a 100644
@@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
  	u32 len;
  	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
  	/*
  	 * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
  	 * before computing the HMAC
@@ -449,6 +452,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
  	u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
  	struct sha256_state sctx;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
  	/* save the command code in BE format */
  	auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
 
@@ -639,6 +645,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
  	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
  	int slot;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
  	slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
  	if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
  		dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
@@ -705,6 +714,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
  	u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
  	int parm_len, len, i, handles;
 
+	if (!auth)
+		return rc;
+
  	if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
  		WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
  		goto out;
@@ -824,8 +836,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response);
   */
  void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
  {
-	tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle);
-	memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth));
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
+
+	if (!auth)
+		return;
+
+	tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
+	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
 
@@ -907,6 +924,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
  	int rc;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) · line 934

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +5 -0
  	u32 null_key;
 
+	if (!auth) {
+		pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
  	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
  	if (rc)
  		goto out;

It looks like you got all of the chip->auth tested:

As I mentioned in the other email (1), it does not solve the problem on ppc64.

1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/T/#m88892cb6f9cf8fdef875dcdd0ed3eccac1d28190