KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs
Sean Christopherson
maintainercover KVM: x86: Fix multiple #PF RO infinite loop bugs
The folks doing TDX enabling ran into a problem where exposing a read-only memslot to a TDX guest put it into an infinite loop. The most immediate issue is that KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs for RO memslots, because except for TDX (which isn't officially supported yet), such SPTEs can't distinguish between reads and writes, i.e. would trigger MMIO on everything and thus defeat the purpose of having a RX memslot.
That breaks TDX, SEV-ES, and SNP, i.e. VM types that rely on MMIO caching to reflect MMIO faults into the guest as #VC/#VE, as the guest never sees the fault, KVM refuses to emulate, the guest loops indefinitely. That's patch 1.
Patches 2-4 fix an amusing number of other bugs that made it difficult to figure out the true root cause.
The rest is a bunch of cleanups to consolidate all of the unprotect+retry paths (there are four-ish).
As a bonus, adding RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED obviates the need for kvm_lookup_pfn()[*].
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Sean Christopherson (22):
KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is
valid
KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page
faults
KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is
zapped
KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip
KVM: x86: Store gpa as gpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for
retry
KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path
KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive
helper
KVM: x86: Move EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to x86_emulate_instruction()
KVM: x86: Fold retry_instruction() into x86_emulate_instruction()
KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect an INVALID_GPA
KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when
unprotecting
KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed
emulation
KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn
KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path
KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on
emulation failure
KVM: x86: Rename
reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure()
KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry()
version
KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on
invalid_list
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 16 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 133 +++++++----------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 ++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)
base-commit: 332d2c1d713e232e163386c35a3ba0c1b90df83f
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 1/22 KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must explicitly request emulation. Unless the guest explicitly requests emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.
But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs, because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on writes. Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to emulation, the guest never gets a #VC. And since KVM simply resumes the guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.
Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs. For TDX, it's actually possible to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0. But there is no strong use case for supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory. And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the restriction can always be lifted for TDX.
Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES VMs that are created as type KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM. Read-only memslots can't possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs. Trying to deal with the ordering between KVM_SEV_INIT and memslot creation isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -2191,6 +2191,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) false#endif +#define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state) +static inline u16 kvm_read_ldt (void ) {u16 ldt;
include/linux/kvm_host.h +7 -0
@@ -715,6 +715,13 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) }#endif +#ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem +static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM ); +} +#endif +struct kvm_memslots {u64 generation;atomic_long_t last_used_slot;
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -3
@@ -1578,15 +1578,14 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,if (mem->flags &KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD ) valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES ; -#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_READONLY_MEM /* * GUEST_MEMFD is incompatible with read-only memslots, as writes to * read-only memslots have emulated MMIO, not page fault, semantics, * and KVM doesn't allow emulated MMIO for private memory. */ -if (!(mem->flags &KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD )) +if (kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (kvm) && + !(mem->flags &KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD )) valid_flags |=KVM_MEM_READONLY ; -#endif if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs. For TDX, it's actually possible to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0. But there is no strong use case for supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory. And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the restriction can always be lifted for TDX.
Quoted 6 lines
Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES VMs that are created as type
KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM. Read-only memslots can't possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs. Trying to deal with the ordering betweenKVM_SEV_INITand memslot creation isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.
Queuing this one for 6.11, thanks.
Paolo
Re: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
In reply to Sean ChristophersonHi Sean,
Quoted 38 lines · Sean Christopherson
Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must explicitly request emulation. Unless the guest explicitly requests emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.
But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs, because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on writes. Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to emulation, the guest never gets a #VC. And since KVM simply resumes the guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.
Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs. For TDX, it's actually possible to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0. But there is no strong use case for supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory. And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the restriction can always be lifted for TDX.
Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES VMs that are created as type
KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM. Read-only memslots can't possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs. Trying to deal with the ordering betweenKVM_SEV_INITand memslot creation isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.Fixes 26c44aa9e076 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")Fixes 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")Cc Peter Gonda <[email protected]>Cc Michael Roth <[email protected]>Cc Vishal Annapurve <[email protected]>Cc Ackerly Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
As discussed in one of the previous PUCK calls, this is causing Qemu to throw an error when trying to enable debug-swap for a SEV-ES guest when using a pflash drive for OVMF. Sample qemu invocation (*):
qemu-system-x86_64 ... \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=/path/to/OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=/path/to/OVMF_VARS.fd \
-machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,debug-swap=onThis is expected since enabling debug-swap requires use of KVM_SEV_INIT2, which implies a VM type of KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. However, SEV-ES VMs that do not enable any VMSA SEV features (and are hence KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM type) are allowed to continue to launch though they are also susceptible to this issue.
One of the suggestions in the call was to consider returning an error to userspace instead. Is this close to what you had in mind:
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +4 -2
@@ -387,8 +387,10 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* they can fix it by changing memory to shared, or they can * provide a better error. */ -if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE && fault.is_private) { -pr_warn_ratelimited ("kvm: unexpected emulation request on private memory\n" ); +if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE && (fault.is_private || + (!fault.map_writable && fault.write && vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected))) { +if (fault.is_private) +pr_warn_ratelimited ("kvm: unexpected emulation request on private memory\n" );kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit (vcpu, &fault);return -EFAULT ; }
This seems to work though Qemu seems to think we are asking it to
convert the memory to shared (so we probably need to signal this error
some other way?):
qemu-system-x86_64: Convert non guest_memfd backed memory region (0xf0000 ,+ 0x1000) to shared
Thoughts?
Thanks,
Naveen
--
(*) This requires below patches for Qemu, unless using IGVM:
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 01/22] KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
Quoted 83 lines · Naveen N Rao
Hi Sean,
Quoted 38 lines · Sean Christopherson
Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must explicitly request emulation. Unless the guest explicitly requests emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.
But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs, because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on writes. Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to emulation, the guest never gets a #VC. And since KVM simply resumes the guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.
Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs. For TDX, it's actually possible to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0. But there is no strong use case for supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory. And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the restriction can always be lifted for TDX.
Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES VMs that are created as type
KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM. Read-only memslots can't possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs. Trying to deal with the ordering betweenKVM_SEV_INITand memslot creation isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.Fixes 26c44aa9e076 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")Fixes 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")Cc Peter Gonda <[email protected]>Cc Michael Roth <[email protected]>Cc Vishal Annapurve <[email protected]>Cc Ackerly Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Quoted 5 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)As discussed in one of the previous PUCK calls, this is causing Qemu to throw an error when trying to enable debug-swap for a SEV-ES guest when using a pflash drive for OVMF. Sample qemu invocation (*):
qemu-system-x86_64 ... \ -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=/path/to/OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on \ -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=/path/to/OVMF_VARS.fd \ -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,debug-swap=onThis is expected since enabling debug-swap requires use of
KVM_SEV_INIT2, which implies a VM type ofKVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. However, SEV-ES VMs that do not enable any VMSA SEV features (and are henceKVM_X86_DEFAULT_VMtype) are allowed to continue to launch though they are also susceptible to this issue.One of the suggestions in the call was to consider returning an error to userspace instead. Is this close to what you had in mind:
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +4
-2@@ -387,8 +387,10 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* they can fix it by changing memory to shared, or they can * provide a better error. */ -if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE && fault.is_private) { -pr_warn_ratelimited ("kvm: unexpected emulation request on private memory\n" ); +if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE && (fault.is_private || + (!fault.map_writable && fault.write && vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected))) { +if (fault.is_private) +pr_warn_ratelimited ("kvm: unexpected emulation request on private memory\n" );kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit (vcpu, &fault);return -EFAULT ; }
Quoted 6 lines
This seems to work though Qemu seems to think we are asking it to
convert the memory to shared (so we probably need to signal this error
some other way?):
qemu-system-x86_64: Convert nonguest_memfdbacked memory region (0xf0000,+0x1000) to sharedThoughts?
The choke point would be kvm_handle_error_pfn() (see below), where the RET_PF_EMULATE originates. But looking at all of this again, I am opposed to changing KVM's ABI to allow KVM_MEM_READONLY for SEV-ES guests, it simply can't work. And KVM enumerates as much.
case KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM: r = kvm ? kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) : 1; break;
More importantly, if QEMU wants to provide a not-fully-functional configuration to allow KVM_SEV_INIT2 with pflash, QEMU can fudge around the lack of read-only memory without KVM's assistance. It likely won't be pretty, but it's doable, by clearing PROT_WRITE in the backing VMA that's handed to the KVM memslot.
KVM will see a normal memslot that the guest can read/execute, and if the guest attempts to write to the memory, hva_to_pfn() will return KVM_PFN_RR_FAULT and kvm_handle_error_pfn() will send that out to userspace as -EFAULT.
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5 -1
@@ -3493,8 +3493,12 @@ static int kvm_handle_error_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fa* into the spte otherwise read access on readonly gfn also can * caused mmio page fault and treat it as mmio access. */ -if (fault->pfn ==KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT ) +if (fault->pfn ==KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT ) { +if (kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (vcpu->kvm)) +return -EFAULT ; +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; + }if (fault->pfn ==KVM_PFN_ERR_HWPOISON ) {kvm_send_hwpoison_signal (fault->slot, fault->gfn);
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 2/22 KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid
In reply to Sean ChristophersonSet PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK based on EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED if and only if EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID is also set in exit qualification. Per the SDM, bit 8 (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) is valid if and only if bit 7 (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID) is set, and is '0' if bit 7 is '0'.
Bit 7 (a.k.a. EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
Set if the guest linear-address field is valid. The guest linear-address field is valid for all EPT violations except those resulting from an attempt to load the guest PDPTEs as part of the execution of the MOV CR instruction and those due to trace-address pre-translation
Bit 8 (a.k.a. EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED)
If bit 7 is 1:
• Set if the access causing the EPT violation is to a guest-physical address that is the translation of a linear address.
• Clear if the access causing the EPT violation is to a paging-structure entry as part of a page walk or the update of an accessed or dirty bit. Reserved if bit 7 is 0 (cleared to 0).
Failure to guard the logic on GVA_IS_VALID results in KVM marking the page fault as PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK when there is no known GVA, which can put the vCPU into an infinite loop due to kvm_mmu_page_fault() getting false positive on its PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE logic (though only because that logic is also buggy/flawed).
In practice, this is largely a non-issue because so GVA_IS_VALID is almost always set. However, when TDX comes along, GVA_IS_VALID will *never* be set, as the TDX Module deliberately clears bits 12:7 in exit qualification, e.g. so that the faulting virtual address and other metadata that aren't practically useful for the hypervisor aren't leaked to the untrusted host.
When exit is due to EPT violation, bits 12-7 of the exit qualification are cleared to 0.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -2
@@ -5804,8 +5804,9 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK ) ?PFERR_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; - error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED ) !=0 ? -PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK :PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK ; +if (error_code &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID ) + error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED ) ? +PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK :PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK ;/* * Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Re: [PATCH 02/22] KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid
Quoted 48 lines · Sean Christopherson
Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK based on
EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATEDif and only ifEPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALIDis also set in exit qualification. Per the SDM, bit 8 (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) is valid if and only if bit 7 (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID) is set, and is '0' if bit 7 is '0'.Bit 7 (a.k.a.
EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)Set if the guest linear-address field is valid. The guest linear-address field is valid for all EPT violations except those resulting from an attempt to load the guest PDPTEs as part of the execution of the MOV CR instruction and those due to trace-address pre-translation
Bit 8 (a.k.a.
EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED)If bit 7 is 1:
• Set if the access causing the EPT violation is to a guest-physical address that is the translation of a linear address.
• Clear if the access causing the EPT violation is to a paging-structure entry as part of a page walk or the update of an accessed or dirty bit. Reserved if bit 7 is 0 (cleared to 0).Failure to guard the logic on
GVA_IS_VALIDresults in KVM marking the page fault asPFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASKwhen there is no known GVA, which can put the vCPU into an infinite loop due tokvm_mmu_page_fault()getting false positive on itsPFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGElogic (though only because that logic is also buggy/flawed).In practice, this is largely a non-issue because so
GVA_IS_VALIDis almost always set. However, when TDX comes along,GVA_IS_VALIDwill *never* be set, as the TDX Module deliberately clears bits 12:7 in exit qualification, e.g. so that the faulting virtual address and other metadata that aren't practically useful for the hypervisor aren't leaked to the untrusted host.When exit is due to EPT violation, bits 12-7 of the exit qualification are cleared to 0.
Fixes eebed2438923 ("kvm: nVMX: Add support for fast unprotection of nested guest page tables")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 5809
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3
-2@@ -5804,8 +5804,9 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK ) ?PFERR_PRESENT_MASK :0 ; - error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED ) !=0 ? -PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK :PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK ; +if (error_code &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID ) + error_code |= (exit_qualification &EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED ) ? +PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK :PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK ;
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-1/* * Check that the GPA doesn't exceed physical memory limits, as that is -- 2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 3/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
In reply to Sean ChristophersonTrigger KVM's various "unprotect gfn" paths if and only if the page fault was a write to a write-protected gfn. To do so, add a new page fault return code, RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED, to explicitly and precisely track such page faults.
If a page fault requires emulation for any MMIO (or any reason besides write-protection), trying to unprotect the gfn is pointless and risks putting the vCPU into an infinite loop. E.g. KVM will put the vCPU into an infinite loop if the vCPU manages to trigger MMIO on a page table walk.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +-- 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +46 -32
@@ -2914,10 +2914,8 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte (level, gfn, sptep); } -if (wrprot) { -if (write_fault) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && write_fault) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;if (flush)kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);
@@ -4549,7 +4547,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultreturn RET_PF_RETRY ;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )
@@ -4642,7 +4640,7 @@ static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )
@@ -4726,6 +4724,9 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,case RET_PF_EMULATE :return -ENOENT ; +case RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED : +return -EPERM ; +case RET_PF_RETRY :case RET_PF_CONTINUE :case RET_PF_INVALID :
@@ -5960,6 +5961,41 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,write_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); } +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +u64 error_code,int *emulation_type) +{ +bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; + +/* +* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code +* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. +* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested +* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page +* and resume the guest. +*/ +if (direct && + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); +return RET_PF_FIXED ; + } + +/* +* The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still +* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor +* re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow +* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also +* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep +* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction +* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only +* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something +* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. +*/ +if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu)) + *emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ; + +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +} + int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,void *insn,int insn_len) {
@@ -6005,6 +6041,10 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 errif (r <0 )return r; +if (r ==RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ) + r =kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, error_code, + &emulation_type); +if (r ==RET_PF_FIXED ) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++;else if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE )
@@ -6015,32 +6055,6 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 errif (r !=RET_PF_EMULATE )return 1 ; -/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. -*/ -if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); -return 1 ; - } - -/* -* vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault returned RET_PF_EMULATE, but we can still -* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor -* re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow -* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also -* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep -* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction -* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only -* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something -* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. -*/ -if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu)) - emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ; emulate:return x86_emulate_instruction (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type, insn, insn_len);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +3 -0
@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);* RET_PF_CONTINUE: So far, so good, keep handling the page fault. * RET_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address. * RET_PF_EMULATE: mmio page fault, emulate the instruction directly. +* RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED: the gfn is write-protected, either unprotected the +* gfn and retry, or emulate the instruction directly. * RET_PF_INVALID: the spte is invalid, let the real page fault path update it. * RET_PF_FIXED: The faulting entry has been fixed. * RET_PF_SPURIOUS: The faulting entry was already fixed, e.g. by another vCPU.
@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ enum {RET_PF_CONTINUE =0 ,RET_PF_RETRY ,RET_PF_EMULATE , +RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ,RET_PF_INVALID ,RET_PF_FIXED , RET_PF_SPURIOUS,
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_CONTINUE );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_RETRY );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_EMULATE ); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_INVALID );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_FIXED );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_SPURIOUS );
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +1 -1
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultif (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) {shadow_page_table_clear_flood (vcpu, fault->addr); -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; } r =mmu_topup_memory_caches (vcpu, true);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +2 -4
@@ -1046,10 +1046,8 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* protected, emulation is needed. If the emulation was skipped, * the vCPU would have the same fault again. */ -if (wrprot) { -if (fault->write) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && fault->write) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */ if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Re: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
Quoted 90 lines · Sean Christopherson
Trigger KVM's various "unprotect gfn" paths if and only if the page fault was a write to a write-protected gfn. To do so, add a new page fault return code,
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED, to explicitly and precisely track such page faults.If a page fault requires emulation for any MMIO (or any reason besides write-protection), trying to unprotect the gfn is pointless and risks putting the vCPU into an infinite loop. E.g. KVM will put the vCPU into an infinite loop if the vCPU manages to trigger MMIO on a page table walk.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +-- 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +27
-6@@ -2914,10 +2914,8 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte (level, gfn, sptep); } -if (wrprot) { -if (write_fault) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && write_fault) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;if (flush)kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);@@ -4549,7 +4547,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultreturn RET_PF_RETRY ;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )@@ -4642,7 +4640,7 @@ static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )@@ -4726,6 +4724,9 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,case RET_PF_EMULATE :return -ENOENT ; +case RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED : +return -EPERM ; +case RET_PF_RETRY :case RET_PF_CONTINUE :case RET_PF_INVALID :@@ -5960,6 +5961,41 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,write_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); } +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +u64 error_code,int *emulation_type) +{ +bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; + +/* +* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code +* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. +* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested +* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page +* and resume the guest. +*/ +if (direct && + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); +return RET_PF_FIXED ; + } + +/* +* The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, · line 5993
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10
-0+* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor +* re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow +* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also +* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep +* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction +* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only +* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something +* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. +*/ +if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu))
Looks the mmio_info_in_cache() checking can be removed, emulation should not come here with RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED introduced, may WARN_ON_ONCE() it.
Quoted 119 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +9
-26+ *emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ; + +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +} + int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 error_code,void *insn,int insn_len) {@@ -6005,6 +6041,10 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 errif (r <0 )return r; +if (r ==RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ) + r =kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, error_code, + &emulation_type); +if (r ==RET_PF_FIXED ) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++;else if (r ==RET_PF_EMULATE )@@ -6015,32 +6055,6 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 errif (r !=RET_PF_EMULATE )return 1 ; -/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. -*/ -if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); -return 1 ; - } - -/* -* vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault returned RET_PF_EMULATE, but we can still -* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor -* re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow -* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also -* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep -* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction -* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only -* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something -* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. -*/ -if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu)) - emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ; emulate:return x86_emulate_instruction (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type, insn, insn_len);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +3
-0@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ int kvm_tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);* RET_PF_CONTINUE: So far, so good, keep handling the page fault. * RET_PF_RETRY: let CPU fault again on the address. * RET_PF_EMULATE: mmio page fault, emulate the instruction directly. +* RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED: the gfn is write-protected, either unprotected the +* gfn and retry, or emulate the instruction directly. * RET_PF_INVALID: the spte is invalid, let the real page fault path update it. * RET_PF_FIXED: The faulting entry has been fixed. * RET_PF_SPURIOUS: The faulting entry was already fixed, e.g. by another vCPU. @@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ enum {RET_PF_CONTINUE =0 ,RET_PF_RETRY ,RET_PF_EMULATE , +RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ,RET_PF_INVALID ,RET_PF_FIXED , RET_PF_SPURIOUS,arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h +1
-0@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_CONTINUE );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_RETRY );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_EMULATE ); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_INVALID );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_FIXED );TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM (RET_PF_SPURIOUS );arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h +1
-1@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultif (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) {shadow_page_table_clear_flood (vcpu, fault->addr); -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; } r =mmu_topup_memory_caches (vcpu, true);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +2
-5@@ -1046,10 +1046,8 @@ static int tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,* protected, emulation is needed. If the emulation was skipped, * the vCPU would have the same fault again. */ -if (wrprot) { -if (fault->write) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && fault->write) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;/* If a MMIO SPTE is installed, the MMIO will need to be emulated. */ if (unlikely (is_mmio_spte (vcpu->kvm, new_spte))) { --2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
Quoted 30 lines · Yuan Yao
Quoted 30 lines
(quoted diff) +26
-0@@ -5960,6 +5961,41 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); } +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, + u64 error_code, int *emulation_type) +{ + bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; + + /* + * Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code + * was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. + * This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested + * paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page + * and resume the guest. + */ + if (direct && + (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) { + kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa)); + return RET_PF_FIXED; + } + + /* + * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still + * optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor + * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow + * retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also + * cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep + * faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction + * from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only
Quoted 8 lines
Review void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, · line 5993
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ * explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something + * for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. + */ + if (!mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))Looks the
mmio_info_in_cache()checking can be removed, emulation should not come here withRET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTEDintroduced, mayWARN_ON_ONCE()it.
Yeah, that was my instinct as well. I kept it mostly because I liked having the comment, but also because I was thinking the cache could theoretically get a hit. But that's not true. KVM should return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED if and only if there is a memslot, and creating a memslot is supposed to invalidate the MMIO cache by virtue of changing the memslot generation.
Unless someone feels strongly that the mmio_info_in_cache() call should be deleted entirely, I'll tack on this patch. The cache lookup is cheap, and IMO it's helpful to explicitly document that it should be impossible to reach this point with what appears to be MMIO.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +19 -9
@@ -5997,6 +5997,18 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =0 ; vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr =0 ; +/* +* It should be impossible to reach this point with an MMIO cache hit, +* as RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED is returned if and only if there's a valid, +* writable memslot, and creating a memslot should invalidate the MMIO +* cache by way of changing the memslot generation. WARN and disallow +* retry if MMIO is detect, as retrying MMIO emulation is pointless and +* could put the vCPU into an infinite loop because the processor will +* keep faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct))) +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +/* * Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be * due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the
@@ -6029,17 +6041,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return RET_PF_FIXED ;/* -* The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still -* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor +* The gfn is write-protected, but if KVM detects its emulating an +* instruction that is unlikely to be used to modify page tables, or if +* emulation fails, KVM can try to unprotect the gfn and let the CPU * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow -* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also -* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep -* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction -* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only -* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something -* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. +* retrying an instruction from a nested guest as KVM is only explicitly +* shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something for L1 isn't +* going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. */ -if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu)) +if (!is_guest_mode (vcpu)) *emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ;return RET_PF_EMULATE ;
base-commit: 7d33880356496eb0640c6c825cc60898063c4902 --
Yuan Yao
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
Quoted 65 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 30 lines · Yuan Yao
Quoted 30 lines
(quoted diff) +26
-0@@ -5960,6 +5961,41 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); } +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, + u64 error_code, int *emulation_type) +{ + bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; + + /* + * Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code + * was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. + * This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested + * paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page + * and resume the guest. + */ + if (direct && + (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) { + kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa)); + return RET_PF_FIXED; + } + + /* + * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still + * optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor + * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow + * retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also + * cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep + * faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction + * from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are onlyQuoted 8 lines
Review void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new, · line 5993
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+ * explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something + * for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. + */ + if (!mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode(vcpu))Looks the
mmio_info_in_cache()checking can be removed, emulation should not come here withRET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTEDintroduced, mayWARN_ON_ONCE()it.Yeah, that was my instinct as well. I kept it mostly because I liked having the comment, but also because I was thinking the cache could theoretically get a hit. But that's not true. KVM should return
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTEDif and only if there is a memslot, and creating a memslot is supposed to invalidate the MMIO cache by virtue of changing the memslot generation.Unless someone feels strongly that the
mmio_info_in_cache()call should be deleted entirely, I'll tack on this patch. The cache lookup is cheap, and IMO it's helpful to explicitly document that it should be impossible to reach this point with what appears to be MMIO.--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-0@@ -5997,6 +5997,18 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =0 ; vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr =0 ; +/* +* It should be impossible to reach this point with an MMIO cache hit,
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 6011
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10
-0+* as RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED is returned if and only if there's a valid, +* writable memslot, and creating a memslot should invalidate the MMIO +* cache by way of changing the memslot generation. WARN and disallow +* retry if MMIO is detect, as retrying MMIO emulation is pointless and +* could put the vCPU into an infinite loop because the processor will +* keep faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct))) +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +
LGTM.
Quoted 31 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +7
-9/* * Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be * due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the @@ -6029,17 +6041,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return RET_PF_FIXED ;/* -* The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still -* optimistically try to just unprotect the page and let the processor +* The gfn is write-protected, but if KVM detects its emulating an +* instruction that is unlikely to be used to modify page tables, or if +* emulation fails, KVM can try to unprotect the gfn and let the CPU * re-execute the instruction that caused the page fault. Do not allow -* retrying MMIO emulation, as it's not only pointless but could also -* cause us to enter an infinite loop because the processor will keep -* faulting on the non-existent MMIO address. Retrying an instruction -* from a nested guest is also pointless and dangerous as we are only -* explicitly shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something -* for L1 isn't going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. +* retrying an instruction from a nested guest as KVM is only explicitly +* shadowing L1's page tables, i.e. unprotecting something for L1 isn't +* going to magically fix whatever issue cause L2 to fail. */ -if (!mmio_info_in_cache (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, direct) && !is_guest_mode (vcpu)) +if (!is_guest_mode (vcpu)) *emulation_type |=EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ;return RET_PF_EMULATE ;base-commit:
7d33880356496eb0640c6c825cc60898063c4902--
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Trigger KVM's various "unprotect gfn" paths if and only if the page fault was a write to a write-protected gfn. To do so, add a new page fault return code,
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED, to explicitly and precisely track such page faults.
Quoted 7 lines
If a page fault requires emulation for any MMIO (or any reason besides write-protection), trying to unprotect the gfn is pointless and risks putting the vCPU into an infinite loop. E.g. KVM will put the vCPU into an infinite loop if the vCPU manages to trigger MMIO on a page table walk.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")
Do we really want Cc: stable@ for all these patches? Most of them are of the "if it hurts, don't do it" kind; as long as there are no infinite loops in a non-killable region, I prefer not to complicate our lives with cherry picks of unknown quality.
That said, this patch could be interesting for 6.11 because of the effect on prefaulting (see below).
Quoted 45 lines
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +-- 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-6@@ -2914,10 +2914,8 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte (level, gfn, sptep); } -if (wrprot) { -if (write_fault) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && write_fault) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;if (flush)kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);@@ -4549,7 +4547,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultreturn RET_PF_RETRY ;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )@@ -4642,7 +4640,7 @@ static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code, · line 4728
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-0@@ -4726,6 +4724,9 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,case RET_PF_EMULATE :return -ENOENT ; +case RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED : +return -EPERM ;
Shouldn't this be a "return 0"? Even if kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() cannot fully unprotect the page, it was nevertheless prefaulted as much as possible.
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 03/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page faults
Quoted 11 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Trigger KVM's various "unprotect gfn" paths if and only if the page fault was a write to a write-protected gfn. To do so, add a new page fault return code,
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED, to explicitly and precisely track such page faults.If a page fault requires emulation for any MMIO (or any reason besides write-protection), trying to unprotect the gfn is pointless and risks putting the vCPU into an infinite loop. E.g. KVM will put the vCPU into an infinite loop if the vCPU manages to trigger MMIO on a page table walk.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Do we really want Cc: stable@ for all these patches? Most of them are of the "if it hurts, don't do it" kind;
True. I was thinking that the VMX PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK bug in particular was stable-worthy, but until TDX comes along, it's only relevant if guests puts PDPTRs in an MMIO region. And in that case, the guest is likely hosed anyway, the only difference is if it gets stuck or killed.
I'll drop the stable@ tags unless someone objects.
Quoted 2 lines
as long as there are no infinite loops in a non-killable region, I prefer not to complicate our lives with cherry picks of unknown quality.
Yeah, the RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED one in particular has high potential for a bad cherry-pick.
Quoted 42 lines
That said, this patch could be interesting for 6.11 because of the effect on prefaulting (see below).
Quoted 39 lines
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +-- 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-6@@ -2914,10 +2914,8 @@ static int mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,trace_kvm_mmu_set_spte (level, gfn, sptep); } -if (wrprot) { -if (write_fault) - ret =RET_PF_EMULATE ; - } +if (wrprot && write_fault) + ret =RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ;if (flush)kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn, level);@@ -4549,7 +4547,7 @@ static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *faultreturn RET_PF_RETRY ;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )@@ -4642,7 +4640,7 @@ static int kvm_tdp_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int r;if (page_fault_handle_page_track (vcpu, fault)) -return RET_PF_EMULATE ; +return RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED ; r =fast_page_fault (vcpu, fault);if (r !=RET_PF_INVALID )@@ -4726,6 +4724,9 @@ static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code,
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_tdp_map_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code, · line 4728
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-0case RET_PF_EMULATE :return -ENOENT ; +case RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED : +return -EPERM ;Shouldn't this be a "return 0"? Even if
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault()cannot fully unprotect the page, it was nevertheless prefaulted as much as possible.
Hmm, I hadn't thought about it from that perspective. Ah, right, and the early check in page_fault_handle_page_track() only handles PRESENT faults, so KVM will at least install a read-only mapping.
So yeah, agreed this should return 0.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 4/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
In reply to Sean ChristophersonWhen doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +20 -8
@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write +* operation, walking NPT entries in L1 can trigger write faults even +* when L1 isn't modifying PTEs, and thus result in KVM emulating an +* excessive number of L1 instructions without triggering KVM's write- +* flooding detection, i.e. without unprotecting the gfn. +* +* If the error code was due to a RO violation while translating the +* guest page, the current MMU is direct (L1 is active), and KVM has +* shadow pages, then the above scenario is likely being hit. Try to +* unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap any shadow pages, so that L1 can walk +* its NPT entries without triggering emulation. If one or more shadow +* pages was zapped, skip emulation and resume L1 to let it natively +* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the +* write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to +* emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. */ if (direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)))return RET_PF_FIXED ; - }/* * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Re: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
Quoted 39 lines · Sean Christopherson
When doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +9
-5@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write +* operation, walking NPT entries in L1 can trigger write faults even +* when L1 isn't modifying PTEs, and thus result in KVM emulating an +* excessive number of L1 instructions without triggering KVM's write- +* flooding detection, i.e. without unprotecting the gfn. +*
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 5988
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +9
-0+* If the error code was due to a RO violation while translating the +* guest page, the current MMU is direct (L1 is active), and KVM has +* shadow pages, then the above scenario is likely being hit. Try to +* unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap any shadow pages, so that L1 can walk +* its NPT entries without triggering emulation. If one or more shadow +* pages was zapped, skip emulation and resume L1 to let it natively +* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the +* write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to +* emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. */
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-4if (direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)))return RET_PF_FIXED ; - }/* * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still -- 2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Re: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
Quoted 25 lines · Yuan Yao
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
When doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 5973
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-5/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write
Hi Sean,
I Just want to consult how often of this on EPT:
The PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK is set when EPT violation happens in middle of walking the guest CR3 page table, and the guest CR3 page table page is write-protected on EPT01, are these guest CR3 page table pages also are EPT12 page table pages often? I just think most of time they should be data page on guest CR3 table for L1 to access them by L1 GVA, if so the PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK should be set but not PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK.
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5
-0+* operation, walking NPT entries in L1 can trigger write faults even +* when L1 isn't modifying PTEs, and thus result in KVM emulating an +* excessive number of L1 instructions without triggering KVM's write- +* flooding detection, i.e. without unprotecting the gfn. +* arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 5988
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +9
-0+* If the error code was due to a RO violation while translating the +* guest page, the current MMU is direct (L1 is active), and KVM has +* shadow pages, then the above scenario is likely being hit. Try to +* unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap any shadow pages, so that L1 can walk +* its NPT entries without triggering emulation. If one or more shadow +* pages was zapped, skip emulation and resume L1 to let it natively +* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the +* write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to +* emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. */ Reviewed-by Yuan Yao <[email protected]>Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-4if (direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)))return RET_PF_FIXED ; - }/* * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still -- 2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
+Tom
Quoted 41 lines · Yao Yuan
Quoted 25 lines · Yuan Yao
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
When doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 5973
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-5/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write Hi Sean,
I Just want to consult how often of this on EPT:
Quoted 8 lines
The
PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASKis set when EPT violation happens in middle of walking the guest CR3 page table, and the guest CR3 page table page is write-protected on EPT01, are these guest CR3 page table pages also are EPT12 page table pages often? I just think most of time they should be data page on guest CR3 table for L1 to access them by L1 GVA, if so thePFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASKshould be set but notPFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK.
Hmm, now I'm confused too. I thought this was handling the case where L1 is accessing EPT12/NTP12 entries, but as you say, that doesn't make sense because those accesses would be PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK. And the EPT12/NPT12 entries should never be used by hardware.
The only thing that I can think of is if L1 stops using the pages for EPT/NPT entries, and instead reallocates them for IA32 page tables. But that doesn't make much sense either, because KVM's write-flooding detection should kick in when L1 repurposes the page for its own page tables, before L1 actually starts using the page tables.
I'll try to reproduce the excessive emulation that this code is handling, because I think I'm missing something too.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
Quoted 56 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 41 lines · Yao Yuan
Quoted 25 lines · Yuan Yao
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
When doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 5973
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-5/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write Hi Sean,
I Just want to consult how often of this on EPT:
Quoted 8 lines
The
PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASKis set when EPT violation happens in middle of walking the guest CR3 page table, and the guest CR3 page table page is write-protected on EPT01, are these guest CR3 page table pages also are EPT12 page table pages often? I just think most of time they should be data page on guest CR3 table for L1 to access them by L1 GVA, if so thePFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASKshould be set but notPFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK.Hmm, now I'm confused too. I thought this was handling the case where L1 is accessing EPT12/NTP12 entries, but as you say, that doesn't make sense because those accesses would be
PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK. And the EPT12/NPT12 entries should never be used by hardware.
Quoted 8 lines
The only thing that I can think of is if L1 stops using the pages for EPT/NPT entries, and instead reallocates them for IA32 page tables. But that doesn't make much sense either, because KVM's write-flooding detection should kick in when L1 repurposes the page for its own page tables, before L1 actually starts using the page tables.
I'll try to reproduce the excessive emulation that this code is handling, because I think I'm missing something too.
*sigh*
After poking for an hour and never being able to hit that error code, _period_, even if without the vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct guard, I came to the conclusion that the only way to hit this is if L1 is reusing its own page tables for L2.
And then I finally wised up and went hunting on lore, and indeed that appears to be what this is trying to handle[1]:
: I think this patch is necessary for functional reasons (not just perf), : because we added the other patch to look at the GPA and stop walking the : guest page tables on a NPF.
:
: The issue I think was that hardware has taken an NPF because the page : table is marked RO, and it saves the GPA in the VMCB. KVM was then : going and emulating the instruction and it saw that a GPA was available. : But that GPA was not the GPA of the instruction it is emulating, since : it was the GPA of the tablewalk page that had the fault. It was debugged : that at the time and realized that emulating the instruction was : unnecessary so we added this new code in there which fixed the functional : issue and helps perf.
:
: I don't have any data on how much perf, as I recall it was most effective : when the L1 guest page tables and L2 nested page tables were exactly the : same. In that case, it avoided emulations for code that L1 executes which : I think could be as much as one emulation per 4kb code page.
To muddy the waters more, the vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct was a proactive suggestion from Paolo[2], i.e. not in response to an actual failure that someone encountered.
Further adding to the confusion was Paolo's commit that extended the behavior to Intel CPUs. The AuthorDate vs. CommitDate is particularly interesting, as it suggests that Paolo wrote the patch in response to the SVM series being posted:
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 12:01:38 -0500 [thread overview]
commit eebed2438923f8df465c27f8fa41303771fdb2e8
Author: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Mon Nov 28 14:39:58 2016 +0100
and then commited after asking many of the same questions we just asked, with Brijesh's reply[1] coming just a few days before:
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes
Date: Wed, 2 Aug 2017 12:42:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Commit: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CommitDate: Thu Aug 10 16:44:04 2017 +0200
kvm: nVMX: Add support for fast unprotection of nested guest page tables
This is the same as commit 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes", 2016-11-23), but for Intel processors. In this case, the exit qualification field's bit 8 says whether the EPT violation occurred while translating the guest's final physical address or rather while translating the guest page tables.
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/3] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 12:01:38 -0500 [thread overview]
Intel support is especially misleading, because sharing page tables between EPT and IA32 is rather nonsensical due to them having different formats. I.e. I doubt Paolo had a use case for the VMX changes, and was just providing parity with SVM. Of course, reusing L1's page tables as the NPT tables for L2 is quite crazy too, but at least the PTE formats are identical.
Given that the patches were original posted as part the SEV enabling series[3], my best guest is that the AMD folks were doing some prototyping or emulation hackery that involved running a nested guest by simply reusing CR3 as hCR3.
So, I'll rewrite the comment to make it clear that practically speaking, this scenario can be hit if and only if L1 is reusing its own page tables for L2's NPT.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/147190822443.9523.7814744422402462127.stgit__43469.155036337$1471909238$gmane$org@brijesh-build-machine
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
On Thu, Aug 22, 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
Intel support is especially misleading, because sharing page tables between EPT and IA32 is rather nonsensical due to them having different formats. I.e. I doubt Paolo had a use case for the VMX changes, and was just providing parity with SVM. Of course, reusing L1's page tables as the NPT tables for L2 is quite crazy too,
Actually, it's not _that_ crazy, e.g. KVM s390 does this for last-level page tables so that changes to the host userspace mappings don't require mmu_notifier-induced changes in KVM.
Quoted 1 line
but at least the PTE formats are identical.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 04/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
When doing "fast unprotection" of nested TDP page tables, skip emulation if and only if at least one gfn was unprotected, i.e. continue with emulation if simply resuming is likely to hit the same fault and risk putting the vCPU into an infinite loop.
Note, it's entirely possible to get a false negative, e.g. if a different vCPU faults on the same gfn and unprotects the gfn first, but that's a relatively rare edge case, and emulating is still functionally ok, i.e. the risk of putting the vCPU isn't an infinite loop isn't justified.
English snafu - "the risk of causing a livelock for the vCPU is negligible", perhaps?
Paolo
Quoted 49 lines
Fixes 147277540bbc ("kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +20
-8@@ -5967,17 +5967,29 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;/* -* Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code -* was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page. -* This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested -* paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page -* and resume the guest. +* Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be +* due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the +* gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is shadowing and has write- +* protected. Because AMD CPUs walk nested page table using a write +* operation, walking NPT entries in L1 can trigger write faults even +* when L1 isn't modifying PTEs, and thus result in KVM emulating an +* excessive number of L1 instructions without triggering KVM's write- +* flooding detection, i.e. without unprotecting the gfn. +* +* If the error code was due to a RO violation while translating the +* guest page, the current MMU is direct (L1 is active), and KVM has +* shadow pages, then the above scenario is likely being hit. Try to +* unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap any shadow pages, so that L1 can walk +* its NPT entries without triggering emulation. If one or more shadow +* pages was zapped, skip emulation and resume L1 to let it natively +* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the +* write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to +* emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. */ if (direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) { -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)); + (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && +kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa)))return RET_PF_FIXED ; - }/* * The gfn is write-protected, but if emulation fails we can still
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 5/22 KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is zapped
In reply to Sean ChristophersonResume the guest and thus skip emulation of a non-PTE-writing instruction if and only if unprotecting the gfn actually zapped at least one shadow page. If the gfn is write-protected for some reason other than shadow paging, attempting to unprotect the gfn will effectively fail, and thus retrying the instruction is all but guaranteed to be pointless. This bug has existed for a long time, but was effectively fudged around by the retry RIP+address anti-loop detection.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -6
@@ -8967,14 +8967,14 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,if (ctxt->eip == last_retry_eip && last_retry_addr == cr2_or_gpa)return false; +if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) + gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); + +if (!kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))) +return false; + vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = ctxt->eip; vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa; - -if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); - -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); -return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 6/22 KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRead RIP from vCPU state instead of pulling it from the emulation context when filling last_retry_eip, which is part of the anti-infinite-loop protection used when unprotecting and retrying instructions that hit a write-protected gfn.
This will allow reusing the anti-infinite-loop protection in flows that never make it into the emulator.
This is a glorified nop as ctxt->eip is set to kvm_rip_read() in init_emulate_ctxt(), and EMULTYPE_PF emulation is mutually exclusive with EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE and EMULTYPE_SKIP, i.e. always goes through x86_decode_emulated_instruction() and hasn't advanced ctxt->eip (yet).
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -1
@@ -8973,7 +8973,7 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,if (!kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)))return false; - vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = ctxt->eip; + vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu); vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa;return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 06/22] KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it to last_retry_eip
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Read RIP from vCPU state instead of pulling it from the emulation context when filling
last_retry_eip, which is part of the anti-infinite-loop protection used when unprotecting and retrying instructions that hit a write-protected gfn.
Quoted 7 lines
This will allow reusing the anti-infinite-loop protection in flows that never make it into the emulator.
This is a glorified nop as
ctxt->eipis set tokvm_rip_read()ininit_emulate_ctxt(), andEMULTYPE_PFemulation is mutually exclusive withEMULTYPE_NO_DECODEandEMULTYPE_SKIP, i.e. always goes throughx86_decode_emulated_instruction()and hasn't advancedctxt->eip(yet).
This is as much a nit as it can be, but "glorified nop" would be interpreted more as "the assignment is not needed at all", or something similarly wrong. Just "This has no functional change because..." will do.
Paolo
Quoted 18 lines
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-1@@ -8973,7 +8973,7 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,if (!kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)))return false; - vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = ctxt->eip; + vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu); vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa;return true; }
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 7/22 KVM: x86: Store gpa as gpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for retry
In reply to Sean ChristophersonStore the gpa used to unprotect the faulting gfn for retry as a gpa_t, not an unsigned long. This fixes a bug where 32-bit KVM would unprotect and retry the wrong gfn if the gpa had bits 63:32!=0. In practice, this bug is functionally benign, as unprotecting the wrong gfn is purely a performance issue (thanks to the anti-infinite-loop logic). And of course, almost no one runs 32-bit KVM these days.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -1
@@ -8934,7 +8934,8 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, int emulation_type) {struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu =emul_to_vcpu (ctxt); -unsigned long last_retry_eip, last_retry_addr, gpa = cr2_or_gpa; +unsigned long last_retry_eip, last_retry_addr; +gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip; last_retry_addr = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 8/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path
In reply to Sean ChristophersonMove the anti-infinite-loop protection provided by last_retry_{eip,addr} into kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault() so that it guards unprotect+retry that never hits the emulator, as well as reexecute_instruction(), which is the last ditch "might as well try it" logic that kicks in when emulation fails on an instruction that faulted on a write-protected gfn.
Add a new helper, kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(), to set the retry fields and deduplicate other code (with more to come).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 +---------------------- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -2136,6 +2136,7 @@ int kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_update_dr7 (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn); +bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa);void kvm_mmu_free_roots (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu *mmu,ulong roots_to_free);void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu *mmu);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +38 -1
@@ -2731,6 +2731,22 @@ int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)return r; } +bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa) +{ +gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; +bool r; + +if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) + gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); + + r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); +if (r) { + vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu); + vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa; + } +return r; +} +static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gva_t gva) {gpa_t gpa;
@@ -5966,6 +5982,27 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, {bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; +/* +* Do not try to unprotect and retry if the vCPU re-faulted on the same +* RIP with the same address that was previously unprotected, as doing +* so will likely put the vCPU into an infinite. E.g. if the vCPU uses +* a non-page-table modifying instruction on the PDE that points to the +* instruction, then unprotecting the gfn will unmap the instruction's +* code, i.e. make it impossible for the instruction to ever complete. +*/ +if (vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip ==kvm_rip_read (vcpu) && + vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr == cr2_or_gpa) +return RET_PF_EMULATE ; + +/* +* Reset the unprotect+retry values that guard against infinite loops. +* The values will be refreshed if KVM explicitly unprotects a gfn and +* retries, in all other cases it's safe to retry in the future even if +* the next page fault happens on the same RIP+address. +*/ + vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =0 ; + vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr =0 ; +/* * Before emulating the instruction, check to see if the access may be * due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries used for L2, i.e. if the
@@ -5988,7 +6025,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,*/ if (direct && (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (cr2_or_gpa))) +kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return RET_PF_FIXED ;/*
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -26
@@ -8934,27 +8934,13 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, int emulation_type) {struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu =emul_to_vcpu (ctxt); -unsigned long last_retry_eip, last_retry_addr; -gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; - - last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip; - last_retry_addr = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr;/* * If the emulation is caused by #PF and it is non-page_table * writing instruction, it means the VM-EXIT is caused by shadow * page protected, we can zap the shadow page and retry this * instruction directly. -* -* Note: if the guest uses a non-page-table modifying instruction -* on the PDE that points to the instruction, then we will unmap -* the instruction and go to an infinite loop. So, we cache the -* last retried eip and the last fault address, if we meet the eip -* and the address again, we can break out of the potential infinite -* loop. */ - vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip = vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr =0 ; -if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false;
@@ -8965,18 +8951,7 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,if (x86_page_table_writing_insn (ctxt))return false; -if (ctxt->eip == last_retry_eip && last_retry_addr == cr2_or_gpa) -return false; - -if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); - -if (!kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))) -return false; - - vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu); - vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa; -return true; +return kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa); }static int complete_emulated_mmio (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 9/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
In reply to Sean ChristophersonTry to unprotect shadow pages if and only if indirect_shadow_pages is non- zero, i.e. iff there is at least one protected such shadow page. Pre- checking indirect_shadow_pages avoids taking mmu_lock for write when the gfn is write-protected by a third party, i.e. not for KVM shadow paging, and in the *extremely* unlikely case that a different task has already unprotected the last shadow page.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -2736,6 +2736,9 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa;bool r; +if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) +return false; +if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL );
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
Quoted 17 lines · Sean Christopherson
Try to unprotect shadow pages if and only if
indirect_shadow_pagesis non- zero, i.e. iff there is at least one protected such shadow page. Pre- checkingindirect_shadow_pagesavoids takingmmu_lockfor write when the gfn is write-protected by a third party, i.e. not for KVM shadow paging, and in the *extremely* unlikely case that a different task has already unprotected the last shadow page.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa) · line 2740
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-0@@ -2736,6 +2736,9 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa;bool r; +if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) +return false;
indirect_shadow_pages is accessed without a lock, so here please add a note that, while it may be stale, a false negative will only cause KVM to skip the "unprotect and retry" optimization. (This is preexisting in reexecute_instruction() and goes away in patch 18, if I'm pre-reading that part of the series correctly).
Bonus points for opportunistically adding a READ_ONCE() here and in kvm_mmu_track_write().
Paolo
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL );
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
Quoted 13 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 12 lines · Sean Christopherson
Try to unprotect shadow pages if and only if
indirect_shadow_pagesis non- zero, i.e. iff there is at least one protected such shadow page. Pre- checkingindirect_shadow_pagesavoids takingmmu_lockfor write when the gfn is write-protected by a third party, i.e. not for KVM shadow paging, and in the *extremely* unlikely case that a different task has already unprotected the last shadow page.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa) · line 2739
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-0@@ -2736,6 +2736,9 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa;bool r; +if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) +return false;
indirect_shadow_pagesis accessed without a lock, so here please add a note that, while it may be stale, a false negative will only cause KVM to skip the "unprotect and retry" optimization.
Correct, I'll add a comment.
Quoted 5 lines
(This is preexisting in
reexecute_instruction()and goes away in patch 18, if I'm pre-reading that part of the series correctly).Bonus points for opportunistically adding a
READ_ONCE()here and inkvm_mmu_track_write().
Hmm, right, this one should have a READ_ONCE(), but I don't see any reason to add one in kvm_mmu_track_write(). If the compiler was crazy and generate multiple loads between the smp_mb() and write_lock(), _and_ the value transitioned from 1->0, reading '0' on the second go is totally fine because it means the last shadow page was zapped. Amusingly, it'd actually be "better" in that it would avoid unnecessary taking mmu_lock.
Practically speaking, the compiler would have to be broken to generate multiple loads in the 0->1 case, as that would mean the generated code loaded the value but ignored the result. But even if that were to happen, a final read of '1' is again a-ok.
This code is different because a READ_ONCE() would ensure that indirect_shadow_pages isn't reloaded for every check. Though that too would be functionally ok, just weird.
Obviously the READ_ONCE() would be harmless, but IMO it would be more confusing than helpful, e.g. would beg the question of why kvm_vcpu_exit_request() doesn't wrap vcpu->mode with READ_ONCE(). Heh, though arguably vcpu->mode should be wrapped with READ_ONCE() since it's a helper and could be called multiple times without any code in between that would guarantee a reload.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines
(This is preexisting in
reexecute_instruction()and goes away in patch 18, if I'm pre-reading that part of the series correctly).Bonus points for opportunistically adding a
READ_ONCE()here and inkvm_mmu_track_write().
Quoted 6 lines
Hmm, right, this one should have a
READ_ONCE(), but I don't see any reason to add one inkvm_mmu_track_write(). If the compiler was crazy and generate multiple loads between thesmp_mb()andwrite_lock(), _and_ the value transitioned from 1->0, reading '0' on the second go is totally fine because it means the last shadow page was zapped. Amusingly, it'd actually be "better" in that it would avoid unnecessary takingmmu_lock.
Your call, but I have started leaning towards always using READ_ONCE(), similar to all atomic_t accesses are done with atomic_read(); that is, just as much as a marker for cross-thread lock-free accesses, in addition to limiting the compiler's optimizations.
tools/memory-model/Documentation/access-marking.txt also suggests using READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() always except in special cases. They are also more friendly to KCSAN (though I have never used it).
This of course has the issue of being yet another unfinished transition.
Quoted 5 lines
Obviously the
READ_ONCE()would be harmless, but IMO it would be more confusing than helpful, e.g. would beg the question of whykvm_vcpu_exit_request()doesn't wrapvcpu->modewithREAD_ONCE(). Heh, though arguablyvcpu->modeshould be wrapped withREAD_ONCE()since it's a helper and could be called multiple times without any code in between that would guarantee a reload.
Indeed, who said I wouldn't change that one as well? :)
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 09/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
Quoted 20 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines
(This is preexisting in
reexecute_instruction()and goes away in patch 18, if I'm pre-reading that part of the series correctly).Bonus points for opportunistically adding a
READ_ONCE()here and inkvm_mmu_track_write().Quoted 6 lines
Hmm, right, this one should have a
READ_ONCE(), but I don't see any reason to add one inkvm_mmu_track_write(). If the compiler was crazy and generate multiple loads between thesmp_mb()andwrite_lock(), _and_ the value transitioned from 1->0, reading '0' on the second go is totally fine because it means the last shadow page was zapped. Amusingly, it'd actually be "better" in that it would avoid unnecessary takingmmu_lock.Your call, but I have started leaning towards always using
READ_ONCE(), similar to allatomic_taccesses are done withatomic_read(); that is, just as much as a marker for cross-thread lock-free accesses, in addition to limiting the compiler's optimizations.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/memory-model/Documentation/access-marking.txtalso suggests usingREAD_ONCE()andWRITE_ONCE()always except in special cases. They are also more friendly to KCSAN (though I have never used it).This of course has the issue of being yet another unfinished transition.
I opted to fix the kvm_vcpu_exit_request() case[*], and add the READ_ONCE() to this patch, but left kvm_mmu_track_write() as-is.
My reasoning, and what I think makes for a decent policy, is that while I 100% agree lockless accesses need _some_ form of protection/documentation, I think adding READ_ONCE() (and WRITE_ONCE()) on top adds confusion and makes the actual requirement unclear.
In other words, if there's already an smp_rmb() or smp_wmb() (or similar), then don't add READ/WRITE_ONCE() (unless that's also necesary for some reason) because doing so detracts from the barriers that are actually necessary.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Obviously the
READ_ONCE()would be harmless, but IMO it would be more confusing than helpful, e.g. would beg the question of whykvm_vcpu_exit_request()doesn't wrapvcpu->modewithREAD_ONCE(). Heh, though arguablyvcpu->modeshould be wrapped withREAD_ONCE()since it's a helper and could be called multiple times without any code in between that would guarantee a reload.Indeed, who said I wouldn't change that one as well? :)
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 10/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDrop the globally visible PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE and replace it with a more appropriately named is_write_to_guest_page_table(). The macro name is misleading, because while all nNPT walks match PAGE|WRITE|PRESENT, the reverse is not true.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 ---- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0 -4
@@ -280,10 +280,6 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;#define PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS BIT_ULL(49)#define PFERR_SYNTHETIC_MASK (PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS | PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS) -#define PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | \ - PFERR_WRITE_MASK | \ - PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) -/* apic attention bits */ #define KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC 0/*
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8 -2
@@ -5980,6 +5980,13 @@ void kvm_mmu_track_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, const u8 *new,write_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); } +static bool is_write_to_guest_page_table (u64 error_code) +{ +const u64 mask =PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK |PFERR_WRITE_MASK |PFERR_PRESENT_MASK ; + +return (error_code & mask) == mask; +} +static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,u64 error_code,int *emulation_type) {
@@ -6026,8 +6033,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to * emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. */ -if (direct && - (error_code &PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE ) ==PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && +if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) &&kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return RET_PF_FIXED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 10/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 6036
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-2- if (direct && - (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && + if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table(error_code)) &&
Too many parentheses. :)
Maybe put it before patch 3 if we decide not to Cc: stable? Or even squash it in there?
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 10/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Replace PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE with a more descriptive helper
Quoted 8 lines · Paolo Bonzini
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 6036
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-2- if (direct && - (error_code & PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE && + if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table(error_code)) &&Too many parentheses. :)
Maybe put it before patch 3 if we decide not to Cc: stable?
Ya, I'll do this.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 11/22 KVM: x86: Move EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to x86_emulate_instruction()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonMove the sanity checks for EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF to the top of x86_emulate_instruction(). In addition to deduplicating a small amount of code, this makes the connection between EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF and EMULTYPE_PF even more explicit, and will allow dropping retry_instruction() entirely.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 +++++-------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5 -8
@@ -8872,10 +8872,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (is_guest_mode (vcpu)) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_PF ))) -return false; -if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {/* * Write permission should be allowed since only
@@ -8944,10 +8940,6 @@ static bool retry_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (is_guest_mode (vcpu)) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_PF ))) -return false; -if (x86_page_table_writing_insn (ctxt))return false;
@@ -9150,6 +9142,11 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;bool writeback = true; +if ((emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ) && + (WARN_ON_ONCE (is_guest_mode (vcpu)) || +WARN_ON_ONCE (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_PF )))) + emulation_type &= ~EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ; + r =kvm_check_emulate_insn (vcpu, emulation_type, insn, insn_len);if (r !=X86EMUL_CONTINUE ) {if (r ==X86EMUL_RETRY_INSTR || r ==X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT )
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 12/22 KVM: x86: Fold retry_instruction() into x86_emulate_instruction()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonNow that retry_instruction() is reasonably tiny, fold it into its sole caller, x86_emulate_instruction(). In addition to getting rid of the absurdly confusing retry_instruction() name, handling the retry in x86_emulate_instruction() pairs it back up with the code that resets last_retry_{eip,address}.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 30 +++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9 -21
@@ -8926,26 +8926,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return !(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP ); } -static bool retry_instruction (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, -gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,int emulation_type) -{ -struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu =emul_to_vcpu (ctxt); - -/* -* If the emulation is caused by #PF and it is non-page_table -* writing instruction, it means the VM-EXIT is caused by shadow -* page protected, we can zap the shadow page and retry this -* instruction directly. -*/ -if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF )) -return false; - -if (x86_page_table_writing_insn (ctxt)) -return false; - -return kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa); -} -static int complete_emulated_mmio (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);static int complete_emulated_pio (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -9225,7 +9205,15 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return 1 ; } -if (retry_instruction (ctxt, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type)) +/* +* If emulation was caused by a write-protection #PF on a non-page_table +* writing instruction, try to unprotect the gfn, i.e. zap shadow pages, +* and retry the instruction, as the vCPU is likely no longer using the +* gfn as a page table. +*/ +if ((emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ) && + !x86_page_table_writing_insn (ctxt) && +kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return 1 ;/* this is needed for vmware backdoor interface to work since it
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 13/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect an INVALID_GPA
In reply to Sean ChristophersonIf getting the gpa for a gva fails, e.g. because the gva isn't mapped in the guest page tables, don't try to unprotect the invalid gfn. This is mostly a performance fix (avoids unnecessarily taking mmu_lock), as for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes() won't explode on garbage input, it's simply pointless.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6 -1
@@ -2739,8 +2739,11 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages)return false; -if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) +if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) { gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); +if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) +return false; + } r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa));if (r) {
@@ -2759,6 +2762,8 @@ static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)return 0 ; gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read (vcpu, gva,NULL ); +if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) +return 0 ; r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm, gpa >>PAGE_SHIFT );
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 14/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when unprotecting
In reply to Sean ChristophersonWhen getting a gpa from a gva to unprotect the associated gfn when an event is awating reinjection, walk the guest PTEs for WRITE as there's no point in unprotecting the gfn if the guest is unable to write the page, i.e. if write-protection can't trigger emulation.
Note, the entire flow should be guarded on the access being a write, and even better should be conditioned on actually triggering a write-protect fault. This will be addressed in a future commit.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -2761,7 +2761,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct)return 0 ; - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read (vcpu, gva,NULL ); + gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, gva,NULL );if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA )return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 15/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
In reply to Sean ChristophersonMove the event re-injection unprotect+retry logic into kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(), i.e. unprotect and retry if and only if the #PF actually hit a write-protected gfn. Note, there is a small possibility that the gfn was unprotected by a different tasking between hitting the #PF and acquiring mmu_lock, but in that case, KVM will resume the guest immediately anyways because KVM will treat the fault as spurious.
As a bonus, unprotecting _after_ handling the page fault also addresses the case where the installing a SPTE to handle fault encounters a shadowed PTE, i.e. *creates* a read-only SPTE.
Opportunstically add a comment explaining what on earth the intent of the code is, as based on the changelog from commit 577bdc496614 ("KVM: Avoid instruction emulation when event delivery is pending").
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8 -20
@@ -2753,23 +2753,6 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)return r; } -static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gva_t gva) -{ -gpa_t gpa; -int r; - -if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) -return 0 ; - - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, gva,NULL ); -if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) -return 0 ; - - r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm, gpa >>PAGE_SHIFT ); - -return r; -} -static void kvm_unsync_page (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) {trace_kvm_mmu_unsync_page (sp);
@@ -4640,8 +4623,6 @@ int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,if (!flags) {trace_kvm_page_fault (vcpu, fault_address, error_code); -if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection (vcpu)) -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt (vcpu, fault_address); r =kvm_mmu_page_fault (vcpu, fault_address, error_code, insn, insn_len); }else if (flags &KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT ) {
@@ -6037,8 +6018,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the * write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to * emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. +* +* For indirect MMUs, i.e. if KVM is shadowing the current MMU, try to +* unprotect the gfn and retry if an event is awaiting reinjection. If +* KVM emulates multiple instructions before completing even injection, +* the event could be delayed beyond what is architecturally allowed, +* e.g. KVM could inject an IRQ after the TPR has been raised. */ -if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) && +if (((direct &&is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) || + (!direct &&kvm_event_needs_reinjection (vcpu))) &&kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return RET_PF_FIXED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
Quoted 58 lines · Sean Christopherson
Move the event re-injection unprotect+retry logic into
kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(), i.e. unprotect and retry if and only if the #PF actually hit a write-protected gfn. Note, there is a small possibility that the gfn was unprotected by a different tasking between hitting the #PF and acquiringmmu_lock, but in that case, KVM will resume the guest immediately anyways because KVM will treat the fault as spurious.As a bonus, unprotecting _after_ handling the page fault also addresses the case where the installing a SPTE to handle fault encounters a shadowed PTE, i.e. *creates* a read-only SPTE.
Opportunstically add a comment explaining what on earth the intent of the code is, as based on the changelog from commit
577bdc496614("KVM: Avoid instruction emulation when event delivery is pending").Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-19@@ -2753,23 +2753,6 @@ bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa)return r; } -static int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gva_t gva) -{ -gpa_t gpa; -int r; - -if (vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) -return 0 ; - - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, gva,NULL ); -if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) -return 0 ; - - r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm, gpa >>PAGE_SHIFT ); - -return r; -} -static void kvm_unsync_page (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) {trace_kvm_mmu_unsync_page (sp);@@ -4640,8 +4623,6 @@ int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,if (!flags) {trace_kvm_page_fault (vcpu, fault_address, error_code); -if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection (vcpu)) -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt (vcpu, fault_address); r =kvm_mmu_page_fault (vcpu, fault_address, error_code, insn, insn_len); }else if (flags &KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT ) {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 6026
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6
-0@@ -6037,8 +6018,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the * write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to * emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. +* +* For indirect MMUs, i.e. if KVM is shadowing the current MMU, try to +* unprotect the gfn and retry if an event is awaiting reinjection. If +* KVM emulates multiple instructions before completing even injection, +* the event could be delayed beyond what is architecturally allowed, +* e.g. KVM could inject an IRQ after the TPR has been raised.
This paragraph should go before the description of kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry:
* There are two cases in which we try to unprotect the page here
* preemptively, i.e. zap any shadow pages, before emulating the
* instruction.
*
* First, the access may be due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries
* used for L2, i.e. if the gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is
* shadowing and has write-protected. In this case, because AMD CPUs
* walk nested page table using a write operation, walking NPT entries
* in L1 can trigger write faults even when L1 isn't modifying PTEs.
* KVM would then emulate an excessive number of L1 instructions
* without triggering KVM's write-flooding detection, i.e. without
* unprotecting the gfn. This is detected as a RO violation while
* translating the guest page when the current MMU is direct. *
* Second, for indirect MMUs, i.e. if KVM is shadowing the current MMU,
* unprotect the gfn and reenter the guest if an event is awaiting
* reinjection. If KVM emulates multiple instructions before completing
* event injection, the event could be delayed beyond what is
* architecturally allowed, e.g. KVM could inject an IRQ after the
* TPR has been raised.
*
* In both cases, if one or more shadow pages were zapped, skip
* emulation and resume L1 to let it natively execute the instruction.
* If no shadow pages were zapped, then the write-fault is due to
* something else entirely and KVM needs to emulate, as resuming
* the guest will put it into an infinite loop.
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-1*/ -if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) && +if (((direct &&is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) || + (!direct &&kvm_event_needs_reinjection (vcpu))) &&kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return RET_PF_FIXED ;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
Quoted 14 lines · Paolo Bonzini
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 6026
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6
-0@@ -6037,8 +6018,15 @@ static int kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* execute the instruction. If no shadow pages were zapped, then the * write-fault is due to something else entirely, i.e. KVM needs to * emulate, as resuming the guest will put it into an infinite loop. +* +* For indirect MMUs, i.e. if KVM is shadowing the current MMU, try to +* unprotect the gfn and retry if an event is awaiting reinjection. If +* KVM emulates multiple instructions before completing even injection, +* the event could be delayed beyond what is architecturally allowed, +* e.g. KVM could inject an IRQ after the TPR has been raised. This paragraph should go before the description of
kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry:
Hmm, I disagree. The comment ends up being disconnected from the code, especially by the end of the series. E.g. when reading kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault(), someone would have to jump twice (to kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry and then __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry()) in order to understand the checks buried in kvm_mmu_write_protect_fault().
And the comment also becomes stale when kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry() is used by x86_emulate_instruction(). That's obviously solvable by extending the function comment, but then we end up with a rather massive function comment that documents its callers, not the function itself.
Quoted 39 lines
* There are two cases in which we try to unprotect the page here
* preemptively, i.e. zap any shadow pages, before emulating the
* instruction.
*
* First, the access may be due to L1 accessing nested NPT/EPT entries
* used for L2, i.e. if the gfn being written is for gPTEs that KVM is
* shadowing and has write-protected. In this case, because AMD CPUs
* walk nested page table using a write operation, walking NPT entries
* in L1 can trigger write faults even when L1 isn't modifying PTEs.
* KVM would then emulate an excessive number of L1 instructions
* without triggering KVM's write-flooding detection, i.e. without
* unprotecting the gfn. This is detected as a RO violation while
* translating the guest page when the current MMU is direct. *
* Second, for indirect MMUs, i.e. if KVM is shadowing the current MMU,
* unprotect the gfn and reenter the guest if an event is awaiting
* reinjection. If KVM emulates multiple instructions before completing
* event injection, the event could be delayed beyond what is
* architecturally allowed, e.g. KVM could inject an IRQ after the
* TPR has been raised.
*
* In both cases, if one or more shadow pages were zapped, skip
* emulation and resume L1 to let it natively execute the instruction.
* If no shadow pages were zapped, then the write-fault is due to
* something else entirely and KVM needs to emulate, as resuming
* the guest will put it into an infinite loop.Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-1*/ -if (direct && (is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) && +if (((direct &&is_write_to_guest_page_table (error_code)) || + (!direct &&kvm_event_needs_reinjection (vcpu))) &&kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa))return RET_PF_FIXED ;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 16/22 KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed emulation
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDrop the manual pfn look when retrying an instruction that KVM failed to emulation in response to a #PF due to a write-protected gfn. Now that KVM sets EMULTYPE_PF if and only if the page fault it a write-protected gfn, i.e. if and only if there's a writable memslot, there's no need to redo the lookup to avoid retrying an instruction that failed on emulated MMIO (no slot, or a write to a read-only slot).
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 ------------------ 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0 -18
@@ -8867,7 +8867,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, int emulation_type) {gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; -kvm_pfn_t pfn;if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false;
@@ -8887,23 +8886,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return true; } -/* -* Do not retry the unhandleable instruction if it faults on the -* readonly host memory, otherwise it will goto a infinite loop: -* retry instruction -> write #PF -> emulation fail -> retry -* instruction -> ... -*/ - pfn =gfn_to_pfn (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); - -/* -* If the instruction failed on the error pfn, it can not be fixed, -* report the error to userspace. -*/ -if (is_error_noslot_pfn (pfn)) -return false; - -kvm_release_pfn_clean (pfn); -/* * If emulation may have been triggered by a write to a shadowed page * table, unprotect the gfn (zap any relevant SPTEs) and re-enter the
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 16/22] KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed emulation
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Drop the manual pfn look when retrying an instruction that KVM failed to emulation in response to a #PF due to a write-protected gfn. Now that KVM sets
EMULTYPE_PFif and only if the page fault it a write-protected gfn,
Pointing out where this happened will likely help a few years from now:
With the introduction of RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTED, KVM sets EMULTYPE_PF if and only if the page fault it a write-protected gfn, i.e. if and only if there's a writable memslot. KVM will never try to redo an instruction that failed on emulated MMIO (no slot, or a write to a read-only slot), so therefore there's no redo the lookup in reexecute_instruction().
Paolo
Quoted 45 lines
i.e. if and only if there's a writable memslot, there's no need to redo the lookup to avoid retrying an instruction that failed on emulated MMIO (no slot, or a write to a read-only slot).
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 ------------------ 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0
-18@@ -8867,7 +8867,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, int emulation_type) {gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; -kvm_pfn_t pfn;if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false;@@ -8887,23 +8886,6 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return true; } -/* -* Do not retry the unhandleable instruction if it faults on the -* readonly host memory, otherwise it will goto a infinite loop: -* retry instruction -> write #PF -> emulation fail -> retry -* instruction -> ... -*/ - pfn =gfn_to_pfn (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); - -/* -* If the instruction failed on the error pfn, it can not be fixed, -* report the error to userspace. -*/ -if (is_error_noslot_pfn (pfn)) -return false; - -kvm_release_pfn_clean (pfn); -/* * If emulation may have been triggered by a write to a shadowed page * table, unprotect the gfn (zap any relevant SPTEs) and re-enter the
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 17/22 KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn
In reply to Sean ChristophersonDon't bother unprotecting the target gfn if EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP is set, as KVM will simply report the emulation failure to userspace. This will allow converting reexecute_instruction() to use kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_instead_retry() instead of kvm_mmu_unprotect_page().
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +19 -9
@@ -8871,6 +8871,19 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false; +/* +* If the failed instruction faulted on an access to page tables that +* are used to translate any part of the instruction, KVM can't resolve +* the issue by unprotecting the gfn, as zapping the shadow page will +* result in the instruction taking a !PRESENT page fault and thus put +* the vCPU into an infinite loop of page faults. E.g. KVM will create +* a SPTE and write-protect the gfn to resolve the !PRESENT fault, and +* then zap the SPTE to unprotect the gfn, and then do it all over +* again. Report the error to userspace. +*/ +if (emulation_type &EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP ) +return false; +if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {/* * Write permission should be allowed since only
@@ -8896,16 +8909,13 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa));/* -* If the failed instruction faulted on an access to page tables that -* are used to translate any part of the instruction, KVM can't resolve -* the issue by unprotecting the gfn, as zapping the shadow page will -* result in the instruction taking a !PRESENT page fault and thus put -* the vCPU into an infinite loop of page faults. E.g. KVM will create -* a SPTE and write-protect the gfn to resolve the !PRESENT fault, and -* then zap the SPTE to unprotect the gfn, and then do it all over -* again. Report the error to userspace. +* Retry even if _this_ vCPU didn't unprotect the gfn, as it's possible +* all SPTEs were already zapped by a different task. The alternative +* is to report the error to userspace and likely terminate the guest, +* and the infinite loop detection logic will prevent retrying the page +* fault indefinitely, i.e. there's nothing to lose by retrying. */ -return !(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP ); +return true; }static int complete_emulated_mmio (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 17/22] KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 8916
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5
-0+* Retry even if _this_ vCPU didn't unprotect the gfn, as it's possible +* all SPTEs were already zapped by a different task. The alternative +* is to report the error to userspace and likely terminate the guest, +* and the infinite loop detection logic will prevent retrying the page +* fault indefinitely, i.e. there's nothing to lose by retrying.
Putting myself in the shoes of someone unfamiliar with the code, I might prefer "the last_retry_eip/last_retry_addr checks" to "the infinite loop detection logic"; after all, you're saying in the same sentence that it's preventing an infinite loop.
Thanks,
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 18/22 KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path
In reply to Sean ChristophersonUse kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry() in reexecute_instruction() to pick up protection against infinite loops, e.g. if KVM somehow manages to encounter an unsupported instruction and unprotecting the gfn doesn't allow the vCPU to make forward progress. Other than that, the retry-on- failure logic is a functionally equivalent, open coded version of kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry().
Note, the emulation failure path still isn't fully protected, as KVM won't update the retry protection fields if no shadow pages are zapped (but this change is still a step forward). That flaw will be addressed in a future patch.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 20 +------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -19
@@ -8866,8 +8866,6 @@ static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type)static bool reexecute_instruction (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,int emulation_type) { -gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; -if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false;
@@ -8884,29 +8882,13 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,if (emulation_type &EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP )return false; -if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) { -/* -* Write permission should be allowed since only -* write access need to be emulated. -*/ - gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL ); - -/* -* If the mapping is invalid in guest, let cpu retry -* it to generate fault. -*/ -if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) -return true; - } -/* * If emulation may have been triggered by a write to a shadowed page * table, unprotect the gfn (zap any relevant SPTEs) and re-enter the * guest to let the CPU re-execute the instruction in the hope that the * CPU can cleanly execute the instruction that KVM failed to emulate. */ -if (vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) -kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); +kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa);/* * Retry even if _this_ vCPU didn't unprotect the gfn, as it's possible
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 19/22 KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure
In reply to Sean ChristophersonWhen retrying the faulting instruction after emulation failure, refresh the infinite loop protection fields even if no shadow pages were zapped, i.e. avoid hitting an infinite loop even when retrying the instruction as a last-ditch effort to avoid terminating the guest.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 +++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 12 +++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +9 -1
@@ -2132,7 +2132,15 @@ int kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_update_dr7 (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn); -bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa); +bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +bool always_retry); + +static inline bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +gpa_t cr2_or_gpa) +{ +return __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, false); +} +void kvm_mmu_free_roots (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu *mmu,ulong roots_to_free);void kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_mmu *mmu);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +7 -5
@@ -2731,22 +2731,24 @@ int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)return r; } -bool kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa) +bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +bool always_retry) {gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa; -bool r; +bool r = false;if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) -return false; + goto out;if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) { gpa =kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa,NULL );if (gpa ==INVALID_GPA ) -return false; + goto out; } r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); -if (r) { +out: +if (r || always_retry) { vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu); vcpu->arch.last_retry_addr = cr2_or_gpa; }
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -1
@@ -8888,7 +8888,7 @@ static bool reexecute_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,* guest to let the CPU re-execute the instruction in the hope that the * CPU can cleanly execute the instruction that KVM failed to emulate. */ -kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa); +__kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, true);/* * Retry even if _this_ vCPU didn't unprotect the gfn, as it's possible
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 20/22 KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure()
In reply to Sean ChristophersonRename reexecute_instruction() to kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure() to make the intent and purpose of the helper much more obvious.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +7 -5
@@ -8863,8 +8863,9 @@ static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type)return 1 ; } -static bool reexecute_instruction (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, -int emulation_type) +static bool kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, +int emulation_type) {if (!(emulation_type &EMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PF ))return false;
@@ -9131,8 +9132,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,kvm_queue_exception (vcpu,UD_VECTOR );return 1 ; } -if (reexecute_instruction (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, - emulation_type)) +if (kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, + emulation_type))return 1 ; if (ctxt->have_exception &&
@@ -9218,7 +9219,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return 1 ;if (r ==EMULATION_FAILED ) { -if (reexecute_instruction (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, emulation_type)) +if (kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure (vcpu, cr2_or_gpa, + emulation_type))return 1 ;return handle_emulation_failure (vcpu, emulation_type);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 21/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version
In reply to Sean ChristophersonFold kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry() now that all other direct usage is gone.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 - arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 33 +++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +0 -1
@@ -2131,7 +2131,6 @@ int kvm_get_nr_pending_nmis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void kvm_update_dr7 (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn);bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool always_retry);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +13 -20
@@ -2713,31 +2713,16 @@ void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long goal_nr_mmu_pages)write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock); } -int kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) -{ -struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; -LIST_HEAD (invalid_list); -int r; - - r =0 ; -write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock); -for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp, gfn) { - r =1 ; -kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); - } -kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page (kvm, &invalid_list); -write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock); - -return r; -} -bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,bool always_retry) { +struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; +LIST_HEAD (invalid_list); +struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;gpa_t gpa = cr2_or_gpa;bool r = false; -if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) +if (!kvm->arch.indirect_shadow_pages) goto out;if (!vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct) {
@@ -2746,7 +2731,15 @@ bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, goto out; } - r =kvm_mmu_unprotect_page (vcpu->kvm,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)); + r = false; +write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock); +for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { + r = true; +kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); + } +kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page (kvm, &invalid_list); +write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock); + out:if (r || always_retry) { vcpu->arch.last_retry_eip =kvm_rip_read (vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 22/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
In reply to Sean ChristophersonExplicitly query the list of to-be-zapped shadow pages when checking to see if unprotecting a gfn for retry has succeeded, i.e. if KVM should retry the faulting instruction.
Add a comment to explain why the list needs to be checked before zapping, which is the primary motivation for this change.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +7 -4
@@ -2731,12 +2731,15 @@ bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, goto out; } - r = false;write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock); -for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { - r = true; +for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); - } + +/* +* Snapshot the result before zapping, as zapping will remove all list +* entries, i.e. checking the list later would yield a false negative. +*/ + r = !list_empty (&invalid_list);kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page (kvm, &invalid_list);write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.76.ge559c4bf1a-goog
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerRe: [PATCH 22/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
Quoted 24 lines · Sean Christopherson
Explicitly query the list of to-be-zapped shadow pages when checking to see if unprotecting a gfn for retry has succeeded, i.e. if KVM should retry the faulting instruction.
Add a comment to explain why the list needs to be checked before zapping, which is the primary motivation for this change.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-1@@ -2731,12 +2731,15 @@ bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, goto out; } - r = false;write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 2741
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6
-3-for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { - r = true; +for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); - } + +/* +* Snapshot the result before zapping, as zapping will remove all list +* entries, i.e. checking the list later would yield a false negative. +*/
Hmm, the comment is kinda overkill? Maybe just
/* Return whether there were sptes to zap. */ r = !list_empty(&invalid_test);
I'm not sure about patch 21 - I like the simple kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() function. Maybe rename it to kvm_mmu_zap_gfn() and make it static in the same patch?
Either way, this small cleanup applies even if the function is not inlined.
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-0+ r = !list_empty (&invalid_list);kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page (kvm, &invalid_list);write_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 22/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
Quoted 37 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Explicitly query the list of to-be-zapped shadow pages when checking to see if unprotecting a gfn for retry has succeeded, i.e. if KVM should retry the faulting instruction.
Add a comment to explain why the list needs to be checked before zapping, which is the primary motivation for this change.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-1@@ -2731,12 +2731,15 @@ bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, goto out; } - r = false;write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 2740
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6
-3-for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { - r = true; +for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); - } + +/* +* Snapshot the result before zapping, as zapping will remove all list +* entries, i.e. checking the list later would yield a false negative. +*/ Hmm, the comment is kinda overkill? Maybe just
Quoted 2 lines
/* Return whether there were sptes to zap. */ r = !list_empty(&invalid_test);
I would strongly prefer to keep the verbose comment. I was "this" close to removing the local variable and checking list_empty() after the commit phase. If we made that goof, it would only show up at the worst time, i.e. when a guest triggers retry and gets stuck. And the logical outcome of fixing such a bug would be to add a comment to prevent it from happening again, so I say just add the comment straightaway.
Quoted 2 lines
I'm not sure about patch 21 - I like the simple
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page()function.
From a code perspective, I kinda like having a separate helper too. As you likely suspect given your below suggestion, KVM should never unprotect a gfn without retry protection, i.e. there should never be another caller, and I want to enforce that.
Quoted 1 line
Maybe rename it to
kvm_mmu_zap_gfn()and make it static in the same patch?
kvm_mmu_zap_gfn() would be quite misleading. Unlike kvm_zap_gfn_range(), it only zaps non-leaf shadow pages. E.g. the name would suggest that it could be used by __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(), but it would do the complete wrong thing.
kvm_mmu_zap_shadow_pages() is the least awful I can come up with (it needs to be plural because it zaps all SPs related to the gfn), but that's something confusing too since it would take in a single gfn. So I think my vote is to keep patch 21 and dodge the naming entirely.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 22/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
Quoted 48 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 37 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 23 lines · Sean Christopherson
Explicitly query the list of to-be-zapped shadow pages when checking to see if unprotecting a gfn for retry has succeeded, i.e. if KVM should retry the faulting instruction.
Add a comment to explain why the list needs to be checked before zapping, which is the primary motivation for this change.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-1@@ -2731,12 +2731,15 @@ bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, goto out; } - r = false;write_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c bool __kvm_mmu_unprotect_gfn_and_retry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, · line 2740
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +6
-3-for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa)) { - r = true; +for_each_gfn_valid_sp_with_gptes (kvm, sp,gpa_to_gfn (gpa))kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page (kvm, sp, &invalid_list); - } + +/* +* Snapshot the result before zapping, as zapping will remove all list +* entries, i.e. checking the list later would yield a false negative. +*/ Hmm, the comment is kinda overkill? Maybe just
Quoted 2 lines
/* Return whether there were sptes to zap. */ r = !list_empty(&invalid_test);I would strongly prefer to keep the verbose comment. I was "this" close to removing the local variable and checking
list_empty()after the commit phase. If we made that goof, it would only show up at the worst time, i.e. when a guest triggers retry and gets stuck. And the logical outcome of fixing such a bug would be to add a comment to prevent it from happening again, so I say just add the comment straightaway.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not sure about patch 21 - I like the simple
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page()function.From a code perspective, I kinda like having a separate helper too. As you
likely suspect given your below suggestion, KVM should never unprotect a gfn without retry protection, i.e. there should never be another caller, and I want to enforce that.
Oh, another argument for eliminating the separate helper is that having a separate helper makes it really hard to write a comment for why reading indirect_shadow_pages outside of mmu_lock is ok (it reads/looks weird if mmu_lock is taken in a different helper).
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
The folks doing TDX enabling ran into a problem where exposing a read-only memslot to a TDX guest put it into an infinite loop. The most immediate issue is that KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs for RO memslots, because except for TDX (which isn't officially supported yet), such SPTEs can't distinguish between reads and writes, i.e. would trigger MMIO on everything and thus defeat the purpose of having a RX memslot.
That breaks TDX, SEV-ES, and SNP, i.e. VM types that rely on MMIO caching to reflect MMIO faults into the guest as #VC/#VE, as the guest never sees the fault, KVM refuses to emulate, the guest loops indefinitely. That's patch 1.
Patches 2-4 fix an amusing number of other bugs that made it difficult to figure out the true root cause.
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The rest is a bunch of cleanups to consolidate all of the unprotect+retry paths (there are four-ish).
As a bonus, adding
RET_PF_WRITE_PROTECTEDobviates the need for kvm_lookup_pfn()[*].
Nice! For now I've placed it in kvm/queue as this is clearly 6.12 material. It will be replaced by the v2 of course before graduating to kvm/next.
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 49 lines
Sean Christopherson (22):
KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is
valid
KVM: x86/mmu: Trigger unprotect logic only on write-protection page
faults
KVM: x86/mmu: Skip emulation on page fault iff 1+ SPs were unprotected
KVM: x86: Retry to-be-emulated insn in "slow" unprotect path iff sp is
zapped
KVM: x86: Get RIP from vCPU state when storing it tolast_retry_eip
KVM: x86: Store gpa asgpa_t, not unsigned long, when unprotecting for
retry
KVM: x86/mmu: Apply retry protection to "fast nTDP unprotect" path
KVM: x86/mmu: Try "unprotect for retry" iff there are indirect SPs
KVM: x86/mmu: ReplacePFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGEwith a more descriptive
helper
KVM: x86: MoveEMULTYPE_ALLOW_RETRY_PFtox86_emulate_instruction()
KVM: x86: Foldretry_instruction()intox86_emulate_instruction()
KVM: x86/mmu: Don't try to unprotect anINVALID_GPA
KVM: x86/mmu: Always walk guest PTEs with WRITE access when
unprotecting
KVM: x86/mmu: Move event re-injection unprotect+retry into common path
KVM: x86: Remove manual pfn lookup when retrying #PF after failed
emulation
KVM: x86: CheckEMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SPbefore unprotecting gfn
KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path
KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on
emulation failure
KVM: x86: Rename
reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure()
KVM: x86/mmu: Subsumekvm_mmu_unprotect_page()into theand_retry()
version
KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on
invalid_listarch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 16 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 133 +++++++----------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 ++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)base-commit:
332d2c1d713e232e163386c35a3ba0c1b90df83f