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bpf: Fix a kernel verifier crash in stacksafe()

PATCH Applied Yonghong Song 3 participants 4 messages Aug 12, 2024 – Aug 13, 2024

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Yonghong Song

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: Fix a kernel verifier crash in stacksafe()

Daniel Hodges reported a kernel verifier crash when playing with sched-ext. The crash dump looks like below:

  [   65.874474] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088
  [   65.888406] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  [   65.898682] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  [   65.908957] PGD 0 P4D 0
  [   65.914020] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  [   65.920300] CPU: 19 PID: 9364 Comm: scx_layered Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S          E      6.9.5-g93cea04637ea-dirty #7
  [   65.941874] Hardware name: Quanta Delta Lake MP 29F0EMA01D0/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A19 04/27/2023
  [   65.960664] RIP: 0010:states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   65.969559] Code: 33 85 ed 89 e8 41 0f 48 c7 83 e0 f8 89 e9 29 c1 48 63 c1 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e1 07 49 8d 14 08 0f
                 b6 54 10 78 49 03 8a 58 05 00 00 <3a> 54 08 78 0f 85 60 03 00 00 49 c1 e5 07 43 8b 44 28 70 83 e0 03
  [   66.007120] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ebeb8b8 EFLAGS: 00010202
  [   66.017570] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888149719680 RCX: 0000000000000010
  [   66.031843] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88907f4e0c08 RDI: ffff8881572f0000
  [   66.046115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8883d5014000 R09: ffffffff83065d50
  [   66.060386] R10: ffff8881bf9a1800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
  [   66.074659] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888149719a40 R15: 0000000000000007
  [   66.088932] FS:  00007f5d5da96800(0000) GS:ffff88907f4c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [   66.105114] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [   66.116606] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 0000000388261001 CR4: 00000000007706f0
  [   66.130873] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [   66.145145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [   66.159416] PKRU: 55555554
  [   66.164823] Call Trace:
  [   66.169709]  <TASK>
  [   66.173906]  ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0
  [   66.180890]  ? page_fault_oops+0x370/0x3d0
  [   66.189082]  ? console_unlock+0xb5/0x140
  [   66.196926]  ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xb0
  [   66.204597]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  [   66.212974]  ? states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   66.220643]  ? states_equal+0x529/0x770
  [   66.228312]  do_check+0x60f/0x5240
  [   66.235114]  do_check_common+0x388/0x840
  [   66.242960]  do_check_subprogs+0x101/0x150
  [   66.251150]  bpf_check+0x5d5/0x4b60
  [   66.258134]  ? __mod_memcg_state+0x79/0x110
  [   66.266506]  ? pcpu_alloc+0x892/0xba0
  [   66.273829]  bpf_prog_load+0x5bb/0x660
  [   66.281324]  ? bpf_prog_bind_map+0x1e1/0x290
  [   66.289862]  __sys_bpf+0x29d/0x3a0
  [   66.296664]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x18/0x20
  [   66.303811]  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x140
  [   66.311133]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Forther investigation shows that the crash is due to invalid memory access in stacksafe(). More specifically, it is the following code:

    if (exact != NOT_EXACT &&
        old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
        cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
            return false;

If cur->allocated_stack is 0, cur->stack will be a ZERO_SIZE_PTR. If this happens, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] will crash the kernel as the memory address is illegal. This is exactly what happened in the above crash dump. If cur->allocated_stack is not 0, the above code could trigger array out-of-bound access.

The patch added a condition 'i >= cur->allocated_stack' such that if the condition is true, stacksafe() should fail. Otherwise, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] memory access is always legal.

Fixes 2793a8b015f7 ("bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks")
Cc Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Changelogs:
v1 -> v2:
- If 'i >= cur->allocated_stack' during !NOT_EXACT slot_type comparisoon, return false.

kernel/bpf/verifier.c +3 -2
index 4cb5441ad75f..d8520095ca03 100644
@@ -16884,8 +16884,9 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
 		spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
 
 		if (exact != NOT_EXACT &&
-		    old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
-		    cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
+		    (i >= cur->allocated_stack ||
+		     old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
+		     cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]))
 			return false;
 
 		if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add a test to verify previous stacksafe() fix

A selftest is added such that without the previous patch, a crash can happen. With the previous patch, the test can run successfully. The new test is written in a way which mimics original crash case:
main_prog
static_prog_1
static_prog_2
where static_prog_1 has different paths to static_prog_2 and some path has stack allocated and some other path does not. A stacksafe() checking in static_prog_2() triggered the crash.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)

Changelogs:
v1 -> v2:
- remove unused 'len' argument for nest_2().

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c +54 -0
index 16bdc3e25591..ef70b88bccb2 100644
@@ -1432,4 +1432,58 @@ int iter_arr_with_actual_elem_count(const void *ctx)
 	return sum;
 }
 
+__u32 upper, select_n, result;
+__u64 global;
+
+static __noinline bool nest_2(char *str)
+{
+	/* some insns (including branch insns) to ensure stacksafe() is triggered
+	 * in nest_2(). This way, stacksafe() can compare frame associated with nest_1().
+	 */
+	if (str[0] == 't')
+		return true;
+	if (str[1] == 'e')
+		return true;
+	if (str[2] == 's')
+		return true;
+	if (str[3] == 't')
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static __noinline bool nest_1(int n)
+{
+	/* case 0: allocate stack, case 1: no allocate stack */
+	switch (n) {
+	case 0: {
+		char comm[16];
+
+		if (bpf_get_current_comm(comm, 16))
+			return false;
+		return nest_2(comm);
+	}
+	case 1:
+		return nest_2((char *)&global);
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+SEC("raw_tp")
+__success
+int iter_subprog_check_stacksafe(const void *ctx)
+{
+	long i;
+
+	bpf_for(i, 0, upper) {
+		if (!nest_1(select_n)) {
+			result = 1;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	result = 2;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
#2 lore raw
In reply to Yonghong Song
Quoted 39 lines · Yonghong Song

Daniel Hodges reported a kernel verifier crash when playing with sched-ext. The crash dump looks like below:

  [   65.874474] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088
  [   65.888406] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  [   65.898682] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  [   65.908957] PGD 0 P4D 0
  [   65.914020] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  [   65.920300] CPU: 19 PID: 9364 Comm: scx_layered Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S          E      6.9.5-g93cea04637ea-dirty #7
  [   65.941874] Hardware name: Quanta Delta Lake MP 29F0EMA01D0/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A19 04/27/2023
  [   65.960664] RIP: 0010:states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   65.969559] Code: 33 85 ed 89 e8 41 0f 48 c7 83 e0 f8 89 e9 29 c1 48 63 c1 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e1 07 49 8d 14 08 0f
                 b6 54 10 78 49 03 8a 58 05 00 00 <3a> 54 08 78 0f 85 60 03 00 00 49 c1 e5 07 43 8b 44 28 70 83 e0 03
  [   66.007120] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ebeb8b8 EFLAGS: 00010202
  [   66.017570] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888149719680 RCX: 0000000000000010
  [   66.031843] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88907f4e0c08 RDI: ffff8881572f0000
  [   66.046115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8883d5014000 R09: ffffffff83065d50
  [   66.060386] R10: ffff8881bf9a1800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
  [   66.074659] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888149719a40 R15: 0000000000000007
  [   66.088932] FS:  00007f5d5da96800(0000) GS:ffff88907f4c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [   66.105114] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [   66.116606] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 0000000388261001 CR4: 00000000007706f0
  [   66.130873] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [   66.145145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [   66.159416] PKRU: 55555554
  [   66.164823] Call Trace:
  [   66.169709]  <TASK>
  [   66.173906]  ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0
  [   66.180890]  ? page_fault_oops+0x370/0x3d0
  [   66.189082]  ? console_unlock+0xb5/0x140
  [   66.196926]  ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xb0
  [   66.204597]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  [   66.212974]  ? states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   66.220643]  ? states_equal+0x529/0x770
  [   66.228312]  do_check+0x60f/0x5240
  [   66.235114]  do_check_common+0x388/0x840
  [   66.242960]  do_check_subprogs+0x101/0x150
  [   66.251150]  bpf_check+0x5d5/0x4b60
Quoted 8 lines
  [   66.258134]  ? __mod_memcg_state+0x79/0x110
  [   66.266506]  ? pcpu_alloc+0x892/0xba0
  [   66.273829]  bpf_prog_load+0x5bb/0x660
  [   66.281324]  ? bpf_prog_bind_map+0x1e1/0x290
  [   66.289862]  __sys_bpf+0x29d/0x3a0
  [   66.296664]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x18/0x20
  [   66.303811]  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x140
  [   66.311133]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

This stack trace doesn't really help to understand the issue. So I removed it.

Quoted 1 line

Forther investigation shows that the crash is due to invalid memory access in stacksafe().

further.

Quoted 7 lines

More specifically, it is the following code:

    if (exact != NOT_EXACT &&
        old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
        cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
            return false;
Quoted 5 lines

If cur->allocated_stack is 0, cur->stack will be a ZERO_SIZE_PTR. If this happens, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] will crash the kernel as the memory address is illegal. This is exactly what happened in the above crash dump. If cur->allocated_stack is not 0, the above code could trigger array out-of-bound access.

And reworded this paragraph, since ZERO_SIZE_PTR detail is a distraction.

Quoted 3 lines

The patch added a condition 'i >= cur->allocated_stack' such that if the condition is true, stacksafe() should fail. Otherwise, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] memory access is always legal.

and reformatted everything to fit 75 char line.

We've been sloppy with commit log line width.
It's better to align to 75 char as the rest of the kernel does.

Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 2793a8b015f7 ("bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks")
Cc Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>

Applied to bpf tree.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Yonghong Song
This series was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:

Quoted 47 lines · On Mon, 12 Aug 2024 14:48:47 -0700 you wrote:

Daniel Hodges reported a kernel verifier crash when playing with sched-ext. The crash dump looks like below:

  [   65.874474] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088
  [   65.888406] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  [   65.898682] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  [   65.908957] PGD 0 P4D 0
  [   65.914020] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  [   65.920300] CPU: 19 PID: 9364 Comm: scx_layered Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S          E      6.9.5-g93cea04637ea-dirty #7
  [   65.941874] Hardware name: Quanta Delta Lake MP 29F0EMA01D0/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A19 04/27/2023
  [   65.960664] RIP: 0010:states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   65.969559] Code: 33 85 ed 89 e8 41 0f 48 c7 83 e0 f8 89 e9 29 c1 48 63 c1 4c 89 e9 48 c1 e1 07 49 8d 14 08 0f
                 b6 54 10 78 49 03 8a 58 05 00 00 <3a> 54 08 78 0f 85 60 03 00 00 49 c1 e5 07 43 8b 44 28 70 83 e0 03
  [   66.007120] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000ebeb8b8 EFLAGS: 00010202
  [   66.017570] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888149719680 RCX: 0000000000000010
  [   66.031843] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88907f4e0c08 RDI: ffff8881572f0000
  [   66.046115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8883d5014000 R09: ffffffff83065d50
  [   66.060386] R10: ffff8881bf9a1800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
  [   66.074659] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888149719a40 R15: 0000000000000007
  [   66.088932] FS:  00007f5d5da96800(0000) GS:ffff88907f4c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [   66.105114] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [   66.116606] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 0000000388261001 CR4: 00000000007706f0
  [   66.130873] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [   66.145145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [   66.159416] PKRU: 55555554
  [   66.164823] Call Trace:
  [   66.169709]  <TASK>
  [   66.173906]  ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0
  [   66.180890]  ? page_fault_oops+0x370/0x3d0
  [   66.189082]  ? console_unlock+0xb5/0x140
  [   66.196926]  ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xb0
  [   66.204597]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  [   66.212974]  ? states_equal+0x3ee/0x770
  [   66.220643]  ? states_equal+0x529/0x770
  [   66.228312]  do_check+0x60f/0x5240
  [   66.235114]  do_check_common+0x388/0x840
  [   66.242960]  do_check_subprogs+0x101/0x150
  [   66.251150]  bpf_check+0x5d5/0x4b60
  [   66.258134]  ? __mod_memcg_state+0x79/0x110
  [   66.266506]  ? pcpu_alloc+0x892/0xba0
  [   66.273829]  bpf_prog_load+0x5bb/0x660
  [   66.281324]  ? bpf_prog_bind_map+0x1e1/0x290
  [   66.289862]  __sys_bpf+0x29d/0x3a0
  [   66.296664]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x18/0x20
  [   66.303811]  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x140
  [   66.311133]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Quoted 1 line

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf,v2,1/2] bpf: Fix a kernel verifier crash in stacksafe()

    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/bed2eb964c70
  - [bpf,v2,2/2] selftests/bpf: Add a test to verify previous stacksafe() fix
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/662c3e2db00f

You are awesome, thank you!

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