KVM: Fix a lurking bug in kvm_clear_guest()
Sean Christopherson
maintainercover KVM: Fix a lurking bug in kvm_clear_guest()
Fix a bug in kvm_clear_guest() where it would write beyond the target page _if_ handed a gpa+len that would span multiple pages. Luckily, the bug is unhittable in the current code base as all users ensure the gpa+len is bound to a single page.
Patch 2 hardens the underlying single page APIs to guard against a bad offset+len, e.g. so that bugs like the one in kvm_clear_guest() are noisy and don't escalate to an out-of-bounds access.
Verified and tested by hacking KVM to use kvm_clear_guest() when zeroing all three pages used for KVM's hidden TSS.
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9 -6
@@ -3872,14 +3872,17 @@ bool __vmx_guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)static int init_rmode_tss (struct kvm *kvm,void __user *ua) { -const void *zero_page = (const void *)__va (page_to_phys (ZERO_PAGE (0 ))); +// const void *zero_page = (const void *) __va(page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0))); u16 data; -int i; +// int i; -for (i =0 ; i <3 ; i++) { -if (__copy_to_user (ua +PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page,PAGE_SIZE )) -return -EFAULT ; - } +if (kvm_clear_guest (kvm,to_kvm_vmx (kvm)->tss_addr,PAGE_SIZE *3 )) +return -EFAULT ; + +// for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { +// if (__copy_to_user(ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE)) +// return -EFAULT; +// } data =TSS_BASE_SIZE +TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE ;if (__copy_to_user (ua +TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET , &data,sizeof (u16)))
Sean Christopherson (2):
KVM: Write the per-page "segment" when clearing (part of) a guest page
KVM: Harden guest memory APIs against out-of-bounds accesses
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
base-commit: 15e1c3d65975524c5c792fcd59f7d89f00402261
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.469.g59c65b2a67-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 1/2 KVM: Write the per-page "segment" when clearing (part of) a guest page
Pass "seg" instead of "len" when writing guest memory in kvm_clear_guest(), as "seg" holds the number of bytes to write for the current page, while "len" holds the total bytes remaining.
Luckily, all users of kvm_clear_guest() are guaranteed to not cross a page boundary, and so the bug is unhittable in the current code base.
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
@@ -3582,7 +3582,7 @@ int kvm_clear_guest(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len)int ret;while ((seg =next_segment (len, offset)) !=0 ) { - ret =kvm_write_guest_page (kvm, gfn, zero_page, offset, len); + ret =kvm_write_guest_page (kvm, gfn, zero_page, offset, seg);if (ret <0 )return ret; offset =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.469.g59c65b2a67-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerPATCH 2/2 KVM: Harden guest memory APIs against out-of-bounds accesses
In reply to Sean ChristophersonWhen reading or writing a guest page, WARN and bail if offset+len would result in a read to a different page so that KVM bugs are more likely to be detected, and so that any such bugs are less likely to escalate to an out-of-bounds access. E.g. if userspace isn't using guard pages and the target page is at the end of a memslot.
Note, KVM already hardens itself in similar APIs, e.g. in the "cached" variants, it's just the vanilla APIs that are playing with fire.
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +9 -0
@@ -3276,6 +3276,9 @@ static int __kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,int r;unsigned long addr; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset + len >PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EFAULT ; + addr =gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot (slot, gfn,NULL );if (kvm_is_error_hva (addr))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -3349,6 +3352,9 @@ static int __kvm_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,int r;unsigned long addr; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset + len >PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EFAULT ; + addr =gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot (slot, gfn,NULL );if (kvm_is_error_hva (addr))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -3379,6 +3385,9 @@ static int __kvm_write_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm,int r;unsigned long addr; +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (offset + len >PAGE_SIZE )) +return -EFAULT ; + addr =gfn_to_hva_memslot (memslot, gfn);if (kvm_is_error_hva (addr))return -EFAULT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0.469.g59c65b2a67-goog
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Fix a bug in
kvm_clear_guest()where it would write beyond the target page _if_ handed a gpa+len that would span multiple pages. Luckily, the bug is unhittable in the current code base as all users ensure the gpa+len is bound to a single page.Patch 2 hardens the underlying single page APIs to guard against a bad offset+len, e.g. so that bugs like the one in
kvm_clear_guest()are noisy and don't escalate to an out-of-bounds access.[...]
Applied to kvm-x86 generic, thanks!
[1/2] KVM: Write the per-page "segment" when clearing (part of) a guest page
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/ec495f2ab122 [2/2] KVM: Harden guest memory APIs against out-of-bounds accesses https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/025dde582bbf