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jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()

PATCH In review Qasim Ijaz 2 participants 2 messages Feb 13, 2025 – Feb 19, 2025

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Qasim Ijaz

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()

During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().

Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:

	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));

Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).

The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration:

	for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;

		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
	
		...
	}

The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following for loop:

	for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
			if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
				goto overflow2;
			ch = ptr[j];
		...
	}

To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" before it is utilised.

Fixes d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")

---
v2:
- Added Cc stable tag

 fs/jfs/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/jfs/xattr.c +10 -5
index 24afbae87225..7575c51cce9b 100644
@@ -559,11 +555,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size)
 
       size_check:
 	if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
-		int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
-
-		printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
-		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
-				     ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
+			       EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+		} else {
+			int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
+			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
+				       ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		}
 		ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
 		rc = -EIO;
 		goto clean_up;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
#1 lore raw
Quoted 46 lines · Qasim Ijaz

During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().

Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:

	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));

Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).

The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration:

	for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;

		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
	
		...
	}

The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following for loop:

	for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
			if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
				goto overflow2;
			ch = ptr[j];
		...
	}
Quoted 2 lines

To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" before it is utilised.

Agreed. The patch looks good. I'll add it to jfs-next

Shaggy

Quoted 40 lines
Fixes d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")

---
v2:
- Added Cc stable tag

  fs/jfs/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/jfs/xattr.c +10 -5
index 24afbae87225..7575c51cce9b 100644
@@ -559,11 +555,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size)
 
        size_check:
  	if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
-		int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
-
-		printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
-		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
-				     ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
+			       EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+		} else {
+			int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
+			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
+				       ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		}
  		ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
  		rc = -EIO;
  		goto clean_up;