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station: always add BSS to network blacklist on failure

PATCH In review James Prestwood 2 participants 12 messages Mar 28, 2025 – Apr 1, 2025

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/11 station: always add BSS to network blacklist on failure

Allowing the timeout blacklist to be disabled has introduced a bug where a failed connection will not result in the BSS list to be traversed. This causes IWD to retry the same BSS over and over which be either a) have some issue preventing a connection or b) may simply be unreachable/out of range.

This is because IWD was inherently relying on the timeout blacklist to flag BSS's on failures. With it disabled there was nothing to tell network_bss_select that we should skip the BSS and it would return the same BSS indefinitely.

To fix this some of the blacklisting logic was re-worked in station. Now, a BSS will always get network blacklisted upon a failure. This allows network.c to traverse to the next BSS upon failure.

For auth/assoc failures we will then only timeout blacklist under certain conditions, i.e. the status code was not in the temporary list.

Fixes 77639d2d452e ("blacklist: allow configuration to disable the blacklist")
---
 src/station.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/station.c +21 -4
index 5403c332..0b20e785 100644
@@ -3402,6 +3402,13 @@ static bool station_retry_with_reason(struct station *station,
 
 	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr);
 
+	/*
+	 * Network blacklist the BSS as well, since the timeout blacklist could
+	 * be disabled
+	 */
+	network_blacklist_add(station->connected_network,
+				station->connected_bss);
+
 try_next:
 	return station_try_next_bss(station);
 }
@@ -3449,6 +3456,10 @@ static bool station_pmksa_fallback(struct station *station, uint16_t status)
 static bool station_retry_with_status(struct station *station,
 					uint16_t status_code)
 {
+	/* If PMKSA failed don't blacklist so we can retry this BSS */
+	if (station_pmksa_fallback(station, status_code))
+		goto try_next;
+
 	/*
 	 * Certain Auth/Assoc failures should not cause a timeout blacklist.
 	 * In these cases we want to only temporarily blacklist the BSS until
@@ -3459,12 +3470,18 @@ static bool station_retry_with_status(struct station *station,
 	 *       specific BSS on our next attempt. There is currently no way to
 	 *       obtain that IE, but this should be done in the future.
 	 */
-	if (IS_TEMPORARY_STATUS(status_code))
-		network_blacklist_add(station->connected_network,
-						station->connected_bss);
-	else if (!station_pmksa_fallback(station, status_code))
+	if (!IS_TEMPORARY_STATUS(status_code))
 		blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr);
 
+	/*
+	 * Unconditionally network blacklist the BSS if we are retrying. This
+	 * will allow network_bss_select to traverse the BSS list and ignore
+	 * BSS's which have previously failed
+	 */
+	network_blacklist_add(station->connected_network,
+				station->connected_bss);
+
+try_next:
 	iwd_notice(IWD_NOTICE_CONNECT_FAILED, "status: %u", status_code);
 
 	return station_try_next_bss(station);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/11 auto-t: add test for disabling the timeout blacklist

---
 autotests/testBSSBlacklist/TestBlacklist.psk  |  2 +
 autotests/testBSSBlacklist/connection_test.py | 57 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../{main.conf => main.conf.default}          |  0
 autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf.disabled |  2 +
 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 autotests/testBSSBlacklist/TestBlacklist.psk
 rename autotests/testBSSBlacklist/{main.conf => main.conf.default} (100%)
 create mode 100644 autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf.disabled
autotests/testBSSBlacklist/TestBlacklist.psk new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..abafdb66
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[Security]
+Passphrase=secret123
autotests/testBSSBlacklist/connection_test.py +57 -0

69 lines not on this page · raw message

autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf.default renamed from autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf
rename to autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf.default
autotests/testBSSBlacklist/main.conf.disabled new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..aae6bc12
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[Blacklist]
+InitialTimeout=0
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/11 blacklist: include a blacklist reason when adding/finding

In reply to James Prestwood

To both prepare for some new blacklisting behavior and allow for easier consolidation of the network-specific blacklist include a reason enum for each entry. This allows IWD to differentiate between multiple blacklist types. For now only the existing "permanent" type is being added which prevents connections to that BSS via autoconnect until it expires.

By including a type into each entry we now have additional search criteria and can have multiple entires of the same BSS with different reasons. This was done versus a bitmask because each blacklist reason may have a different expiration time. We want to maintain individual expirations to have the best "memory" of past events rather than overwriting them.

Future patches will lump in the temporary network blacklist as well as a new roaming blacklist type.

---
 src/blacklist.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 src/blacklist.h | 14 +++++++++---
 src/network.c   |  3 ++-
 src/station.c   | 12 ++++++----
 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
src/blacklist.c +51 -10
index 21f85a75..8ae474b3 100644
@@ -51,10 +51,27 @@ struct blacklist_entry {
 	uint8_t addr[6];
 	uint64_t added_time;
 	uint64_t expire_time;
+	enum blacklist_reason reason;
+};
+
+struct blacklist_search {
+	const uint8_t *addr;
+	enum blacklist_reason reason;
 };
 
 static struct l_queue *blacklist;
 
+static uint64_t get_reason_timeout(enum blacklist_reason reason)
+{
+	switch (reason) {
+	case BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED:
+		return blacklist_initial_timeout;
+	default:
+		l_warn("Unhandled blacklist reason: %u", reason);
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
 static bool check_if_expired(void *data, void *user_data)
 {
 	struct blacklist_entry *entry = data;
@@ -87,15 +104,31 @@ static bool match_addr(const void *a, const void *b)
 	return false;
 }
 
-void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr)
+static bool match_addr_and_reason(const void *a, const void *b)
 {
-	struct blacklist_entry *entry;
+	const struct blacklist_entry *entry = a;
+	const struct blacklist_search *search = b;
 
-	if (!blacklist_initial_timeout)
-		return;
+	if (entry->reason != search->reason)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!memcmp(entry->addr, search->addr, 6))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
+{
+	struct blacklist_entry *entry;
+	uint64_t timeout;
 
 	blacklist_prune();
 
+	timeout = get_reason_timeout(reason);
+	if (!timeout)
+		return;
+
 	entry = l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr, addr);
 
 	if (entry) {
@@ -115,22 +148,26 @@ void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr)
 	entry = l_new(struct blacklist_entry, 1);
 
 	entry->added_time = l_time_now();
-	entry->expire_time = l_time_offset(entry->added_time,
-						blacklist_initial_timeout);
+	entry->expire_time = l_time_offset(entry->added_time, timeout);
+	entry->reason = reason;
 	memcpy(entry->addr, addr, 6);
 
 	l_queue_push_tail(blacklist, entry);
 }
 
-bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr)
+bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 {
 	bool ret;
 	uint64_t time_now;
 	struct blacklist_entry *entry;
+	struct blacklist_search search = {
+		.addr = addr,
+		.reason = reason
+	};
 
 	blacklist_prune();
 
-	entry = l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr, addr);
+	entry = l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr_and_reason, &search);
 
 	if (!entry)
 		return false;
@@ -142,13 +179,17 @@ bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-void blacklist_remove_bss(const uint8_t *addr)
+void blacklist_remove_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 {
 	struct blacklist_entry *entry;
+	struct blacklist_search search = {
+		.addr = addr,
+		.reason = reason
+	};
 
 	blacklist_prune();
 
-	entry = l_queue_remove_if(blacklist, match_addr, addr);
+	entry = l_queue_remove_if(blacklist, match_addr_and_reason, &search);
 
 	if (!entry)
 		return;
src/blacklist.h +11 -3
index 56260e20..a87e5eca 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@
  *
  */
 
-void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr);
-bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr);
-void blacklist_remove_bss(const uint8_t *addr);
+enum blacklist_reason {
+	/*
+	 * When a BSS is blacklisted using this reason IWD will refuse to
+	 * connect to it via autoconnect
+	 */
+	BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED,
+};
+
+void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason);
+bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason);
+void blacklist_remove_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason);
src/network.c +2 -1
index 0a40a6c5..4602a110 100644
@@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ struct scan_bss *network_bss_select(struct network *network,
 		if (l_queue_find(network->blacklist, match_bss, bss))
 			continue;
 
-		if (blacklist_contains_bss(bss->addr))
+		if (blacklist_contains_bss(bss->addr,
+					BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED))
 			continue;
 
 		/* OWE Transition BSS */
src/station.c +8 -4
index 0b20e785..e2ed78f3 100644
@@ -2880,7 +2880,8 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 		if (network_can_connect_bss(network, bss) < 0)
 			goto next;
 
-		if (blacklist_contains_bss(bss->addr))
+		if (blacklist_contains_bss(bss->addr,
+					BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED))
 			goto next;
 
 		rank = bss->rank;
@@ -3400,7 +3401,8 @@ static bool station_retry_with_reason(struct station *station,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr);
+	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
+				BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED);
 
 	/*
 	 * Network blacklist the BSS as well, since the timeout blacklist could
@@ -3471,7 +3473,8 @@ static bool station_retry_with_status(struct station *station,
 	 *       obtain that IE, but this should be done in the future.
 	 */
 	if (!IS_TEMPORARY_STATUS(status_code))
-		blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr);
+		blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
+					BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED);
 
 	/*
 	 * Unconditionally network blacklist the BSS if we are retrying. This
@@ -3566,7 +3569,8 @@ static void station_connect_cb(struct netdev *netdev, enum netdev_result result,
 
 	switch (result) {
 	case NETDEV_RESULT_OK:
-		blacklist_remove_bss(station->connected_bss->addr);
+		blacklist_remove_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
+					BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED);
 		station_connect_ok(station);
 		return;
 	case NETDEV_RESULT_DISCONNECTED:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/11 blacklist: fix pruning to remove the entry if its expired

In reply to James Prestwood

When pruning the list check_if_expired was comparing to the maximum amount of time a BSS can be blacklisted, not if the current time had exceeded the expirationt time. This results in blacklist entries hanging around longer than they should, which would result in them poentially being blacklisted even longer if there was another reason to blacklist in the future.

Instead on prune check the actual expiration and remove the entry if its expired. Doing this removes the need to check any of the times in blacklist_contains_bss since prune will remove any expired entries correctly.

---
 src/blacklist.c | 16 ++--------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
src/blacklist.c +2 -14
index 8ae474b3..2539c5e0 100644
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static bool check_if_expired(void *data, void *user_data)
 	struct blacklist_entry *entry = data;
 	uint64_t now = l_get_u64(user_data);
 
-	if (l_time_diff(now, entry->added_time) > blacklist_max_timeout) {
+	if (l_time_after(now, entry->expire_time)) {
 		l_debug("Removing entry "MAC" on prune", MAC_STR(entry->addr));
 		l_free(entry);
 		return true;
@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 
 bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 {
-	bool ret;
-	uint64_t time_now;
-	struct blacklist_entry *entry;
 	struct blacklist_search search = {
 		.addr = addr,
 		.reason = reason
@@ -167,16 +164,7 @@ bool blacklist_contains_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 
 	blacklist_prune();
 
-	entry = l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr_and_reason, &search);
-
-	if (!entry)
-		return false;
-
-	time_now = l_time_now();
-
-	ret = l_time_after(time_now, entry->expire_time) ? false : true;
-
-	return ret;
+	return l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr_and_reason, &search) != NULL;
 }
 
 void blacklist_remove_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/11 blacklist: add new blacklist reason, ROAM_REQUESTED

In reply to James Prestwood

This adds a new (less severe) blacklist reason as well as an option to configure the timeout. This blacklist reason will be used in cases where a BSS has requested IWD roam elsewhere. At that time a new blacklist entry will be added which will be used along with some other criteria to determine if IWD should connect/roam to that BSS again.

Now that we have multiple blacklist reasons there may be situations where a blacklist entry already exists but with a different reason. This is going to be handled by the reason severity. Since we have just two reasons we will treat a connection failure as most severe and a roam requested as less severe. This leaves us with two possible situations:

1. BSS is roam blacklisted, then gets connection blacklisted:
The reason will be "promoted" to connection blacklisted.

2. BSS is connection blacklisted, then gets roam blacklisted:
The blacklist request will be ignored

---
 src/blacklist.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 src/blacklist.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
src/blacklist.c +30 -2
index 2539c5e0..4250618b 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 
 static uint64_t blacklist_multiplier;
 static uint64_t blacklist_initial_timeout;
+static uint64_t blacklist_roam_initial_timeout;
 static uint64_t blacklist_max_timeout;
 
 struct blacklist_entry {
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ static uint64_t get_reason_timeout(enum blacklist_reason reason)
 	switch (reason) {
 	case BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED:
 		return blacklist_initial_timeout;
+	case BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED:
+		return blacklist_roam_initial_timeout;
 	default:
 		l_warn("Unhandled blacklist reason: %u", reason);
 		return 0;
@@ -132,8 +135,25 @@ void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason)
 	entry = l_queue_find(blacklist, match_addr, addr);
 
 	if (entry) {
-		uint64_t offset = l_time_diff(entry->added_time,
-							entry->expire_time);
+		uint64_t offset;
+
+		if (reason < entry->reason) {
+			l_debug("Promoting "MAC" blacklist to reason %u",
+					MAC_STR(addr), reason);
+			/* Reset this to the new timeout and reason */
+			entry->reason = reason;
+			entry->added_time = l_time_now();
+			entry->expire_time = l_time_offset(entry->added_time,
+								timeout);
+			return;
+		} else if (reason > entry->reason) {
+			l_debug("Ignoring blacklist extension of "MAC", "
+				"current blacklist status is more severe!",
+				MAC_STR(addr));
+			return;
+		}
+
+		offset = l_time_diff(entry->added_time, entry->expire_time);
 
 		offset *= blacklist_multiplier;
 
@@ -196,6 +216,14 @@ static int blacklist_init(void)
 	/* For easier user configuration the timeout values are in seconds */
 	blacklist_initial_timeout *= L_USEC_PER_SEC;
 
+	if (!l_settings_get_uint64(config, "Blacklist",
+					"InitialRoamRequestedTimeout",
+					&blacklist_roam_initial_timeout))
+		blacklist_roam_initial_timeout = BLACKLIST_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
+
+	/* For easier user configuration the timeout values are in seconds */
+	blacklist_roam_initial_timeout *= L_USEC_PER_SEC;
+
 	if (!l_settings_get_uint64(config, "Blacklist",
 					"Multiplier",
 					&blacklist_multiplier))
src/blacklist.h +7 -0
index a87e5eca..f5c899e0 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ enum blacklist_reason {
 	 * connect to it via autoconnect
 	 */
 	BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED,
+	/*
+	 * This type of blacklist is added when a BSS requests IWD roams
+	 * elsewhere. This is to aid in preventing IWD from roaming/connecting
+	 * back to that BSS in the future unless there are no other "good"
+	 * candidates to connect to.
+	 */
+	BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED,
 };
 
 void blacklist_add_bss(const uint8_t *addr, enum blacklist_reason reason);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/11 netdev: add netdev_get_low_signal_threshold

In reply to James Prestwood
---
 src/netdev.c | 8 ++++++++
 src/netdev.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
src/netdev.c +8 -0
index 2a6d94fc..048681f5 100644
@@ -463,6 +463,14 @@ uint8_t netdev_get_rssi_level_idx(struct netdev *netdev)
 	return netdev->cur_rssi_level_idx;
 }
 
+int netdev_get_low_signal_threshold(uint32_t frequency)
+{
+	if (frequency > 4000)
+		return LOW_SIGNAL_THRESHOLD_5GHZ;
+
+	return LOW_SIGNAL_THRESHOLD;
+}
+
 static void netdev_set_powered_result(int error, uint16_t type,
 					const void *data,
 					uint32_t len, void *user_data)
src/netdev.h +1 -0
index 6299934e..4ac1de40 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ const char *netdev_get_name(struct netdev *netdev);
 bool netdev_get_is_up(struct netdev *netdev);
 const char *netdev_get_path(struct netdev *netdev);
 uint8_t netdev_get_rssi_level_idx(struct netdev *netdev);
+int netdev_get_low_signal_threshold(uint32_t frequency);
 
 struct handshake_state *netdev_handshake_state_new(struct netdev *netdev);
 struct handshake_state *netdev_get_handshake(struct netdev *netdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 7/11 station: roam blacklist BSS's, and consider when roaming

In reply to James Prestwood

If the BSS is requesting IWD roam elsewhere add this BSS to the blacklist using BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED. This will lower the chances of IWD roaming/connecting back to this BSS in the future.

This then allows IWD to consider this blacklist state when picking a roam candidate. Its undesireable to fully ban a roam blacklisted BSS, so some additional sorting logic has been added. Prior to comparing based on rank, BSS's will be sorted into two higher level groups:

Above Threshold - BSS is above the CriticalRoamThreshold Below Threshold - BSS is below the CriticalRoamThreshold

Within each of these groups the BSS may be roam blacklisted which will position it at the bottom of the list within its respecitve group.

---
 src/station.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
src/station.c +69 -6
index e2ed78f3..623cfdca 100644
@@ -155,6 +155,55 @@ struct anqp_entry {
 	uint32_t pending;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Rather than sorting BSS's purely based on ranking a higher level grouping
+ * is used. The purpose of this higher order grouping is the consider the BSS's
+ * roam blacklist status. The roam blacklist is a "soft" blacklist in that we
+ * still should connect to these BSS's if they are the only "good" option.
+ * The question here is: what makes a BSS "good" vs "bad".
+ *
+ * For an initial (probably naive) approach here we can use the
+ * CriticalSignalThreshod[5G] which indicates the signal level that would not
+ * be of an acceptable connection quality. BSS can then be sorted either
+ * above or below this threshold. Within each of these groups a BSS may be
+ * blacklisted, meaning it should get sorted lower on the list compared to
+ * others within the same group.
+ *
+ * This sorting is achieved by extending rank to a uint32_t where the first 16
+ * bits are the standard rank calculated by scan.c. Above that bits can be
+ * reserved for this higher level grouping:
+ *
+ * Bit 16 indicates the BSS is not blacklisted
+ * Bit 17 indicates the BSS is above the critical signal threshold
+ */
+
+#define ABOVE_THRESHOLD_BIT 17
+#define NOT_BLACKLISTED_BIT 16
+
+static uint32_t evaluate_bss_group_rank(const uint8_t *addr, uint32_t freq,
+					int16_t signal_strength, uint16_t rank)
+{
+	int signal = signal_strength / 100;
+	bool roam_blacklist;
+	bool good_signal;
+	uint32_t rank_out = (uint32_t) rank;
+
+	if (blacklist_contains_bss(addr, BLACKLIST_REASON_CONNECT_FAILED))
+		return 0;
+
+	roam_blacklist = blacklist_contains_bss(addr,
+					BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED);
+	good_signal = signal >= netdev_get_low_signal_threshold(freq);
+
+	if (good_signal)
+		set_bit(&rank_out, ABOVE_THRESHOLD_BIT);
+
+	if (!roam_blacklist)
+		set_bit(&rank_out, NOT_BLACKLISTED_BIT);
+
+	return rank_out;
+}
+
 /*
  * Used as entries for the roam list since holding scan_bss pointers directly
  * from station->bss_list is not 100% safe due to the possibility of the
@@ -162,13 +211,13 @@ struct anqp_entry {
  */
 struct roam_bss {
 	uint8_t addr[6];
-	uint16_t rank;
+	uint32_t rank;
 	int32_t signal_strength;
 	bool ft_failed: 1;
 };
 
 static struct roam_bss *roam_bss_from_scan_bss(const struct scan_bss *bss,
-						uint16_t rank)
+						uint32_t rank)
 {
 	struct roam_bss *rbss = l_new(struct roam_bss, 1);
 
@@ -2805,7 +2854,7 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 	struct handshake_state *hs = netdev_get_handshake(station->netdev);
 	struct scan_bss *current_bss = station->connected_bss;
 	struct scan_bss *bss;
-	double cur_bss_rank = 0.0;
+	uint32_t cur_bss_group_rank = 0;
 	static const double RANK_FT_FACTOR = 1.3;
 	uint16_t mdid;
 	enum security orig_security, security;
@@ -2834,10 +2883,15 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 	 */
 	bss = l_queue_find(bss_list, bss_match_bssid, current_bss->addr);
 	if (bss && !station->ap_directed_roaming) {
-		cur_bss_rank = bss->rank;
+		double cur_bss_rank = bss->rank;
 
 		if (hs->mde && bss->mde_present && l_get_le16(bss->mde) == mdid)
 			cur_bss_rank *= RANK_FT_FACTOR;
+
+		cur_bss_group_rank = evaluate_bss_group_rank(bss->addr,
+						bss->frequency,
+						bss->signal_strength,
+						(uint16_t) cur_bss_rank);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2859,6 +2913,7 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 	while ((bss = l_queue_pop_head(bss_list))) {
 		double rank;
 		struct roam_bss *rbss;
+		uint32_t group_rank;
 
 		station_print_scan_bss(bss);
 
@@ -2889,7 +2944,11 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 		if (hs->mde && bss->mde_present && l_get_le16(bss->mde) == mdid)
 			rank *= RANK_FT_FACTOR;
 
-		if (rank <= cur_bss_rank)
+		group_rank = evaluate_bss_group_rank(bss->addr, bss->frequency,
+						bss->signal_strength,
+						(uint16_t) rank);
+
+		if (group_rank <= cur_bss_group_rank)
 			goto next;
 
 		/*
@@ -2898,7 +2957,7 @@ static bool station_roam_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 		 */
 		station_update_roam_bss(station, bss);
 
-		rbss = roam_bss_from_scan_bss(bss, rank);
+		rbss = roam_bss_from_scan_bss(bss, group_rank);
 
 		l_queue_insert(station->roam_bss_list, rbss,
 				roam_bss_rank_compare, NULL);
@@ -3268,6 +3327,10 @@ static void station_ap_directed_roam(struct station *station,
 	l_timeout_remove(station->roam_trigger_timeout);
 	station->roam_trigger_timeout = NULL;
 
+	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
+				BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED);
+	station_debug_event(station, "ap-roam-blacklist-added");
+
 	if (req_mode & WNM_REQUEST_MODE_PREFERRED_CANDIDATE_LIST) {
 		l_debug("roam: AP sent a preferred candidate list");
 		station_neighbor_report_cb(station->netdev, 0, body + pos,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 07/11] station: roam blacklist BSS's, and consider when roaming

Hi James,

Quoted 5 lines · James Prestwood

If the BSS is requesting IWD roam elsewhere add this BSS to the blacklist using BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED. This will lower the chances of IWD roaming/connecting back to this BSS in the future.

Quoted 8 lines

This then allows IWD to consider this blacklist state when picking a roam candidate. Its undesireable to fully ban a roam blacklisted BSS, so some additional sorting logic has been added. Prior to comparing based on rank, BSS's will be sorted into two higher level groups:

Above Threshold - BSS is above the CriticalRoamThreshold Below Threshold - BSS is below the CriticalRoamThreshold

As discussed, I amended this to read RoamThreshold since that is what patch 6 is returning.

Quoted 8 lines

Within each of these groups the BSS may be roam blacklisted which will position it at the bottom of the list within its respecitve group.

---
  src/station.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
  1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

<snip>

Quoted 3 lines

+ *
+ * For an initial (probably naive) approach here we can use the
+ * CriticalSignalThreshod[5G] which indicates the signal level that would not

ditto here.

Quoted 5 lines

+ * be of an acceptable connection quality. BSS can then be sorted either
+ * above or below this threshold. Within each of these groups a BSS may be
+ * blacklisted, meaning it should get sorted lower on the list compared to
+ * others within the same group.
+ *

All applied, thanks.

Regards,
-Denis

#8 lore raw

PATCH v4 8/11 station: roam blacklist AP even mid-roam

In reply to James Prestwood

If an AP directed roam frame comes in while IWD is roaming its still valuable to parse that frame and blacklist the BSS that sent it.

This can happen most frequently during a roam scan while connected to an overloaded BSS that is requesting IWD roams elsewhere.

---
 src/station.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
src/station.c +20 -8
index 623cfdca..c5529842 100644
@@ -3225,12 +3225,10 @@ static void station_ap_directed_roam(struct station *station,
 	uint8_t req_mode;
 	uint16_t dtimer;
 	uint8_t valid_interval;
+	bool can_roam = !station_cannot_roam(station);
 
 	l_debug("ifindex: %u", netdev_get_ifindex(station->netdev));
 
-	if (station_cannot_roam(station))
-		return;
-
 	if (station->state != STATION_STATE_CONNECTED) {
 		l_debug("roam: unexpected AP directed roam -- ignore");
 		return;
@@ -3294,8 +3292,13 @@ static void station_ap_directed_roam(struct station *station,
 	 * disassociating us. If either of these bits are set, set the
 	 * ap_directed_roaming flag. Otherwise still try roaming but don't
 	 * treat it any different than a normal roam.
+	 *
+	 * The only exception here is if we are in the middle of roaming
+	 * (can_roam == false) since we cannot reliably know if the roam scan
+	 * included frequencies from potential candidates in this request,
+	 * forcing a roam in this case might result in unintended behavior.
 	 */
-	if (req_mode & (WNM_REQUEST_MODE_DISASSOCIATION_IMMINENT |
+	if (can_roam && req_mode & (WNM_REQUEST_MODE_DISASSOCIATION_IMMINENT |
 			WNM_REQUEST_MODE_TERMINATION_IMMINENT |
 			WNM_REQUEST_MODE_ESS_DISASSOCIATION_IMMINENT))
 		station->ap_directed_roaming = true;
@@ -3322,15 +3325,24 @@ static void station_ap_directed_roam(struct station *station,
 		pos += url_len;
 	}
 
+	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
+				BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED);
+	station_debug_event(station, "ap-roam-blacklist-added");
+
+	/*
+	 * Validating the frame and blacklisting should still be done even if
+	 * we are mid-roam. Its important to track the BSS requesting the
+	 * transition so when the current roam completes IWD will be less likely
+	 * to roam back to the current BSS.
+	 */
+	if (!can_roam)
+		return;
+
 	station->preparing_roam = true;
 
 	l_timeout_remove(station->roam_trigger_timeout);
 	station->roam_trigger_timeout = NULL;
 
-	blacklist_add_bss(station->connected_bss->addr,
-				BLACKLIST_REASON_ROAM_REQUESTED);
-	station_debug_event(station, "ap-roam-blacklist-added");
-
 	if (req_mode & WNM_REQUEST_MODE_PREFERRED_CANDIDATE_LIST) {
 		l_debug("roam: AP sent a preferred candidate list");
 		station_neighbor_report_cb(station->netdev, 0, body + pos,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH v4 9/11 auto-t: add tests for AP roam blacklisting

In reply to James Prestwood
---
 autotests/testAPRoam/connection_test.py     |  56 +++---
 autotests/testAPRoam/hw.conf                |   2 +
 autotests/testAPRoam/main.conf.roaming      |   6 +
 autotests/testAPRoam/roam_blacklist_test.py | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 autotests/testAPRoam/main.conf.roaming
 create mode 100644 autotests/testAPRoam/roam_blacklist_test.py
autotests/testAPRoam/connection_test.py +33 -23
index a419f4aa..1f95fb96 100644
@@ -11,52 +11,58 @@ from iwd import NetworkType
 from hostapd import HostapdCLI
 
 class Test(unittest.TestCase):
-
-    def validate(self, expect_roam=True):
-        wd = IWD()
-
-        devices = wd.list_devices(1)
-        device = devices[0]
-
-        ordered_network = device.get_ordered_network('TestAPRoam')
+    def initial_connection(self):
+        ordered_network = self.device.get_ordered_network('TestAPRoam')
 
         self.assertEqual(ordered_network.type, NetworkType.psk)
 
         condition = 'not obj.connected'
-        wd.wait_for_object_condition(ordered_network.network_object, condition)
+        self.wd.wait_for_object_condition(ordered_network.network_object, condition)
 
-        device.connect_bssid(self.bss_hostapd[0].bssid)
+        self.device.connect_bssid(self.bss_hostapd[0].bssid)
 
         condition = 'obj.state == DeviceState.connected'
-        wd.wait_for_object_condition(device, condition)
+        self.wd.wait_for_object_condition(self.device, condition)
 
         self.bss_hostapd[0].wait_for_event('AP-STA-CONNECTED')
 
         self.assertFalse(self.bss_hostapd[1].list_sta())
 
-        self.bss_hostapd[0].send_bss_transition(device.address,
-                [(self.bss_hostapd[1].bssid, '8f0000005102060603000000')],
+    def validate_roam(self, from_bss, to_bss, expect_roam=True):
+        from_bss.send_bss_transition(self.device.address,
+                self.neighbor_list,
                 disassoc_imminent=expect_roam)
 
         if expect_roam:
             from_condition = 'obj.state == DeviceState.roaming'
             to_condition = 'obj.state == DeviceState.connected'
-            wd.wait_for_object_change(device, from_condition, to_condition)
+            self.wd.wait_for_object_change(self.device, from_condition, to_condition)
 
-            self.bss_hostapd[1].wait_for_event('AP-STA-CONNECTED %s' % device.address)
+            to_bss.wait_for_event('AP-STA-CONNECTED %s' % self.device.address)
         else:
-            device.wait_for_event("no-roam-candidates")
-
-        device.disconnect()
-
-        condition = 'not obj.connected'
-        wd.wait_for_object_condition(ordered_network.network_object, condition)
+            self.device.wait_for_event("no-roam-candidates")
 
     def test_disassoc_imminent(self):
-        self.validate(expect_roam=True)
+        self.initial_connection()
+        self.validate_roam(self.bss_hostapd[0], self.bss_hostapd[1])
 
     def test_no_candidates(self):
-        self.validate(expect_roam=False)
+        self.initial_connection()
+        # We now have BSS0 roam blacklisted
+        self.validate_roam(self.bss_hostapd[0], self.bss_hostapd[1])
+        # Try and trigger another roam back, which shouldn't happen since now
+        # both BSS's are roam blacklisted
+        self.validate_roam(self.bss_hostapd[1], self.bss_hostapd[0], expect_roam=False)
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.wd = IWD(True)
+
+        devices = self.wd.list_devices(1)
+        self.device = devices[0]
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.wd = None
+        self.device = None
 
     @classmethod
     def setUpClass(cls):
@@ -65,6 +71,10 @@ class Test(unittest.TestCase):
         cls.bss_hostapd = [ HostapdCLI(config='ssid1.conf'),
                             HostapdCLI(config='ssid2.conf'),
                             HostapdCLI(config='ssid3.conf') ]
+        cls.neighbor_list = [
+            (cls.bss_hostapd[0].bssid, "8f0000005101060603000000"),
+            (cls.bss_hostapd[1].bssid, "8f0000005102060603000000"),
+        ]
 
     @classmethod
     def tearDownClass(cls):
autotests/testAPRoam/hw.conf +2 -0
index 00a31063..46b1d4a8 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 [SETUP]
 num_radios=4
+hwsim_medium=true
+start_iwd=false
 
 [HOSTAPD]
 rad0=ssid1.conf
autotests/testAPRoam/main.conf.roaming new file +6 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ff23571
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+[General]
+RoamThreshold=-72
+CriticalRoamThreshold=-72
+
+[Blacklist]
+InitialRoamRequestedTimeout=20
autotests/testAPRoam/roam_blacklist_test.py new file +183 -0

183 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 10/11 doc: document InitialRoamRequestedTimeout

In reply to James Prestwood
---
 src/iwd.config.rst | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
src/iwd.config.rst +6 -0
index 895a1012..9761e8fd 100644
@@ -292,6 +292,12 @@ control how long a misbehaved BSS spends on the blacklist.
 
        The initial time that a BSS spends on the blacklist. Setting this to zero
        will disable blacklisting functionality in IWD.
+   * - InitialRoamRequestedTimeout
+     - Values: uint64 value in seconds (default: **30**)
+
+       The initial time that a BSS will be marked after a BSS requests a roam.
+       This is to aid in avoiding roaming back to BSS's which are likely
+       overloaded. Setting this to zero will disabled this form of blacklisting.
    * - Multiplier
      - Values: unsigned int value greater than zero, in seconds
        (default: **30**)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#11 lore raw

PATCH v4 11/11 netdev: fix invalid read after netdev_free

In reply to James Prestwood

The netdev frame watches got cleaned up upon the interface going down which works if the interface is simply being toggled but when IWD shuts down it first shuts down the interface, then immediately frees netdev. If a watched frame arrives immediately after that before the interface shutdown callback it will reference netdev, which has been freed.

Fix this by clearing out the frame watches in netdev_free.

==147== Invalid read of size 8

==147==    at 0x408ADB: netdev_neighbor_report_frame_event (netdev.c:4772)
==147==    by 0x467C75: frame_watch_unicast_notify (frame-xchg.c:234)
==147==    by 0x4E28F8: __notifylist_notify (notifylist.c:91)
==147==    by 0x4E2D37: l_notifylist_notify_matches (notifylist.c:204)
==147==    by 0x4A1388: process_unicast (genl.c:844)
==147==    by 0x4A1388: received_data (genl.c:972)
==147==    by 0x49D82F: io_callback (io.c:105)
==147==    by 0x49C93C: l_main_iterate (main.c:461)
==147==    by 0x49CA0B: l_main_run (main.c:508)
==147==    by 0x49CA0B: l_main_run (main.c:490)
==147==    by 0x49CC3F: l_main_run_with_signal (main.c:630)
==147==    by 0x4049EC: main (main.c:614)
---
 src/netdev.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
src/netdev.c +1 -0
index 048681f5..b81a475f 100644
@@ -1109,6 +1109,7 @@ static void netdev_free(void *data)
 		l_timeout_remove(netdev->rssi_poll_timeout);
 
 	scan_wdev_remove(netdev->wdev_id);
+	frame_watch_wdev_remove(netdev->wdev_id);
 
 	watchlist_destroy(&netdev->station_watches);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1