Allow tls-crypt-v2 to be setup only on initial packet of a session
PATCH 1/1 Allow tls-crypt-v2 to be setup only on initial packet of a session
From: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
This fixes an internal server error condition that can be triggered by a malicous authenticated client, a very unlucky corruption of packets in transit or by an attacker that is able to inject a specially created packet at the right time and is able to observe the traffic to construct the packet.
The error condition results in an ASSERT statement being triggered,
NOTE: due to the security sensitive nature, this patch was prepared under embargo on the [email protected]... mailing list, and thus has no publically available "mailing list discussion before merge" URL.
CVE: 2025-2704
Change-Id I07c1352204d308e5bde5f0b85e561a5dd0bc63c8
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
Signed-off-by Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++---- src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 15 +++++++------ src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 7 +++--- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 12 +++++++++-- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 7 +++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +22 -4
@@ -697,6 +697,9 @@ state_name(int state)case S_INITIAL :return "S_INITIAL" ; +case S_PRE_START_SKIP : +return "S_PRE_START_SKIP" ; +case S_PRE_START :return "S_PRE_START" ;
@@ -2506,7 +2509,7 @@ session_move_pre_start(const struct tls_session *session, }INCR_GENERATED ; - ks->state =S_PRE_START ; + ks->state = skip_initial_send ?S_PRE_START_SKIP :S_PRE_START ;struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: Initial Handshake, sid=%s",
@@ -3825,7 +3828,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, - session->opt)) + session->opt, true)) { goto error; }
@@ -3895,7 +3898,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) {if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), - from, session->opt)) + from, session->opt, false)) { goto error; }
@@ -3908,6 +3911,15 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }else { +bool initial_packet = false; +if (ks->state ==S_PRE_START_SKIP ) + { +/* When we are coming from the session_skip_to_pre_start +* method, we allow this initial packet to setup the +* tls-crypt-v2 peer specific key */ + initial_packet = true; + ks->state =S_PRE_START ; + }/* * Remote responding to our key renegotiation request? */
@@ -3917,8 +3929,14 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), - from, session->opt)) + from, session->opt, initial_packet)) { +/* if an initial packet in read_control_auth, we rather +* error out than anything else */ +if (initial_packet) + { + multi->n_hard_errors++; + } goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +9 -6
@@ -84,22 +84,25 @@#define S_INITIAL 1/**< Initial \c key_state state after * initialization by \c key_state_init() * before start of three-way handshake. */ -#define S_PRE_START 2/**< Waiting for the remote OpenVPN peer +#define S_PRE_START_SKIP 2/**< Waiting for the remote OpenVPN peer * to acknowledge during the initial * three-way handshake. */ -#define S_START 3/**< Three-way handshake is complete, +#define S_PRE_START 3/**< Waiting for the remote OpenVPN peer +* to acknowledge during the initial +* three-way handshake. */ +#define S_START 4/**< Three-way handshake is complete, * start of key exchange. */ -#define S_SENT_KEY 4/**< Local OpenVPN process has sent its +#define S_SENT_KEY 5/**< Local OpenVPN process has sent its * part of the key material. */ -#define S_GOT_KEY 5/**< Local OpenVPN process has received +#define S_GOT_KEY 6/**< Local OpenVPN process has received * the remote's part of the key * material. */ -#define S_ACTIVE 6/**< Operational \c key_state state +#define S_ACTIVE 7/**< Operational \c key_state state * immediately after negotiation has * completed while still within the * handshake window. Deferred auth and * client connect can still be pending. */ -#define S_GENERATED_KEYS 7/**< The data channel keys have been generated +#define S_GENERATED_KEYS 8/**< The data channel keys have been generated * The TLS session is fully authenticated * when reaching this state. */
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +4 -3
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ bool read_control_auth(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx, const struct link_socket_actual *from, - const struct tls_options *opt) + const struct tls_options *opt, + bool initial_packet) { struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();bool ret = false;
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ read_control_auth(struct buffer *buf,const uint8_t opcode = *(BPTR (buf)) >>P_OPCODE_SHIFT ;if ((opcode ==P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 || opcode ==P_CONTROL_WKC_V1 ) - && !tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (buf, ctx, opt)) + && !tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (buf, ctx, opt, initial_packet)) { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: can not extract tls-crypt-v2 client key from %s",
@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt_lite(const struct tls_auth_standalone *tas,* into newbuf or just setting newbuf to point to the start of control * message */ bool status =read_control_auth (&state->newbuf, &state->tls_wrap_tmp, - from,NULL ); + from,NULL , true);if (!status) {
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +10 -2
@@ -208,14 +208,22 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session, bool prepend_ack); -/* + +/** * Read a control channel authentication record. +* @param buf buffer that holds the incoming packet +* @param ctx control channel security context +* @param from incoming link socket address +* @param opt tls options struct for the session +* @param initial_packet whether this is the initial packet for the connection +* @return if the packet was successfully processed */ bool read_control_auth (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx,const struct link_socket_actual *from, -const struct tls_options *opt); +const struct tls_options *opt, +bool initial_packet);/**
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +23 -1
@@ -614,7 +614,8 @@ cleanup:bool tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx, -const struct tls_options *opt) +const struct tls_options *opt, +bool initial_packet) {if (!ctx->tls_crypt_v2_server_key.cipher) {
@@ -643,6 +644,27 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf,return false; } +if (!initial_packet) + { +/* This might be a harmless resend of the packet but it is better to +* just ignore the WKC part than trying to setup tls-crypt keys again. +* +* A CONTROL_WKC_V1 packets has a normal packet part and an appended +* wrapped control key. These are authenticated individually. We already +* set up tls-crypt with the wrapped key, so we are ignoring this part +* of the message but we return the normal packet part as the normal +* part of the message might have been corrupted earlier and discarded +* and this is resend. So return the normal part of the packet, +* basically transforming the CONTROL_WKC_V1 into a normal CONTROL_V1 +* packet*/ +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"control channel security already setup ignoring " +"wrapped key part of packet." ); + +/* Remove client key from buffer so tls-crypt code can unwrap message */ +ASSERT (buf_inc_len (buf, -(BLEN (&wrapped_client_key)))); +return true; + } + ctx->tls_crypt_v2_metadata =alloc_buf (TLS_CRYPT_V2_MAX_METADATA_LEN ); if (!tls_crypt_v2_unwrap_client_key(&ctx->original_wrap_keydata, &ctx->tls_crypt_v2_metadata,
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +6 -1
@@ -205,11 +205,16 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key,* message. * @param ctx tls-wrap context to be initialized with the client key. * +* @param initial_packet whether this is the initial packet of the +* connection. Only in these scenarios unwrapping +* of a tls-crypt-v2 key is allowed +* * @returns true if a key was successfully extracted. */ bool tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (struct buffer *buf,struct tls_wrap_ctx *ctx, -const struct tls_options *opt); +const struct tls_options *opt, +bool initial_packet);/** * Generate a tls-crypt-v2 server key, and write to file.
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +1 -1
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ tls_crypt_v2_wrap_unwrap_max_metadata(void **state) .mode = TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, .tls_crypt_v2_server_key = ctx->server_keys.encrypt, }; -assert_true (tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (&ctx->wkc, &wrap_ctx,NULL )); +assert_true (tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key (&ctx->wkc, &wrap_ctx,NULL , true));tls_wrap_free (&wrap_ctx); }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.0