libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
PATCH 1/4 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw can lead to a heap b uffer over-read due to the size of a filter block potentially exceeding the Lempel-Ziv-Storer -Schieber (LZSS) window. This means the library may attempt to read beyond the allocated memo ry buffer, which can result in unpredictable program behavior, crashes (denial of service), o r the disclosure of sensitive information from adjacent memory regions.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5915
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch new file +217 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +From a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 19:00:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: Fix heap-buffer-overflow (#2599) + +A filter block size must not be larger than the lzss window, which is +defined +by dictionary size, which in turn can be derived from unpacked file +size. + +While at it, improve error messages and fix lzss window wrap around +logic. + +Fixes https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/2565 + +--------- + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Co-authored-by: Tim Kientzle <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5915 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + Makefile.am | 2 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 17 ++++--- + libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu | 11 +++++ + 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu + +diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am +index 4fafc41..9f3a6d1 100644 +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ libarchive_test_SOURCES= \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_encryption_header.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_filter.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_tar.c \ +@@ -889,6 +890,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0003.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0004.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_noeof.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_lzss_conversion.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free2.rar.uu \ +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 9eb3c84..88eab62 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int read_filter(struct archive_read *, int64_t *); + static int rar_decode_byte(struct archive_read*, uint8_t *); + static int execute_filter(struct archive_read*, struct rar_filter *, + struct rar_virtual_machine *, size_t); +-static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, void *, int64_t, int); ++static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, uint8_t *, int64_t, int); + static inline void vm_write_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t, uint32_t); + static inline uint32_t vm_read_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t); + +@@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + } + + if ((symbol = read_next_symbol(a, &rar->maincode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + + if (symbol < 256) + { +@@ -2956,14 +2956,14 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + else + { + if (parse_codes(a) != ARCHIVE_OK) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + } + else if(symbol==257) + { + if (!read_filter(a, end)) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + else if(symbol==258) +@@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + { + if ((lowoffsetsymbol = + read_next_symbol(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + if(lowoffsetsymbol == 16) + { + rar->numlowoffsetrepeats = 15; +@@ -3096,7 +3096,7 @@ bad_data: + } + + static int +-copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, ++copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, uint8_t *buffer, + int64_t startpos, int length) + { + int windowoffs, firstpart; +@@ -3111,7 +3111,7 @@ copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, + } + if (firstpart < length) { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], firstpart); +- memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); ++ memcpy(buffer + firstpart, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); + } else { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], length); + } +@@ -3266,6 +3266,9 @@ parse_filter(struct archive_read *a, const uint8_t *bytes, uint16_t length, uint + else + blocklength = prog ? prog->oldfilterlength : 0; + ++ if (blocklength > rar->dictionary_size) ++ return 0; ++ + registers[3] = PROGRAM_SYSTEM_GLOBAL_ADDRESS; + registers[4] = blocklength; + registers[5] = prog ? prog->usagecount : 0; +diff --git a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +index 5d7a5d2..59c5f5d 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt ++++ b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ IF(ENABLE_TEST) + test_read_format_rar_encryption_partially.c + test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c + test_read_format_rar_filter.c ++ test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + test_read_format_rar5.c + test_read_format_raw.c + test_read_format_tar.c +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b39ed6b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++/*- ++ * Copyright (c) 2003-2025 Tim Kientzle ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++#include "test.h" ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar_overflow) ++{ ++ struct archive *a; ++ struct archive_entry *ae; ++ const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar"; ++ const void *buff; ++ size_t size; ++ int64_t offset; ++ ++ extract_reference_file(reffile); ++ assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 1024)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae)); ++ assertEqualInt(48, archive_entry_size(ae)); ++ /* The next call should reproduce Issue #2565 */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_data_block(a, &buff, &size, &offset)); ++ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); ++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..48fd3fd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`,($=```(0`@`0``,`````(````````````S`0``````,`"_B%_: ++MZ?^[:7``?S!!,`@P,KB@,T@RN33)MTEB@5Z3<`DP`K35`.0P63@P<,Q&0?#, ++MA##,,",S,(@P,#,@##`&,#":(3`!,#"(`9HPS,,S13`P,#`P,*`PHPS,,S1A ++M,!,!,#","9H@S12D#$PP!C`P`*'F03":,,T8H`@\,/DPJS!/,"30,#`3N%LP ++MCQ6:S3"!,#LP22<-,$5%B"5B$S!)(&*>G#+@!`E`%0ODC])62=DO,)BYJX'P ++M=/LPZ3!!008?%S`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P2$PP,#`P03!(,#`P,#`& ++M,`7),#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P ++-,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,``` ++` ++end +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile --without-iconv" SRC_URI = "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 2/4 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5916
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an integer overflow that can be triggered when processing a Web Archive (WARC) file that claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes. An attacker could craft a malicious WARC archive to induce this overflow, potentially leading to unpredictable program behavior, memory corruption, or a denial-of-service condition within applications that process such archives using libarchive.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5916
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch new file +116 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 00:24:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] warc: Prevent signed integer overflow (#2568) + +If a warc archive claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes, +the inevitable failure to skip all these bytes could lead to parsing +data which should be ignored instead. + +The test case contains a conversation entry with that many bytes and if +the entry is not properly skipped, the warc implementation would read +the conversation data as a new file entry. + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5916 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + Makefile.am | 1 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 7 ++++-- + libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu | 10 ++++++++ + 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu + +diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am +index 9f3a6d1..7627ec5 100644 +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_eucjp.tar.Z.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_koi8r.tar.Z.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.warc.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_xar_doublelink.xar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_xar_duplicate_filename_node.xar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip.zip.uu \ +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +index fcec5bc..696f959 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ start_over: + case LAST_WT: + default: + /* consume the content and start over */ +- _warc_skip(a); ++ if (_warc_skip(a) < 0) ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); + goto start_over; + } + return (ARCHIVE_OK); +@@ -439,7 +440,9 @@ _warc_skip(struct archive_read *a) + { + struct warc_s *w = a->format->data; + +- __archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen + 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/); ++ if (__archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen) < 0 || ++ __archive_read_consume(a, 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/) < 0) ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); + w->cntlen = 0U; + w->cntoff = 0U; + return (ARCHIVE_OK); +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c +index 91e6dc6..745aabf 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c +@@ -78,3 +78,27 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc) + assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); + assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); + } ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc_incomplete) ++{ ++ const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc"; ++ struct archive_entry *ae; ++ struct archive *a; ++ ++ extract_reference_file(reffile); ++ assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, ++ archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 10240)); ++ ++ /* Entry cannot be parsed */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae)); ++ ++ /* Verify archive format. */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FILTER_NONE, archive_filter_code(a, 0)); ++ ++ /* Verify closing and resource freeing */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); ++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b91b97e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc ++M5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@8V]N=F5R<VEO;@T*5T%20RU$871E.B`R ++M,#(U+3`S+3,P5#$U.C`P.C0P6@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#DR,C,S-S(P ++M,S8X-30W-S4X,#<-"@T*5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@<F5S;W5R8V4- ++M"E=!4D,M5&%R9V5T+55223H@9FEL93HO+W)E861M92YT>'0-"E=!4D,M1&%T ++M93H@,C`R-2TP,RTS,%0Q-3HP,#HT,%H-"D-O;G1E;G0M5'EP93H@=&5X="]P ++M;&%I;@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#,X#0H-"E1H92!R96%D;64N='AT('-H ++4;W5L9"!N;W0@8F4@=FES:6)L90H` ++` ++end +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile --without-iconv" SRC_URI = "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 3/4 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5917
In reply to dchellamFrom: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an 'off-by- one' miscalculation when handling prefixes and suffixes for file names. This can lead to a 1- byte write overflow. While seemingly small, such an overflow can corrupt adjacent memory, lea ding to unpredictable program behavior, crashes, or in specific circumstances, could be lever aged as a building block for more sophisticated exploitation.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5917
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch new file +54 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Brian Campbell <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2025 05:11:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix overflow in build_ustar_entry (#2588) + +The calculations for the suffix and prefix can increment the endpoint +for a trailing slash. Hence the limits used should be one lower than the +maximum number of bytes. + +Without this patch, when this happens for both the prefix and the +suffix, we end up with 156 + 100 bytes, and the write of the null at the +end will overflow the 256 byte buffer. This can be reproduced by running +``` +mkdir -p foo/bar +bsdtar cvf test.tar foo////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////bar +``` +when bsdtar is compiled with Address Sanitiser, although I originally +noticed this by accident with a genuine filename on a CHERI capability +system, which faults immediately on the buffer overflow. + +CVE: CVE-2025-5917 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c +index 6e35f70..b2ba959 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c +@@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length, + const char *filename, *filename_end; + char *p; + int need_slash = 0; /* Was there a trailing slash? */ +- size_t suffix_length = 99; ++ size_t suffix_length = 98; /* 99 - 1 for trailing slash */ + size_t insert_length; + + /* Length of additional dir element to be added. */ +@@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length, + /* Step 2: Locate the "prefix" section of the dirname, including + * trailing '/'. */ + prefix = src; +- prefix_end = prefix + 155; ++ prefix_end = prefix + 154 /* 155 - 1 for trailing / */; + if (prefix_end > filename) + prefix_end = filename; + while (prefix_end > prefix && *prefix_end != '/') +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5917.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 4/4 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5918
In reply to dchellamFrom: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw can be triggered whe n file streams are piped into bsdtar, potentially allowing for reading past the end of the fi le. This out-of-bounds read can lead to unintended consequences, including unpredictable prog ram behavior, memory corruption, or a denial-of-service condition.
CVE-2025-5918-0001 is the dependent commit and CVE-2025-5918-0002 is the actual CVE fix.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5918
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/89b8c35ff4b5addc08a85bf5df02b407f8af1f6c
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/dcbf1e0ededa95849f098d154a25876ed5754bcf
--- .../libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0001.patch | 326 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0002.patch | 222 ++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 550 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0002.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0001.patch new file +326 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +From 89b8c35ff4b5addc08a85bf5df02b407f8af1f6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2025 22:34:37 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Improve lseek handling (#2564) + +The skip functions are limited to 1 GB for cases in which libarchive +runs on a system with an off_t or long with 32 bits. This has negative +impact on 64 bit systems. + +Instead, make sure that _all_ subsequent functions truncate properly. +Some of them already did and some had regressions for over 10 years. + +Tests pass on Debian 12 i686 configured with --disable-largefile, i.e. +running with an off_t with 32 bits. + +Casts added where needed to still pass MSVC builds. + +--------- + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5918 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/89b8c35ff4b5addc08a85bf5df02b407f8af1f6c] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + libarchive/archive_read.c | 6 ---- + libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c | 3 +- + libarchive/archive_read_open_fd.c | 29 +++++++++++++------ + libarchive/archive_read_open_file.c | 35 ++++++++++++----------- + libarchive/archive_read_open_filename.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++------- + libarchive/test/read_open_memory.c | 2 +- + libarchive/test/test_sparse_basic.c | 6 ++-- + libarchive/test/test_tar_large.c | 2 +- + 8 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read.c b/libarchive/archive_read.c +index 822c534..50db870 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read.c +@@ -176,15 +176,9 @@ client_skip_proxy(struct archive_read_filter *self, int64_t request) + return 0; + + if (self->archive->client.skipper != NULL) { +- /* Seek requests over 1GiB are broken down into +- * multiple seeks. This avoids overflows when the +- * requests get passed through 32-bit arguments. */ +- int64_t skip_limit = (int64_t)1 << 30; + int64_t total = 0; + for (;;) { + int64_t get, ask = request; +- if (ask > skip_limit) +- ask = skip_limit; + get = (self->archive->client.skipper) + (&self->archive->archive, self->data, ask); + total += get; +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c +index 09965eb..4839d62 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_disk_posix.c +@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ _archive_read_data_block(struct archive *_a, const void **buff, + */ + if (t->current_sparse->offset > t->entry_total) { + if (lseek(t->entry_fd, +- (off_t)t->current_sparse->offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) { ++ (off_t)t->current_sparse->offset, SEEK_SET) != ++ t->current_sparse->offset) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno, "Seek error"); + r = ARCHIVE_FATAL; + a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL; +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_open_fd.c b/libarchive/archive_read_open_fd.c +index debfde2..3fd536d 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_open_fd.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_open_fd.c +@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int64_t + file_skip(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request) + { + struct read_fd_data *mine = (struct read_fd_data *)client_data; +- int64_t skip = request; ++ off_t skip = (off_t)request; + int64_t old_offset, new_offset; + int skip_bits = sizeof(skip) * 8 - 1; /* off_t is a signed type. */ + +@@ -140,15 +140,15 @@ file_skip(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request) + + /* Reduce a request that would overflow the 'skip' variable. */ + if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(skip)) { +- int64_t max_skip = ++ const int64_t max_skip = + (((int64_t)1 << (skip_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; + if (request > max_skip) +- skip = max_skip; ++ skip = (off_t)max_skip; + } + +- /* Reduce request to the next smallest multiple of block_size */ +- request = (request / mine->block_size) * mine->block_size; +- if (request == 0) ++ /* Reduce 'skip' to the next smallest multiple of block_size */ ++ skip = (off_t)(((int64_t)skip / mine->block_size) * mine->block_size); ++ if (skip == 0) + return (0); + + if (((old_offset = lseek(mine->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR)) >= 0) && +@@ -178,11 +178,24 @@ static int64_t + file_seek(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request, int whence) + { + struct read_fd_data *mine = (struct read_fd_data *)client_data; ++ off_t seek = (off_t)request; + int64_t r; ++ int seek_bits = sizeof(seek) * 8 - 1; /* off_t is a signed type. */ + + /* We use off_t here because lseek() is declared that way. */ +- /* See above for notes about when off_t is less than 64 bits. */ +- r = lseek(mine->fd, request, whence); ++ ++ /* Reduce a request that would overflow the 'seek' variable. */ ++ if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(seek)) { ++ const int64_t max_seek = ++ (((int64_t)1 << (seek_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; ++ const int64_t min_seek = ~max_seek; ++ if (request > max_seek) ++ seek = (off_t)max_seek; ++ else if (request < min_seek) ++ seek = (off_t)min_seek; ++ } ++ ++ r = lseek(mine->fd, seek, whence); + if (r >= 0) + return r; + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_open_file.c b/libarchive/archive_read_open_file.c +index ecd56dc..2829b9a 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_open_file.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_open_file.c +@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ FILE_skip(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request) + + /* If request is too big for a long or an off_t, reduce it. */ + if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(skip)) { +- int64_t max_skip = ++ const int64_t max_skip = + (((int64_t)1 << (skip_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; + if (request > max_skip) + skip = max_skip; +@@ -176,39 +176,42 @@ FILE_seek(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request, int whence) + { + struct read_FILE_data *mine = (struct read_FILE_data *)client_data; + #if HAVE__FSEEKI64 +- int64_t skip = request; ++ int64_t seek = request; + #elif HAVE_FSEEKO +- off_t skip = (off_t)request; ++ off_t seek = (off_t)request; + #else +- long skip = (long)request; ++ long seek = (long)request; + #endif +- int skip_bits = sizeof(skip) * 8 - 1; ++ int seek_bits = sizeof(seek) * 8 - 1; + (void)a; /* UNUSED */ + +- /* If request is too big for a long or an off_t, reduce it. */ +- if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(skip)) { +- int64_t max_skip = +- (((int64_t)1 << (skip_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; +- if (request > max_skip) +- skip = max_skip; ++ /* Reduce a request that would overflow the 'seek' variable. */ ++ if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(seek)) { ++ const int64_t max_seek = ++ (((int64_t)1 << (seek_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; ++ const int64_t min_seek = ~max_seek; ++ if (request > max_seek) ++ seek = max_seek; ++ else if (request < min_seek) ++ seek = min_seek; + } + + #ifdef __ANDROID__ + /* Newer Android versions have fseeko...to meditate. */ +- int64_t ret = lseek(fileno(mine->f), skip, whence); ++ int64_t ret = lseek(fileno(mine->f), seek, whence); + if (ret >= 0) { + return ret; + } + #elif HAVE__FSEEKI64 +- if (_fseeki64(mine->f, skip, whence) == 0) { ++ if (_fseeki64(mine->f, seek, whence) == 0) { + return _ftelli64(mine->f); + } + #elif HAVE_FSEEKO +- if (fseeko(mine->f, skip, whence) == 0) { ++ if (fseeko(mine->f, seek, whence) == 0) { + return ftello(mine->f); + } + #else +- if (fseek(mine->f, skip, whence) == 0) { ++ if (fseek(mine->f, seek, whence) == 0) { + return ftell(mine->f); + } + #endif +@@ -226,4 +229,4 @@ FILE_close(struct archive *a, void *client_data) + free(mine->buffer); + free(mine); + return (ARCHIVE_OK); +-} +\ No newline at end of file ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_open_filename.c b/libarchive/archive_read_open_filename.c +index 05f0ffb..3894b15 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_open_filename.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_open_filename.c +@@ -479,20 +479,24 @@ file_skip_lseek(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request) + struct read_file_data *mine = (struct read_file_data *)client_data; + #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) + /* We use _lseeki64() on Windows. */ +- int64_t old_offset, new_offset; ++ int64_t old_offset, new_offset, skip = request; + #else +- off_t old_offset, new_offset; ++ off_t old_offset, new_offset, skip = (off_t)request; + #endif ++ int skip_bits = sizeof(skip) * 8 - 1; + + /* We use off_t here because lseek() is declared that way. */ + +- /* TODO: Deal with case where off_t isn't 64 bits. +- * This shouldn't be a problem on Linux or other POSIX +- * systems, since the configuration logic for libarchive +- * tries to obtain a 64-bit off_t. +- */ ++ /* Reduce a request that would overflow the 'skip' variable. */ ++ if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(skip)) { ++ const int64_t max_skip = ++ (((int64_t)1 << (skip_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; ++ if (request > max_skip) ++ skip = max_skip; ++ } ++ + if ((old_offset = lseek(mine->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR)) >= 0 && +- (new_offset = lseek(mine->fd, request, SEEK_CUR)) >= 0) ++ (new_offset = lseek(mine->fd, skip, SEEK_CUR)) >= 0) + return (new_offset - old_offset); + + /* If lseek() fails, don't bother trying again. */ +@@ -540,11 +544,24 @@ static int64_t + file_seek(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t request, int whence) + { + struct read_file_data *mine = (struct read_file_data *)client_data; ++ off_t seek = (off_t)request; + int64_t r; ++ int seek_bits = sizeof(seek) * 8 - 1; + + /* We use off_t here because lseek() is declared that way. */ +- /* See above for notes about when off_t is less than 64 bits. */ +- r = lseek(mine->fd, request, whence); ++ ++ /* Reduce a request that would overflow the 'seek' variable. */ ++ if (sizeof(request) > sizeof(seek)) { ++ const int64_t max_seek = ++ (((int64_t)1 << (seek_bits - 1)) - 1) * 2 + 1; ++ const int64_t min_seek = ~max_seek; ++ if (request > max_seek) ++ seek = (off_t)max_seek; ++ else if (request < min_seek) ++ seek = (off_t)min_seek; ++ } ++ ++ r = lseek(mine->fd, seek, whence); + if (r >= 0) + return r; + +diff --git a/libarchive/test/read_open_memory.c b/libarchive/test/read_open_memory.c +index 6d2468c..9262ab9 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/read_open_memory.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/read_open_memory.c +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ memory_read_skip(struct archive *a, void *client_data, int64_t skip) + + (void)a; /* UNUSED */ + /* We can't skip by more than is available. */ +- if ((off_t)skip > (off_t)(mine->end - mine->p)) ++ if (skip > mine->end - mine->p) + skip = mine->end - mine->p; + /* Always do small skips by prime amounts. */ + if (skip > 71) +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_sparse_basic.c b/libarchive/test/test_sparse_basic.c +index 23cde56..93710cb 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/test_sparse_basic.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_sparse_basic.c +@@ -608,7 +608,8 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_sparse_basic) + verify_sparse_file(a, "file2", sparse_file2, 20); + /* Encoded non sparse; expect a data block but no sparse entries. */ + verify_sparse_file(a, "file3", sparse_file3, 0); +- verify_sparse_file(a, "file4", sparse_file4, 2); ++ if (sizeof(off_t) > 4) ++ verify_sparse_file(a, "file4", sparse_file4, 2); + + assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); + +@@ -635,7 +636,8 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_sparse_basic) + verify_sparse_file(a, "file1", sparse_file1, 0); + verify_sparse_file(a, "file2", sparse_file2, 0); + verify_sparse_file(a, "file3", sparse_file3, 0); +- verify_sparse_file(a, "file4", sparse_file4, 0); ++ if (sizeof(off_t) > 4) ++ verify_sparse_file(a, "file4", sparse_file4, 0); + + assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); + +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_tar_large.c b/libarchive/test/test_tar_large.c +index c1f3791..1cde321 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/test_tar_large.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_tar_large.c +@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ memory_read_skip(struct archive *a, void *_private, int64_t skip) + } + if (private->filebytes > 0) { + if (private->filebytes < skip) +- skip = (off_t)private->filebytes; ++ skip = private->filebytes; + private->filebytes -= skip; + } else { + skip = 0; +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5918-0002.patch new file +222 -0
222 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +2 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5917.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5918-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5918-0002.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
Not quite sure what is going on, but this series fails to apply for me:
Applying: libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
error: sha1 information is lacking or useless (meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb).
error: could not build fake ancestor
Patch failed at 0001 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch=diff' to see the failed patch When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue". If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead. To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
Could you try rebasing your patchset on the current walnascar head and submit a V2?
Thanks!
Steve
Quoted 269 lines · dchellam via lists.openembedded.org
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw can lead to a heap b uffer over-read due to the size of a filter block potentially exceeding the Lempel-Ziv-Storer -Schieber (LZSS) window. This means the library may attempt to read beyond the allocated memo ry buffer, which can result in unpredictable program behavior, crashes (denial of service), o r the disclosure of sensitive information from adjacent memory regions.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5915Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8cSigned-off-by Divya Chellam <[email protected]>--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patchmeta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch new file +217
-0@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +From a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 19:00:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: Fix heap-buffer-overflow (#2599) + +A filter block size must not be larger than the lzss window, which is +defined +by dictionary size, which in turn can be derived from unpacked file +size. + +While at it, improve error messages and fix lzss window wrap around +logic. + +Fixes https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/2565 + +--------- + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Co-authored-by: Tim Kientzle <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5915 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + Makefile.am | 2 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 17 ++++--- + libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu | 11 +++++ + 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu + +diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am +index 4fafc41..9f3a6d1 100644 +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ libarchive_test_SOURCES= \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_encryption_header.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_filter.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_tar.c \ +@@ -889,6 +890,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0003.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0004.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_noeof.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_lzss_conversion.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free2.rar.uu \ +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 9eb3c84..88eab62 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int read_filter(struct archive_read *, int64_t *); + static int rar_decode_byte(struct archive_read*, uint8_t *); + static int execute_filter(struct archive_read*, struct rar_filter *, + struct rar_virtual_machine *, size_t); +-static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, void *, int64_t, int); ++static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, uint8_t *, int64_t, int); + static inline void vm_write_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t, uint32_t); + static inline uint32_t vm_read_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t); + +@@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + } + + if ((symbol = read_next_symbol(a, &rar->maincode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + + if (symbol < 256) + { +@@ -2956,14 +2956,14 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + else + { + if (parse_codes(a) != ARCHIVE_OK) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + } + else if(symbol==257) + { + if (!read_filter(a, end)) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + else if(symbol==258) +@@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + { + if ((lowoffsetsymbol = + read_next_symbol(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + if(lowoffsetsymbol == 16) + { + rar->numlowoffsetrepeats = 15; +@@ -3096,7 +3096,7 @@ bad_data: + } + + static int +-copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, ++copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, uint8_t *buffer, + int64_t startpos, int length) + { + int windowoffs, firstpart; +@@ -3111,7 +3111,7 @@ copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, + } + if (firstpart < length) { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], firstpart); +- memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); ++ memcpy(buffer + firstpart, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); + } else { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], length); + } +@@ -3266,6 +3266,9 @@ parse_filter(struct archive_read *a, const uint8_t *bytes, uint16_t length, uint + else + blocklength = prog ? prog->oldfilterlength : 0; + ++ if (blocklength > rar->dictionary_size) ++ return 0; ++ + registers[3] = PROGRAM_SYSTEM_GLOBAL_ADDRESS; + registers[4] = blocklength; + registers[5] = prog ? prog->usagecount : 0; +diff --git a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +index 5d7a5d2..59c5f5d 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt ++++ b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ IF(ENABLE_TEST) + test_read_format_rar_encryption_partially.c + test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c + test_read_format_rar_filter.c ++ test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + test_read_format_rar5.c + test_read_format_raw.c + test_read_format_tar.c +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b39ed6b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++/*- ++ * Copyright (c) 2003-2025 Tim Kientzle ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++#include "test.h" ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar_overflow) ++{ ++ struct archive *a; ++ struct archive_entry *ae; ++ const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar"; ++ const void *buff; ++ size_t size; ++ int64_t offset; ++ ++ extract_reference_file(reffile); ++ assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 1024)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae)); ++ assertEqualInt(48, archive_entry_size(ae)); ++ /* The next call should reproduce Issue #2565 */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_data_block(a, &buff, &size, &offset)); ++ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); ++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..48fd3fd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`,($=```(0`@`0``,`````(````````````S`0``````,`"_B%_: ++MZ?^[:7``?S!!,`@P,KB@,T@RN33)MTEB@5Z3<`DP`K35`.0P63@P<,Q&0?#, ++MA##,,",S,(@P,#,@##`&,#":(3`!,#"(`9HPS,,S13`P,#`P,*`PHPS,,S1A ++M,!,!,#","9H@S12D#$PP!C`P`*'F03":,,T8H`@\,/DPJS!/,"30,#`3N%LP ++MCQ6:S3"!,#LP22<-,$5%B"5B$S!)(&*>G#+@!`E`%0ODC])62=DO,)BYJX'P ++M=/LPZ3!!008?%S`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P2$PP,#`P03!(,#`P,#`& ++M,`7),#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P ++-,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,``` ++` ++end +-- +2.40.0 +meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1
-1@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile --without-iconv" SRC_URI = "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/" --2.40.0
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