libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
PATCH 1/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw can lead to a heap b uffer over-read due to the size of a filter block potentially exceeding the Lempel-Ziv-Storer -Schieber (LZSS) window. This means the library may attempt to read beyond the allocated memo ry buffer, which can result in unpredictable program behavior, crashes (denial of service), o r the disclosure of sensitive information from adjacent memory regions.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5915
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch new file +217 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +From a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 19:00:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] rar: Fix heap-buffer-overflow (#2599) + +A filter block size must not be larger than the lzss window, which is +defined +by dictionary size, which in turn can be derived from unpacked file +size. + +While at it, improve error messages and fix lzss window wrap around +logic. + +Fixes https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/2565 + +--------- + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Co-authored-by: Tim Kientzle <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5915 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + Makefile.am | 2 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 17 ++++--- + libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt | 1 + + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu | 11 +++++ + 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu + +diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am +index 3fd2fdb..e486a8d 100644 +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ libarchive_test_SOURCES= \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_encryption_header.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_filter.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.c \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_tar.c \ +@@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0003.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0004.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_noeof.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_lzss_conversion.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free2.rar.uu \ +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +index 091a993..4d3b966 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c +@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int read_filter(struct archive_read *, int64_t *); + static int rar_decode_byte(struct archive_read*, uint8_t *); + static int execute_filter(struct archive_read*, struct rar_filter *, + struct rar_virtual_machine *, size_t); +-static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, void *, int64_t, int); ++static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, uint8_t *, int64_t, int); + static inline void vm_write_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t, uint32_t); + static inline uint32_t vm_read_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t); + +@@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + } + + if ((symbol = read_next_symbol(a, &rar->maincode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + + if (symbol < 256) + { +@@ -2926,14 +2926,14 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + else + { + if (parse_codes(a) != ARCHIVE_OK) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + } + else if(symbol==257) + { + if (!read_filter(a, end)) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + continue; + } + else if(symbol==258) +@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end) + { + if ((lowoffsetsymbol = + read_next_symbol(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode)) < 0) +- return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); ++ goto bad_data; + if(lowoffsetsymbol == 16) + { + rar->numlowoffsetrepeats = 15; +@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ bad_data: + } + + static int +-copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, ++copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, uint8_t *buffer, + int64_t startpos, int length) + { + int windowoffs, firstpart; +@@ -3081,7 +3081,7 @@ copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer, + } + if (firstpart < length) { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], firstpart); +- memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); ++ memcpy(buffer + firstpart, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart); + } else { + memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], length); + } +@@ -3228,6 +3228,9 @@ parse_filter(struct archive_read *a, const uint8_t *bytes, uint16_t length, uint + else + blocklength = prog ? prog->oldfilterlength : 0; + ++ if (blocklength > rar->dictionary_size) ++ return 0; ++ + registers[3] = PROGRAM_SYSTEM_GLOBAL_ADDRESS; + registers[4] = blocklength; + registers[5] = prog ? prog->usagecount : 0; +diff --git a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +index bbbff22..05c6fd7 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt ++++ b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt +@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ IF(ENABLE_TEST) + test_read_format_rar_encryption_partially.c + test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c + test_read_format_rar_filter.c ++ test_read_format_rar_overflow.c + test_read_format_rar5.c + test_read_format_raw.c + test_read_format_tar.c +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b39ed6b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c +@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ ++/*- ++ * Copyright (c) 2003-2025 Tim Kientzle ++ * All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++#include "test.h" ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar_overflow) ++{ ++ struct archive *a; ++ struct archive_entry *ae; ++ const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar"; ++ const void *buff; ++ size_t size; ++ int64_t offset; ++ ++ extract_reference_file(reffile); ++ assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 1024)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae)); ++ assertEqualInt(48, archive_entry_size(ae)); ++ /* The next call should reproduce Issue #2565 */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_data_block(a, &buff, &size, &offset)); ++ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); ++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..48fd3fd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`,($=```(0`@`0``,`````(````````````S`0``````,`"_B%_: ++MZ?^[:7``?S!!,`@P,KB@,T@RN33)MTEB@5Z3<`DP`K35`.0P63@P<,Q&0?#, ++MA##,,",S,(@P,#,@##`&,#":(3`!,#"(`9HPS,,S13`P,#`P,*`PHPS,,S1A ++M,!,!,#","9H@S12D#$PP!C`P`*'F03":,,T8H`@\,/DPJS!/,"30,#`3N%LP ++MCQ6:S3"!,#LP22<-,$5%B"5B$S!)(&*>G#+@!`E`%0ODC])62=DO,)BYJX'P ++M=/LPZ3!!008?%S`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P2$PP,#`P03!(,#`P,#`& ++M,`7),#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P ++-,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,``` ++` ++end +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2024-20696.patch \ file://CVE-2025-25724.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 2/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5916
From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an integer overflow that can be triggered when processing a Web Archive (WARC) file that claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes. An attacker could craft a malicious WARC archive to induce this overflow, potentially leading to unpredictable program behavior, memory corruption, or a denial-of-service condition within applications that process such archives using libarchive.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5916
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch new file +116 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 00:24:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] warc: Prevent signed integer overflow (#2568) + +If a warc archive claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes, +the inevitable failure to skip all these bytes could lead to parsing +data which should be ignored instead. + +The test case contains a conversation entry with that many bytes and if +the entry is not properly skipped, the warc implementation would read +the conversation data as a new file entry. + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-5916 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + Makefile.am | 1 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 7 ++++-- + libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu | 10 ++++++++ + 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu + +diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am +index e486a8d..dd1620d 100644 +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_eucjp.tar.Z.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_koi8r.tar.Z.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.warc.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip.zip.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip_7075_utf8_paths.zip.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip_7z_deflate.zip.uu \ +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +index 2732996..19cf5a3 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c +@@ -379,7 +379,8 @@ start_over: + case LAST_WT: + default: + /* consume the content and start over */ +- _warc_skip(a); ++ if (_warc_skip(a) < 0) ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); + goto start_over; + } + return (ARCHIVE_OK); +@@ -432,7 +433,9 @@ _warc_skip(struct archive_read *a) + { + struct warc_s *w = a->format->data; + +- __archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen + 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/); ++ if (__archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen) < 0 || ++ __archive_read_consume(a, 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/) < 0) ++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); + w->cntlen = 0U; + w->cntoff = 0U; + return (ARCHIVE_OK); +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c +index 658ab8a..8a6d178 100644 +--- a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c +@@ -80,3 +80,27 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc) + assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); + assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); + } ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc_incomplete) ++{ ++ const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc"; ++ struct archive_entry *ae; ++ struct archive *a; ++ ++ extract_reference_file(reffile); ++ assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a)); ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, ++ archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 10240)); ++ ++ /* Entry cannot be parsed */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae)); ++ ++ /* Verify archive format. */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FILTER_NONE, archive_filter_code(a, 0)); ++ ++ /* Verify closing and resource freeing */ ++ assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a)); ++ assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a)); ++} +diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..b91b97e +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc ++M5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@8V]N=F5R<VEO;@T*5T%20RU$871E.B`R ++M,#(U+3`S+3,P5#$U.C`P.C0P6@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#DR,C,S-S(P ++M,S8X-30W-S4X,#<-"@T*5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@<F5S;W5R8V4- ++M"E=!4D,M5&%R9V5T+55223H@9FEL93HO+W)E861M92YT>'0-"E=!4D,M1&%T ++M93H@,C`R-2TP,RTS,%0Q-3HP,#HT,%H-"D-O;G1E;G0M5'EP93H@=&5X="]P ++M;&%I;@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#,X#0H-"E1H92!R96%D;64N='AT('-H ++4;W5L9"!N;W0@8F4@=FES:6)L90H` ++` ++end +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-25724.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
PATCH 3/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5917
In reply to dchellamFrom: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an 'off-by- one' miscalculation when handling prefixes and suffixes for file names. This can lead to a 1- byte write overflow. While seemingly small, such an overflow can corrupt adjacent memory, lea ding to unpredictable program behavior, crashes, or in specific circumstances, could be lever aged as a building block for more sophisticated exploitation.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5917
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch new file +54 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Brian Campbell <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2025 05:11:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix overflow in build_ustar_entry (#2588) + +The calculations for the suffix and prefix can increment the endpoint +for a trailing slash. Hence the limits used should be one lower than the +maximum number of bytes. + +Without this patch, when this happens for both the prefix and the +suffix, we end up with 156 + 100 bytes, and the write of the null at the +end will overflow the 256 byte buffer. This can be reproduced by running +``` +mkdir -p foo/bar +bsdtar cvf test.tar foo////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////bar +``` +when bsdtar is compiled with Address Sanitiser, although I originally +noticed this by accident with a genuine filename on a CHERI capability +system, which faults immediately on the buffer overflow. + +CVE: CVE-2025-5917 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c +index cf1f477..8e6aade 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c +@@ -1546,7 +1546,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length, + const char *filename, *filename_end; + char *p; + int need_slash = 0; /* Was there a trailing slash? */ +- size_t suffix_length = 99; ++ size_t suffix_length = 98; /* 99 - 1 for trailing slash */ + size_t insert_length; + + /* Length of additional dir element to be added. */ +@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length, + /* Step 2: Locate the "prefix" section of the dirname, including + * trailing '/'. */ + prefix = src; +- prefix_end = prefix + 155; ++ prefix_end = prefix + 154 /* 155 - 1 for trailing / */; + if (prefix_end > filename) + prefix_end = filename; + while (prefix_end > prefix && *prefix_end != '/') +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \ file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-5917.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0