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libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915

PATCH Superseded dchellam 1 participant 3 messages Jul 8, 2025

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PATCH 1/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5915

From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>

A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw can lead to a heap b uffer over-read due to the size of a filter block potentially exceeding the Lempel-Ziv-Storer -Schieber (LZSS) window. This means the library may attempt to read beyond the allocated memo ry buffer, which can result in unpredictable program behavior, crashes (denial of service), o r the disclosure of sensitive information from adjacent memory regions.

Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5915

Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c

---
 .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch | 217 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb            |   1 +
 2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5915.patch new file +217 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c83f4f1abc
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+From a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 11 May 2025 19:00:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] rar: Fix heap-buffer-overflow (#2599)
+
+A filter block size must not be larger than the lzss window, which is
+defined
+by dictionary size, which in turn can be derived from unpacked file
+size.
+
+While at it, improve error messages and fix lzss window wrap around
+logic.
+
+Fixes https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/2565
+
+---------
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]>
+Co-authored-by: Tim Kientzle <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-5915
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/a612bf62f86a6faa47bd57c52b94849f0a404d8c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
+---
+ Makefile.am                                   |  2 +
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c  | 17 ++++---
+ libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt                |  1 +
+ .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c      | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu | 11 +++++
+ 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c
+ create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 3fd2fdb..e486a8d 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ libarchive_test_SOURCES= \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_encryption_header.c \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_filter.c \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c \
++	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.c \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_tar.c \
+@@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0003.rar.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_multivolume.part0004.rar.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_noeof.rar.uu \
++	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_lzss_conversion.rar.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free.rar.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_ppmd_use_after_free2.rar.uu \
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index 091a993..4d3b966 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int read_filter(struct archive_read *, int64_t *);
+ static int rar_decode_byte(struct archive_read*, uint8_t *);
+ static int execute_filter(struct archive_read*, struct rar_filter *,
+                           struct rar_virtual_machine *, size_t);
+-static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, void *, int64_t, int);
++static int copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *, uint8_t *, int64_t, int);
+ static inline void vm_write_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t, uint32_t);
+ static inline uint32_t vm_read_32(struct rar_virtual_machine*, size_t);
+ 
+@@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end)
+     }
+ 
+     if ((symbol = read_next_symbol(a, &rar->maincode)) < 0)
+-      return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++      goto bad_data;
+ 
+     if (symbol < 256)
+     {
+@@ -2926,14 +2926,14 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end)
+       else
+       {
+         if (parse_codes(a) != ARCHIVE_OK)
+-          return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++          goto bad_data;
+         continue;
+       }
+     }
+     else if(symbol==257)
+     {
+       if (!read_filter(a, end))
+-          return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++          goto bad_data;
+       continue;
+     }
+     else if(symbol==258)
+@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ expand(struct archive_read *a, int64_t *end)
+           {
+             if ((lowoffsetsymbol =
+               read_next_symbol(a, &rar->lowoffsetcode)) < 0)
+-              return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++              goto bad_data;
+             if(lowoffsetsymbol == 16)
+             {
+               rar->numlowoffsetrepeats = 15;
+@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ bad_data:
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer,
++copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, uint8_t *buffer,
+                       int64_t startpos, int length)
+ {
+   int windowoffs, firstpart;
+@@ -3081,7 +3081,7 @@ copy_from_lzss_window(struct archive_read *a, void *buffer,
+   }
+   if (firstpart < length) {
+     memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], firstpart);
+-    memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart);
++    memcpy(buffer + firstpart, &rar->lzss.window[0], length - firstpart);
+   } else {
+     memcpy(buffer, &rar->lzss.window[windowoffs], length);
+   }
+@@ -3228,6 +3228,9 @@ parse_filter(struct archive_read *a, const uint8_t *bytes, uint16_t length, uint
+   else
+     blocklength = prog ? prog->oldfilterlength : 0;
+ 
++  if (blocklength > rar->dictionary_size)
++    return 0;
++
+   registers[3] = PROGRAM_SYSTEM_GLOBAL_ADDRESS;
+   registers[4] = blocklength;
+   registers[5] = prog ? prog->usagecount : 0;
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt
+index bbbff22..05c6fd7 100644
+--- a/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/libarchive/test/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ IF(ENABLE_TEST)
+     test_read_format_rar_encryption_partially.c
+     test_read_format_rar_invalid1.c
+     test_read_format_rar_filter.c
++    test_read_format_rar_overflow.c
+     test_read_format_rar5.c
+     test_read_format_raw.c
+     test_read_format_tar.c
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b39ed6b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
++/*-
++ * Copyright (c) 2003-2025 Tim Kientzle
++ * All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++#include "test.h"
++
++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar_overflow)
++{
++    struct archive *a;
++    struct archive_entry *ae;
++    const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar";
++    const void *buff;
++    size_t size;
++    int64_t offset;
++
++    extract_reference_file(reffile);
++    assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL);
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a));
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a));
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 1024));
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
++    assertEqualInt(48, archive_entry_size(ae));
++    /* The next call should reproduce Issue #2565 */
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_data_block(a, &buff, &size, &offset));
++
++    assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a));
++    assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a));
++}
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..48fd3fd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar.uu
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
++begin 644 test_read_format_rar_overflow.rar
++M4F%R(1H'`,($=```(0`@`0``,`````(````````````S`0``````,`"_B%_:
++MZ?^[:7``?S!!,`@P,KB@,T@RN33)MTEB@5Z3<`DP`K35`.0P63@P<,Q&0?#,
++MA##,,",S,(@P,#,@##`&,#":(3`!,#"(`9HPS,,S13`P,#`P,*`PHPS,,S1A
++M,!,!,#","9H@S12D#$PP!C`P`*'F03":,,T8H`@\,/DPJS!/,"30,#`3N%LP
++MCQ6:S3"!,#LP22<-,$5%B"5B$S!)(&*>G#+@!`E`%0ODC])62=DO,)BYJX'P
++M=/LPZ3!!008?%S`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P2$PP,#`P03!(,#`P,#`&
++M,`7),#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P
++-,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,```
++`
++end
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
index 4d0e3f7179..c612c1b7e0 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-20696.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-25724.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5916

From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>

A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an integer overflow that can be triggered when processing a Web Archive (WARC) file that claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes. An attacker could craft a malicious WARC archive to induce this overflow, potentially leading to unpredictable program behavior, memory corruption, or a denial-of-service condition within applications that process such archives using libarchive.

Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5916

Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403

---
 .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb            |   1 +
 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5916.patch new file +116 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d32c8ee84e
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 00:24:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] warc: Prevent signed integer overflow (#2568)
+
+If a warc archive claims to have more than INT64_MAX - 4 content bytes,
+the inevitable failure to skip all these bytes could lead to parsing
+data which should be ignored instead.
+
+The test case contains a conversation entry with that many bytes and if
+the entry is not properly skipped, the warc implementation would read
+the conversation data as a new file entry.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-5916
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/ef093729521fcf73fa4007d5ae77adfe4df42403]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
+---
+ Makefile.am                                   |  1 +
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c |  7 ++++--
+ libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c       | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu  | 10 ++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index e486a8d..dd1620d 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_eucjp.tar.Z.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_ustar_filename_koi8r.tar.Z.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.warc.uu \
++	libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip.zip.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip_7075_utf8_paths.zip.uu \
+ 	libarchive/test/test_read_format_zip_7z_deflate.zip.uu \
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+index 2732996..19cf5a3 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+@@ -379,7 +379,8 @@ start_over:
+ 	case LAST_WT:
+ 	default:
+ 		/* consume the content and start over */
+-		_warc_skip(a);
++		if (_warc_skip(a) < 0)
++			return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ 		goto start_over;
+ 	}
+ 	return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+@@ -432,7 +433,9 @@ _warc_skip(struct archive_read *a)
+ {
+ 	struct warc_s *w = a->format->data;
+ 
+-	__archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen + 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/);
++	if (__archive_read_consume(a, w->cntlen) < 0 ||
++	    __archive_read_consume(a, 4U/*\r\n\r\n separator*/) < 0)
++		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ 	w->cntlen = 0U;
+ 	w->cntoff = 0U;
+ 	return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c
+index 658ab8a..8a6d178 100644
+--- a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c
++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc.c
+@@ -80,3 +80,27 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc)
+ 	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a));
+ 	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a));
+ }
++
++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_warc_incomplete)
++{
++	const char reffile[] = "test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc";
++	struct archive_entry *ae;
++	struct archive *a;
++
++	extract_reference_file(reffile);
++	assert((a = archive_read_new()) != NULL);
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_filter_all(a));
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_support_format_all(a));
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK,
++	    archive_read_open_filename(a, reffile, 10240));
++
++	/* Entry cannot be parsed */
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FATAL, archive_read_next_header(a, &ae));
++
++	/* Verify archive format. */
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_FILTER_NONE, archive_filter_code(a, 0));
++
++	/* Verify closing and resource freeing */
++	assertEqualIntA(a, ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_close(a));
++	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_read_free(a));
++}
+diff --git a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b91b97e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc.uu
+@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
++begin 644 test_read_format_warc_incomplete.warc
++M5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@8V]N=F5R<VEO;@T*5T%20RU$871E.B`R
++M,#(U+3`S+3,P5#$U.C`P.C0P6@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#DR,C,S-S(P
++M,S8X-30W-S4X,#<-"@T*5T%20R\Q+C`-"E=!4D,M5'EP93H@<F5S;W5R8V4-
++M"E=!4D,M5&%R9V5T+55223H@9FEL93HO+W)E861M92YT>'0-"E=!4D,M1&%T
++M93H@,C`R-2TP,RTS,%0Q-3HP,#HT,%H-"D-O;G1E;G0M5'EP93H@=&5X="]P
++M;&%I;@T*0V]N=&5N="U,96YG=&@Z(#,X#0H-"E1H92!R96%D;64N='AT('-H
++4;W5L9"!N;W0@8F4@=FES:6)L90H`
++`
++end
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
index c612c1b7e0..f90063ba3a 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-25724.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 libarchive: fix CVE-2025-5917

In reply to dchellam

From: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>

A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library. This flaw involves an 'off-by- one' miscalculation when handling prefixes and suffixes for file names. This can lead to a 1- byte write overflow. While seemingly small, such an overflow can corrupt adjacent memory, lea ding to unpredictable program behavior, crashes, or in specific circumstances, could be lever aged as a building block for more sophisticated exploitation.

Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-5917

Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85

---
 .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2025-5917.patch new file +54 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c2003e574
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Brian Campbell <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2025 05:11:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix overflow in build_ustar_entry (#2588)
+
+The calculations for the suffix and prefix can increment the endpoint
+for a trailing slash. Hence the limits used should be one lower than the
+maximum number of bytes.
+
+Without this patch, when this happens for both the prefix and the
+suffix, we end up with 156 + 100 bytes, and the write of the null at the
+end will overflow the 256 byte buffer. This can be reproduced by running
+```
+mkdir -p foo/bar
+bsdtar cvf test.tar foo////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////bar
+```
+when bsdtar is compiled with Address Sanitiser, although I originally
+noticed this by accident with a genuine filename on a CHERI capability
+system, which faults immediately on the buffer overflow.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-5917
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7c02cde37a63580cd1859183fbbd2cf04a89be85]
+
+Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
+---
+ libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
+index cf1f477..8e6aade 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
+@@ -1546,7 +1546,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length,
+ 	const char *filename, *filename_end;
+ 	char *p;
+ 	int need_slash = 0; /* Was there a trailing slash? */
+-	size_t suffix_length = 99;
++	size_t suffix_length = 98; /* 99 - 1 for trailing slash */
+ 	size_t insert_length;
+ 
+ 	/* Length of additional dir element to be added. */
+@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ build_ustar_entry_name(char *dest, const char *src, size_t src_length,
+ 	/* Step 2: Locate the "prefix" section of the dirname, including
+ 	 * trailing '/'. */
+ 	prefix = src;
+-	prefix_end = prefix + 155;
++	prefix_end = prefix + 154 /* 155 - 1 for trailing / */;
+ 	if (prefix_end > filename)
+ 		prefix_end = filename;
+ 	while (prefix_end > prefix && *prefix_end != '/')
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +1 -0
index f90063ba3a..3937bfb82d 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-5914.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-5915.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-5916.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-5917.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0