x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
PATCH v3 1/1 x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly documented.
Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
* Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the guest
* Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
---
v3:
* Drop pt_regs pointer as it is already part of the es_em_ctxt struct (Tom)
* Added Sean's suggested-by instead of authored-by (Sean)
* Removed WARN_ON_ONCE as kernel already warns via ex_handler_msr() for bare wrmsrq() calls (Sean)
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c +16 -15
@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ. */ -static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct pt_regs *regs,bool write) +static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,bool write) { +struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;u64 tsc;/* -* GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled. -* Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. +* Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to +* return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate +* a #GP on all writes. */ -if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) -return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +if (write) { + ctxt->fi.vector =X86_TRAP_GP ; + ctxt->fi.error_code =0 ; +return ES_EXCEPTION ; + }/* -* Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC -* to return undefined values, so ignore all writes. -* -* Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use -* the value returned by rdtsc_ordered(). +* GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is +* enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. */ -if (write) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n" ); -return ES_OK ; - } +if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) +return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +/* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */ tsc =rdtsc_ordered (); regs->ax =lower_32_bits (tsc); regs->dx =upper_32_bits (tsc);
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)case MSR_IA32_TSC :case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ :if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC ) -return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (regs, write); +return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (ctxt, write);break ;default :break ;
base-commit: 34481698fd9c3c21425ab744e9e15dc2ce3b1b85
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 11 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQMSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly documented.Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
* Write toGUEST_TSC_FREQwill generate a #GP instead of terminating the guest
* Write toMSR_IA32_TSCwill generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
Quoted 6 lines
However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQMSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
Quoted 71 lines
---
v3:
* Droppt_regspointer as it is already part of thees_em_ctxtstruct (Tom)
* Added Sean's suggested-by instead of authored-by (Sean)
* RemovedWARN_ON_ONCEas kernel already warns viaex_handler_msr()for barewrmsrq()calls (Sean)arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c +16
-15@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ. */ -static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct pt_regs *regs,bool write) +static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,bool write) { +struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;u64 tsc;/* -* GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled. -* Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. +* Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to +* return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate +* a #GP on all writes. */ -if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) -return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +if (write) { + ctxt->fi.vector =X86_TRAP_GP ; + ctxt->fi.error_code =0 ; +return ES_EXCEPTION ; + }/* -* Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC -* to return undefined values, so ignore all writes. -* -* Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use -* the value returned by rdtsc_ordered(). +* GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is +* enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. */ -if (write) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n" ); -return ES_OK ; - } +if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) +return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +/* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */ tsc =rdtsc_ordered (); regs->ax =lower_32_bits (tsc); regs->dx =upper_32_bits (tsc);@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)case MSR_IA32_TSC :case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ :if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC ) -return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (regs, write); +return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (ctxt, write);break ;default :break ;base-commit:
34481698fd9c3c21425ab744e9e15dc2ce3b1b85
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af Author: Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 13:18:53 +05:30 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 12:33:58 +02:00
x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly documented.
Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
* Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the guest
* Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate an improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
[ bp: simplify comment. ]
--- arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c +16 -15
@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ. */ -static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct pt_regs *regs,bool write) +static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,bool write) { +struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;u64 tsc;/* -* GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled. -* Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. +* Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to +* return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate +* a #GP on all writes. */ -if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) -return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +if (write) { + ctxt->fi.vector =X86_TRAP_GP ; + ctxt->fi.error_code =0 ; +return ES_EXCEPTION ; + }/* -* Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC -* to return undefined values, so ignore all writes. -* -* Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use -* the value returned by rdtsc_ordered(). +* GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is +* enabled. Terminate the guest if a read is attempted. */ -if (write) { -WARN_ONCE (1 ,"TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n" ); -return ES_OK ; - } +if (regs->cx ==MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ ) +return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +/* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */ tsc =rdtsc_ordered (); regs->ax =lower_32_bits (tsc); regs->dx =upper_32_bits (tsc);
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)case MSR_IA32_TSC :case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ :if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC ) -return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (regs, write); +return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs (ctxt, write);break ;default :break ;