x86/sev: Remove bogus virtual address check
PATCH 1/1 x86/sev: Remove bogus virtual address check
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling virt_addr_valid() is not needed.
--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0 -9
@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW. -* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.740.g6adb054d12-goog
(cc Eric)
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)
Ping?
Quoted 23 lines
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-9@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW. -* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0.740.g6adb054d12-goog
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.Cc Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-2@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW.
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req · line 2254
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-7-* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670 ("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")
and there was some speculation about the potential of using a crypto accelerator which wants addresses in linear mapping...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteQuoted 38 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 24 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.Cc Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-2@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW. arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req · line 2254
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-7-* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ This came from:
Quoted 6 lines
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of
guest request buffers")and there was some speculation about the potential of using a crypto accelerator which wants addresses in linear mapping...
Sure, but that speculation was entirely misguided, so we can remove this again.
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 38 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 24 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.Cc Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-2@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW. arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req · line 2254
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-7-* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ This came from:
Quoted 6 lines
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of
guest request buffers")and there was some speculation about the potential of using a crypto accelerator which wants addresses in linear mapping...
Sure, but that speculation was entirely misguided, so we can remove this again.
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 41 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 40 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 24 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.Cc Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-2@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *requ64 seqno;int rc; -/* -* enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW. arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req · line 2254
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c +0
-7-* The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping. -*/ -if (!virt_addr_valid (req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid (req->resp_buf)) { -pr_warn ("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } -guard (mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of
guest request buffers")
Nah, this is because ofdb10cb9b574675402b virt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist target
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and there was some speculation about the potential of using a crypto accelerator which wants addresses in linear mapping...
If the pr_warn() above is removed, then we get this BUG_ON back:
===
static inline void sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, const void *buf,
unsigned int buflen)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SG
BUG_ON(!virt_addr_valid(buf));
#endif
sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf));
}===
So if you really insist on removing my pr_warn(), then post a patch removing the BUG_ON too. Thanks,
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Sure, but that speculation was entirely misguided, so we can remove this again.
Signature · 1 line
Alexey
[ replying a second time since the first one seems to have evaporated - apologies if you are seeing two replies that look vaguely but not exactly the same]
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 14 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed.
...
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This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")Nah, this is because of
db10cb9b574675402bvirt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist target
Is that change still needed after
f3476bc77057 ("virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library")
If not, should we revert db10cb9b574675402b too?
Using the crypto API for simple operations where the algorithm is known at build time was always a mistake. But moving stack allocations to the heap just to placate a clunky API that can only be used meaningfully in an asynchronous manner in the first place is just pointless.
Quoted 27 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
[ replying a second time since the first one seems to have evaporated - apologies if you are seeing two replies that look vaguely but not exactly the same]
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 14 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed....
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This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")
Quoted 7 lines
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Nah, this is because of
db10cb9b574675402bvirt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist targetIs that change still needed after
f3476bc77057("virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library")
huh. You're right, looks like it is not, I missed that.
Quoted 1 line
If not, should we revert
db10cb9b574675402btoo?
Nah, we do not want these structures on stack anyway (they might get too big in the future).
Quoted 4 lines
Using the crypto API for simple operations where the algorithm is known at build time was always a mistake. But moving stack allocations to the heap just to placate a clunky API that can only be used meaningfully in an asynchronous manner in the first place is just pointless.
True.
or should I reply with these to the original mail?
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Alexey
Quoted 44 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 23 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 14 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed....
Quoted 6 lines
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This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")Quoted 7 lines
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Nah, this is because of
db10cb9b574675402bvirt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist targetIs that change still needed after
f3476bc77057("virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library")huh. You're right, looks like it is not, I missed that.
Quoted 1 line
If not, should we revert
db10cb9b574675402btoo?Nah, we do not want these structures on stack anyway (they might get too big in the future).
Quoted 4 lines
Using the crypto API for simple operations where the algorithm is known at build time was always a mistake. But moving stack allocations to the heap just to placate a clunky API that can only be used meaningfully in an asynchronous manner in the first place is just pointless.
Quoted 7 lines
True.
Reviewed-by Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]>Tested-by Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]>or should I reply with these to the original mail?
Thanks. I think it should be fine like this.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 46 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 23 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 15 lines · Alexey Kardashevskiy
Quoted 14 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(add Eric back to cc)
Please keep Eric on cc - I added him for a reason, thanks.
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and never performs any H/W offload, and so calling
virt_addr_valid()is not needed....
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This came from:
7ffeb2fc2670("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")Quoted 7 lines
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Nah, this is because of
db10cb9b574675402bvirt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist targetIs that change still needed after
f3476bc77057("virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library")huh. You're right, looks like it is not, I missed that.
Quoted 1 line
If not, should we revert
db10cb9b574675402btoo?Nah, we do not want these structures on stack anyway (they might get too big in the future).
Quoted 4 lines
Using the crypto API for simple operations where the algorithm is known at build time was always a mistake. But moving stack allocations to the heap just to placate a clunky API that can only be used meaningfully in an asynchronous manner in the first place is just pointless.
True.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Reviewed-by Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]>Tested-by Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]>or should I reply with these to the original mail?
Thanks. I think it should be fine like this.
And now let's invite the folks from
db10cb9b5746 ("virt: sevguest: Fix passing a stack buffer as a scatterlist target")
to the party so that the circle is complete. :-)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette