audit: Improve path logging for unlinked files
PATCH 1/1 audit: Improve path logging for unlinked files
When logging the path associated with a denial, the path is scanned to ensure that it does not contain control characters, unprintable characters, double quote marks, or spaces. If it does, the hexadecimal representation of the path is emitted.
This can make debugging difficult in scenarios where the file name that was given to the file does not contain any of those characters, but the hexadecimal representation of the path is still emitted when a denial occurs because the file is unlinked.
For example, suppose a memfd is created with the name "MemoryHeapBase". Memfds are unlinked, so when a denial related to that memfd is encountered, and the the path name for it is obtained via d_path(), the name will be: "/memfd:MemoryHeapBase (deleted)". Since the name has a space, the audit logic will just print the hexadecimal representation instead of the name:
type=1400 audit(0.0:319): avc: denied { read write } for path=2F6D656D66643A4D656D6F72794865617042617365202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=75 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
To improve debuggability of denials related to unlinked files, check if the " (deleted)" suffix is detected in a path name and remove it if so. This allows the actual filename to be validated and emitted if appropriate, making denials easier to read and more actionable:
type=1400 audit(0.0:254): avc: denied { read write } for path="/memfd:MemoryHeapBase" dev="tmpfs" ino=67 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
--- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +14 -2
@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string)void audit_log_d_path (struct audit_buffer *ab,const char *prefix,const struct path *path) { -char *p, *pathname; +char *p, *pathname, *suffix;if (prefix)audit_log_format (ab,"%s" , prefix);
@@ -2199,8 +2199,20 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,if (IS_ERR (p)) {/* Should never happen since we send PATH_MAX */ /* FIXME: can we save some information here? */ audit_log_format (ab,"\"<too_long>\"" ); - }else + }else { +/* +* Terminate the buffer where the " (deleted)" suffix starts so +* that audit_log_untrustedstring() emits the pathname, +* assuming it doesn't have other control characters or spaces. +*/ + suffix =strstr (p," (deleted)" ); +/* Ensure the string ends with the " (deleted)" suffix. */ +if (suffix && + ((p +strlen (p) -strlen (" (deleted)" )) == suffix)) + *suffix ='\0' ; +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, p); + }kfree (pathname); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.1.851.g4ebd6896fd-goog
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 33 lines · Isaac J. Manjarres
When logging the path associated with a denial, the path is scanned to ensure that it does not contain control characters, unprintable characters, double quote marks, or spaces. If it does, the hexadecimal representation of the path is emitted.
This can make debugging difficult in scenarios where the file name that was given to the file does not contain any of those characters, but the hexadecimal representation of the path is still emitted when a denial occurs because the file is unlinked.
For example, suppose a memfd is created with the name "MemoryHeapBase". Memfds are unlinked, so when a denial related to that memfd is encountered, and the the path name for it is obtained via
d_path(), the name will be: "/memfd:MemoryHeapBase (deleted)". Since the name has a space, the audit logic will just print the hexadecimal representation instead of the name:type=1400 audit(0.0:319): avc: denied { read write } for path=2F6D656D66643A4D656D6F72794865617042617365202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=75 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
To improve debuggability of denials related to unlinked files, check if the " (deleted)" suffix is detected in a path name and remove it if so. This allows the actual filename to be validated and emitted if appropriate, making denials easier to read and more actionable:
type=1400 audit(0.0:254): avc: denied { read write } for path="/memfd:MemoryHeapBase" dev="tmpfs" ino=67 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Isaac J. Manjarres <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
I'd prefer not to add any additional string processing to the audit hot path.
Quoted 37 lines
kernel/audit.c +14
-3@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string)void audit_log_d_path (struct audit_buffer *ab,const char *prefix,const struct path *path) { -char *p, *pathname; +char *p, *pathname, *suffix;if (prefix)audit_log_format (ab,"%s" , prefix);@@ -2199,8 +2199,20 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,if (IS_ERR (p)) {/* Should never happen since we send PATH_MAX */ /* FIXME: can we save some information here? */ audit_log_format (ab,"\"<too_long>\"" ); - }else + }else { +/* +* Terminate the buffer where the " (deleted)" suffix starts so +* that audit_log_untrustedstring() emits the pathname, +* assuming it doesn't have other control characters or spaces. +*/ + suffix =strstr (p," (deleted)" ); +/* Ensure the string ends with the " (deleted)" suffix. */ +if (suffix && + ((p +strlen (p) -strlen (" (deleted)" )) == suffix)) + *suffix ='\0' ; +audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, p); + }kfree (pathname); } --2.51.1.851.g4ebd6896fd-goog
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Quoted 36 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 33 lines · Isaac J. Manjarres
When logging the path associated with a denial, the path is scanned to ensure that it does not contain control characters, unprintable characters, double quote marks, or spaces. If it does, the hexadecimal representation of the path is emitted.
This can make debugging difficult in scenarios where the file name that was given to the file does not contain any of those characters, but the hexadecimal representation of the path is still emitted when a denial occurs because the file is unlinked.
For example, suppose a memfd is created with the name "MemoryHeapBase". Memfds are unlinked, so when a denial related to that memfd is encountered, and the the path name for it is obtained via
d_path(), the name will be: "/memfd:MemoryHeapBase (deleted)". Since the name has a space, the audit logic will just print the hexadecimal representation instead of the name:type=1400 audit(0.0:319): avc: denied { read write } for path=2F6D656D66643A4D656D6F72794865617042617365202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=75 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
To improve debuggability of denials related to unlinked files, check if the " (deleted)" suffix is detected in a path name and remove it if so. This allows the actual filename to be validated and emitted if appropriate, making denials easier to read and more actionable:
type=1400 audit(0.0:254): avc: denied { read write } for path="/memfd:MemoryHeapBase" dev="tmpfs" ino=67 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Isaac J. Manjarres <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)I'd prefer not to add any additional string processing to the audit hot path.
Hi Paul,
Thank you for taking the time to look through the patch. Would it help if I could
optimize the logic to scan for the " (deleted)" string from the end of the string
so that the search is bounded by at most 10 characters? I can also switch to calling audit_log_n_untrustedstring() instead to avoid another call to strlen().
If not, do you have any other suggestions to help make this improvement?
Thanks,
Isaac
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 45 lines · Isaac Manjarres
Quoted 35 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 33 lines · Isaac J. Manjarres
When logging the path associated with a denial, the path is scanned to ensure that it does not contain control characters, unprintable characters, double quote marks, or spaces. If it does, the hexadecimal representation of the path is emitted.
This can make debugging difficult in scenarios where the file name that was given to the file does not contain any of those characters, but the hexadecimal representation of the path is still emitted when a denial occurs because the file is unlinked.
For example, suppose a memfd is created with the name "MemoryHeapBase". Memfds are unlinked, so when a denial related to that memfd is encountered, and the the path name for it is obtained via
d_path(), the name will be: "/memfd:MemoryHeapBase (deleted)". Since the name has a space, the audit logic will just print the hexadecimal representation instead of the name:type=1400 audit(0.0:319): avc: denied { read write } for path=2F6D656D66643A4D656D6F72794865617042617365202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=75 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
To improve debuggability of denials related to unlinked files, check if the " (deleted)" suffix is detected in a path name and remove it if so. This allows the actual filename to be validated and emitted if appropriate, making denials easier to read and more actionable:
type=1400 audit(0.0:254): avc: denied { read write } for path="/memfd:MemoryHeapBase" dev="tmpfs" ino=67 scontext=u:r:audioserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_server:s0 tclass=memfd_file permissive=0
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Isaac J. Manjarres <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)I'd prefer not to add any additional string processing to the audit hot path.
Hi Paul,
Quoted 8 lines
Thank you for taking the time to look through the patch. Would it help if I could
optimize the logic to scan for the " (deleted)" string from the end of the string
so that the search is bounded by at most 10 characters? I can also switch to callingaudit_log_n_untrustedstring()instead to avoid another call tostrlen().If not, do you have any other suggestions to help make this improvement?
Since we don't know the length of the path string, I'm not sure starting the search from the end would be a significant improvement as you would still need to traverse the string to find the end, and then do the search. It is possible that searching from the end may be slower than searching from the front, although as you point out, some of this work could be reused through the use of audit_log_n_untrustedstring().
However, we're still doing string processing/searching in a critical path. Audit is already suffering from far too much string processing and I'm *extremely* hesitant to add any more unless there simply is no other way. As this is a "nice to have" sort of thing, and not a critical bug fix, I'd strongly prefer not to do the extra work here.
As far as other suggestions are concerned, nothing comes immediately to mind, I'm sorry.
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