KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to control SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature
PATCH 1/1 KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to control SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature
Add a module parameter secure_tsc to allow control of the SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature at module load time, providing administrators with the ability to disable Secure TSC support even when the hardware and kernel support it.
Default the parameter to enabled (true) to maintain existing behavior when the feature is supported. Set the parameter to false if the feature cannot be enabled to reflect the actual state.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +9 -1
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(sev_snp, sev_snp_enabled, bool, 0444);/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */ static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;module_param_named (debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool,0444 ); + +/* enable/disable Secure TSC support */ +static bool sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled = true; +module_param_named (secure_tsc, sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled, bool,0444 ); +static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;static unsigned int nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids;
@@ -3147,8 +3152,11 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (sev_snp_enabled && sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled && + tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; +else + sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled = false; }void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )
base-commit: 6b36119b94d0b2bb8cea9d512017efafd461d6ac
Signature · 1 line
2.48.1
Quoted 31 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a module parameter
secure_tscto allow control of the SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature at module load time, providing administrators with the ability to disable Secure TSC support even when the hardware and kernel support it.Default the parameter to enabled (true) to maintain existing behavior when the feature is supported. Set the parameter to false if the feature cannot be enabled to reflect the actual state.
Suggested-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +5
-0@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ module_param_named(sev_snp, sev_snp_enabled, bool, 0444);/* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */ static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;module_param_named (debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool,0444 ); + +/* enable/disable Secure TSC support */ +static bool sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled = true; +module_param_named (secure_tsc, sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled, bool,0444 ); +static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;static unsigned int nr_ciphertext_hiding_asids;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) · line 3159
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +4
-1@@ -3147,8 +3152,11 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (sev_snp_enabled && sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled && + tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; +else + sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled = false;
Looks reasonable to me. My only nit is to rework this to look like the debug_swap support, e.g.:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +4 -1
@@ -3143,11 +3143,14 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP)) sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false; +if (!sev_snp_enabled || !tsc_khz || !cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) + sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled = false; + sev_supported_vmsa_features =0 ;if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP ; -if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC )) +if (sev_snp_secure_tsc_enabled) sev_supported_vmsa_features |=SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC ; }
But I'll leave that decision up to the maintainers.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0}void sev_hardware_unsetup (void )base-commit:
6b36119b94d0b2bb8cea9d512017efafd461d6ac
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a module parameter
secure_tscto allow control of the SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature at module load time, providing administrators with the ability to disable Secure TSC support even when the hardware and kernel support it.
Why?
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a module parameter
secure_tscto allow control of the SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature at module load time, providing administrators with the ability to disable Secure TSC support even when the hardware and kernel support it.Why?
That's on me. Based on the debug_swap parameter I thought we wanted to be able to control all SEV features that are advertised and thought this was just missed for Secure TSC. I'm good with not adding it we don't need to do that.
Thanks,
Tom
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a module parameter
secure_tscto allow control of the SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature at module load time, providing administrators with the ability to disable Secure TSC support even when the hardware and kernel support it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Why?
That's on me. Based on the
debug_swapparameter I thought we wanted to be able to control all SEV features that are advertised and thought this was just missed for Secure TSC. I'm good with not adding it we don't need to do that.
DebugSwap was one big mistake. At this point, I think we can and should rip out its module param.
Commit d1f85fbe836e ("KVM: SEV: Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES") goofed by not adding a way for the userspace VMM to control the feature. Functionally, that was fine, but it broke attestation signatures because SEV_FEATURES are included in the signature.
Commit 5abf6dceb066 ("SEV: disable SEV-ES DebugSwap by default") fixed that issue, but the underlying flaw of userspace not having a way to control SEV_FEATURES was still there.
That flaw was addressed by commit 4f5defae7089 ("KVM: SEV: introduce KVM_SEV_INIT2 operation"), and so then 4dd5ecacb9a4 ("KVM: SEV: allow SEV-ES DebugSwap again") re-enabled DebugSwap by default.
Now that the dust is settled, the module param doesn't serve any meaningful purpose.