ksmbd: Compare MACs in constant time
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 ksmbd: Compare MACs in constant time
To prevent timing attacks, MAC comparisons need to be constant-time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
Fixes e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
--- fs/smb/server/Kconfig | 1 + fs/smb/server/auth.c | 4 +++- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ config SMB_SERVER select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 select CRYPTO_LIB_DES select CRYPTO_LIB_MD5 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512 + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select CRYPTO_CMAC select CRYPTO_AEAD2 select CRYPTO_CCM select CRYPTO_GCM select ASN1
fs/smb/server/auth.c +3 -1
@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/aead.h> #include <crypto/md5.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include "auth.h" #include "glob.h"
@@ -163,11 +164,12 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess,/* Generate the session key */ hmac_md5_usingrawkey (ntlmv2_hash,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , ntlmv2_rsp,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , sess->sess_key); -if (memcmp (ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE ) !=0 ) +if (crypto_memneq (ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, +CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; }/**
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +3 -2
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@/* * Copyright (C) 2016 Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. */ +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/inetdevice.h> #include <net/addrconf.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/statfs.h>
@@ -8878,11 +8879,11 @@ int smb2_check_sign_req(struct ksmbd_work *work) iov[0 ].iov_len = len;ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (work->conn, work->sess->sess_key, iov,1 , signature); -if (memcmp (signature, signature_req,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { +if (crypto_memneq (signature, signature_req,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) {pr_err ("bad smb2 signature\n" );return 0 ; }return 1 ;
@@ -8966,11 +8967,11 @@ int smb3_check_sign_req(struct ksmbd_work *work) iov[0 ].iov_len = len;if (ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu (conn, signing_key, iov,1 , signature))return 0 ; -if (memcmp (signature, signature_req,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) { +if (crypto_memneq (signature, signature_req,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) {pr_err ("bad smb2 signature\n" );return 0 ; }return 1 ;
base-commit: 2961f841b025fb234860bac26dfb7fa7cb0fb122
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers
To prevent timing attacks, MAC comparisons need to be constant-time. Replace the
memcmp()with the correct function,crypto_memneq().Fixes e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Applied it to #ksmbd-for-next-next.
Thanks!