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ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline

PATCH Applied Joseph Qi 3 participants 6 messages Apr 3 – Apr 7 OCFS2

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Joseph Qi

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)

     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +10 -0
index 03a51662ea8e..a2ccd8011706 100644
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3
#1 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <[email protected]>…

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB
Quoted 2 lines

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

Thanks.

Quoted 9 lines
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +3 -0
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,

fs/ocfs2/inode.c int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb, · line 1520

Quoted 10 lines
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +7 -0
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",

Even though the surrounding code is from 2025 (1524af3685b35), I think this bug predates 1524af3685b35?

If so, I expect the -stable people will have trouble backporting this. If so, they'll report it and shall ask for a reworked version.

author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 56 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 26 lines · On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <[email protected]>…

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB
Quoted 2 lines

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

Thanks.

Quoted 9 lines
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +3 -0
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,

fs/ocfs2/inode.c int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb, · line 1520

Quoted 10 lines
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +7 -0
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",

Even though the surrounding code is from 2025 (1524af3685b35), I think this bug predates 1524af3685b35?

Quoted 2 lines

If so, I expect the -stable people will have trouble backporting this. If so, they'll report it and shall ask for a reworked version.

This seems blame to a very old commit (perhaps 1afc32b95233?), since it was designed to trust the on-disk block.
So I don't add a fixes tag for it.

Thanks,
Joseph

#3 lore raw
In reply to Joseph Qi
Quoted 26 lines · On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <[email protected]>…

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB
Quoted 2 lines

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

AI review had a question:

	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]
author maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 26 lines · On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <[email protected]>…

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

AI review had a question:

	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]

Sashiko worries about it can't handle the case OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL not set. I think it is a seprated case.

Thanks,
Joseph

reviewer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#5 lore raw
In reply to Joseph Qi
Quoted 26 lines · Joseph Qi

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB
Quoted 7 lines

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

Looks good to me.

Quoted 28 lines
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/inode.c +10 -0
index 03a51662ea8e..a2ccd8011706 100644
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3