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util/readline: Fix out-of-bounds access in readline_insert_char().

PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 3 messages Apr 6 – Apr 8

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 util/readline: Fix out-of-bounds access in readline_insert_char().

From: Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>

Currently, the readline_insert_char() function is guarded by the cursor position (cmd_buf_index) rather than the actual buffer fill level(cmd_buf_size). The current check is:

	if (rs->cmd_buf_index < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE)

This logic is flawed because if the command buffer is full and a user moves the cursor backward (e.g. by sending left arrow key), cmd_buf_index can be decreased without descreasing of buffer size.
This allow subsequent insertions to increase cmd_buf_size past its maximum limit of rs->cmd_buf.

Because in the ReadLineState struct, cmd_buf[READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE + 1] is immediately followed by the cmd_buf_index integer, once the buffer size is sufficiently inflated, the memmove() operation inside readline_insert_char() can write past the end of cmd_buf[] and overwrites cmd_buf_index itself.

The subsequent line:

	rs->cmd_buf[rs->cmd_buf_index] = ch;

then writes the input character to an address determined by the now-corrupted index.

By providing a specifically crafted input sequence via HMP, this flaw can be used to redirect the write operation to overwrite any field within the ReadLineState structure, which can lead to unpredictable behavior or application crashes.

Fix this by adding the guard to check for buffer fullness.

---
 util/readline.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

---
V2:
use assert() to check the value of cmd_buf_index before the insertion.

util/readline.c +3 -1
index 0f19674f52..e2664e48ca 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,9 @@ static void readline_update(ReadLineState *rs)
 
 static void readline_insert_char(ReadLineState *rs, int ch)
 {
-    if (rs->cmd_buf_index < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
+    assert(rs->cmd_buf_index <= rs->cmd_buf_size);
+
+    if (rs->cmd_buf_size < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
         memmove(rs->cmd_buf + rs->cmd_buf_index + 1,
                 rs->cmd_buf + rs->cmd_buf_index,
                 rs->cmd_buf_size - rs->cmd_buf_index);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#1 lore raw

Hi

Quoted 25 lines · On Mon, Apr 6, 2026 at 9:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>

Currently, the readline_insert_char() function is guarded by the cursor position (cmd_buf_index) rather than the actual buffer fill level(cmd_buf_size). The current check is:

        if (rs->cmd_buf_index < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE)

This logic is flawed because if the command buffer is full and a user moves the cursor backward (e.g. by sending left arrow key), cmd_buf_index can be decreased without descreasing of buffer size.
This allow subsequent insertions to increase cmd_buf_size past its maximum limit of rs->cmd_buf.

Because in the ReadLineState struct, cmd_buf[READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE + 1] is immediately followed by the cmd_buf_index integer, once the buffer size is sufficiently inflated, the memmove() operation inside readline_insert_char() can write past the end of cmd_buf[] and overwrites cmd_buf_index itself.

The subsequent line:

        rs->cmd_buf[rs->cmd_buf_index] = ch;

then writes the input character to an address determined by the now-corrupted index.

Quoted 8 lines

By providing a specifically crafted input sequence via HMP, this flaw can be used to redirect the write operation to overwrite any field within the ReadLineState structure, which can lead to unpredictable behavior or application crashes.

Fix this by adding the guard to check for buffer fullness.

Quoted 26 lines
---
 util/readline.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

---
V2:
use assert() to check the value of cmd_buf_index before the insertion.

util/readline.c +3 -2
index 0f19674f52..e2664e48ca 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,9 @@ static void readline_update(ReadLineState *rs)
 
 static void readline_insert_char(ReadLineState *rs, int ch)
 {
-    if (rs->cmd_buf_index < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
+    assert(rs->cmd_buf_index <= rs->cmd_buf_size);
+
+    if (rs->cmd_buf_size < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
         memmove(rs->cmd_buf + rs->cmd_buf_index + 1,
                 rs->cmd_buf + rs->cmd_buf_index,
                 rs->cmd_buf_size - rs->cmd_buf_index);
--

2.43.0

Signature · 1 line
Marc-André Lureau
#2 lore raw
Quoted 34 lines · Marc-André Lureau

Hi

Quoted 30 lines · On Mon, Apr 6, 2026 at 9:05 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>

Currently, the readline_insert_char() function is guarded by the cursor position (cmd_buf_index) rather than the actual buffer fill level(cmd_buf_size). The current check is:

        if (rs->cmd_buf_index < READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE)

This logic is flawed because if the command buffer is full and a user moves the cursor backward (e.g. by sending left arrow key), cmd_buf_index can be decreased without descreasing of buffer size.
This allow subsequent insertions to increase cmd_buf_size past its maximum limit of rs->cmd_buf.

Because in the ReadLineState struct, cmd_buf[READLINE_CMD_BUF_SIZE + 1] is immediately followed by the cmd_buf_index integer, once the buffer size is sufficiently inflated, the memmove() operation inside readline_insert_char() can write past the end of cmd_buf[] and overwrites cmd_buf_index itself.

The subsequent line:

        rs->cmd_buf[rs->cmd_buf_index] = ch;

then writes the input character to an address determined by the now-corrupted index.

By providing a specifically crafted input sequence via HMP, this flaw can be used to redirect the write operation to overwrite any field within the ReadLineState structure, which can lead to unpredictable behavior or application crashes.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Fix this by adding the guard to check for buffer fullness.

Thanks; this seemed worth getting into the next rc so I have applied it directly to git.

-- PMM