FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 917e3ad3321e75ca0223d5ccf26ceda116aa51e1
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026040756-egging-glider-c9f9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 917e3ad3321e75ca0223d5ccf26ceda116aa51e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:48:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()

The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an endless loop.

To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented kernel:

  $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel
  $ kexec -e

The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.

Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()) is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.

Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile, so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the future, other approaches should be considered.

The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported there.

[ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]

index e9aeeeafad17..47a32f583930 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,20 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_orc.o				:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_frame.o				:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_guess.o				:= n
 
+# Disable KCOV to prevent crashes during kexec: load_segments() invalidates
+# the GS base, which KCOV relies on for per-CPU data.
+#
+# As KCOV and KEXEC compatibility should be preserved (e.g. syzkaller is
+# using it to collect crash dumps during kernel fuzzing), disabling
+# KCOV for KEXEC kernels is not an option. Selectively disabling KCOV
+# instrumentation for individual affected functions can be fragile, while
+# adding more checks to KCOV would slow it down.
+#
+# As a compromise solution, disable KCOV instrumentation for the whole
+# source code file. If its coverage is ever needed, other approaches
+# should be considered.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_machine_kexec_64.o			:= n
+
 CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
 CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
 CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(src)/../include/asm/trace

index 5b9908f13dcf..3a5364853eab 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_tlb.o			:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt.o		:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mem_encrypt_amd.o	:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_pgprot.o		:= n
+# See the "Disable KCOV" comment in arch/x86/kernel/Makefile.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_physaddr.o		:= n
 
 KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt.o		:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_mem_encrypt_amd.o	:= n