Skip to contentSkip to conversation

ocfs2: validate inline dir size in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id

PATCH In review ZhengYuan Huang 2 participants 3 messages Apr 10 OCFS2

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ocfs2: validate inline dir size in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id

[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can set i_size larger than id_count. readdir then walks past data->id_data and KASAN reports:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656
Call Trace:
 ...
 ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline]
 ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977
 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65
 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822
 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108
 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline]
 __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396
 ...

[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() uses i_size_read(inode) as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid while i_size <= le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Once ctx->pos reaches id_count, data->id_data + ctx->pos points past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.

[FIX]
Validate i_size_read(inode) against data->id_count immediately after ocfs2_read_inode_block(). If the inline directory size exceeds its on-disk capacity, return -EFSCORRUPTED before constructing any dirent pointer. Keep the change local to ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() so the patch stays scoped to the readdir bug.

Fixes 23193e513d1c ("ocfs2: Read support for directories with inline data")
---
 fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/dir.c +8 -1
index 8c9c4825f984..fa537505d1a9 100644
@@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 				    struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
 	int ret, i;
+	int error = 0;
 	unsigned long offset = ctx->pos;
 	struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
 	struct ocfs2_dinode *di;
@@ -1777,6 +1778,12 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 	di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data;
 	data = &di->id2.i_data;
 
+	if (unlikely(i_size_read(inode) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count))) {
+		error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		mlog_errno(error);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	while (ctx->pos < i_size_read(inode)) {
 		/* If the dir block has changed since the last call to
 		 * readdir(2), then we might be pointing to an invalid
@@ -1819,7 +1826,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 	}
 out:
 	brelse(di_bh);
-	return 0;
+	return error;
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · ZhengYuan Huang

[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can set i_size larger than id_count. readdir then walks past data->id_data and KASAN reports:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656
Call Trace:
 ...
 ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline]
 ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977
 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65
 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822
 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108
 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline]
 __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396
 ...
Quoted 8 lines

[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() uses i_size_read(inode) as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid while i_size <= le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Once ctx->pos reaches id_count, data->id_data + ctx->pos points past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.

ocfs2_read_inode_block() has already validated dinode->i_size. So how it happens for the corrupted in-memory i_size?

Thanks,
Joseph

Quoted 47 lines

[FIX]
Validate i_size_read(inode) against data->id_count immediately after ocfs2_read_inode_block(). If the inline directory size exceeds its on-disk capacity, return -EFSCORRUPTED before constructing any dirent pointer. Keep the change local to ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() so the patch stays scoped to the readdir bug.

Fixes 23193e513d1c ("ocfs2: Read support for directories with inline data")
---
 fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/dir.c +8 -1
index 8c9c4825f984..fa537505d1a9 100644
@@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 				    struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
 	int ret, i;
+	int error = 0;
 	unsigned long offset = ctx->pos;
 	struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
 	struct ocfs2_dinode *di;
@@ -1777,6 +1778,12 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 	di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data;
 	data = &di->id2.i_data;
 
+	if (unlikely(i_size_read(inode) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count))) {
+		error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		mlog_errno(error);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	while (ctx->pos < i_size_read(inode)) {
 		/* If the dir block has changed since the last call to
 		 * readdir(2), then we might be pointing to an invalid
@@ -1819,7 +1826,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode,
 	}
 out:
 	brelse(di_bh);
-	return 0;
+	return error;
 }
 
 /*
#2 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Joseph Qi
Quoted 20 lines · ZhengYuan Huang

[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can set i_size larger than id_count. readdir then walks past data->id_data and KASAN reports:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656
Call Trace:
 ...
 ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805
 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline]
 ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977
 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65
 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822
 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108
 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline]
 __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396
 ...
Quoted 8 lines

[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() uses i_size_read(inode) as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid while i_size <= le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Once ctx->pos reaches id_count, data->id_data + ctx->pos points past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.

Quoted 5 lines

ocfs2_read_inode_block() has already validated dinode->i_size. So how it happens for the corrupted in-memory i_size?

Thanks,
Joseph

Thanks, my previous description was inaccurate.

The issue is not that inode->i_size becomes corrupted in memory after ocfs2_read_inode_block() validates the dinode. The issue is that the current dinode validation does not check the inline-directory invariant i_size <= id_count.

ocfs2_validate_inode_block() does basic dinode validation, but it does not verify that inline directory size fits within id_count. Then ocfs2_populate_inode() / ocfs2_refresh_inode() / ocfs2_refresh_inode_from_lvb() copy that unchecked size into the VFS inode.

So the actual problem is an unchecked corrupted on-disk i_size, not a post-validation in-memory corruption.

Once such an inode is loaded, readdir can legally reach ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(), which uses i_size_read(inode) as the upper bound.

Based on your comment, I think the cleaner fix is to reject such inline directories when the inode is loaded or refreshed, rather than only checking in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(). I will respin the patch accordingly.

Thanks,
ZhengYuan Huang