ocfs2: validate inline dir size in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id
PATCH 1/1 ocfs2: validate inline dir size in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id
[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can set i_size larger than id_count. readdir then walks past data->id_data and KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline] ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline] __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396 ...
[CAUSE]ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() uses i_size_read(inode) as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid while i_size <= le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Once ctx->pos reaches id_count, data->id_data + ctx->pos points past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.
[FIX]
Validate i_size_read(inode) against data->id_count immediately after ocfs2_read_inode_block(). If the inline directory size exceeds its on-disk capacity, return -EFSCORRUPTED before constructing any dirent pointer. Keep the change local to ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() so the patch stays scoped to the readdir bug.
--- fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ocfs2/dir.c +8 -1
@@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, struct dir_context *ctx) {int ret, i; +int error =0 ;unsigned long offset = ctx->pos;struct buffer_head *di_bh =NULL ;struct ocfs2_dinode *di;
@@ -1777,6 +1778,12 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data; data = &di->id2.i_data; +if (unlikely (i_size_read (inode) >le16_to_cpu (data->id_count))) { + error = -EFSCORRUPTED ; +mlog_errno (error); + goto out; + } +while (ctx->pos <i_size_read (inode)) {/* If the dir block has changed since the last call to * readdir(2), then we might be pointing to an invalid
@@ -1819,7 +1826,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, } out:brelse (di_bh); -return 0 ; +return error; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.49.0
Joseph Qi
maintainerQuoted 20 lines · ZhengYuan Huang
[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can seti_sizelarger thanid_count. readdir then walks pastdata->id_dataand KASAN reports:BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline] ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline] __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396 ...
Quoted 8 lines
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id()usesi_size_read(inode)as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid whilei_size<=le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Oncectx->posreachesid_count,data->id_data+ctx->pospoints past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.
ocfs2_read_inode_block() has already validated dinode->i_size. So how it happens for the corrupted in-memory i_size?
Thanks,
Joseph
Quoted 47 lines
[FIX]
Validatei_size_read(inode)againstdata->id_countimmediately afterocfs2_read_inode_block(). If the inline directory size exceeds its on-disk capacity, return-EFSCORRUPTEDbefore constructing any dirent pointer. Keep the change local toocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id()so the patch stays scoped to the readdir bug.Fixes 23193e513d1c ("ocfs2: Read support for directories with inline data")Signed-off-by ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>--- fs/ocfs2/dir.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/ocfs2/dir.c +8
-1@@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, struct dir_context *ctx) {int ret, i; +int error =0 ;unsigned long offset = ctx->pos;struct buffer_head *di_bh =NULL ;struct ocfs2_dinode *di;@@ -1777,6 +1778,12 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data; data = &di->id2.i_data; +if (unlikely (i_size_read (inode) >le16_to_cpu (data->id_count))) { + error = -EFSCORRUPTED ; +mlog_errno (error); + goto out; + } +while (ctx->pos <i_size_read (inode)) {/* If the dir block has changed since the last call to * readdir(2), then we might be pointing to an invalid @@ -1819,7 +1826,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(struct inode *inode, } out:brelse (di_bh); -return 0 ; +return error; }/*
Quoted 30 lines · Joseph Qi
Quoted 20 lines · ZhengYuan Huang
[BUG]
A crafted inline-data directory can seti_sizelarger thanid_count. readdir then walks pastdata->id_dataand KASAN reports:BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088f0008 by task syz.0.1936/4656 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_check_dir_entry.isra.0+0x31f/0x370 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:305 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id+0x203/0xa70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1805 ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1933 [inline] ocfs2_readdir+0x4ba/0x520 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1977 wrap_directory_iterator+0x9c/0xe0 fs/readdir.c:65 shared_ocfs2_readdir+0x29/0x40 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2822 iterate_dir+0x276/0x9e0 fs/readdir.c:108 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:410 [inline] __se_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:396 [inline] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x143/0x2a0 fs/readdir.c:396 ...Quoted 8 lines
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id()usesi_size_read(inode)as the loop bound after reading the inode block. Inline directories are only valid whilei_size<=le16_to_cpu(data->id_count), but that invariant is never checked on read. Oncectx->posreachesid_count,data->id_data+ctx->pospoints past the inode block and can land in a freed neighbor page.
Quoted 5 lines
ocfs2_read_inode_block()has already validateddinode->i_size. So how it happens for the corrupted in-memoryi_size?Thanks,
Joseph
Thanks, my previous description was inaccurate.
The issue is not that inode->i_size becomes corrupted in memory after ocfs2_read_inode_block() validates the dinode. The issue is that the current dinode validation does not check the inline-directory invariant i_size <= id_count.
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() does basic dinode validation, but it does not verify that inline directory size fits within id_count. Then ocfs2_populate_inode() / ocfs2_refresh_inode() / ocfs2_refresh_inode_from_lvb() copy that unchecked size into the VFS inode.
So the actual problem is an unchecked corrupted on-disk i_size, not a post-validation in-memory corruption.
Once such an inode is loaded, readdir can legally reach ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(), which uses i_size_read(inode) as the upper bound.
Based on your comment, I think the cleaner fix is to reject such inline directories when the inode is loaded or refreshed, rather than only checking in ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id(). I will respin the patch accordingly.
Thanks,
ZhengYuan Huang