smb: client: Fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 smb: client: Fix integer underflow in receive_encrypted_read()
In receive_encrypted_read(), the length of data to read from the socket is computed as:
len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) -
server->vals->read_rsp_size;
OriginalMessageSize comes from the server's transform header and is untrusted. If a malicious server sends a value smaller than read_rsp_size (sizeof(struct smb2_read_rsp), ~80 bytes), the unsigned subtraction wraps to a very large value (~4GB). This value is then passed to netfs_alloc_folioq_buffer() and cifs_read_iter_from_socket(), causing either:
- A massive allocation attempt that fails with -ENOMEM (DoS)
- Under extreme memory pressure, potential heap corruption
The existing validation in smb3_receive_transform() only checks that pdu_length >= orig_len + sizeof(transform_hdr), which does not prevent orig_len from being smaller than read_rsp_size.
Fix this by adding a check that OriginalMessageSize is at least read_rsp_size before the subtraction.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +8 -0
@@ -4943,6 +4943,14 @@ receive_encrypted_read(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct mid_q_entry **mid, goto free_dw; server->total_read += rc; +if (le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) < + server->vals->read_rsp_size) { +cifs_server_dbg (VFS ,"OriginalMessageSize %u too small for read response (%u)\n" , +le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize), + server->vals->read_rsp_size); + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto free_dw; + } len =le32_to_cpu (tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize) - server->vals->read_rsp_size; dw->len = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3 (Apple Git-145)