HID: magicmouse: Prevent out-of-bounds (OOB) read during DOUBLE_REPORT_ID
PATCH v2 1/1 HID: magicmouse: Prevent out-of-bounds (OOB) read during DOUBLE_REPORT_ID
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using DOUBLE_REPORT_ID by specifying a large report length and providing a smaller one.
Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the user and prevent any further processing.
---
v1 => v2: Add more size checks to protect against issues during recursion
drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c +16 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,struct input_dev *input = msc->input;int x =0 , y =0 , ii, clicks =0 , npoints; +/* Protect against zero sized recursive calls from DOUBLE_REPORT_ID */ +if (size <1 ) +return 0 ; +switch (data[0 ]) {case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID :case TRACKPAD2_BT_REPORT_ID :
@@ -490,6 +494,18 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one * packet. */ + +/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */ +if (size <2 ) +return 0 ; + +if (size < data[1 ] +2 ) { +hid_warn (hdev, +"received report length (%d) was smaller than specified (%d)" , + size, data[1 ] +2 ); +return 0 ; + } +magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 , data[1 ]);magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 + data[1 ], size -2 - data[1 ]);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.rc1.513.gad8abe7a5a-goog
Quoted 54 lines · Lee Jones
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using
DOUBLE_REPORT_IDby specifying a large report length and providing a smaller one.Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the user and prevent any further processing.
Signed-off-by Lee Jones <[email protected]>---
v1 => v2: Add more size checks to protect against issues during recursiondrivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c +16
-0@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,struct input_dev *input = msc->input;int x =0 , y =0 , ii, clicks =0 , npoints; +/* Protect against zero sized recursive calls from DOUBLE_REPORT_ID */ +if (size <1 ) +return 0 ; +switch (data[0 ]) {case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID :case TRACKPAD2_BT_REPORT_ID :@@ -490,6 +494,18 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one * packet. */ + +/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */ +if (size <2 ) +return 0 ; + +if (size < data[1 ] +2 ) { +hid_warn (hdev, +"received report length (%d) was smaller than specified (%d)" , + size, data[1 ] +2 ); +return 0 ; + } +magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 , data[1 ]);magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 + data[1 ], size -2 - data[1 ]);Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.rc1.513.gad8abe7a5a-goog
Thank you! This looks correct now.
—Günther
Quoted 58 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 54 lines · Lee Jones
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using
DOUBLE_REPORT_IDby specifying a large report length and providing a smaller one.Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the user and prevent any further processing.
Signed-off-by Lee Jones <[email protected]>---
v1 => v2: Add more size checks to protect against issues during recursiondrivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c +16
-0@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,struct input_dev *input = msc->input;int x =0 , y =0 , ii, clicks =0 , npoints; +/* Protect against zero sized recursive calls from DOUBLE_REPORT_ID */ +if (size <1 ) +return 0 ; +switch (data[0 ]) {case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID :case TRACKPAD2_BT_REPORT_ID :@@ -490,6 +494,18 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one * packet. */ + +/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */ +if (size <2 ) +return 0 ; + +if (size < data[1 ] +2 ) { +hid_warn (hdev, +"received report length (%d) was smaller than specified (%d)" , + size, data[1 ] +2 ); +return 0 ; + } +magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 , data[1 ]);magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 + data[1 ], size -2 - data[1 ]);Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.rc1.513.gad8abe7a5a-googThank you! This looks correct now.
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>
Contentless ping. =:-)
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones
Quoted 60 lines · Lee Jones
Quoted 58 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 54 lines · Lee Jones
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using
DOUBLE_REPORT_IDby specifying a large report length and providing a smaller one.Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the user and prevent any further processing.
Signed-off-by Lee Jones <[email protected]>---
v1 => v2: Add more size checks to protect against issues during recursiondrivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)drivers/hid/hid-magicmouse.c +16
-0@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,struct input_dev *input = msc->input;int x =0 , y =0 , ii, clicks =0 , npoints; +/* Protect against zero sized recursive calls from DOUBLE_REPORT_ID */ +if (size <1 ) +return 0 ; +switch (data[0 ]) {case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID :case TRACKPAD2_BT_REPORT_ID :@@ -490,6 +494,18 @@ static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one * packet. */ + +/* Ensure that we have at least 2 elements (report type and size) */ +if (size <2 ) +return 0 ; + +if (size < data[1 ] +2 ) { +hid_warn (hdev, +"received report length (%d) was smaller than specified (%d)" , + size, data[1 ] +2 ); +return 0 ; + } +magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 , data[1 ]);magicmouse_raw_event (hdev, report, data +2 + data[1 ], size -2 - data[1 ]);Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.rc1.513.gad8abe7a5a-googThank you! This looks correct now.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>Contentless ping. =:-)
Biweekly ping on this please - if you'd prefer a [RESEND], let me know.
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones
Quoted 5 lines · Lee Jones
It is currently possible for a malicious or misconfigured USB device to cause an out-of-bounds (OOB) read when submitting reports using
DOUBLE_REPORT_IDby specifying a large report length and providing a smaller one.
Quoted 8 lines
Let's prevent that by comparing the specified report length with the actual size of the data read in from userspace. If the actual data length ends up being smaller than specified, we'll politely warn the user and prevent any further processing.
Signed-off-by Lee Jones <[email protected]>---
v1 => v2: Add more size checks to protect against issues during recursion
Applied, sorry for the delay.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs