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smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers

PATCH In review Michael Bommarito 2 participants 2 messages Apr 20 – May 3

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers

parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security descriptor.

On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths.

Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.

Fixes bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6

---
This applies on top of

[PATCH v2] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cifs/[email protected]/

so that the new dacl_offset_valid() numeric precheck sits upstream of that series' validate_dacl() structural check at all three call sites. The two patches are independent fixes for different bug classes on the same three entry points; applying this one without the KCIFS2 v2 patch first will fail on the build_sec_desc() hunk because the trailing context line "rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl)" only exists after v2. If you prefer a different ordering, happy to reroll on a plain mainline base instead.

 fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +32 -3
index cb4060ba5e31..87d2a58fc8b4 100644
@@ -1263,6 +1263,17 @@ static int parse_sid(struct smb_sid *psid, char *end_of_acl)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool dacl_offset_valid(unsigned int acl_len, __u32 dacloffset)
+{
+	if (acl_len < sizeof(struct smb_acl))
+		return false;
+
+	if (dacloffset < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd))
+		return false;
+
+	return dacloffset <= acl_len - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
+}
+
 
 /* Convert CIFS ACL to POSIX form */
 static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
@@ -1283,7 +1294,6 @@ static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
 	group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd +
 				le32_to_cpu(pntsd->gsidoffset));
 	dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
-	dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
 	cifs_dbg(NOISY, "revision %d type 0x%x ooffset 0x%x goffset 0x%x sacloffset 0x%x dacloffset 0x%x\n",
 		 pntsd->revision, pntsd->type, le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset),
 		 le32_to_cpu(pntsd->gsidoffset),
@@ -1314,11 +1324,18 @@ static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
 		return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (dacloffset)
+	if (dacloffset) {
+		if (!dacl_offset_valid(acl_len, dacloffset)) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
 		parse_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl, owner_sid_ptr,
 			   group_sid_ptr, fattr, get_mode_from_special_sid);
-	else
+	} else {
 		cifs_dbg(FYI, "no ACL\n"); /* BB grant all or default perms? */
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1341,6 +1358,11 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *pnntsd,
 
 	dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 	if (dacloffset) {
+		if (!dacl_offset_valid(secdesclen, dacloffset)) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
 		rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl);
 		if (rc)
@@ -1709,6 +1731,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
 		nsecdesclen = sizeof(struct smb_ntsd) + (sizeof(struct smb_sid) * 2);
 		dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 		if (dacloffset) {
+			if (!dacl_offset_valid(secdesclen, dacloffset)) {
+				cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				goto id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit;
+			}
+
 			dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
 			rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen);
 			if (rc) {
@@ -1751,6 +1779,7 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
 		rc = ops->set_acl(pnntsd, nsecdesclen, inode, path, aclflag);
 		cifs_dbg(NOISY, "set_cifs_acl rc: %d\n", rc);
 	}
+id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit:
 	cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
 
 	kfree(pnntsd);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw

merged into cifs-2.6.git for-next pending additional testing and review

Quoted 126 lines · Michael Bommarito

parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security descriptor.

On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths.

Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.

Fixes bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6

---
This applies on top of

[PATCH v2] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cifs/[email protected]/

so that the new dacl_offset_valid() numeric precheck sits upstream of that series' validate_dacl() structural check at all three call sites. The two patches are independent fixes for different bug classes on the same three entry points; applying this one without the KCIFS2 v2 patch first will fail on the build_sec_desc() hunk because the trailing context line "rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl)" only exists after v2. If you prefer a different ordering, happy to reroll on a plain mainline base instead.

 fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +32 -4
index cb4060ba5e31..87d2a58fc8b4 100644
@@ -1263,6 +1263,17 @@ static int parse_sid(struct smb_sid *psid, char *end_of_acl)
        return 0;
 }
 
+static bool dacl_offset_valid(unsigned int acl_len, __u32 dacloffset)
+{
+       if (acl_len < sizeof(struct smb_acl))
+               return false;
+
+       if (dacloffset < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd))
+               return false;
+
+       return dacloffset <= acl_len - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
+}
+
 
 /* Convert CIFS ACL to POSIX form */
 static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
@@ -1283,7 +1294,6 @@ static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
        group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd +
                                le32_to_cpu(pntsd->gsidoffset));
        dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
-       dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
        cifs_dbg(NOISY, "revision %d type 0x%x ooffset 0x%x goffset 0x%x sacloffset 0x%x dacloffset 0x%x\n",
                 pntsd->revision, pntsd->type, le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset),
                 le32_to_cpu(pntsd->gsidoffset),
@@ -1314,11 +1324,18 @@ static int parse_sec_desc(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
                return rc;
        }
 
-       if (dacloffset)
+       if (dacloffset) {
+               if (!dacl_offset_valid(acl_len, dacloffset)) {
+                       cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
+
+               dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
                parse_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl, owner_sid_ptr,
                           group_sid_ptr, fattr, get_mode_from_special_sid);
-       else
+       } else {
                cifs_dbg(FYI, "no ACL\n"); /* BB grant all or default perms? */
+       }
 
        return rc;
 }
@@ -1341,6 +1358,11 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *pnntsd,
 
        dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
        if (dacloffset) {
+               if (!dacl_offset_valid(secdesclen, dacloffset)) {
+                       cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
+
                dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
                rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl);
                if (rc)
@@ -1709,6 +1731,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
                nsecdesclen = sizeof(struct smb_ntsd) + (sizeof(struct smb_sid) * 2);
                dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
                if (dacloffset) {
+                       if (!dacl_offset_valid(secdesclen, dacloffset)) {
+                               cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n");
+                               rc = -EINVAL;
+                               goto id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit;
+                       }
+
                        dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
                        rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen);
                        if (rc) {
@@ -1751,6 +1779,7 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
                rc = ops->set_acl(pnntsd, nsecdesclen, inode, path, aclflag);
                cifs_dbg(NOISY, "set_cifs_acl rc: %d\n", rc);
        }
+id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit:
        cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
 
        kfree(pnntsd);
--

2.53.0

Signature · 3 lines
Thanks,

Steve