netfilter: nf_socket: skip socket lookup for non-first fragments
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v3 1/3 netfilter: nf_socket: skip socket lookup for non-first fragments
Both nft_socket and xt_socket relies on L4 headers to perform socket lookup in the slow path. For fragmented packets, while the IP protocol remains constant across all fragments, only the first fragment contains the actual L4 header.
As the expression/match could be attached to a chain with a priority lower than -400, it could bypass defragmentation.
Add a check for fragmentation in the lookup functions directly so the problem is handled for both nft_socket and xt_socket at the same time. In addition, future users of the functions would not need to care about this.
---
v3: added this patch to the series, I splitted this as the fix is generic for both nft_socket and xt_socket
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv4.c | 3 +++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv4.c +3 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,#endif int doff =0 ; +if (ntohs (iph->frag_off) &IP_OFFSET ) +return NULL ; +if (iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_UDP || iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_TCP ) {struct tcphdr _hdr;struct udphdr *hp;
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c +3 -2
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct in6_addr *daddr =NULL , *saddr =NULL ;struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb), ipv6_var;struct sk_buff *data_skb =NULL ; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;int doff =0 ;int thoff =0 , tproto;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK )
@@ -107,8 +108,8 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,struct nf_conn const *ct;#endif - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) { + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff) {pr_debug ("unable to find transport header in IPv6 packet, dropping\n" );return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v3 2/3 netfilter: nf_tables: skip L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
The tproxy, osf and exthdr (SCTP) expressions rely on the presence of transport layer headers to perform socket lookups, fingerprint matching, or chunk extraction. For fragmented packets, while the IP protocol remains constant across all fragments, only the first fragment contains the actual L4 header.
The expressions could be attached to a chain with a priority lower than -400, bypassing defragmentation. Or could be used in stateless environments where defragmentation is not happening at all. This could result in garbage data being used for the matching.
Add a check for pkt->fragoff so only unfragmented packets or the first fragment is processed.
---
v2: handled fragmented packets for socket expression too, squashed nftables expression commits into this one.
v3: removed changes to nft_socket and created a generic solution for xt/nft
--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nft_osf.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +1 -1
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) +if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP || pkt->fragoff) goto err; do {
net/netfilter/nft_osf.c +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static void nft_osf_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,struct nf_osf_data data;struct tcphdr _tcph; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP ) { +if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c +4 -4
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ static void nft_tproxy_eval_v4(const struct nft_expr *expr,__be16 tport =0 ;struct sock *sk; -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && - pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) { +if ((pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && + pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ static void nft_tproxy_eval_v6(const struct nft_expr *expr,memset (&taddr,0 ,sizeof (taddr)); -if (pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && - pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) { +if ((pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_TCP && + pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_UDP ) || pkt->fragoff) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v3 3/3 netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
In reply to Fernando Fernandez ManceraMultiple targets and matches relies on L4 header to operate. For fragmented packets, every fragment carries the transport protocol identifier, but only the first fragment contains the L4 header.
As the 'raw' table can be configured to run at priority -450 (before defragmentation at -400), the target/match can be reached before reassembly. In this case, non-first fragments have their payload incorrectly parsed as a TCP/UDP header. This would be of course a misconfiguration scenario. In most of the cases this just lead to a unreliable behavior for fragmented traffic.
Add a fragment check to ensure target/match only evaluates unfragmented packets or the first fragment in the stream.
---
v2: handled ecn, socket and tcpmss matches
v3: extracted socket to its own patch with a generic solution for nft/xt, added a comment specifying that par->fragoff is fine for ecn/tcpmss ipv6 as they enforce -p tcp. Keep on mind that osf only supports ipv4.
--- net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c | 4 ++++ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c +9 -2
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }
@@ -95,6 +98,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr.ip, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }
@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;struct udphdr _hdr, *hp;struct sock *sk;const struct in6_addr *laddr;
@@ -113,8 +120,8 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)int thoff =0 ;int tproto; - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff)return NF_DROP ; hp =skb_header_pointer (skb, thoff,sizeof (_hdr), &_hdr);
net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c +4 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ static bool match_tcp(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)struct tcphdr _tcph;const struct tcphdr *th; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as ecn_mt_check6() enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* In practice, TCP match does this, so can't fail. But let's * be good citizens. */
net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +3 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@static bool xt_osf_match_packet (const struct sk_buff *skb,struct xt_action_param *p) { +if (p->fragoff) +return false; +return nf_osf_match (skb,xt_family (p),xt_hooknum (p),xt_in (p),xt_out (p), p->matchinfo,xt_net (p), nf_osf_fingers); }
net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +4 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as xt_tcpmss enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3 nf v3] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Quoted 11 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
Multiple targets and matches relies on L4 header to operate. For fragmented packets, every fragment carries the transport protocol identifier, but only the first fragment contains the L4 header.
As the 'raw' table can be configured to run at priority -450 (before defragmentation at -400), the target/match can be reached before reassembly. In this case, non-first fragments have their payload incorrectly parsed as a TCP/UDP header. This would be of course a misconfiguration scenario. In most of the cases this just lead to a unreliable behavior for fragmented traffic.
Quoted 2 lines
Add a fragment check to ensure target/match only evaluates unfragmented packets or the first fragment in the stream.
AI reports xt_hashlimit could be a good candidate to check for fragoff, I think it is, so I would suggest to expand it there to cover this.
It also mentions synproxy as another candidate but IPv6 synproxy does not do ipv6_find_hdr() on purpose I think (it assumed nexthdr is TCP) for SYN and ACK packets, so checking for fragoff there is not possible. Given this is to deal with flood, I think think it is worth the fragoff validation.
Quoted 105 lines
Fixes 902d6a4c2a4f ("netfilter: nf_defrag: Skip defrag if NOTRACK is set")Signed-off-by Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>---
v2: handled ecn, socket and tcpmss matches
v3: extracted socket to its own patch with a generic solution for nft/xt, added a comment specifying thatpar->fragoffis fine for ecn/tcpmss ipv6 as they enforce -p tcp. Keep on mind that osf only supports ipv4.--- net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c | 4 ++++ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c +9
-2@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -95,6 +98,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr.ip, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;struct udphdr _hdr, *hp;struct sock *sk;const struct in6_addr *laddr;@@ -113,8 +120,8 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)int thoff =0 ;int tproto; - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff)return NF_DROP ; hp =skb_header_pointer (skb, thoff,sizeof (_hdr), &_hdr);net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c +4
-0@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ static bool match_tcp(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)struct tcphdr _tcph;const struct tcphdr *th; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as ecn_mt_check6() enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* In practice, TCP match does this, so can't fail. But let's * be good citizens. */ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +3
-0@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@static bool xt_osf_match_packet (const struct sk_buff *skb,struct xt_action_param *p) { +if (p->fragoff) +return false; +return nf_osf_match (skb,xt_family (p),xt_hooknum (p),xt_in (p),xt_out (p), p->matchinfo,xt_net (p), nf_osf_fingers); }net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +4
-0@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as xt_tcpmss enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH 3/3 nf v3] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Quoted 12 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 11 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
Multiple targets and matches relies on L4 header to operate. For fragmented packets, every fragment carries the transport protocol identifier, but only the first fragment contains the L4 header.
As the 'raw' table can be configured to run at priority -450 (before defragmentation at -400), the target/match can be reached before reassembly. In this case, non-first fragments have their payload incorrectly parsed as a TCP/UDP header. This would be of course a misconfiguration scenario. In most of the cases this just lead to a unreliable behavior for fragmented traffic.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Add a fragment check to ensure target/match only evaluates unfragmented packets or the first fragment in the stream.
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 4 lines
AI reports
xt_hashlimitcould be a good candidate to check for fragoff, I think it is, so I would suggest to expand it there to cover this.
This seems like a good catch. I will work on this.
Quoted 6 lines
It also mentions synproxy as another candidate but IPv6 synproxy does not do
ipv6_find_hdr()on purpose I think (it assumed nexthdr is TCP) for SYN and ACK packets, so checking for fragoff there is not possible. Given this is to deal with flood, I think think it is worth the fragoff validation.
I don't think it makes sense for SYNPROXY. SYNPROXY requires conntrack to work both ipt_SYNPROXY and nft_synproxy and only allows LOCAL_IN and FORWARD hooks so it should be fine AFAIU. I don't understand how someone could skip defragmentation here.
Maybe something extra to add to ipt_SYNPROXY is a restriction for TCP protocol only. As the code currently assumes the transport layer is TCP which isn't enforced.
But that would be kind of a different fix. What do you think?
Quoted 106 lines
Quoted 105 lines
Fixes 902d6a4c2a4f ("netfilter: nf_defrag: Skip defrag if NOTRACK is set")Signed-off-by Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>---
v2: handled ecn, socket and tcpmss matches
v3: extracted socket to its own patch with a generic solution for nft/xt, added a comment specifying thatpar->fragoffis fine for ecn/tcpmss ipv6 as they enforce -p tcp. Keep on mind that osf only supports ipv4.--- net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c | 4 ++++ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c +9
-2@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -95,6 +98,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr.ip, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;struct udphdr _hdr, *hp;struct sock *sk;const struct in6_addr *laddr;@@ -113,8 +120,8 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)int thoff =0 ;int tproto; - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff)return NF_DROP ; hp =skb_header_pointer (skb, thoff,sizeof (_hdr), &_hdr);net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c +4
-0@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ static bool match_tcp(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)struct tcphdr _tcph;const struct tcphdr *th; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as ecn_mt_check6() enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* In practice, TCP match does this, so can't fail. But let's * be good citizens. */ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +3
-0@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@static bool xt_osf_match_packet (const struct sk_buff *skb,struct xt_action_param *p) { +if (p->fragoff) +return false; +return nf_osf_match (skb,xt_family (p),xt_hooknum (p),xt_in (p),xt_out (p), p->matchinfo,xt_net (p), nf_osf_fingers); }net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +4
-0@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as xt_tcpmss enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3 nf v3] netfilter: xtables: fix L4 header parsing for non-first fragments
Quoted 38 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
Quoted 12 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 11 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
Multiple targets and matches relies on L4 header to operate. For fragmented packets, every fragment carries the transport protocol identifier, but only the first fragment contains the L4 header.
As the 'raw' table can be configured to run at priority -450 (before defragmentation at -400), the target/match can be reached before reassembly. In this case, non-first fragments have their payload incorrectly parsed as a TCP/UDP header. This would be of course a misconfiguration scenario. In most of the cases this just lead to a unreliable behavior for fragmented traffic.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Add a fragment check to ensure target/match only evaluates unfragmented packets or the first fragment in the stream.
Hi Pablo,
Quoted 4 lines
AI reports
xt_hashlimitcould be a good candidate to check for fragoff, I think it is, so I would suggest to expand it there to cover this.This seems like a good catch. I will work on this.
Quoted 6 lines
It also mentions synproxy as another candidate but IPv6 synproxy does not do
ipv6_find_hdr()on purpose I think (it assumed nexthdr is TCP) for SYN and ACK packets, so checking for fragoff there is not possible. Given this is to deal with flood, I think think it is worth the fragoff validation.I don't think it makes sense for SYNPROXY. SYNPROXY requires conntrack to work both
ipt_SYNPROXYandnft_synproxyand only allowsLOCAL_INand FORWARD hooks so it should be fine AFAIU. I don't understand how someone could skip defragmentation here.
Quoted 5 lines
Maybe something extra to add to
ipt_SYNPROXYis a restriction for TCP protocol only. As the code currently assumes the transport layer is TCP which isn't enforced.But that would be kind of a different fix. What do you think?
My suggestion is to update xt_hashlimit to handle fragoff.
Regarding synproxy, it is a right indeed that this depends on nf_defrag so no changes are needed there.
So please send a v4 including xt_hashlimit.
Thanks Fernando.
Quoted 101 lines
Quoted 100 lines
Quoted 99 lines
Fixes 902d6a4c2a4f ("netfilter: nf_defrag: Skip defrag if NOTRACK is set")Signed-off-by Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>---
v2: handled ecn, socket and tcpmss matches
v3: extracted socket to its own patch with a generic solution for nft/xt, added a comment specifying thatpar->fragoffis fine for ecn/tcpmss ipv6 as they enforce -p tcp. Keep on mind that osf only supports ipv4.--- net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c | 11 +++++++++-- net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c | 4 ++++ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 3 +++ net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/netfilter/xt_TPROXY.c +9
-2@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v0(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -95,6 +98,9 @@ tproxy_tg4_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +if (par->fragoff) +return NF_DROP ; +return tproxy_tg4 (xt_net (par), skb, tgi->laddr.ip, tgi->lport, tgi->mark_mask, tgi->mark_value); }@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par) {const struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb);const struct xt_tproxy_target_info_v1 *tgi = par->targinfo; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;struct udphdr _hdr, *hp;struct sock *sk;const struct in6_addr *laddr;@@ -113,8 +120,8 @@ tproxy_tg6_v1(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)int thoff =0 ;int tproto; - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff)return NF_DROP ; hp =skb_header_pointer (skb, thoff,sizeof (_hdr), &_hdr);net/netfilter/xt_ecn.c +4
-0@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ static bool match_tcp(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)struct tcphdr _tcph;const struct tcphdr *th; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as ecn_mt_check6() enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* In practice, TCP match does this, so can't fail. But let's * be good citizens. */ net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +3
-0@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@static bool xt_osf_match_packet (const struct sk_buff *skb,struct xt_action_param *p) { +if (p->fragoff) +return false; +return nf_osf_match (skb,xt_family (p),xt_hooknum (p),xt_in (p),xt_out (p), p->matchinfo,xt_net (p), nf_osf_fingers); }net/netfilter/xt_tcpmss.c +4
-0@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ tcpmss_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)u8 _opt[15 *4 -sizeof (_tcph)];unsigned int i, optlen; +/* this is fine for IPv6 as xt_tcpmss enforces -p tcp */ +if (par->fragoff) +return false; +/* If we don't have the whole header, drop packet. */ th =skb_header_pointer (skb, par->thoff,sizeof (_tcph), &_tcph);if (th ==NULL )Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerHi Fernando,
This series LGTM, it is addressing the issues we have discussed.
Quoted 64 lines · Fernando Fernandez Mancera
Both
nft_socketandxt_socketrelies on L4 headers to perform socket lookup in the slow path. For fragmented packets, while the IP protocol remains constant across all fragments, only the first fragment contains the actual L4 header.As the expression/match could be attached to a chain with a priority lower than -400, it could bypass defragmentation.
Add a check for fragmentation in the lookup functions directly so the problem is handled for both
nft_socketandxt_socketat the same time. In addition, future users of the functions would not need to care about this.Fixes 902d6a4c2a4f ("netfilter: nf_defrag: Skip defrag if NOTRACK is set")Fixes 554ced0a6e29 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for native socket matching")Signed-off-by Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>---
v3: added this patch to the series, I splitted this as the fix is generic for bothnft_socketandxt_socket--- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv4.c | 3 +++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv4.c +3
-0@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v4(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,#endif int doff =0 ; +if (ntohs (iph->frag_off) &IP_OFFSET ) +return NULL ; +if (iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_UDP || iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_TCP ) {struct tcphdr _hdr;struct udphdr *hp;net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c +3
-2@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct in6_addr *daddr =NULL , *saddr =NULL ;struct ipv6hdr *iph =ipv6_hdr (skb), ipv6_var;struct sk_buff *data_skb =NULL ; +unsigned short fragoff =0 ;int doff =0 ;int thoff =0 , tproto;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK )@@ -107,8 +108,8 @@ struct sock *nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb,struct nf_conn const *ct;#endif - tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 ,NULL ,NULL ); -if (tproto <0 ) { + tproto =ipv6_find_hdr (skb, &thoff,-1 , &fragoff,NULL ); +if (tproto <0 || fragoff) {pr_debug ("unable to find transport header in IPv6 packet, dropping\n" );return NULL ; }Signature · 1 line
2.53.0