staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential speculative cpu oob read
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential speculative cpu oob read
Fixes potential speculative cpu oob read in os_intfs.c by guarding the index with array_index_nospec.
Fixes smatch warning:
warn: potential spectre issue 'rtw_1d_to_queue' [r]
---
I can't argue with 100% certainty if this is a real risk. I found the warning when I was testing out smatch (awesome work on that by the way) and thought I'd take a look.
I did a quick search on the linux-staging list but couldn't find any mention of 'spectre'. So as far as I could see it hasn't been brought up before.
Was unsure if I should prefix this with RFC first.
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/os_intfs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/os_intfs.c +2 -2
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static u16 rtw_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,if (pmlmepriv->acm_mask !=0 ) skb->priority =qos_acm (pmlmepriv->acm_mask, skb->priority); -return rtw_1d_to_queue[skb->priority]; +return rtw_1d_to_queue[array_index_nospec (skb->priority,ARRAY_SIZE (rtw_1d_to_queue))]; }u16 rtw_recv_select_queue (struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ u16 rtw_recv_select_queue(struct sk_buff *skb) priority =0 ; } -return rtw_1d_to_queue[priority]; +return rtw_1d_to_queue[array_index_nospec (priority,ARRAY_SIZE (rtw_1d_to_queue))]; }static int rtw_ndev_init (struct net_device *dev)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Linus Probert
Fixes potential speculative cpu oob read in
os_intfs.cby guarding the index witharray_index_nospec.Fixes smatch warning:
warn: potential spectre issue 'rtw_1d_to_queue' [r]
Is this value controlled by a user? Or is it just a normal operation that happens that is not controlled? In other words, can a user manipulate this directly to be out of range?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Linus Probert
Fixes potential speculative cpu oob read in
os_intfs.cby guarding the index witharray_index_nospec.Fixes smatch warning:
warn: potential spectre issue 'rtw_1d_to_queue' [r]
Quoted 7 lines
Is this value controlled by a user? Or is it just a normal operation that happens that is not controlled? In other words, can a user manipulate this directly to be out of range?
thanks,
greg k-h
To my understanding, yes. Which is somewhat limited due to being rather new to kernel code and not having access to this hardware. The priority is extracted from ip header which can be user controlled.
However, looking closer at the execution before I see that in both cases bounding is performed on the value as follows:
dscp = ip_hdr(skb)->tos & 0xfc; prio = dscp >> 5;
So my change here adds no additional security. The smatch warning is a false positive. It only warned on one of the cases. Most likely because the bounding happened in a function call and it only sees the u32.
Some quick LLM research told me this (in my own words but have not verified extensively):
The case where the bounding is performed in a function call could be susceptible to *Spectre v4 (Speculative Store Bypass)*.
But the fix I applied here only applies to v1 so no additional security on that front either.
This is probably best to NAK unless we just want to remove a false positive smatch warning. But I personally don't agree with that.
Br,
Linus
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 34 lines · Linus Probert
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Linus Probert
Fixes potential speculative cpu oob read in
os_intfs.cby guarding the index witharray_index_nospec.Fixes smatch warning:
warn: potential spectre issue 'rtw_1d_to_queue' [r]Quoted 7 lines
Is this value controlled by a user? Or is it just a normal operation that happens that is not controlled? In other words, can a user manipulate this directly to be out of range?
thanks,
greg k-h
To my understanding, yes. Which is somewhat limited due to being rather new to kernel code and not having access to this hardware. The priority is extracted from ip header which can be user controlled.
However, looking closer at the execution before I see that in both cases bounding is performed on the value as follows:
dscp = ip_hdr(skb)->tos & 0xfc; prio = dscp >> 5;So my change here adds no additional security. The smatch warning is a false positive. It only warned on one of the cases. Most likely because the bounding happened in a function call and it only sees the u32.
Some quick LLM research told me this (in my own words but have not verified extensively):
Quoted 7 lines
The case where the bounding is performed in a function call could be susceptible to *Spectre v4 (Speculative Store Bypass)*.
But the fix I applied here only applies to v1 so no additional security on that front either.This is probably best to NAK unless we just want to remove a false positive smatch warning. But I personally don't agree with that.
Yes, let's fix the tool instead. The '&' above shows that this is not really a spectre issue that you can actually trigger.
thanks,
greg k-h