6.12.86-rc1 review
Subsystems (4)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/215 mfd: core: Preserve OF node when ACPI handle is present
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Mak <[email protected]>
commit caa5a5d44d8ae4fd13b744857d66c9313b712d1f upstream.
Switch device_set_node to set_primary_fwnode, so that the ACPI fwnode does not overwrite the of_node with NULL.
This allows MFD children with both OF nodes and ACPI handles to have OF nodes again.
--- drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c +11 -1
@@ -88,7 +88,17 @@ static void mfd_acpi_add_device(const struct mfd_cell *cell, } } -device_set_node (&pdev->dev,acpi_fwnode_handle (adev ?: parent)); +/* +* NOTE: The fwnode design doesn't allow proper stacking/sharing. This +* should eventually turn into a device fwnode API call that will allow +* prepending to a list of fwnodes (with ACPI taking precedence). +* +* set_primary_fwnode() is used here, instead of device_set_node(), as +* device_set_node() will overwrite the existing fwnode, which may be an +* OF node that was populated earlier. To support a use case where ACPI +* and OF is used in conjunction, we call set_primary_fwnode() instead. +*/ +set_primary_fwnode (&pdev->dev,acpi_fwnode_handle (adev ?: parent)); }#else static inline void mfd_acpi_add_device(const struct mfd_cell *cell,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/215 apparmor: use target tasks context in apparmor_getprocattr()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cengiz Can <[email protected]>
commit 4afc61702bdcc3b9b519749ef966cf762a6e7051 upstream.
apparmor_getprocattr() incorrectly calls task_ctx(current) instead of task_ctx(task) when retrieving prev and exec attributes, returning the caller's labels rather than the target's.
Fix by passing task to task_ctx().
The issue can be reproduced when a process with an onexec transition (e.g., configured by a container runtime) is inspected via /proc/<pid>/attr/apparmor/exec. The reader's own value is returned instead of the target's.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +7 -9
@@ -823,25 +823,23 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct t char **value) {int error = -ENOENT ; -/* released below */ -const struct cred *cred =get_task_cred (task); -struct aa_task_ctx *ctx =task_ctx (current);struct aa_label *label =NULL ; +rcu_read_lock ();if (strcmp (name,"current" ) ==0 ) - label =aa_get_newest_label (cred_label (cred)); -else if (strcmp (name,"prev" ) ==0 && ctx->previous) - label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->previous); -else if (strcmp (name,"exec" ) ==0 && ctx->onexec) - label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->onexec); + label =aa_get_newest_cred_label (__task_cred (task)); +else if (strcmp (name,"prev" ) ==0 &&task_ctx (task)->previous) + label =aa_get_newest_label (task_ctx (task)->previous); +else if (strcmp (name,"exec" ) ==0 &&task_ctx (task)->onexec) + label =aa_get_newest_label (task_ctx (task)->onexec);else error = -EINVAL ; +rcu_read_unlock ();if (label) error =aa_getprocattr (label, value, true);aa_put_label (label); -put_cred (cred);return error; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/215 Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>
commit 85fa3512048793076eef658f66489112dcc91993 upstream.
hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in hci_user_passkey_notify_evt() and hci_keypress_notify_evt(), otherwise the connection can be freed concurrently.
Extend the hci_dev_lock critical section to cover all conn usage in both handlers.
Keep the existing keypress notification behavior unchanged by routing the early exits through a common unlock path.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +14 -4
@@ -5412,9 +5412,11 @@ static void hci_user_passkey_notify_evt(bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" ); +hci_dev_lock (hdev); + conn =hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba (hdev,ACL_LINK , &ev->bdaddr);if (!conn) -return ; + goto unlock; conn->passkey_notify =__le32_to_cpu (ev->passkey); conn->passkey_entered =0 ;
@@ -5423,6 +5425,9 @@ static void hci_user_passkey_notify_evt(mgmt_user_passkey_notify (hdev, &conn->dst, conn->type, conn->dst_type, conn->passkey_notify, conn->passkey_entered); + +unlock: +hci_dev_unlock (hdev); } static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
@@ -5433,14 +5438,16 @@ static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(strubt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" ); +hci_dev_lock (hdev); + conn =hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba (hdev,ACL_LINK , &ev->bdaddr);if (!conn) -return ; + goto unlock;switch (ev->type) {case HCI_KEYPRESS_STARTED : conn->passkey_entered =0 ; -return ; + goto unlock;case HCI_KEYPRESS_ENTERED : conn->passkey_entered++;
@@ -5455,13 +5462,16 @@ static void hci_keypress_notify_evt(strubreak ;case HCI_KEYPRESS_COMPLETED : -return ; + goto unlock; }if (hci_dev_test_flag (hdev,HCI_MGMT ))mgmt_user_passkey_notify (hdev, &conn->dst, conn->type, conn->dst_type, conn->passkey_notify, conn->passkey_entered); + +unlock: +hci_dev_unlock (hdev); } static void hci_simple_pair_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/215 bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Switch to async power up to avoid boot delays
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qiang Yu <[email protected]>
commit cfdb41adf1c2822ad1b1791d4d11093edb5582b6 upstream.
Some modem devices can take significant time (up to 20 secs for sdx75) to enter mission mode during initialization. Currently, mhi_sync_power_up() waits for this entire process to complete, blocking other driver probes and delaying system boot.
Switch to mhi_async_power_up() so probe can return immediately while MHI initialization continues in the background. This eliminates lengthy boot delays and allows other drivers to probe in parallel, improving overall system boot performance.
--- drivers/bus/mhi/host/pci_generic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/bus/mhi/host/pci_generic.c +1 -1
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ static int mhi_pci_probe(struct pci_dev goto err_unregister; } - err =mhi_sync_power_up (mhi_cntrl); + err =mhi_async_power_up (mhi_cntrl);if (err) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"failed to power up MHI controller\n" ); goto err_unprepare;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/215 can: ucan: fix devres lifetime
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit fed4626501c871890da287bec62a96e52da1af89 upstream.
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the control message buffer lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.
--- drivers/net/can/usb/ucan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/usb/ucan.c +1 -1
@@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ static int ucan_probe(struct usb_interfa*/ /* Prepare Memory for control transfers */ - ctl_msg_buffer =devm_kzalloc (&udev->dev, + ctl_msg_buffer =devm_kzalloc (&intf->dev,sizeof (union ucan_ctl_payload ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ctl_msg_buffer) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/215 crypto: arm64/aes - Fix 32-bit aes_mac_update() arg treated as 64-bit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit f8f08d7cc43237e91e3aedf7b67d015d24c38fcc upstream.
Since the 'enc_after' argument to neon_aes_mac_update() and ce_aes_mac_update() has type 'int', it needs to be accessed using the corresponding 32-bit register, not the 64-bit register. The upper half of the corresponding 64-bit register may contain garbage.
--- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S +2 -2
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ AES_FUNC_START(aes_mac_update) encrypt_block v0, w2, x1, x7, w8 eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v4.16b cmp w3, wzr - csinv x5, x6, xzr, eq + csinv w5, w6, wzr, eq cbz w5, .Lmacout encrypt_block v0, w2, x1, x7, w8 st1 {v0.16b}, [x4] /* return dg */
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ AES_FUNC_START(aes_mac_update) eor v0.16b, v0.16b, v1.16b /* ..and xor with dg */ subs w3, w3, #1 - csinv x5, x6, xzr, eq + csinv w5, w6, wzr, eq cbz w5, .Lmacout .Lmacenc:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/215 crypto: atmel-aes - Fix 3-page memory leak in atmel_aes_buff_cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 3fcfff4ed35f963380a68741bcd52742baff7f76 upstream.
atmel_aes_buff_init() allocates 4 pages using __get_free_pages() with ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER, but atmel_aes_buff_cleanup() frees only the first page using free_page(), leaking the remaining 3 pages. Use free_pages() with ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER to fix the memory leak.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c +1 -1
@@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ static int atmel_aes_buff_init(struct atstatic void atmel_aes_buff_cleanup (struct atmel_aes_dev *dd) { -free_page ((unsigned long )dd->buf); +free_pages ((unsigned long )dd->buf,ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER ); }static int atmel_aes_dma_init (struct atmel_aes_dev *dd)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/215 crypto: atmel-ecc - Release client on allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 095d50008d55d13f8fcf1bbeb7c6eba51779bc85 upstream.
Call atmel_ecc_i2c_client_free() to release the I2C client reserved by atmel_ecc_i2c_client_alloc() when crypto_alloc_kpp() fails. Otherwise ->tfm_count will be out of sync.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c +1 -0
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ static int atmel_ecdh_init_tfm(struct crif (IS_ERR (fallback)) {dev_err (&ctx->client->dev,"Failed to allocate transformation for '%s': %ld\n" , alg,PTR_ERR (fallback)); +atmel_ecc_i2c_client_free (ctx->client);return PTR_ERR (fallback); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/215 crypto: hisilicon - Fix dma_unmap_single() direction
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
commit 1ee57ab93b75eb59f426aef37b5498a7ffc28278 upstream.
The direction used to map the buffer skreq->iv is DMA_TO_DEVICE but it is unmapped with direction DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL in the error path.
Change the unmap to match the mapping.
--- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c +1 -1
@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ err_free_elements:if (crypto_skcipher_ivsize (atfm))dma_unmap_single (info->dev, sec_req->dma_iv,crypto_skcipher_ivsize (atfm), -DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); +DMA_TO_DEVICE ); err_unmap_out_sg:if (split) sec_unmap_sg_on_err(skreq->dst, steps, splits_out,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/215 crypto: ccree - fix a memory leak in cc_mac_digest()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
commit 02c64052fad03699b9c6d1df2f9b444d17e4ac50 upstream.
Add cc_unmap_result() if cc_map_hash_request_final() fails to prevent potential memory leak.
--- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c +1 -0
@@ -1448,6 +1448,7 @@ static int cc_mac_digest(struct ahash_reif (cc_map_hash_request_final (ctx->drvdata, state, req->src, req->nbytes,1 , flags)) {dev_err (dev,"map_ahash_request_final() failed\n" ); +cc_unmap_result (dev, state, digestsize, req->result);cc_unmap_req (dev, state, ctx);return -ENOMEM ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/215 crypto: atmel-tdes - fix DMA sync direction
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit c8a9a647532f5c2a04180352693215e24e9dba03 upstream.
Before DMA output is consumed by the CPU, ->dma_addr_out must be synced with dma_sync_single_for_cpu() instead of dma_sync_single_for_device(). Using the wrong direction can return stale cache data on non-coherent platforms.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c +4 -4
@@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static int atmel_tdes_crypt_pdc_stop(strdma_unmap_sg (dd->dev, dd->out_sg,1 ,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );dma_unmap_sg (dd->dev, dd->in_sg,1 ,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); }else { -dma_sync_single_for_device (dd->dev, dd->dma_addr_out, - dd->dma_size,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +dma_sync_single_for_cpu (dd->dev, dd->dma_addr_out, + dd->dma_size,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );/* copy data */ count = atmel_tdes_sg_copy(&dd->out_sg, &dd->out_offset,
@@ -619,8 +619,8 @@ static int atmel_tdes_crypt_dma_stop(strdma_unmap_sg (dd->dev, dd->out_sg,1 ,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );dma_unmap_sg (dd->dev, dd->in_sg,1 ,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); }else { -dma_sync_single_for_device (dd->dev, dd->dma_addr_out, - dd->dma_size,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +dma_sync_single_for_cpu (dd->dev, dd->dma_addr_out, + dd->dma_size,DMA_FROM_DEVICE );/* copy data */ count = atmel_tdes_sg_copy(&dd->out_sg, &dd->out_offset,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/215 crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix error codes in OTP reads
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 094c276da6a0d4971c3faae09a36b51d096659b2 upstream.
Return -EINVAL from atmel_i2c_init_read_otp_cmd() on invalid addresses instead of -1. Since the OTP zone is accessed in 4-byte blocks, valid addresses range from 0 to OTP_ZONE_SIZE / 4 - 1. Fix the bounds check accordingly.
In atmel_sha204a_otp_read(), propagate the actual error code from atmel_i2c_init_read_otp_cmd() instead of -1. Also, return -EIO instead of -EINVAL when the device is not ready.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.c +2 -2
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(atmel_i2c_init_read_configint atmel_i2c_init_read_otp_cmd (struct atmel_i2c_cmd *cmd,u16 addr) { -if (addr <0 || addr >OTP_ZONE_SIZE ) -return -1 ; +if (addr >=OTP_ZONE_SIZE /4 ) +return -EINVAL ; cmd->word_addr =COMMAND ; cmd->opcode =OPCODE_READ ;
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +4 -3
@@ -96,9 +96,10 @@ static int atmel_sha204a_rng_read(structstatic int atmel_sha204a_otp_read (struct i2c_client *client,u16 addr,u8 *otp) {struct atmel_i2c_cmd cmd; -int ret =-1 ; +int ret; -if (atmel_i2c_init_read_otp_cmd (&cmd, addr) <0 ) { + ret =atmel_i2c_init_read_otp_cmd (&cmd, addr); +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (&client->dev,"failed, invalid otp address %04X\n" , addr);return ret;
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ static int atmel_sha204a_otp_read(structif (cmd.data[0 ] ==0xff ) {dev_err (&client->dev,"failed, device not ready\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; +return -EIO ; }memcpy (otp, cmd.data+1 ,4 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/215 crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix potential UAF and memory leak in remove path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit bab1adf3b87e4bfac92c4f5963c63db434d561c1 upstream.
Unregister the hwrng to prevent new ->read() calls and flush the Atmel I2C workqueue before teardown to prevent a potential UAF if a queued callback runs while the device is being removed.
Drop the early return to ensure sysfs entries are removed and ->hwrng.priv is freed, preventing a memory leak.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +2 -4
@@ -194,10 +194,8 @@ static void atmel_sha204a_remove(struct {struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv =i2c_get_clientdata (client); -if (atomic_read (&i2c_priv->tfm_count)) { -dev_emerg (&client->dev,"Device is busy, will remove it anyhow\n" ); -return ; - } +devm_hwrng_unregister (&client->dev, &i2c_priv->hwrng); +atmel_i2c_flush_queue ();sysfs_remove_group (&client->dev.kobj, &atmel_sha204a_groups);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/215 crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix uninitialized data access on OTP read error
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit de4e66b763d1e81188cb2803ec109466582fc9d1 upstream.
Return early if atmel_i2c_send_receive() fails to avoid checking potentially uninitialized data in 'cmd.data'.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +4 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static int atmel_sha204a_otp_read(struct i2c_client *client, u16 addr, u8 *otp) } ret =atmel_i2c_send_receive (client, &cmd); +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_err (&client->dev,"failed to read otp at %04X\n" , addr); +return ret; + }if (cmd.data[0 ] ==0xff ) {dev_err (&client->dev,"failed, device not ready\n" );
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/215 crypto: nx - Fix packed layout in struct nx842_crypto_header
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit b0bfa49c03e3c65737eafa73d8a698eaf55379a6 upstream.
struct nx842_crypto_header is declared with the __packed attribute,
however the fields grouped with struct_group_tagged() were not packed.
This caused the grouped header portion of the structure to lose the packed layout guarantees of the containing structure.
Fix this by replacing struct_group_tagged() with __struct_group(..., ..., __packed, ...) so the grouped fields are packed, and the original layout is preserved, restoring the intended packed layout of the structure.
Before changes:
struct nx842_crypto_header {
union {
struct {
__be16 magic; /* 0 2 */
__be16 ignore; /* 2 2 */
u8 groups; /* 4 1 */
}; /* 0 6 */
struct nx842_crypto_header_hdr hdr; /* 0 6 */
}; /* 0 6 */
struct nx842_crypto_header_group group[]; /* 6 0 */
/* size: 6, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */
/* last cacheline: 6 bytes */
} __attribute__((__packed__));After changes:
struct nx842_crypto_header {
union {
struct {
__be16 magic; /* 0 2 */
__be16 ignore; /* 2 2 */
u8 groups; /* 4 1 */
} __attribute__((__packed__)); /* 0 5 */
struct nx842_crypto_header_hdr hdr; /* 0 5 */
}; /* 0 5 */
struct nx842_crypto_header_group group[]; /* 5 0 */
/* size: 5, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */
/* last cacheline: 5 bytes */
} __attribute__((__packed__));--- drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.h +2 -2
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct nx842_crypto_header_group {struct nx842_crypto_header {/* New members MUST be added within the struct_group() macro below. */ - struct_group_tagged(nx842_crypto_header_hdr, hdr, + __struct_group(nx842_crypto_header_hdr, hdr, __packed, __be16 magic; /* NX842_CRYPTO_MAGIC */__be16 ignore;/* decompressed end bytes to ignore */ u8 groups;/* total groups in this header */
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct nx842_crypto_header {struct nx842_crypto_header_group group[]; } __packed;static_assert (offsetof(struct nx842_crypto_header , group) ==sizeof (struct nx842_crypto_header_hdr ), -"struct member likely outside of struct_group_tagged()" ); +"struct member likely outside of __struct_group()" );#define NX842_CRYPTO_GROUP_MAX (0x20)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/215 dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
commit 4c788c6f921b22f9b6c3f316c4a071c05683e7de upstream.
The argument count calculation in create_dirty_log() performs *args_used = 2 + param_count before validating against argc. When a user provides a param_count close to UINT_MAX via the device mapper table string, this unsigned addition wraps around to a small value, causing the subsequent argc < *args_used check to be bypassed.
The overflowed param_count is then passed as argc to dm_dirty_log_create(), where it can cause out-of-bounds reads on the argv array.
Fix by comparing param_count against argc - 2 before performing the addition, following the same pattern used by parse_features() in the same file. Since argc >= 2 is already guaranteed, the subtraction is safe.
--- drivers/md/dm-raid1.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-raid1.c +3 -3
@@ -993,13 +993,13 @@ static struct dm_dirty_log *create_dirtyreturn NULL ; } - *args_used =2 + param_count; - -if (argc < *args_used) { +if (param_count > argc -2 ) { ti->error ="Insufficient mirror log arguments" ;return NULL ; } + *args_used =2 + param_count; + dl =dm_dirty_log_create (argv[0 ], ti, mirror_flush, param_count, argv +2 );if (!dl) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/215 ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 upstream.
Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already present in the primary dcache hash.
In the current VFS that is not safe. d_add() goes through __d_add() to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry->d_hash into the hlist_bl bucket. If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop. Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk, typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one:
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829 rcu: (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192) CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db <74> 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f FS: 00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100 walk_component+0x1f/0x150 link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0 path_lookupat+0x68/0x180 filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0 vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140 vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries. A Ceph lookup or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed, and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume "negative" also means "unhashed":
- ceph_finish_lookup():
MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace
-> d_add(dentry, NULL)
- ceph_lookup():
local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps -> d_add(dentry, NULL)
Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry.
Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn) is true.
Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a negative dentry when it is actually unhashed. If the negative dentry is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is.
This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +4 -2
@@ -769,7 +769,8 @@ struct dentry *ceph_finish_lookup(structd_drop (dentry); err = -ENOENT ; }else { -d_add (dentry,NULL ); +if (d_unhashed (dentry)) +d_add (dentry,NULL ); } } }
@@ -840,7 +841,8 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(structspin_unlock (&ci->i_ceph_lock);doutc (cl," dir %llx.%llx complete, -ENOENT\n" ,ceph_vinop (dir)); -d_add (dentry,NULL ); +if (d_unhashed (dentry)) +d_add (dentry,NULL ); di->lease_shared_gen =atomic_read (&ci->i_shared_gen);return NULL ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/215 IB/core: Fix zero dmac race in neighbor resolution
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Zhao <[email protected]>
commit 5e6de34d82b49cab9d8a42063e9cd0f22a4f31e5 upstream.
dst_fetch_ha() checks nud_state without holding the neighbor lock, then copies ha under the seqlock. A race in __neigh_update() where nud_state is set to NUD_REACHABLE before ha is written allows dst_fetch_ha() to read a zero MAC address while the seqlock reports no concurrent writer.
netevent_callback amplifies this by waking ALL pending addr_req workers when ANY neighbor becomes NUD_VALID. At scale (N peers resolving ARP concurrently), the hit probability scales as N^2, making it near-certain for large RDMA workloads.
N(A): neigh_update(A) W(A): addr_resolve(A)
| [sleep] | write_lock_bh(&A->lock) | | A->nud_state = NUD_REACHABLE | | // A->ha is still 0 | | [woken by netevent_cb() of | another neighbour] | | dst_fetch_ha(A) | | A->nud_state & NUD_VALID | | read_seqbegin(&A->ha_lock) | | snapshot = A->ha /* 0 */ | | read_seqretry(&A->ha_lock) | | return snapshot | seqlock(&A->ha_lock) | A->ha = mac_A /* too late */ | sequnlock(&A->ha_lock) | write_unlock_bh(&A->lock)
The incorrect/zero mac is read and programmed in the device QP while it was not yet updated. This causes silent packet loss and eventual RETRY_EXC_ERR.
Fix by holding the neighbor read lock across the nud_state check and ha copy in dst_fetch_ha(), ensuring it synchronizes with __neigh_update() which is updating while holding the write lock.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +3 -0
@@ -321,11 +321,14 @@ static int dst_fetch_ha(const struct dstif (!n)return -ENODATA ; +read_lock_bh (&n->lock);if (!(n->nud_state &NUD_VALID )) { +read_unlock_bh (&n->lock);neigh_event_send (n,NULL ); ret = -ENODATA ; }else {neigh_ha_snapshot (dev_addr->dst_dev_addr, n, dst->dev); +read_unlock_bh (&n->lock); }neigh_release (n);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/215 ktest: Fix the month in the name of the failure directory
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
commit 768059ede35f197575a38b10797b52402d9d4d2f upstream.
The Perl localtime() function returns the month starting at 0 not 1. This caused the date produced to create the directory for saving files of a failed run to have the month off by one.
machine-test-useconfig-fail-20260314073628
The above happened in April, not March. The correct name should have been:
machine-test-useconfig-fail-20260414073628
This was somewhat confusing.
--- tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl +1 -1
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@ sub save_logs { my ($result, $basedir) = @_; my @t = localtime; my $date = sprintf "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", - 1900+$t[5],$t[4],$t[3],$t[2],$t[1],$t[0]; + 1900+$t[5],$t[4]+1,$t[3],$t[2],$t[1],$t[0]; my $type = $build_type; if ($type =~ /useconfig/) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/215 ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
commit b62567bca47408e6739dee75f02a2113548af875 upstream.
run_unpack() checks run_buf < run_last at the top of the while loop but then reads size_size and offset_size bytes via run_unpack_s64() without verifying they fit within the remaining buffer. A crafted NTFS image with truncated run data in an MFT attribute triggers an OOB heap read of up to 15 bytes when the filesystem is mounted.
Add boundary checks before each run_unpack_s64() call to ensure the declared field size does not exceed the remaining buffer.
Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).
--- fs/ntfs3/run.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/run.c +6 -0
@@ -963,6 +963,9 @@ int run_unpack(struct runs_tree *run, stif (size_size >sizeof (len))return -EINVAL ; +if (run_buf + size_size > run_last) +return -EINVAL ; + len =run_unpack_s64 (run_buf, size_size,0 );/* Skip size_size. */ run_buf += size_size;
@@ -975,6 +978,9 @@ int run_unpack(struct runs_tree *run, stelse if (offset_size <=sizeof (s64)) {s64 dlcn; +if (run_buf + offset_size > run_last) +return -EINVAL ; +/* Initial value of dlcn is -1 or 0. */ dlcn = (run_buf[offset_size -1 ] &0x80 ) ? (s64)-1 :0 ; dlcn =run_unpack_s64 (run_buf, offset_size, dlcn);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/215 ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
commit 984a415f019536ea2d24de9010744e5302a9a948 upstream.
The volume boundary check lcn + len > sbi->used.bitmap.nbits uses raw addition which can wrap around for large lcn and len values, bypassing the validation. Use check_add_overflow() as is already done for the adjacent prev_lcn + dlcn and vcn64 + len checks added by commit 3ac37e100385 ("ntfs3: Fix integer overflow in run_unpack()").
Found by fuzzing with a source-patched harness (LibAFL + QEMU).
--- fs/ntfs3/run.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/run.c +9 -3
@@ -1020,9 +1020,15 @@ int run_unpack(struct runs_tree *run, st return -EOPNOTSUPP; }#endif -if (lcn !=SPARSE_LCN64 && lcn + len > sbi->used.bitmap.nbits) { -/* LCN range is out of volume. */ -return -EINVAL ; +if (lcn !=SPARSE_LCN64 ) { +u64 lcn_end; + +if (check_add_overflow (lcn, len, &lcn_end)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (lcn_end > sbi->used.bitmap.nbits) { +/* LCN range is out of volume. */ +return -EINVAL ; + } }if (!run)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/215 rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
commit 3bfdc63936dd4773109b7b8c280c0f3b5ae7d349 upstream.
remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from futex_requeue().
In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter() operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several problems:
1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held
2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a dangling pointer primed for UAF around.
3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter task
Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in remove_waiter() to cure those problems.
[ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the
changelog ]
--- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +8 -5
@@ -1531,20 +1531,23 @@ static bool rtmutex_spin_on_owner(struct* * Must be called with lock->wait_lock held and interrupts disabled. It must * have just failed to try_to_take_rt_mutex(). +* +* When invoked from rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() waiter::task != current ! */ static void __sched remove_waiter(struct rt_mutex_base *lock,struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter) {bool is_top_waiter = (waiter ==rt_mutex_top_waiter (lock));struct task_struct *owner =rt_mutex_owner (lock); +struct task_struct *waiter_task = waiter->task;struct rt_mutex_base *next_lock;lockdep_assert_held (&lock->wait_lock); -raw_spin_lock (¤t->pi_lock); -rt_mutex_dequeue (lock, waiter); - current->pi_blocked_on =NULL ; -raw_spin_unlock (¤t->pi_lock); + scoped_guard(raw_spinlock, &waiter_task->pi_lock) { +rt_mutex_dequeue (lock, waiter); + waiter_task->pi_blocked_on =NULL ; + }/* * Only update priority if the waiter was the highest priority
@@ -1580,7 +1583,7 @@ static void __sched remove_waiter(structraw_spin_unlock_irq (&lock->wait_lock);rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain (owner,RT_MUTEX_MIN_CHAINWALK , lock, - next_lock,NULL , current); + next_lock,NULL , waiter_task);raw_spin_lock_irq (&lock->wait_lock); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/215 scsi: sd: fix missing put_disk() when device_add(&disk_dev) fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yang Xiuwei <[email protected]>
commit 1e111c4b3a726df1254670a5cc4868cedb946d37 upstream.
If device_add(&sdkp->disk_dev) fails, put_device() runs scsi_disk_release(), which frees the scsi_disk but leaves the gendisk referenced. The device_add_disk() error path in sd_probe() calls put_disk(gd); call put_disk(gd) here to mirror that cleanup.
--- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/sd.c +1 -0
@@ -3982,6 +3982,7 @@ static int sd_probe(struct device *dev) error =device_add (&sdkp->disk_dev);if (error) {put_device (&sdkp->disk_dev); +put_disk (gd); goto out; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/215 seg6: fix seg6 lwtunnel output redirect for L2 reduced encap mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
commit ade67d5f588832c7ba131aadd4215a94ce0a15c8 upstream.
When SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED (L2ENCAP_RED) was introduced, the condition in seg6_build_state() that excludes L2 encap modes from setting LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT was not updated to account for the new mode.
As a consequence, L2ENCAP_RED routes incorrectly trigger seg6_output() on the output path, where the packet is silently dropped because skb_mac_header_was_set() fails on L3 packets.
Extend the check to also exclude L2ENCAP_RED, consistent with L2ENCAP.
--- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +2 -1
@@ -715,7 +715,8 @@ static int seg6_build_state(struct net * newts->type =LWTUNNEL_ENCAP_SEG6 ; newts->flags |=LWTUNNEL_STATE_INPUT_REDIRECT ; -if (tuninfo->mode !=SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP ) +if (tuninfo->mode !=SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP && + tuninfo->mode !=SEG6_IPTUN_MODE_L2ENCAP_RED ) newts->flags |=LWTUNNEL_STATE_OUTPUT_REDIRECT ; newts->headroom =seg6_lwt_headroom (tuninfo);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/215 smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a ]
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
--- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +85 -31
@@ -758,6 +758,77 @@ static void dump_ace(struct smb_ace *pac }#endif +static int validate_dacl (struct smb_acl *pdacl,char *end_of_acl) +{ +int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size; +u16 dacl_size, num_aces; +char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl; +struct smb_ace *pace; + +if (!pdacl) +return 0 ; + +if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl +sizeof (struct smb_acl )) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse DACL\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + dacl_size =le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size); +if (dacl_size <sizeof (struct smb_acl ) || + end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse DACL\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + num_aces =le16_to_cpu (pdacl->num_aces); +if (!num_aces) +return 0 ; + + ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + + offsetof(struct smb_sid , sub_auth); + min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size +sizeof (__le32); +if (num_aces > (dacl_size -sizeof (struct smb_acl )) / min_ace_size) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse DACL\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size; + acl_base = (char *)pdacl; + ace_size =sizeof (struct smb_acl ); + +for (i =0 ; i < num_aces; ++i) { +if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse ACE\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + pace = (struct smb_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size); + acl_base = (char *)pace; + +if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size || + pace->sid.num_subauth ==0 || + pace->sid.num_subauth >SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse ACE\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + ace_size = ace_hdr_size +sizeof (__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth; +if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size || +le16_to_cpu (pace->size) < ace_size) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse ACE\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + ace_size =le16_to_cpu (pace->size); +if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { +cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse ACE\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + +return 0 ; +} +static void parse_dacl (struct smb_acl *pdacl,char *end_of_acl,struct smb_sid *pownersid,struct smb_sid *pgrpsid,struct cifs_fattr *fattr,bool mode_from_special_sid)
@@ -765,7 +836,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pint i;u16 num_aces =0 ;int acl_size; -char *acl_base; +char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;struct smb_ace **ppace;/* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */
@@ -777,12 +848,8 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *preturn ; } -/* validate that we do not go past end of acl */ -if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl +sizeof (struct smb_acl ) || - end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl +le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size)) { -cifs_dbg (VFS ,"ACL too small to parse DACL\n" ); +if (validate_dacl (pdacl, end_of_acl))return ; - } cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n", le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size),
@@ -793,6 +860,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *puser/group/other have no permissions */ fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777 ); + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl +le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size); acl_base = (char *)pdacl; acl_size =sizeof (struct smb_acl );
@@ -800,36 +868,16 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pif (num_aces >0 ) {umode_t denied_mode =0 ; -if (num_aces > (le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size) -sizeof (struct smb_acl )) / - (offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid , sub_auth) +sizeof (__le16))) -return ; - ppace =kmalloc_array (num_aces,sizeof (struct smb_ace *),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ppace)return ;for (i =0 ; i < num_aces; ++i) { -if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size) -break ; - ppace[i] = (struct smb_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size); - acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; - acl_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid , sub_auth); - -if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth ==0 || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth >SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES || - (end_of_acl - acl_base < - acl_size +sizeof (__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth) || - (le16_to_cpu (ppace[i]->size) < - acl_size +sizeof (__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth)) -break ;#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 -dump_ace (ppace[i], end_of_acl); +dump_ace (ppace[i], end_of_dacl);#endif if (mode_from_special_sid && ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth >= 3 &&
@@ -872,6 +920,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *p(void *)ppace[i], sizeof(struct smb_ace)); */ + acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; acl_size =le16_to_cpu (ppace[i]->size); }
@@ -1295,10 +1344,9 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_nts dacloffset =le32_to_cpu (pntsd->dacloffset);if (dacloffset) { dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); -if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr +le16_to_cpu (dacl_ptr->size)) { -cifs_dbg (VFS ,"Server returned illegal ACL size\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } + rc =validate_dacl (dacl_ptr, end_of_acl); +if (rc) +return rc; } owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd +
@@ -1669,6 +1717,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, dacloffset =le32_to_cpu (pntsd->dacloffset);if (dacloffset) { dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); + rc =validate_dacl (dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen); +if (rc) { +kfree (pntsd); +cifs_put_tlink (tlink); +return rc; + }if (mode_from_sid) nsecdesclen +=le16_to_cpu (dacl_ptr->num_aces) *sizeof (struct smb_ace );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/215 f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yongpeng Yang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d9c4a4ed4eef1f82c5b16b037aee8bad819fd53 ]
The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL pointer dereference.
The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:
F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback umount
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
- bio_endio
- f2fs_write_end_io
: dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
: wake_up(&sbi->cp_wait)
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- f2fs_put_super
: iput(sbi->node_inode)
: sbi->node_inode = NULL
: f2fs_in_warm_node_list
- is_node_folio // sbi->node_inode is NULL and panic
The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi->node_inode) and sets sbi->node_inode to NULL after sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to the node inode, leading to a panic.
This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before decrementing sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the use-after-free condition.
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +2 -2
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ static void f2fs_write_end_io(struct biof2fs_bug_on (sbi, page->mapping ==NODE_MAPPING (sbi) &&page_folio (page)->index !=nid_of_node (page)); +if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list (sbi, page)) +f2fs_del_fsync_node_entry (sbi, page);dec_page_count (sbi, type);
@@ -366,8 +368,6 @@ static void f2fs_write_end_io(struct bio wq_has_sleeper(&sbi->cp_wait))wake_up (&sbi->cp_wait); -if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list (sbi, page)) -f2fs_del_fsync_node_entry (sbi, page);clear_page_private_gcing (page);end_page_writeback (page); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/215 lib: test_hmm: evict device pages on file close to avoid use-after-free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 744dd97752ef1076a8d8672bb0d8aa2c7abc1144 ]
Patch series "Minor hmm_test fixes and cleanups".
Two bugfixes a cleanup for the HMM kernel selftests. These were mostly reported by Zenghui Yu with special thanks to Lorenzo for analysing and pointing out the problems.
This patch (of 3):
When dmirror_fops_release() is called it frees the dmirror struct but doesn't migrate device private pages back to system memory first. This leaves those pages with a dangling zone_device_data pointer to the freed dmirror.
If a subsequent fault occurs on those pages (eg. during coredump) the dmirror_devmem_fault() callback dereferences the stale pointer causing a kernel panic. This was reported [1] when running mm/ksft_hmm.sh on arm64, where a test failure triggered SIGABRT and the resulting coredump walked the VMAs faulting in the stale device private pages.
Fix this by calling dmirror_device_evict_chunk() for each devmem chunk in dmirror_fops_release() to migrate all device private pages back to system memory before freeing the dmirror struct. The function is moved earlier in the file to avoid a forward declaration.
--- lib/test_hmm.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
lib/test_hmm.c +49 -37
@@ -183,11 +183,60 @@ static int dmirror_fops_open(struct inodreturn 0 ; } +static void dmirror_device_evict_chunk (struct dmirror_chunk *chunk) +{ +unsigned long start_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.start >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +unsigned long end_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.end >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +unsigned long npages = end_pfn - start_pfn +1 ; +unsigned long i; +unsigned long *src_pfns; +unsigned long *dst_pfns; + + src_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*src_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); + dst_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*dst_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); + +migrate_device_range (src_pfns, start_pfn, npages); +for (i =0 ; i < npages; i++) { +struct page *dpage, *spage; + + spage =migrate_pfn_to_page (src_pfns[i]); +if (!spage || !(src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE )) +continue ; + +if (WARN_ON (!is_device_private_page (spage) && + !is_device_coherent_page (spage))) +continue ; + spage =BACKING_PAGE (spage); + dpage =alloc_page (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_NOFAIL); +lock_page (dpage); +copy_highpage (dpage, spage); + dst_pfns[i] =migrate_pfn (page_to_pfn (dpage)); +if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ) + dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ; + } +migrate_device_pages (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); +migrate_device_finalize (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); +kvfree (src_pfns); +kvfree (dst_pfns); +} +static int dmirror_fops_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) {struct dmirror *dmirror = filp->private_data; +struct dmirror_device *mdevice = dmirror->mdevice; +int i;mmu_interval_notifier_remove (&dmirror->notifier); + +if (mdevice->devmem_chunks) { +for (i =0 ; i < mdevice->devmem_count; i++) { +struct dmirror_chunk *devmem = + mdevice->devmem_chunks[i]; + +dmirror_device_evict_chunk (devmem); + } + } +xa_destroy (&dmirror->pt);kfree (dmirror);return 0 ;
@@ -1214,43 +1263,6 @@ static int dmirror_snapshot(struct dmirrreturn ret; } -static void dmirror_device_evict_chunk (struct dmirror_chunk *chunk) -{ -unsigned long start_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.start >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -unsigned long end_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.end >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -unsigned long npages = end_pfn - start_pfn +1 ; -unsigned long i; -unsigned long *src_pfns; -unsigned long *dst_pfns; - - src_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*src_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); - dst_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*dst_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); - -migrate_device_range (src_pfns, start_pfn, npages); -for (i =0 ; i < npages; i++) { -struct page *dpage, *spage; - - spage =migrate_pfn_to_page (src_pfns[i]); -if (!spage || !(src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE )) -continue ; - -if (WARN_ON (!is_device_private_page (spage) && - !is_device_coherent_page (spage))) -continue ; - spage =BACKING_PAGE (spage); - dpage =alloc_page (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_NOFAIL); -lock_page (dpage); -copy_highpage (dpage, spage); - dst_pfns[i] =migrate_pfn (page_to_pfn (dpage)); -if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ) - dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ; - } -migrate_device_pages (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); -migrate_device_finalize (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); -kvfree (src_pfns); -kvfree (dst_pfns); -} -/* Removes free pages from the free list so they can't be re-allocated */ static void dmirror_remove_free_pages (struct dmirror_chunk *devmem) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/215 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on dcc->discard_cmd_cnt conditionally
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6af249c996f7d73a3435f9e577956fa259347d18 ]
Syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6527 Comm: syz.5.110 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:f2fs_issue_discard_timeout+0x59b/0x5a0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900
Code: d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c d6 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 a8 5e fa fd e9 c9 fe ff ff e8 4e 46 94 fd 90 0f 0b e8 46 46 94 fd 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000494f940 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff843009ca RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc9001ca78000 RSI: 00000000000029f3 RDI: 00000000000029f4
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100893a431 R12: 1ffff1100893a430
R13: 1ffff1100c2b702c R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880449d2160
FS: 00007ffa35fed6c0(0000) GS:ffff88812643d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2b68634000 CR3: 0000000039f62000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__f2fs_remount fs/f2fs/super.c:2960 [inline]
f2fs_reconfigure+0x108a/0x1710 fs/f2fs/super.c:5443
reconfigure_super+0x227/0x8a0 fs/super.c:1080
do_remount fs/namespace.c:3391 [inline]
path_mount+0xdc5/0x10e0 fs/namespace.c:4151
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4172 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4361 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4338
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ffa37dbda0aThe root cause is there will be race condition in between f2fs_ioc_fitrim() and f2fs_remount():
- f2fs_remount - f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_issue_discard_timeout
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __drop_discard_cmd
- __wait_all_discard_cmd
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_clear_prefree_segments
- f2fs_issue_discard
- __issue_discard_async
- __queue_discard_cmd
- __update_discard_tree_range
- __insert_discard_cmd
- __create_discard_cmd
: atomic_inc(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt);
- sanity check on dcc->discard_cmd_cnt (expect discard_cmd_cnt to be zero)
This will only happen when fitrim races w/ remount rw, if we remount to readonly filesystem, remount will wait until mnt_pcp.mnt_writers to zero, that means fitrim is not in process at that time.
--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 6 +++--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 11 ++++++++--- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +1 -1
@@ -3782,7 +3782,7 @@ bool f2fs_is_checkpointed_data(struct f2int f2fs_start_discard_thread (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);void f2fs_drop_discard_cmd (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);void f2fs_stop_discard_thread (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); -bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); +bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,bool need_check);void f2fs_clear_prefree_segments (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,struct cp_control *cpc);void f2fs_dirty_to_prefree (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
fs/f2fs/segment.c +3 -3
@@ -1885,7 +1885,7 @@ void f2fs_stop_discard_thread(struct f2f* * Return true if issued all discard cmd or no discard cmd need issue, otherwise return false. */ -bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,bool need_check) {struct discard_cmd_control *dcc =SM_I (sbi)->dcc_info;struct discard_policy dpolicy;
@@ -1902,7 +1902,7 @@ bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout(struct f/* just to make sure there is no pending discard commands */ __wait_all_discard_cmd (sbi,NULL ); -f2fs_bug_on (sbi,atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt)); +f2fs_bug_on (sbi, need_check &&atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt));return !dropped; }
@@ -2371,7 +2371,7 @@ static void destroy_discard_cmd_control(* Recovery can cache discard commands, so in error path of * fill_super(), it needs to give a chance to handle them. */ -f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); +f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, true);kfree (dcc);SM_I (sbi)->dcc_info =NULL ;
fs/f2fs/super.c +8 -3
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_ }/* be sure to wait for any on-going discard commands */ - done =f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); + done =f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, true);if (f2fs_realtime_discard_enable (sbi) && !sbi->discard_blks && done) {struct cp_control cpc = { .reason =CP_UMOUNT |CP_TRIMMED ,
@@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ static int f2fs_unfreeze(struct super_bl* will recover after removal of snapshot. */ if (test_opt (sbi,DISCARD ) && !f2fs_hw_support_discard (sbi)) -f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); +f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, true);clear_sbi_flag (F2FS_SB (sb),SBI_IS_FREEZING );return 0 ;
@@ -2535,7 +2535,12 @@ static int f2fs_remount(struct super_blo need_stop_discard = true; }else {f2fs_stop_discard_thread (sbi); -f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); +/* +* f2fs_ioc_fitrim() won't race w/ "remount ro" +* so it's safe to check discard_cmd_cnt in +* f2fs_issue_discard_timeout(). +*/ +f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, *flags &SB_RDONLY ); need_restart_discard = true; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/215 ksmbd: use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f75f8bdd4ff4830abe31a1b94892eb12b85b9535 ]
use msleep instaed of schedule_timeout_interruptible() to guarantee the task delays as expected.
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
--- fs/smb/server/connection.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/connection.c +1 -1
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ again:up_read (&conn_list_lock);if (!list_empty (&conn_list)) { -schedule_timeout_interruptible (HZ /10 );/* 100ms */ +msleep (100 ); goto again; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/215 ksmbd: replace connection list with hash table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0bcc831be535269556f59cb70396f7e34f03a276 ]
Replace connection list with hash table to improve lookup performance.
Stable-dep-of: def036ef87f8 ("ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()")
--- fs/smb/server/connection.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ fs/smb/server/connection.h | 6 ++++-- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++-- fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 5 +++++ fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/connection.c +11 -12
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(init_lock);static struct ksmbd_conn_ops default_conn_ops; -LIST_HEAD (conn_list); +DEFINE_HASHTABLE (conn_list,CONN_HASH_BITS );DECLARE_RWSEM (conn_list_lock);/**
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ DECLARE_RWSEM(conn_list_lock);void ksmbd_conn_free (struct ksmbd_conn *conn) {down_write (&conn_list_lock); -list_del (&conn->conns_list); +hash_del (&conn->hlist);up_write (&conn_list_lock);xa_destroy (&conn->sessions);
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ struct ksmbd_conn *ksmbd_conn_alloc(voidinit_waitqueue_head (&conn->req_running_q);init_waitqueue_head (&conn->r_count_q); -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&conn->conns_list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&conn->requests);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&conn->async_requests);spin_lock_init (&conn->request_lock);
@@ -91,19 +90,17 @@ struct ksmbd_conn *ksmbd_conn_alloc(voidinit_rwsem (&conn->session_lock); -down_write (&conn_list_lock); -list_add (&conn->conns_list, &conn_list); -up_write (&conn_list_lock);return conn; }bool ksmbd_conn_lookup_dialect (struct ksmbd_conn *c) {struct ksmbd_conn *t; +int bkt;bool ret = false;down_read (&conn_list_lock); -list_for_each_entry (t, &conn_list, conns_list) { +hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, t, hlist) {if (memcmp (t->ClientGUID, c->ClientGUID,SMB2_CLIENT_GUID_SIZE ))continue ;
@@ -164,9 +161,10 @@ void ksmbd_conn_unlock(struct ksmbd_connvoid ksmbd_all_conn_set_status (u64 sess_id,u32 status) {struct ksmbd_conn *conn; +int bkt;down_read (&conn_list_lock); -list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { +hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, conn, hlist) {if (conn->binding ||xa_load (&conn->sessions, sess_id))WRITE_ONCE (conn->status, status); }
@@ -182,14 +180,14 @@ int ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(struct {struct ksmbd_conn *conn;int rc, retry_count =0 , max_timeout =120 ; -int rcount =1 ; +int rcount =1 , bkt; retry_idle:if (retry_count >= max_timeout)return -EIO ;down_read (&conn_list_lock); -list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { +hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, conn, hlist) {if (conn->binding ||xa_load (&conn->sessions, sess_id)) {if (conn == curr_conn) rcount =2 ;
@@ -480,10 +478,11 @@ static void stop_sessions(void) {struct ksmbd_conn *conn;struct ksmbd_transport *t; +int bkt; again:down_read (&conn_list_lock); -list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { +hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, conn, hlist) { t = conn->transport;ksmbd_conn_set_exiting (conn);if (t->ops->shutdown) {
@@ -494,7 +493,7 @@ again: }up_read (&conn_list_lock); -if (!list_empty (&conn_list)) { +if (!hash_empty (conn_list)) {msleep (100 ); goto again; }
fs/smb/server/connection.h +4 -2
@@ -52,11 +52,12 @@ struct ksmbd_conn {u8 inet6_addr[16 ];#endif }; +unsigned int inet_hash;char *request_buf;struct ksmbd_transport *transport;struct nls_table *local_nls;struct unicode_map *um; -struct list_head conns_list; +struct hlist_node hlist;struct rw_semaphore session_lock;/* smb session 1 per user */ struct xarray sessions;
@@ -151,7 +152,8 @@ struct ksmbd_transport {#define KSMBD_TCP_SEND_TIMEOUT (5 * HZ)#define KSMBD_TCP_PEER_SOCKADDR (c) ((struct sockaddr *)&((c)->peer_addr)) -extern struct list_head conn_list; +#define CONN_HASH_BITS 12 +extern DECLARE_HASHTABLE(conn_list, CONN_HASH_BITS);extern struct rw_semaphore conn_list_lock;bool ksmbd_conn_alive (struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +2 -2
@@ -7427,7 +7427,7 @@ int smb2_lock(struct ksmbd_work *work)int nolock =0 ;LIST_HEAD (lock_list);LIST_HEAD (rollback_list); -int prior_lock =0 ; +int prior_lock =0 , bkt;WORK_BUFFERS (work, req, rsp);
@@ -7537,7 +7537,7 @@ int smb2_lock(struct ksmbd_work *work) nolock =1 ;/* check locks in connection list */ down_read (&conn_list_lock); -list_for_each_entry (conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { +hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, conn, hlist) {spin_lock (&conn->llist_lock);list_for_each_entry_safe (cmp_lock, tmp2, &conn->lock_list, clist) { if (file_inode(cmp_lock->fl->c.flc_file) !=
fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c +5 -0
@@ -381,6 +381,11 @@ static struct smb_direct_transport *allo conn =ksmbd_conn_alloc ();if (!conn) goto err; + +down_write (&conn_list_lock); +hash_add (conn_list, &conn->hlist,0 ); +up_write (&conn_list_lock); + conn->transport =KSMBD_TRANS (t);KSMBD_TRANS (t)->conn = conn;KSMBD_TRANS (t)->ops = &ksmbd_smb_direct_transport_ops;
fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c +21 -4
@@ -89,13 +89,21 @@ static struct tcp_transport *alloc_trans }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) -if (client_sk->sk->sk_family ==AF_INET6 ) +if (client_sk->sk->sk_family ==AF_INET6 ) {memcpy (&conn->inet6_addr, &client_sk->sk->sk_v6_daddr,16 ); -else + conn->inet_hash =ipv6_addr_hash (&client_sk->sk->sk_v6_daddr); + }else { conn->inet_addr =inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr; + conn->inet_hash =ipv4_addr_hash (inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr); + }#else conn->inet_addr =inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr; + conn->inet_hash =ipv4_addr_hash (inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr);#endif +down_write (&conn_list_lock); +hash_add (conn_list, &conn->hlist, conn->inet_hash); +up_write (&conn_list_lock); + conn->transport =KSMBD_TRANS (t);KSMBD_TRANS (t)->conn = conn;KSMBD_TRANS (t)->ops = &ksmbd_tcp_transport_ops;
@@ -242,7 +250,7 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p)struct socket *client_sk =NULL ;struct interface *iface = (struct interface *)p;struct ksmbd_conn *conn; -int ret; +int ret, inet_hash;unsigned int max_ip_conns;while (!kthread_should_stop ()) {
@@ -267,9 +275,18 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p)/* * Limits repeated connections from clients with the same IP. */ +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +if (client_sk->sk->sk_family ==AF_INET6 ) + inet_hash =ipv6_addr_hash (&client_sk->sk->sk_v6_daddr); +else + inet_hash =ipv4_addr_hash (inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr); +#else + inet_hash =ipv4_addr_hash (inet_sk (client_sk->sk)->inet_daddr); +#endif + max_ip_conns =0 ;down_read (&conn_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { + hash_for_each_possible(conn_list, conn, hlist, inet_hash) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) if (client_sk->sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { if (memcmp(&client_sk->sk->sk_v6_daddr,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/215 ksmbd: reset rcount per connection in ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit def036ef87f8641c1c525d5ae17438d7a1006491 ]
rcount is intended to be connection-specific: 2 for curr_conn, 1 for every other connection sharing the same session. However, it is initialised only once before the hash iteration and is never reset. After the loop visits curr_conn, later sibling connections are also checked against rcount == 2, so a sibling with req_running == 1 is incorrectly treated as idle. This makes the outcome depend on the hash iteration order: whether a given sibling is checked against the loose (< 2) or the strict (< 1) threshold is decided by whether it happens to be visited before or after curr_conn.
The function's contract is "wait until every connection sharing this session is idle" so that destroy_previous_session() can safely tear the session down. The latched rcount violates that contract and reopens the teardown race window the wait logic was meant to close:destroy_previous_session() may proceed before sibling channels have actually quiesced, overlapping session teardown with in-flight work on those connections.
Recompute rcount inside the loop so each connection is compared against its own threshold regardless of iteration order.
This is a code-inspection fix for an iteration-order-dependent logic error; a targeted reproducer would require SMB3 multichannel with in-flight work on a sibling channel landing after curr_conn in hash order, which is not something that can be triggered reliably.
--- fs/smb/server/connection.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/connection.c +2 -3
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(struct {struct ksmbd_conn *conn;int rc, retry_count =0 , max_timeout =120 ; -int rcount =1 , bkt; +int rcount, bkt; retry_idle:if (retry_count >= max_timeout)
@@ -189,8 +189,7 @@ retry_idle:down_read (&conn_list_lock);hash_for_each (conn_list, bkt, conn, hlist) {if (conn->binding ||xa_load (&conn->sessions, sess_id)) { -if (conn == curr_conn) - rcount =2 ; + rcount = (conn == curr_conn) ?2 :1 ;if (atomic_read (&conn->req_running) >= rcount) { rc = wait_event_timeout(conn->req_running_q, atomic_read(&conn->req_running) < rcount,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/215 thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 41ff66baf81c6541f4f985dd7eac4494d03d9440 ]
If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after adding a thermal governor to the thermal zone being registered, the governor is not removed from it as appropriate which may lead to a memory leak.
In turn, thermal_zone_device_unregister() calls thermal_set_governor() without acquiring the thermal zone lock beforehand which may race with a governor update via sysfs and may lead to a use-after-free in that case.
Address these issues by adding two thermal_set_governor() calls, one to thermal_release() to remove the governor from the given thermal zone, and one to the thermal zone registration error path to cover failures preceding the thermal zone device registration.
--- drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c +4 -3
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static void thermal_release(struct devic sizeof("thermal_zone") - 1)) { tz =to_thermal_zone (dev);thermal_zone_destroy_device_groups (tz); +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL );mutex_destroy (&tz->lock);complete (&tz->removal); } else if (!strncmp(dev_name(dev), "cooling_device",
@@ -1483,8 +1484,10 @@ thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips(/* sys I/F */ /* Add nodes that are always present via .groups */ result =thermal_zone_create_device_groups (tz); -if (result) +if (result) { +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); goto remove_id; + }/* A new thermal zone needs to be updated anyway. */ atomic_set (&tz->need_update,1 );
@@ -1630,8 +1633,6 @@ void thermal_zone_device_unregister(strucancel_delayed_work_sync (&tz->poll_queue); -thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); -thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs (tz);ida_free (&thermal_tz_ida, tz->id);ida_destroy (&tz->ida);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/215 wifi: mt76: mt792x: describe USB WFSYS reset with a descriptor
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e6f48512c1ceebcd1ce6bb83df3b3d56a261507d ]
Prepare mt792xu_wfsys_reset() for chips that share the same USB WFSYS reset flow but use different register definitions.
This is a pure refactor of the current mt7921u path and keeps the reset sequence unchanged.
Stable-dep-of: 56154fef47d1 ("wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix mt7925u USB WFSYS reset handling")
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c +32 -8
@@ -206,6 +206,24 @@ static void mt792xu_epctl_rst_opt(structmt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76,MT_SSUSB_EPCTL_CSR_EP_RST_OPT , val); } +struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc { +u32 rst_reg; +u32 done_reg; +u32 done_mask; +u32 done_val; +u32 delay_ms; +bool need_status_sel; +}; + +static const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc mt7921_wfsys_desc = { + .rst_reg =MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST , + .done_reg =MT_UDMA_CONN_INFRA_STATUS , + .done_mask =MT_UDMA_CONN_WFSYS_INIT_DONE , + .done_val =MT_UDMA_CONN_WFSYS_INIT_DONE , + .delay_ms =0 , + .need_status_sel = true, +}; +int mt792xu_dma_init (struct mt792x_dev *dev,bool resume) {int err;
@@ -236,25 +254,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mt792xu_dma_init);int mt792xu_wfsys_reset (struct mt792x_dev *dev) { +const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc *desc = &mt7921_wfsys_desc;u32 val;int i;mt792xu_epctl_rst_opt (dev, false); - val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76,MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST ); + val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76, desc->rst_reg); val |=MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST_WF_WHOLE_PATH ; -mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76,MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST , val); +mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76, desc->rst_reg, val); -usleep_range (10 ,20 ); +if (desc->delay_ms) +msleep (desc->delay_ms); +else +usleep_range (10 ,20 ); - val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76,MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST ); + val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76, desc->rst_reg); val &= ~MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST_WF_WHOLE_PATH ; -mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76,MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST , val); +mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76, desc->rst_reg, val); + +if (desc->need_status_sel) +mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76,MT_UDMA_CONN_INFRA_STATUS_SEL ,0 ); -mt792xu_uhw_wr (&dev->mt76,MT_UDMA_CONN_INFRA_STATUS_SEL ,0 );for (i =0 ; i < MT792x_WFSYS_INIT_RETRY_COUNT; i++) { - val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76,MT_UDMA_CONN_INFRA_STATUS ); -if (val &MT_UDMA_CONN_WFSYS_INIT_DONE ) + val =mt792xu_uhw_rr (&dev->mt76, desc->done_reg); +if ((val & desc->done_mask) == desc->done_val)break ;msleep (100 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/215 wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix mt7925u USB WFSYS reset handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 56154fef47d104effa9f29ed3db4f805cbc0d640 ]
mt7925u uses different reset/status registers from mt7921u. Reusing the mt7921u register set causes the WFSYS reset to fail.
Add a chip-specific descriptor in mt792xu_wfsys_reset() to select the correct registers and fix mt7925u failing to initialize after a warm reboot.
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_regs.h | 4 ++++ drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_regs.h +4 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@#define MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST MT_CBTOP_RGU(0x600)#define MT_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST_WF_WHOLE_PATH BIT(0) +#define MT7925_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST 0x70028600 +#define MT7925_WFSYS_INIT_DONE_ADDR 0x184c1604 +#define MT7925_WFSYS_INIT_DONE 0x00001d1e +#define MT_HW_BOUND 0x70010020#define MT_HW_CHIPID 0x70010200#define MT_HW_REV 0x70010204
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c +12 -1
@@ -224,6 +224,15 @@ static const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc m .need_status_sel = true, }; +static const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc mt7925_wfsys_desc = { + .rst_reg =MT7925_CBTOP_RGU_WF_SUBSYS_RST , + .done_reg =MT7925_WFSYS_INIT_DONE_ADDR , + .done_mask =U32_MAX , + .done_val =MT7925_WFSYS_INIT_DONE , + .delay_ms =20 , + .need_status_sel = false, +}; +int mt792xu_dma_init (struct mt792x_dev *dev,bool resume) {int err;
@@ -254,7 +263,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mt792xu_dma_init);int mt792xu_wfsys_reset (struct mt792x_dev *dev) { -const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc *desc = &mt7921_wfsys_desc; +const struct mt792xu_wfsys_desc *desc =is_mt7925 (&dev->mt76) ? + &mt7925_wfsys_desc : + &mt7921_wfsys_desc;u32 val;int i;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/215 wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae5e95d4157481693be2317e3ffcd84e36010cbb ]
The mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous) for the wakeup_timer before the adapter structure is freed. This is incorrect because timer_delete() does not wait for any running timer callback to complete.
If the wakeup_timer callback (wakeup_timer_fn) is executing when mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() is called, the callback will continue to access adapter fields (adapter->hw_status, adapter->if_ops.card_reset, etc.) which may be freed by mwifiex_free_adapter() called later in the mwifiex_remove_card() path.
Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback has completed before returning.
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c +1 -1
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static void mwifiex_invalidate_lists(strstatic void mwifiex_adapter_cleanup (struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter) { -del_timer (&adapter->wakeup_timer); +del_timer_sync (&adapter->wakeup_timer);cancel_delayed_work_sync (&adapter->devdump_work);mwifiex_cancel_all_pending_cmd (adapter);wake_up_interruptible (&adapter->cmd_wait_q.wait);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/215 mm/migrate: factor out movable_ops page handling into migrate_movable_ops_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b9ed00483d4cbacca04edb11984d8daf09e9ae22 ]
Let's factor it out, simplifying the calling code.
Before this change, we would have called flush_dcache_folio() also on movable_ops pages. As documented in Documentation/core-api/cachetlb.rst:
"This routine need only be called for page cache pages which can
potentially ever be mapped into the address space of a user process."
So don't do it for movable_ops pages. If there would ever be such a movable_ops page user, it should do the flushing itself after performing the copy.
Note that we can now change folio_mapping_flags() to folio_test_anon() to make it clearer, because movable_ops pages will never take that path.
Stable-dep-of: a2e0c0668a34 ("mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue")
--- mm/migrate.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
mm/migrate.c +47 -37
@@ -130,6 +130,47 @@ static void putback_movable_folio(structfolio_clear_isolated (folio); } +/** +* migrate_movable_ops_page - migrate an isolated movable_ops page +* @dst: The destination page. +* @src: The source page. +* @mode: The migration mode. +* +* Migrate an isolated movable_ops page. +* +* If the src page was already released by its owner, the src page is +* un-isolated (putback) and migration succeeds; the migration core will be the +* owner of both pages. +* +* If the src page was not released by its owner and the migration was +* successful, the owner of the src page and the dst page are swapped and +* the src page is un-isolated. +* +* If migration fails, the ownership stays unmodified and the src page +* remains isolated: migration may be retried later or the page can be putback. +* +* TODO: migration core will treat both pages as folios and lock them before +* this call to unlock them after this call. Further, the folio refcounts on +* src and dst are also released by migration core. These pages will not be +* folios in the future, so that must be reworked. +* +* Returns MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS on success, otherwise a negative error +* code. +*/ +static int migrate_movable_ops_page (struct page *dst,struct page *src, +enum migrate_mode mode) +{ +int rc =MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ; + +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE (!PageIsolated (src), src); +/* If the page was released by it's owner, there is nothing to do. */ +if (PageMovable (src)) + rc =page_movable_ops (src)->migrate_page (dst, src, mode); +if (rc ==MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ) +ClearPageIsolated (src); +return rc; +} +/* * Put previously isolated pages back onto the appropriate lists * from where they were once taken off for compaction/migration.
@@ -1044,51 +1085,20 @@ static int move_to_new_folio(struct foli mode); else rc =fallback_migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, mode); - }else { -const struct movable_operations *mops; -/* -* In case of non-lru page, it could be released after -* isolation step. In that case, we shouldn't try migration. -*/ -VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO (!folio_test_isolated (src), src); -if (!folio_test_movable (src)) { - rc =MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ; -folio_clear_isolated (src); +if (rc !=MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ) goto out; - } - - mops =folio_movable_ops (src); - rc = mops->migrate_page (&dst->page, &src->page, mode); -WARN_ON_ONCE (rc ==MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS && - !folio_test_isolated (src)); - } - -/* -* When successful, old pagecache src->mapping must be cleared before -* src is freed; but stats require that PageAnon be left as PageAnon. -*/ -if (rc ==MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ) { -if (__folio_test_movable (src)) { -VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO (!folio_test_isolated (src), src); - -/* -* We clear PG_movable under page_lock so any compactor -* cannot try to migrate this page. -*/ -folio_clear_isolated (src); - } -/* -* Anonymous and movable src->mapping will be cleared by -* free_pages_prepare so don't reset it here for keeping -* the type to work PageAnon, for example. +* For pagecache folios, src->mapping must be cleared before src +* is freed. Anonymous folios must stay anonymous until freed. */ -if (!folio_mapping_flags (src)) +if (!folio_test_anon (src)) src->mapping =NULL ;if (likely (!folio_is_zone_device (dst)))flush_dcache_folio (dst); + }else { + rc =migrate_movable_ops_page (&dst->page, &src->page, mode); } out:return rc;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/215 mm/migrate: move movable_ops page handling out of move_to_new_folio()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be4a3e9c185264e9ad0fe02c1c5d81b8386bd50c ]
Let's move that handling directly into migrate_folio_move(), so we can simplify move_to_new_folio(). While at it, fixup the documentation a bit.
Note that unmap_and_move_huge_page() does not care, because it only deals with actual folios. (we only support migration of individual movable_ops pages)
Stable-dep-of: a2e0c0668a34 ("mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue")
--- mm/migrate.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
mm/migrate.c +30 -33
@@ -1047,11 +1047,12 @@ static int fallback_migrate_folio(struct }/* -* Move a page to a newly allocated page -* The page is locked and all ptes have been successfully removed. +* Move a src folio to a newly allocated dst folio. * -* The new page will have replaced the old page if this function -* is successful. +* The src and dst folios are locked and the src folios was unmapped from +* the page tables. +* +* On success, the src folio was replaced by the dst folio. * * Return value: * < 0 - error code
@@ -1060,34 +1061,30 @@ static int fallback_migrate_folio(structstatic int move_to_new_folio (struct folio *dst,struct folio *src,enum migrate_mode mode) { +struct address_space *mapping =folio_mapping (src);int rc = -EAGAIN ; -bool is_lru = !__folio_test_movable (src);VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO (!folio_test_locked (src), src);VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO (!folio_test_locked (dst), dst); -if (likely (is_lru)) { -struct address_space *mapping =folio_mapping (src); - -if (!mapping) - rc =migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, mode); -else if (mapping_inaccessible (mapping)) - rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; -else if (mapping->a_ops->migrate_folio) -/* -* Most folios have a mapping and most filesystems -* provide a migrate_folio callback. Anonymous folios -* are part of swap space which also has its own -* migrate_folio callback. This is the most common path -* for page migration. -*/ - rc = mapping->a_ops->migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, - mode); -else - rc =fallback_migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, mode); +if (!mapping) + rc =migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, mode); +else if (mapping_inaccessible (mapping)) + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +else if (mapping->a_ops->migrate_folio) +/* +* Most folios have a mapping and most filesystems +* provide a migrate_folio callback. Anonymous folios +* are part of swap space which also has its own +* migrate_folio callback. This is the most common path +* for page migration. +*/ + rc = mapping->a_ops->migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, + mode); +else + rc =fallback_migrate_folio (mapping, dst, src, mode); -if (rc !=MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ) - goto out; +if (rc ==MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ) {/* * For pagecache folios, src->mapping must be cleared before src * is freed. Anonymous folios must stay anonymous until freed.
@@ -1097,10 +1094,7 @@ static int move_to_new_folio(struct foliif (likely (!folio_is_zone_device (dst)))flush_dcache_folio (dst); - }else { - rc =migrate_movable_ops_page (&dst->page, &src->page, mode); } -out:return rc; }
@@ -1351,20 +1345,23 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioint rc;int old_page_state =0 ;struct anon_vma *anon_vma =NULL ; -bool is_lru = !__folio_test_movable (src);struct list_head *prev;__migrate_folio_extract (dst, &old_page_state, &anon_vma); prev = dst->lru.prev;list_del (&dst->lru); +if (unlikely (__folio_test_movable (src))) { + rc =migrate_movable_ops_page (&dst->page, &src->page, mode); +if (rc) + goto out; + goto out_unlock_both; + } + rc =move_to_new_folio (dst, src, mode);if (rc) goto out; -if (unlikely (!is_lru)) - goto out_unlock_both; -/* * When successful, push dst to LRU immediately: so that if it * turns out to be an mlocked page, remove_migration_ptes() will
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/215 mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Usama Arif <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2e0c0668a3486f96b86c50e02872c8e94fd4f9c ]
During folio migration, __folio_migrate_mapping() removes the source folio from the deferred split queue, but the destination folio is never re-queued. This causes underutilized THPs to escape the shrinker after NUMA migration, since they silently drop off the deferred split list.
Fix this by recording whether the source folio was on the deferred split queue and its partially mapped state before move_to_new_folio() unqueues it, and re-queuing the destination folio after a successful migration if it was.
By the time migrate_folio_move() runs, partially mapped folios without a pin have already been split by migrate_pages_batch(). So only two cases remain on the deferred list at this point:
1. Partially mapped folios with a pin (split failed).
2. Fully mapped but potentially underused folios. The recorded partially_mapped state is forwarded to deferred_split_folio() so that the destination folio is correctly re-queued in both cases.
Because THPs are removed from the deferred_list, THP shinker cannot split the underutilized THPs in time. As a result, users will show less free memory than before.
--- mm/migrate.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
mm/migrate.c +17 -0
@@ -1345,6 +1345,8 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioint rc;int old_page_state =0 ;struct anon_vma *anon_vma =NULL ; +bool src_deferred_split = false; +bool src_partially_mapped = false;struct list_head *prev;__migrate_folio_extract (dst, &old_page_state, &anon_vma);
@@ -1358,6 +1360,12 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folio goto out_unlock_both; } +if (folio_order (src) >1 && + !data_race (list_empty (&src->_deferred_list))) { + src_deferred_split = true; + src_partially_mapped =folio_test_partially_mapped (src); + } + rc =move_to_new_folio (dst, src, mode);if (rc) goto out;
@@ -1378,6 +1386,15 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioif (old_page_state &PAGE_WAS_MAPPED )remove_migration_ptes (src, dst,0 ); +/* +* Requeue the destination folio on the deferred split queue if +* the source was on the queue. The source is unqueued in +* __folio_migrate_mapping(), so we recorded the state from +* before move_to_new_folio(). +*/ +if (src_deferred_split) +deferred_split_folio (dst, src_partially_mapped); + out_unlock_both:folio_unlock (dst);set_page_owner_migrate_reason (&dst->page, reason);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/215 ALSA: aoa: Use guard() for mutex locks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1cb6ecbb372002ef9e531c5377e5f60122411e40 ]
Replace the manual mutex lock/unlock pairs with guard() for code simplification.
Only code refactoring, and no behavior change.
Stable-dep-of: 5ed060d54915 ("ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state")
--- sound/aoa/codecs/onyx.c | 104 +++++++++++------------------------- sound/aoa/codecs/tas.c | 113 +++++++++++++--------------------------- sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c | 20 ++----- sound/aoa/core/gpio-pmf.c | 26 +++------ sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 76 ++++++++------------------ 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/codecs/onyx.c +32 -72
@@ -122,10 +122,9 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_get(struct snd_kstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);s8 l, r; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , &l);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , &r); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = l +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ; ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] = r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -146,15 +145,13 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_put(struct snd_k ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] > -1 + VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT)return -EINVAL ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , &l);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , &r);if (l +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] && - r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ]) { -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); + r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ])return 0 ; - }onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]
@@ -162,7 +159,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_put(struct snd_konyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] -VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 1 ; }
@@ -198,9 +194,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_inputgain_get(structstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 ig; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &ig); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = (ig &ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ) +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -217,14 +212,13 @@ static int onyx_snd_inputgain_put(structif (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] <3 +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT || ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] >28 +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT )return -EINVAL ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); n = v; n &= ~ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ; n |= (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] -INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT ) &ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , n); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return n != v; }
@@ -252,9 +246,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_capture_source_get(sstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);s8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0 ] = !!(v&ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC );
@@ -265,13 +258,12 @@ static void onyx_set_capture_source(stru {s8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); v &= ~ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC ;if (mic) v |=ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); } static int onyx_snd_capture_source_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
@@ -312,9 +304,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_get(struct snd_struct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 c; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &c); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = !(c &ONYX_MUTE_LEFT ); ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] = !(c &ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT );
@@ -329,9 +320,9 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_put(struct snd_u8 v =0 , c =0 ;int err = -EBUSY ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (onyx->analog_locked) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ;onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &v); c = v;
@@ -342,9 +333,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_put(struct snd_ c |=ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT ; err =onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , c); - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); -return !err ? (v != c) : err; }
@@ -373,9 +361,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_get(strucu8 address = (pv >>8 ) &0xff ;u8 mask = pv &0xff ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx, address, &c); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = !!(c & mask) ^ polarity;
@@ -394,11 +381,10 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_put(strucu8 address = (pv >>8 ) &0xff ;u8 mask = pv &0xff ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (spdiflock && onyx->spdif_locked) {/* even if alsamixer doesn't care.. */ - err = -EBUSY ; - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; }onyx_read_register (onyx, address, &v); c = v;
@@ -407,9 +393,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_put(struc c |= mask; err =onyx_write_register (onyx, address, c); - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); -return !err ? (v != c) : err; }
@@ -490,7 +473,7 @@ static int onyx_spdif_get(struct snd_kcostruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , &v); ucontrol->value.iec958.status[0 ] = v &0x3e ;
@@ -502,7 +485,6 @@ static int onyx_spdif_get(struct snd_kcoonyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); ucontrol->value.iec958.status[4 ] = v &0x0f ; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -513,7 +495,7 @@ static int onyx_spdif_put(struct snd_kcostruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , &v); v = (v & ~0x3e ) | (ucontrol->value.iec958.status[0 ] &0x3e );onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , v);
@@ -528,7 +510,6 @@ static int onyx_spdif_put(struct snd_kcoonyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); v = (v & ~0x0f ) | (ucontrol->value.iec958.status[4 ] &0x0f );onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 1 ; }
@@ -673,14 +654,13 @@ static int onyx_usable(struct codec_infostruct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;int spdif_enabled, analog_enabled; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); spdif_enabled = !!(v &ONYX_SPDIF_ENABLE );onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &v); analog_enabled = (v & (ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT )) != (ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT ); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);switch (ti->tag) {case 0 :return 1 ;
@@ -696,9 +676,8 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_inf {u8 v;struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -int err = -EBUSY ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);#ifdef SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_COMPRESSED_16BE if (substream->runtime->format ==SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_COMPRESSED_16BE ) {
@@ -707,10 +686,9 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_infif (onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , v |ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT )) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; onyx->analog_locked =1 ; - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; + return 0; }#endif switch (substream->runtime->rate) {
@@ -720,8 +698,7 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_inf/* these rates are ok for all outputs */ /* FIXME: program spdif channel control bits here so that * userspace doesn't have to if it only plays pcm! */ - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return 0 ;default :/* got some rate that the digital output can't do, * so disable and lock it */
@@ -729,16 +706,12 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_infif (onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , v & ~ONYX_SPDIF_ENABLE )) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; onyx->spdif_locked =1 ; - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return 0 ; } - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - -return err; +return -EBUSY ; } static int onyx_open(struct codec_info_item *cii,
@@ -746,9 +719,8 @@ static int onyx_open(struct codec_info_i {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex); onyx->open_count++; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -758,11 +730,10 @@ static int onyx_close(struct codec_info_ {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex); onyx->open_count--;if (!onyx->open_count) onyx->spdif_locked = onyx->analog_locked =0 ; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -772,7 +743,7 @@ static int onyx_switch_clock(struct code {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);/* this *MUST* be more elaborate later... */ switch (what) {case CLOCK_SWITCH_PREPARE_SLAVE :
@@ -784,7 +755,6 @@ static int onyx_switch_clock(struct codedefault :/* silence warning */ break ; } -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -795,27 +765,21 @@ static int onyx_suspend(struct codec_inf {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;u8 v; -int err = -ENXIO ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , &v)) - goto out_unlock; +return -ENXIO ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , v |ONYX_ADPSV |ONYX_DAPSV );/* Apple does a sleep here but the datasheet says to do it on resume */ - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - -return err; +return 0 ; }static int onyx_resume (struct codec_info_item *cii) {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;u8 v; -int err = -ENXIO ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);/* reset codec */ onyx->codec.gpio->methods->set_hw_reset (onyx->codec.gpio,0 );
@@ -827,17 +791,13 @@ static int onyx_resume(struct codec_info/* take codec out of suspend (if it still is after reset) */ if (onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , &v)) - goto out_unlock; +return -ENXIO ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , v & ~(ONYX_ADPSV |ONYX_DAPSV ));/* FIXME: should divide by sample rate, but 8k is the lowest we go */ msleep (2205000 /8000 );/* reset all values */ onyx_register_init (onyx); - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - - return err; + return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_PM */
sound/aoa/codecs/tas.c +39 -74
303 lines not on this page · raw message
sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c +7 -13
@@ -212,10 +212,9 @@ static void ftr_handle_notify(struct worstruct gpio_notification *notif = container_of(work, struct gpio_notification, work.work); -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex);if (notif->notify) notif->notify (notif->data); -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); }static void gpio_enable_dual_edge (int gpio)
@@ -341,19 +340,17 @@ static int ftr_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!irq)return -ENODEV ; -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex); old = notif->notify; -if (!old && !notify) { - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!old && !notify) +return 0 ;if (old && notify) {if (old == notify && notif->data == data) err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return err; }if (old && !notify)
@@ -362,16 +359,13 @@ static int ftr_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!old && notify) { err =request_irq (irq, ftr_handle_notify_irq,0 , name, notif);if (err) - goto out_unlock; +return err; } notif->notify = notify; notif->data = data; - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); -return err; +return 0 ; } static int ftr_get_detect(struct gpio_runtime *rt,
sound/aoa/core/gpio-pmf.c +9 -17
@@ -74,10 +74,9 @@ static void pmf_handle_notify(struct worstruct gpio_notification *notif = container_of(work, struct gpio_notification, work.work); -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex);if (notif->notify) notif->notify (notif->data); -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); }static void pmf_gpio_init (struct gpio_runtime *rt)
@@ -154,19 +153,17 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_rureturn -EINVAL ; } -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex); old = notif->notify; -if (!old && !notify) { - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!old && !notify) +return 0 ;if (old && notify) {if (old == notify && notif->data == data) err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return err; }if (old && !notify) {
@@ -178,10 +175,8 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!old && notify) { irq_client =kzalloc (sizeof (struct pmf_irq_client ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!irq_client) { - err = -ENOMEM ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!irq_client) +return -ENOMEM ; irq_client->data = notif; irq_client->handler = pmf_handle_notify_irq; irq_client->owner =THIS_MODULE ;
@@ -192,17 +187,14 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_ruprintk (KERN_ERR "snd-aoa: gpio layer failed to" " register %s irq (%d)\n" , name, err);kfree (irq_client); - goto out_unlock; +return err; } notif->gpio_private = irq_client; } notif->notify = notify; notif->data = data; - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); -return err; +return 0 ; } static int pmf_get_detect(struct gpio_runtime *rt,
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +25 -51
184 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/215 ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ed060d5491597490fb53ec69da3edc4b1e8c165 ]
The i2sbus PCM code uses pi->active to constrain the sibling stream to an already prepared duplex format and rate in i2sbus_pcm_open().
That state is set from i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), but the current code only clears it on close. As a result, the sibling stream can inherit stale constraints after the prepared state has been torn down.
Clear pi->active when hw_params() or hw_free() tears down the prepared state, and set it again only after prepare succeeds.
Replace the stale FIXME in the duplex constraint comment with a description of the current driver behavior: i2sbus still programs a single shared transport configuration for both directions, so mixed formats are not supported in duplex mode.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +44 -11
@@ -165,17 +165,16 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_open(struct i2sbus* currently in use (if any). */ hw->rate_min =5512 ; hw->rate_max =192000 ; -/* if the other stream is active, then we can only -* support what it is currently using. -* FIXME: I lied. This comment is wrong. We can support -* anything that works with the same serial format, ie. -* when recording 24 bit sound we can well play 16 bit -* sound at the same time iff using the same transfer mode. +/* If the other stream is already prepared, keep this stream +* on the same duplex format and rate. +* +* i2sbus_pcm_prepare() still programs one shared transport +* configuration for both directions, so mixed duplex formats +* are not supported here. */ if (other->active) { -/* FIXME: is this guaranteed by the alsa api? */ hw->formats &=pcm_format_to_bits (i2sdev->format); -/* see above, restrict rates to the one we already have */ +/* Restrict rates to the one already in use. */ hw->rate_min = i2sdev->rate; hw->rate_max = i2sdev->rate; }
@@ -283,6 +282,23 @@ void i2sbus_wait_for_stop_both(struct i2 }#endif +static void i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev,int in) +{ +struct pcm_info *pi; + +guard (mutex)(&i2sdev->lock); + +get_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL ); + pi->active =0 ; +} + +static inline int i2sbus_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,int in) +{ +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream), in); +return 0 ; +} +static inline int i2sbus_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,int in) {struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev =snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream);
@@ -291,14 +307,27 @@ static inline int i2sbus_hw_free(structget_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL );if (pi->dbdma_ring.stopping)i2sbus_wait_for_stop (i2sdev, pi); +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (i2sdev, in);return 0 ; } +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,0 ); +} +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,0 ); } +static int i2sbus_record_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,1 ); +} +static int i2sbus_record_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,1 );
@@ -335,7 +364,6 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; runtime = pi->substream->runtime; - pi->active =1 ;if (other->active && ((i2sdev->format != runtime->format) || (i2sdev->rate != runtime->rate)))
@@ -450,9 +478,11 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* early exit if already programmed correctly */ /* not locking these is fine since we touch them only in this function */ -if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr - &&in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) +if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr && +in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) { + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; + }/* let's notify the codecs about clocks going away. * For now we only do mastering on the i2s cell... */
@@ -490,6 +520,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sif (cii->codec->switch_clock) cii->codec->switch_clock (cii,CLOCK_SWITCH_SLAVE ); + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; }
@@ -746,6 +777,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_playbackstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_playback_ops = { .open = i2sbus_playback_open, .close = i2sbus_playback_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_playback_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_playback_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_playback_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_playback_trigger,
@@ -814,6 +846,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_record_pstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_record_ops = { .open = i2sbus_record_open, .close = i2sbus_record_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_record_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_record_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_record_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_record_trigger,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/215 mm/zsmalloc: copy KMSAN metadata in zs_page_migrate()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4fb61d95ad21c3b6f1c09f357ff49d70abb0535e ]
zs_page_migrate() uses copy_page() to copy the contents of a zspage page during migration. However, copy_page() is not instrumented by KMSAN, so the shadow and origin metadata of the destination page are not updated.
As a result, subsequent accesses to the migrated page are reported as use-after-free by KMSAN, despite the data being correctly copied.
Add a kmsan_copy_page_meta() call after copy_page() to propagate the KMSAN metadata to the new page, matching what copy_highpage() does internally.
--- mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
mm/zsmalloc.c +1 -0
@@ -1808,6 +1808,7 @@ static int zs_page_migrate(struct page **/ d_addr =kmap_atomic (newpage);copy_page (d_addr, s_addr); +kmsan_copy_page_meta (newpage, page);kunmap_atomic (d_addr); for (addr = s_addr + offset; addr < s_addr + PAGE_SIZE;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/215 media: rc: ttusbir: respect DMA coherency rules
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 50acaad3d202c064779db8dc3d010007347f59c7 ]
Buffers must not share a cache line with other data structures. Allocate separately.
--- drivers/media/rc/ttusbir.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/rc/ttusbir.c +9 -4
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct ttusbir {struct led_classdev led;struct urb *bulk_urb; -uint8_t bulk_buffer[5 ]; +u8 *bulk_buffer;int bulk_out_endp, iso_in_endp;bool led_on, is_led_on;atomic_t led_complete;
@@ -186,13 +186,16 @@ static int ttusbir_probe(struct usb_intestruct rc_dev *rc;int i, j, ret;int altsetting =-1 ; +u8 *buffer; tt =kzalloc (sizeof (*tt),GFP_KERNEL ); + buffer =kzalloc (5 ,GFP_KERNEL ); rc =rc_allocate_device (RC_DRIVER_IR_RAW ); -if (!tt || !rc) { +if (!tt || !rc || buffer) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out; } + tt->bulk_buffer = buffer;/* find the correct alt setting */ for (i =0 ; i < intf->num_altsetting && altsetting ==-1 ; i++) {
@@ -281,8 +284,8 @@ static int ttusbir_probe(struct usb_inte tt->bulk_buffer[3 ] =0x01 ;usb_fill_bulk_urb (tt->bulk_urb, tt->udev,usb_sndbulkpipe (tt->udev, - tt->bulk_out_endp), tt->bulk_buffer,sizeof (tt->bulk_buffer), - ttusbir_bulk_complete, tt); + tt->bulk_out_endp), tt->bulk_buffer,5 , + ttusbir_bulk_complete, tt); tt->led.name ="ttusbir:green:power" ; tt->led.default_trigger ="rc-feedback" ;
@@ -351,6 +354,7 @@ out:kfree (tt); }rc_free_device (rc); +kfree (buffer);return ret; }
@@ -373,6 +377,7 @@ static void ttusbir_disconnect(struct us }usb_kill_urb (tt->bulk_urb);usb_free_urb (tt->bulk_urb); +kfree (tt->bulk_buffer);usb_set_intfdata (intf,NULL );kfree (tt); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/215 ALSA: aoa: Skip devices with no codecs in i2sbus_resume()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fd7df93013c5118812e63a52635dc6c3a805a1de ]
In i2sbus_resume(), skip devices with an empty codec list, which avoids using an uninitialized 'sysclock_factor' in the 32-bit format path in i2sbus_pcm_prepare().
In i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), replace two list_for_each_entry() loops with a single list_first_entry() now that the codec list is guaranteed to be non-empty by all callers.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c | 3 +++ sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 16 +++++----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c +3 -0
@@ -410,6 +410,9 @@ static int i2sbus_resume(struct macio_deint err, ret =0 ;list_for_each_entry (i2sdev, &control->list, item) { +if (list_empty (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list)) +continue ; +/* reset i2s bus format etc. */ i2sbus_pcm_prepare_both (i2sdev);
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +5 -11
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* set stop command */ command->command =cpu_to_le16 (DBDMA_STOP ); + cii =list_first_entry (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list, + struct codec_info_item, list); +/* ok, let's set the serial format and stuff */ switch (runtime->format) {/* 16 bit formats */
@@ -418,13 +421,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2scase SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_U16_BE :/* FIXME: if we add different bus factors we need to * do more here!! */ - bi.bus_factor =0 ; -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; -break ; - } -if (!bi.bus_factor) -return -ENODEV ; + bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; input_16bit =1 ;break ;case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S32_BE :
@@ -438,10 +435,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; }/* we assume all sysclocks are the same! */ -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; -break ; - } + bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; if (clock_and_divisors(bi.sysclock_factor, bi.bus_factor,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/215 media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eac69475b01fe1e861dfe3960b57fa95671c132e ]
In a control request, the USB request structure can be subject to DMA on some HCs. Hence it must obey the rules for DMA coherency. Allocate it separately.
--- drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c +11 -5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct igorplugusb {struct device *dev;struct urb *urb; -struct usb_ctrlrequest request; +struct usb_ctrlrequest *request;struct timer_list timer;
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static void igorplugusb_cmd(struct igorp {int ret; - ir->request.bRequest = cmd; + ir->request->bRequest = cmd; ir->urb->transfer_flags =0 ; ret =usb_submit_urb (ir->urb,GFP_ATOMIC );if (ret && ret != -EPERM )
@@ -164,13 +164,17 @@ static int igorplugusb_probe(struct usb_if (!ir)return -ENOMEM ; + ir->request =kzalloc (sizeof (*ir->request),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ir->request) + goto fail; + ir->dev = &intf->dev;timer_setup (&ir->timer, igorplugusb_timer,0 ); - ir->request.bRequest =GET_INFRACODE ; - ir->request.bRequestType =USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_DIR_IN ; - ir->request.wLength =cpu_to_le16 (MAX_PACKET ); + ir->request->bRequest =GET_INFRACODE ; + ir->request->bRequestType =USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_DIR_IN ; + ir->request->wLength =cpu_to_le16 (MAX_PACKET ); ir->urb =usb_alloc_urb (0 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!ir->urb)
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ fail:usb_free_urb (ir->urb);rc_free_device (ir->rc);kfree (ir->buf_in); +kfree (ir->request);return ret; }
@@ -243,6 +248,7 @@ static void igorplugusb_disconnect(strucusb_unpoison_urb (ir->urb);usb_free_urb (ir->urb);kfree (ir->buf_in); +kfree (ir->request); }static const struct usb_device_id igorplugusb_table[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/215 RDMA/mana_ib: Disable RX steering on RSS QP destroy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Long Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dbeb256e8dd87233d891b170c0b32a6466467036 ]
When an RSS QP is destroyed (e.g. DPDK exit), mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss() destroys the RX WQ objects but does not disable vPort RX steering in firmware. This leaves stale steering configuration that still points to the destroyed RX objects.
If traffic continues to arrive (e.g. peer VM is still transmitting) and the VF interface is subsequently brought up (mana_open), the firmware may deliver completions using stale CQ IDs from the old RX objects. These CQ IDs can be reused by the ethernet driver for new TX CQs, causing RX completions to land on TX CQs:
WARNING: mana_poll_tx_cq+0x1b8/0x220 [mana] (is_sq == false)
WARNING: mana_gd_process_eq_events+0x209/0x290 (cq_table lookup fails)
Fix this by disabling vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects. Note that mana_fence_rqs() cannot be used here because the fence completion is delivered on the CQ, which is polled by user-mode (e.g. DPDK) and not visible to the kernel driver.
Refactor the disable logic into a shared mana_disable_vport_rx() in mana_en, exported for use by mana_ib, replacing the duplicate code. The ethernet driver's mana_dealloc_queues() is also updated to call this common function.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/net/mana/mana.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c +15 -0
@@ -601,6 +601,21 @@ static int mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss(struct ndev =mana_ib_get_netdev (qp->ibqp.device, qp->port); mpc =netdev_priv (ndev); +/* Disable vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects. +* Otherwise firmware still routes traffic to the destroyed queues, +* which can cause bogus completions on reused CQ IDs when the +* ethernet driver later creates new queues on mana_open(). +* +* Unlike the ethernet teardown path, mana_fence_rqs() cannot be +* used here because the fence completion CQE is delivered on the +* CQ which is polled by userspace (e.g. DPDK), so there is no way +* for the kernel to wait for fence completion. +* +* This is best effort — if it fails there is not much we can do, +* and mana_cfg_vport_steering() already logs the error. +*/ +mana_disable_vport_rx (mpc); +for (i =0 ; i < (1 << ind_tbl->log_ind_tbl_size); i++) { ibwq = ind_tbl->ind_tbl[i]; wq = container_of(ibwq, struct mana_ib_wq, ibwq);
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c +10 -1
@@ -2392,6 +2392,13 @@ static void mana_rss_table_init(struct methtool_rxfh_indir_default (i, apc->num_queues); } +int mana_disable_vport_rx (struct mana_port_context *apc) +{ +return mana_cfg_vport_steering (apc,TRI_STATE_FALSE , false, false, + false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS (mana_disable_vport_rx,NET_MANA ); +int mana_config_rss (struct mana_port_context *apc,enum TRI_STATE rx,bool update_hash,bool update_tab) {
@@ -2676,12 +2683,14 @@ static int mana_dealloc_queues(struct ne*/ apc->rss_state =TRI_STATE_FALSE ; - err =mana_config_rss (apc,TRI_STATE_FALSE , false, false); + err =mana_disable_vport_rx (apc);if (err) {netdev_err (ndev,"Failed to disable vPort: %d\n" , err);return err; } +mana_fence_rqs (apc); +mana_destroy_vport (apc);return 0 ;
include/net/mana/mana.h +1 -0
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ struct mana_port_context {netdev_tx_t mana_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *ndev);int mana_config_rss (struct mana_port_context *ac,enum TRI_STATE rx,bool update_hash,bool update_tab); +int mana_disable_vport_rx (struct mana_port_context *apc);int mana_alloc_queues (struct net_device *ndev);int mana_attach (struct net_device *ndev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/215 block: relax pgmap check in bio_add_page for compatible zone device pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Naman Jain <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 41c665aae2b5dbecddddcc8ace344caf630cc7a4 ]
bio_add_page() and bio_integrity_add_page() reject pages from different dev_pagemaps entirely, returning 0 even when those pages have compatible DMA mapping requirements. This forces callers to start a new bio when buffers span pgmap boundaries, even though the pages could safely coexist as separate bvec entries.
This matters for guests where memory is registered through devm_memremap_pages() with MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC in multiple calls, creating separate dev_pagemaps for each chunk. When a direct I/O buffer spans two such chunks, bio_add_page() rejects the second page, forcing an unnecessary bio split or I/O failure.
Introduce zone_device_pages_compatible() in blk.h to check whether two pages can coexist in the same bio as separate bvec entries. The block DMA iterator (blk_dma_map_iter_start) caches the P2PDMA mapping state from the first segment and applies it to all others, so P2PDMA pages from different pgmaps must not be mixed, and neither must P2PDMA and non-P2PDMA pages. All other combinations (MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC pages from different pgmaps, or MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC with normal RAM) use the same dma_map_phys path and are safe.
Replace the blanket zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() rejection with zone_device_pages_compatible(), while keeping zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() as a merge guard.
Pages from different pgmaps can be added as separate bvec entries but must not be coalesced into the same segment, as that would make it impossible to recover the correct pgmap via page_pgmap().
--- block/bio-integrity.c | 2 ++ block/bio.c | 14 +++++++++----- block/blk.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
block/bio-integrity.c +2 -0
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ int bio_integrity_add_page(struct bio *bstruct bio_vec *bv = &bip->bip_vec[bip->bip_vcnt -1 ];bool same_page = false; +if (!zone_device_pages_compatible (bv->bv_page, page)) +return 0 ;if (bvec_try_merge_hw_page (q, bv, page, len, offset, &same_page)) { bip->bip_iter.bi_size += len;
block/bio.c +9 -5
@@ -1155,11 +1155,15 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, structif (bio->bi_iter.bi_size >UINT_MAX - len)return 0 ; -if (bio->bi_vcnt >0 && -bvec_try_merge_page (&bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt -1 ], - page, len, offset, &same_page)) { - bio->bi_iter.bi_size += len; -return len; +if (bio->bi_vcnt >0 ) { +struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt -1 ]; + +if (!zone_device_pages_compatible (bv->bv_page, page)) +return 0 ; +if (bvec_try_merge_page (bv, page, len, offset, &same_page)) { + bio->bi_iter.bi_size += len; +return len; + } }if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs)
block/blk.h +19 -0
@@ -124,6 +124,25 @@ static inline bool biovec_phys_mergeablereturn true; } +/* +* Check if two pages from potentially different zone device pgmaps can +* coexist as separate bvec entries in the same bio. +* +* The block DMA iterator (blk_dma_map_iter_start) caches the P2PDMA mapping +* state from the first segment and applies it to all subsequent segments, so +* P2PDMA pages from different pgmaps must not be mixed in the same bio. +* +* Other zone device types (FS_DAX, GENERIC) use the same dma_map_phys() path +* as normal RAM. PRIVATE and COHERENT pages never appear in bios. +*/ +static inline bool zone_device_pages_compatible (const struct page *a, +const struct page *b) +{ +if (is_pci_p2pdma_page (a) ||is_pci_p2pdma_page (b)) +return zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (a, b); +return true; +} +static inline bool __bvec_gap_to_prev (const struct queue_limits *lim,struct bio_vec *bprv,unsigned int offset) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/215 iio: frequency: admv1013: add dev variable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e61b5bb0e91390adee41eaddc0a1a7d55d5652b2 ]
Introduce a local struct device pointer in functions that reference &spi->dev for device-managed resource calls and device property reads, improving code readability.
Stable-dep-of: aac0a51b1670 ("iio: frequency: admv1013: fix NULL pointer dereference on str")
--- drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c +15 -14
@@ -518,11 +518,11 @@ static int admv1013_properties_parse(str {int ret;const char *str; -struct spi_device *spi = st->spi; +struct device *dev = &st->spi->dev; - st->det_en =device_property_read_bool (&spi->dev,"adi,detector-enable" ); + st->det_en =device_property_read_bool (dev,"adi,detector-enable" ); - ret =device_property_read_string (&spi->dev,"adi,input-mode" , &str); + ret =device_property_read_string (dev,"adi,input-mode" , &str);if (ret) st->input_mode =ADMV1013_IQ_MODE ;
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static int admv1013_properties_parse(strelse return -EINVAL ; - ret =device_property_read_string (&spi->dev,"adi,quad-se-mode" , &str); + ret =device_property_read_string (dev,"adi,quad-se-mode" , &str);if (ret) st->quad_se_mode =ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF ;
@@ -546,11 +546,11 @@ static int admv1013_properties_parse(strelse return -EINVAL ; - ret =devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable (&st->spi->dev, + ret =devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable (dev,ARRAY_SIZE (admv1013_vcc_regs), admv1013_vcc_regs);if (ret) { -dev_err_probe (&spi->dev, ret, +dev_err_probe (dev, ret,"Failed to request VCC regulators\n" );return ret; }
@@ -562,9 +562,10 @@ static int admv1013_probe(struct spi_dev {struct iio_dev *indio_dev;struct admv1013_state *st; +struct device *dev = &spi->dev;int ret, vcm_uv; - indio_dev =devm_iio_device_alloc (&spi->dev,sizeof (*st)); + indio_dev =devm_iio_device_alloc (dev,sizeof (*st));if (!indio_dev)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -581,20 +582,20 @@ static int admv1013_probe(struct spi_devif (ret)return ret; - ret =devm_regulator_get_enable_read_voltage (&spi->dev,"vcm" ); + ret =devm_regulator_get_enable_read_voltage (dev,"vcm" );if (ret <0 ) -return dev_err_probe (&spi->dev, ret, +return dev_err_probe (dev, ret,"failed to get the common-mode voltage\n" ); vcm_uv = ret; - st->clkin =devm_clk_get_enabled (&spi->dev,"lo_in" ); + st->clkin =devm_clk_get_enabled (dev,"lo_in" );if (IS_ERR (st->clkin)) -return dev_err_probe (&spi->dev,PTR_ERR (st->clkin), +return dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (st->clkin),"failed to get the LO input clock\n" ); st->nb.notifier_call = admv1013_freq_change; - ret =devm_clk_notifier_register (&spi->dev, st->clkin, &st->nb); + ret =devm_clk_notifier_register (dev, st->clkin, &st->nb);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -606,11 +607,11 @@ static int admv1013_probe(struct spi_devreturn ret; } - ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (&spi->dev, admv1013_powerdown, st); + ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, admv1013_powerdown, st);if (ret)return ret; -return devm_iio_device_register (&spi->dev, indio_dev); +return devm_iio_device_register (dev, indio_dev); }static const struct spi_device_id admv1013_id[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/215 iio: frequency: admv1013: fix NULL pointer dereference on str
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aac0a51b16700b403a55b67ba495de021db78763 ]
When device_property_read_string() fails, str is left uninitialized but the code falls through to strcmp(str, ...), dereferencing a garbage pointer. Replace manual read/strcmp with device_property_match_property_string() and consolidate the SE mode enums into a single sequential enum, mapping to hardware register values via a switch consistent with other bitfields in the driver.
Several cleanup patches have been applied to this driver recently so this will need a manual backport.
--- drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c +38 -29
@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ enum { };enum { -ADMV1013_SE_MODE_POS =6 , -ADMV1013_SE_MODE_NEG =9 , -ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF =12 +ADMV1013_SE_MODE_POS , +ADMV1013_SE_MODE_NEG , +ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF , };struct admv1013_state {
@@ -470,10 +470,23 @@ static int admv1013_init(struct admv1013if (ret)return ret; - data =FIELD_PREP (ADMV1013_QUAD_SE_MODE_MSK , st->quad_se_mode); +switch (st->quad_se_mode) { +case ADMV1013_SE_MODE_POS : + data =6 ; +break ; +case ADMV1013_SE_MODE_NEG : + data =9 ; +break ; +case ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF : + data =12 ; +break ; +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } ret =__admv1013_spi_update_bits (st,ADMV1013_REG_QUAD , -ADMV1013_QUAD_SE_MODE_MSK , data); +ADMV1013_QUAD_SE_MODE_MSK , +FIELD_PREP (ADMV1013_QUAD_SE_MODE_MSK , data));if (ret)return ret;
@@ -514,37 +527,33 @@ static void admv1013_powerdown(void *datadmv1013_spi_update_bits (data,ADMV1013_REG_ENABLE , enable_reg_msk, enable_reg); } +static const char *const admv1013_input_modes[] = { + [ADMV1013_IQ_MODE ] ="iq" , + [ADMV1013_IF_MODE ] ="if" , +}; + +static const char *const admv1013_quad_se_modes[] = { + [ADMV1013_SE_MODE_POS ] ="se-pos" , + [ADMV1013_SE_MODE_NEG ] ="se-neg" , + [ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF ] ="diff" , +}; +static int admv1013_properties_parse (struct admv1013_state *st) {int ret; -const char *str;struct device *dev = &st->spi->dev; st->det_en =device_property_read_bool (dev,"adi,detector-enable" ); - ret =device_property_read_string (dev,"adi,input-mode" , &str); -if (ret) - st->input_mode =ADMV1013_IQ_MODE ; - -if (!strcmp (str,"iq" )) - st->input_mode =ADMV1013_IQ_MODE ; -else if (!strcmp (str,"if" )) - st->input_mode =ADMV1013_IF_MODE ; -else -return -EINVAL ; - - ret =device_property_read_string (dev,"adi,quad-se-mode" , &str); -if (ret) - st->quad_se_mode =ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF ; - -if (!strcmp (str,"diff" )) - st->quad_se_mode =ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF ; -else if (!strcmp (str,"se-pos" )) - st->quad_se_mode =ADMV1013_SE_MODE_POS ; -else if (!strcmp (str,"se-neg" )) - st->quad_se_mode =ADMV1013_SE_MODE_NEG ; -else -return -EINVAL ; + ret =device_property_match_property_string (dev,"adi,input-mode" , + admv1013_input_modes, +ARRAY_SIZE (admv1013_input_modes)); + st->input_mode = ret >=0 ? ret :ADMV1013_IQ_MODE ; + + ret =device_property_match_property_string (dev,"adi,quad-se-mode" , + admv1013_quad_se_modes, +ARRAY_SIZE (admv1013_quad_se_modes)); + st->quad_se_mode = ret >=0 ? ret :ADMV1013_SE_MODE_DIFF ; ret = devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable(dev, ARRAY_SIZE(admv1013_vcc_regs),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/215 rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1f2740150f904bfa60e4bad74d65add3ccb5e7f8 ]
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread()) will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event() calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 4 ++-- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 - net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 24 ++---------------------- net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | 9 --------- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +2 -2
@@ -127,8 +127,7 @@ E_(rxrpc_call_poke_timer_now, "Timer-now")#define rxrpc_skb_traces \ - EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare, "ETN unshare ") \ - EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem, "ETN unshar-nm") \ + EM(rxrpc_skb_get_call_rx, "GET call-rx ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_secured, "GET conn-secd") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_work, "GET conn-work") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_last_nack, "GET last-nack") \
@@ -153,6 +152,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_recvmsg, "SEE recvmsg ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_reject, "SEE reject ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_rotate, "SEE rotate ") \ + EM(rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem, "SEE unshar-nm") \ E_(rxrpc_skb_see_version, "SEE version ")#define rxrpc_local_traces \
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +0 -1
@@ -1260,7 +1260,6 @@ int rxrpc_server_keyring(struct rxrpc_sovoid rxrpc_kernel_data_consumed (struct rxrpc_call *,struct sk_buff *);void rxrpc_new_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_see_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace ); -void rxrpc_eaten_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_get_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_free_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_purge_queue (struct sk_buff_head *);
net/rxrpc/call_event.c +22 -2
@@ -342,8 +342,28 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpcif (skb && skb->mark ==RXRPC_SKB_MARK_ERROR ) goto out; -if (skb) -rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, skb); +if (skb) { +struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp =rxrpc_skb (skb); + +if (sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 && +skb_cloned (skb)) { +/* Unshare the packet so that it can be modified for +* in-place decryption. +*/ +struct sk_buff *nskb =skb_copy (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); + +if (nskb) { +rxrpc_new_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); +rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, nskb); +rxrpc_free_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_input); + }else { +/* OOM - Drop the packet. */ +rxrpc_see_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem); + } + }else { +rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, skb); + } + }/* If we see our async-event poke, check for timeout trippage. */ now =ktime_get_real ();
net/rxrpc/io_thread.c +2 -22
@@ -178,13 +178,12 @@ static bool rxrpc_extract_abort(struct s/* * Process packets received on the local endpoint */ -static bool rxrpc_input_packet (struct rxrpc_local *local,struct sk_buff **_skb) +static bool rxrpc_input_packet (struct rxrpc_local *local,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct rxrpc_connection *conn;struct sockaddr_rxrpc peer_srx;struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;struct rxrpc_peer *peer =NULL ; -struct sk_buff *skb = *_skb;bool ret = false;skb_pull (skb,sizeof (struct udphdr ));
@@ -230,25 +229,6 @@ static bool rxrpc_input_packet(struct rxreturn rxrpc_bad_message (skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_call);if (sp->hdr.seq ==0 )return rxrpc_bad_message (skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_seq); - -/* Unshare the packet so that it can be modified for in-place -* decryption. -*/ -if (sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 ) { - skb =skb_unshare (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (!skb) { -rxrpc_eaten_skb (*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem); - *_skb =NULL ; -return just_discard; - } - -if (skb != *_skb) { -rxrpc_eaten_skb (*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare); - *_skb = skb; -rxrpc_new_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); - sp =rxrpc_skb (skb); - } - }break ;case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE :
@@ -490,7 +470,7 @@ int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data)switch (skb->mark) {case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_PACKET : skb->priority =0 ; -if (!rxrpc_input_packet (local, &skb)) +if (!rxrpc_input_packet (local, skb))rxrpc_reject_packet (local, skb);trace_rxrpc_rx_done (skb->mark, skb->priority);rxrpc_free_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_put_input);
net/rxrpc/skbuff.c +0 -9
@@ -47,15 +47,6 @@ void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, }/* -* Note the dropping of a ref on a socket buffer by the core. -*/ -void rxrpc_eaten_skb (struct sk_buff *skb,enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) -{ -int n =atomic_inc_return (&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs); -trace_rxrpc_skb (skb,0 , n, why); -} - -/* * Note the destruction of a socket buffer. */ void rxrpc_free_skb (struct sk_buff *skb,enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/215 net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum server registration per node
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d5ee2ff98322337951c56398e79d51815acbf955 ]
Current code does no bound checking on the number of servers added per node. A malicious client can flood NEW_SERVER messages and exhaust memory.
Fix this issue by limiting the maximum number of server registrations to 256 per node. If the NEW_SERVER message is received for an old port, then don't restrict it as it will get replaced. While at it, also rate limit the error messages in the failure path of qrtr_ns_worker().
Note that the limit of 256 is chosen based on the current platform requirements. If requirement changes in the future, this limit can be increased.
--- net/qrtr/ns.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/qrtr/ns.c +21 -5
@@ -68,8 +68,14 @@ struct qrtr_server {struct qrtr_node {unsigned int id;struct xarray servers; +u32 server_count; }; +/* Max server limit is chosen based on the current platform requirements. If the +* requirement changes in the future, this value can be increased. +*/ +#define QRTR_NS_MAX_SERVERS 256 +static struct qrtr_node *node_get (unsigned int node_id) {struct qrtr_node *node;
@@ -230,6 +236,17 @@ static struct qrtr_server *server_add(unif (!service || !port)return NULL ; + node =node_get (node_id); +if (!node) +return NULL ; + +/* Make sure the new servers per port are capped at the maximum value */ + old =xa_load (&node->servers, port); +if (!old && node->server_count >=QRTR_NS_MAX_SERVERS ) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("QRTR client node %u exceeds max server limit!\n" , node_id); +return NULL ; + } + srv =kzalloc (sizeof (*srv),GFP_KERNEL );if (!srv)return NULL ;
@@ -239,10 +256,6 @@ static struct qrtr_server *server_add(un srv->node = node_id; srv->port = port; - node =node_get (node_id); -if (!node) - goto err; -/* Delete the old server on the same port */ old =xa_store (&node->servers, port, srv,GFP_KERNEL );if (old) {
@@ -253,6 +266,8 @@ static struct qrtr_server *server_add(un }else {kfree (old); } + }else { + node->server_count++; } trace_qrtr_ns_server_add(srv->service, srv->instance,
@@ -293,6 +308,7 @@ static int server_del(struct qrtr_node * }kfree (srv); + node->server_count--;return 0 ; }
@@ -681,7 +697,7 @@ static void qrtr_ns_worker(struct work_s }if (ret <0 ) -pr_err ("failed while handling packet from %d:%d" , +pr_err_ratelimited ("failed while handling packet from %d:%d" , sq.sq_node, sq.sq_port); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/215 net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum number of lookups
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5640227d9a21c6a8be249a10677b832e7f40dc55 ]
Current code does no bound checking on the number of lookups a client can perform. Though the code restricts the lookups to local clients, there is still a possibility of a malicious local client sending a flood of NEW_LOOKUP messages over the same socket.
Fix this issue by limiting the maximum number of lookups to 64 globally. Since the nameserver allows only atmost one local observer, this global lookup count will ensure that the lookups stay within the limit.
Note that, limit of 64 is chosen based on the current platform requirements. If requirement changes in the future, this limit can be increased.
--- net/qrtr/ns.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
net/qrtr/ns.c +14 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static struct {struct socket *sock;struct sockaddr_qrtr bcast_sq;struct list_head lookups; +u32 lookup_count;struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;struct work_struct work;void (*saved_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);
@@ -76,6 +77,11 @@ struct qrtr_node {*/ #define QRTR_NS_MAX_SERVERS 256 +/* Max lookup limit is chosen based on the current platform requirements. If the +* requirement changes in the future, this value can be increased. +*/ +#define QRTR_NS_MAX_LOOKUPS 64 +static struct qrtr_node *node_get (unsigned int node_id) {struct qrtr_node *node;
@@ -444,6 +450,7 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_del_client(struct solist_del (&lookup->li);kfree (lookup); + qrtr_ns.lookup_count--; }/* Remove the server belonging to this port but don't broadcast
@@ -561,6 +568,11 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_new_lookup(struct soif (from->sq_node != qrtr_ns.local_node)return -EINVAL ; +if (qrtr_ns.lookup_count >=QRTR_NS_MAX_LOOKUPS ) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("QRTR client node exceeds max lookup limit!\n" ); +return -ENOSPC ; + } + lookup =kzalloc (sizeof (*lookup),GFP_KERNEL );if (!lookup)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -569,6 +581,7 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_new_lookup(struct so lookup->service = service; lookup->instance = instance;list_add_tail (&lookup->li, &qrtr_ns.lookups); + qrtr_ns.lookup_count++;memset (&filter,0 ,sizeof (filter)); filter.service = service;
@@ -609,6 +622,7 @@ static void ctrl_cmd_del_lookup(struct slist_del (&lookup->li);kfree (lookup); + qrtr_ns.lookup_count--; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/215 net: bridge: use a stable FDB dst snapshot in RCU readers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit df4601653201de21b487c3e7fffd464790cab808 ]
Local FDB entries can be rewritten in place by fdb_delete_local(), which updates f->dst to another port or to NULL while keeping the entry alive. Several bridge RCU readers inspect f->dst, including br_fdb_fillbuf() through the brforward_read() sysfs path.
These readers currently load f->dst multiple times and can therefore observe inconsistent values across the check and later dereference. In br_fdb_fillbuf(), this means a concurrent local-FDB update can change f->dst after the NULL check and before the port_no dereference, leading to a NULL-ptr-deref.
Fix this by taking a single READ_ONCE() snapshot of f->dst in each affected RCU reader and using that snapshot for the rest of the access sequence. Also publish the in-place f->dst updates in fdb_delete_local() with WRITE_ONCE() so the readers and writer use matching access patterns.
--- net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c | 8 +++++--- net/bridge/br_fdb.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c +5 -3
@@ -199,11 +199,12 @@ void br_do_proxy_suppress_arp(struct sk_ f =br_fdb_find_rcu (br, n->ha, vid);if (f) { +const struct net_bridge_port *dst =READ_ONCE (f->dst);bool replied = false;if ((p && (p->flags &BR_PROXYARP )) || - (f->dst && (f->dst->flags &BR_PROXYARP_WIFI )) || -br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled (f->dst, vid)) { + (dst && (dst->flags &BR_PROXYARP_WIFI )) || +br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled (dst, vid)) {if (!vid)br_arp_send (br, p, skb->dev, sip, tip, sha, n->ha, sha,0 ,0 );
@@ -463,9 +464,10 @@ void br_do_suppress_nd(struct sk_buff *s f =br_fdb_find_rcu (br, n->ha, vid);if (f) { +const struct net_bridge_port *dst =READ_ONCE (f->dst);bool replied = false; -if (br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled (f->dst, vid)) { +if (br_is_neigh_suppress_enabled (dst, vid)) {if (vid !=0 ) br_nd_send(br, p, skb, n, skb->vlan_proto,
net/bridge/br_fdb.c +18 -10
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct net_device *br_fdb_find_port(cons const unsigned char *addr, __u16 vid) { +const struct net_bridge_port *dst;struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *f;struct net_device *dev =NULL ;struct net_bridge *br;
@@ -255,8 +256,11 @@ struct net_device *br_fdb_find_port(cons br =netdev_priv (br_dev);rcu_read_lock (); f =br_fdb_find_rcu (br, addr, vid); -if (f && f->dst) - dev = f->dst->dev; +if (f) { + dst =READ_ONCE (f->dst); +if (dst) + dev = dst->dev; + }rcu_read_unlock ();return dev;
@@ -353,7 +357,7 @@ static void fdb_delete_local(struct net_ vg =nbp_vlan_group (op);if (op != p &ðer_addr_equal (op->dev->dev_addr, addr) && (!vid ||br_vlan_find (vg, vid))) { - f->dst = op; +WRITE_ONCE (f->dst, op);clear_bit (BR_FDB_ADDED_BY_USER , &f->flags);return ; }
@@ -364,7 +368,7 @@ static void fdb_delete_local(struct net_/* Maybe bridge device has same hw addr? */ if (p &ðer_addr_equal (br->dev->dev_addr, addr) && (!vid || (v &&br_vlan_should_use (v)))) { - f->dst =NULL ; +WRITE_ONCE (f->dst,NULL );clear_bit (BR_FDB_ADDED_BY_USER , &f->flags);return ; }
@@ -827,6 +831,7 @@ int br_fdb_test_addr(struct net_device *int br_fdb_fillbuf (struct net_bridge *br,void *buf,unsigned long maxnum,unsigned long skip) { +const struct net_bridge_port *dst;struct net_bridge_fdb_entry *f;struct __fdb_entry *fe = buf;unsigned long delta;
@@ -843,7 +848,8 @@ int br_fdb_fillbuf(struct net_bridge *brcontinue ;/* ignore pseudo entry for local MAC address */ -if (!f->dst) + dst =READ_ONCE (f->dst); +if (!dst)continue ;if (skip) {
@@ -855,8 +861,8 @@ int br_fdb_fillbuf(struct net_bridge *brmemcpy (fe->mac_addr, f->key.addr.addr,ETH_ALEN );/* due to ABI compat need to split into hi/lo */ - fe->port_no = f->dst->port_no; - fe->port_hi = f->dst->port_no >>8 ; + fe->port_no = dst->port_no; + fe->port_hi = dst->port_no >>8 ; fe->is_local =test_bit (BR_FDB_LOCAL , &f->flags);if (!test_bit (BR_FDB_STATIC , &f->flags)) {
@@ -981,9 +987,11 @@ int br_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,rcu_read_lock ();hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (f, &br->fdb_list, fdb_node) { +const struct net_bridge_port *dst =READ_ONCE (f->dst); +if (*idx < cb->args[2 ]) goto skip; -if (filter_dev && (!f->dst || f->dst->dev != filter_dev)) { +if (filter_dev && (!dst || dst->dev != filter_dev)) {if (filter_dev != dev) goto skip;/* !f->dst is a special case for bridge
@@ -991,10 +999,10 @@ int br_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,* Therefore need a little more filtering * we only want to dump the !f->dst case */ -if (f->dst) +if (dst) goto skip; } -if (!filter_dev && f->dst) +if (!filter_dev && dst) goto skip; err = fdb_fill_info(skb, br, f,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/215 net: mctp: fix dont require received header reserved bits to be zero
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuan Zhaoming <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a663bac71a2f0b3ac6c373168ca57b2a6e6381aa ]
Quoted 1 line
From the MCTP Base specification (DSP0236 v1.2.1), the first byte of
the MCTP header contains a 4 bit reserved field, and 4 bit version.
On our current receive path, we require those 4 reserved bits to be zero, but the 9500-8i card is non-conformant, and may set these reserved bits.
DSP0236 states that the reserved bits must be written as zero, and ignored when read. While the device might not conform to the former, we should accept these message to conform to the latter.
Relax our check on the MCTP version byte to allow non-zero bits in the reserved field.
--- include/net/mctp.h | 3 +++ net/mctp/route.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/mctp.h +3 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ struct mctp_hdr {#define MCTP_VER_MIN 1#define MCTP_VER_MAX 1 +/* Definitions for ver field */ +#define MCTP_HDR_VER_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) +/* Definitions for flags_seq_tag field */ #define MCTP_HDR_FLAG_SOM BIT(7)#define MCTP_HDR_FLAG_EOM BIT(6)
net/mctp/route.c +6 -2
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ static int mctp_route_input(struct mctp_unsigned long f;u8 tag, flags;int rc; +u8 ver; msk =NULL ; rc = -EINVAL ;
@@ -411,7 +412,8 @@ static int mctp_route_input(struct mctp_ netid =mctp_cb (skb)->net;skb_pull (skb,sizeof (struct mctp_hdr )); -if (mh->ver !=1 ) + ver = mh->ver &MCTP_HDR_VER_MASK ; +if (ver <MCTP_VER_MIN || ver >MCTP_VER_MAX ) goto out; flags = mh->flags_seq_tag & (MCTP_HDR_FLAG_SOM |MCTP_HDR_FLAG_EOM );
@@ -1197,6 +1199,7 @@ static int mctp_pkttype_receive(struct sstruct mctp_skb_cb *cb;struct mctp_route *rt;struct mctp_hdr *mh; +u8 ver;rcu_read_lock (); mdev =__mctp_dev_get (dev);
@@ -1214,7 +1217,8 @@ static int mctp_pkttype_receive(struct s/* We have enough for a header; decode and route */ mh =mctp_hdr (skb); -if (mh->ver <MCTP_VER_MIN || mh->ver >MCTP_VER_MAX ) + ver = mh->ver &MCTP_HDR_VER_MASK ; +if (ver <MCTP_VER_MIN || ver >MCTP_VER_MAX ) goto err_drop;/* source must be valid unicast or null; drop reserved ranges and
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/215 net: qrtr: ns: Limit the total number of nodes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 27d5e84e810b0849d08b9aec68e48570461ce313 ]
Currently, the nameserver doesn't limit the number of nodes it handles. This can be an attack vector if a malicious client starts registering random nodes, leading to memory exhaustion.
Hence, limit the maximum number of nodes to 64. Note that, limit of 64 is chosen based on the current platform requirements. If requirement changes in the future, this limit can be increased.
--- net/qrtr/ns.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
net/qrtr/ns.c +15 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ struct qrtr_node {*/ #define QRTR_NS_MAX_LOOKUPS 64 +/* Max nodes limit is chosen based on the current platform requirements. +* If the requirement changes in the future, this value can be increased. +*/ +#define QRTR_NS_MAX_NODES 64 + +static u8 node_count; +static struct qrtr_node *node_get (unsigned int node_id) {struct qrtr_node *node;
@@ -90,6 +97,11 @@ static struct qrtr_node *node_get(unsignif (node)return node; +if (node_count >=QRTR_NS_MAX_NODES ) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("QRTR clients exceed max node limit!\n" ); +return NULL ; + } +/* If node didn't exist, allocate and insert it to the tree */ node =kzalloc (sizeof (*node),GFP_KERNEL );if (!node)
@@ -103,6 +115,8 @@ static struct qrtr_node *node_get(unsignreturn NULL ; } + node_count++; +return node; }
@@ -409,6 +423,7 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_bye(struct sockaddr_ delete_node:xa_erase (&nodes, from->sq_node);kfree (node); + node_count--;return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/215 spi: fix resource leaks on device setup failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit db357034f7e0cf23f233f414a8508312dfe8fbbe ]
Make sure to call controller cleanup() if spi_setup() fails while registering a device to avoid leaking any resources allocated by setup().
--- drivers/spi/spi.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +37 -24
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL(spi_transfer_st#include "internals.h" +static int __spi_setup (struct spi_device *spi,bool initial_setup); +static DEFINE_IDR (spi_master_idr);static void spidev_release (struct device *dev)
@@ -735,7 +737,7 @@ static int __spi_add_device(struct spi_d* normally rely on the device being setup. Devices * using SPI_CS_HIGH can't coexist well otherwise... */ - status =spi_setup (spi); + status =__spi_setup (spi, true);if (status <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"can't setup %s, status %d\n" ,dev_name (&spi->dev), status);
@@ -3879,27 +3881,7 @@ static int spi_set_cs_timing(struct spi_return status; } -/** -* spi_setup - setup SPI mode and clock rate -* @spi: the device whose settings are being modified -* Context: can sleep, and no requests are queued to the device -* -* SPI protocol drivers may need to update the transfer mode if the -* device doesn't work with its default. They may likewise need -* to update clock rates or word sizes from initial values. This function -* changes those settings, and must be called from a context that can sleep. -* Except for SPI_CS_HIGH, which takes effect immediately, the changes take -* effect the next time the device is selected and data is transferred to -* or from it. When this function returns, the SPI device is deselected. -* -* Note that this call will fail if the protocol driver specifies an option -* that the underlying controller or its driver does not support. For -* example, not all hardware supports wire transfers using nine bit words, -* LSB-first wire encoding, or active-high chipselects. -* -* Return: zero on success, else a negative error code. -*/ -int spi_setup (struct spi_device *spi) +static int __spi_setup (struct spi_device *spi,bool initial_setup) {unsigned bad_bits, ugly_bits;int status;
@@ -3984,7 +3966,7 @@ int spi_setup(struct spi_device *spi) status =spi_set_cs_timing (spi);if (status) {mutex_unlock (&spi->controller->io_mutex); -return status; + goto err_cleanup; }if (spi->controller->auto_runtime_pm && spi->controller->set_cs) {
@@ -3993,7 +3975,7 @@ int spi_setup(struct spi_device *spi)mutex_unlock (&spi->controller->io_mutex);dev_err (&spi->controller->dev,"Failed to power device: %d\n" , status); -return status; + goto err_cleanup; }/*
@@ -4030,6 +4012,37 @@ int spi_setup(struct spi_device *spi) status);return status; + +err_cleanup: +if (initial_setup) +spi_cleanup (spi); + +return status; +} + +/** +* spi_setup - setup SPI mode and clock rate +* @spi: the device whose settings are being modified +* Context: can sleep, and no requests are queued to the device +* +* SPI protocol drivers may need to update the transfer mode if the +* device doesn't work with its default. They may likewise need +* to update clock rates or word sizes from initial values. This function +* changes those settings, and must be called from a context that can sleep. +* Except for SPI_CS_HIGH, which takes effect immediately, the changes take +* effect the next time the device is selected and data is transferred to +* or from it. When this function returns, the SPI device is deselected. +* +* Note that this call will fail if the protocol driver specifies an option +* that the underlying controller or its driver does not support. For +* example, not all hardware supports wire transfers using nine bit words, +* LSB-first wire encoding, or active-high chipselects. +* +* Return: zero on success, else a negative error code. +*/ +int spi_setup (struct spi_device *spi) +{ +return __spi_setup (spi, false); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (spi_setup);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/215 mm: prevent droppable mappings from being locked
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d239462787b072c78eb19fc1f155c3d411256282 ]
Droppable mappings must not be lockable. There is a check for VMAs with VM_DROPPABLE set in mlock_fixup() along with checks for other types of unlockable VMAs which ensures this when calling mlock()/mlock2().
For mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), the check for unlockable VMAs is different. In apply_mlockall_flags(), if the flags parameter has MCL_FUTURE set, the current task's mm's default VMA flag field mm->def_flags has VM_LOCKED applied to it. VM_LOCKONFAULT is also applied if MCL_ONFAULT is also set. When these flags are set as default in this manner they are cleared in __mmap_complete() for new mappings that do not support mlock. A check for VM_DROPPABLE in __mmap_complete() is missing resulting in droppable mappings created with VM_LOCKED set. To fix this and reduce that chance of similar bugs in the future, introduce and use vma_supports_mlock().
--- include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h | 4 ++-- mm/internal.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/mlock.c | 10 ++++++---- mm/mmap.c | 4 +--- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h +2 -2
@@ -6,14 +6,14 @@#include <linux/mm.h> -static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return !!(vma->vm_flags &VM_HUGETLB ); }#else -static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return false; }
mm/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -1015,6 +1015,16 @@ static inline struct file *maybe_unlock_ }return fpin; } + +static inline bool vma_supports_mlock (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_SPECIAL |VM_DROPPABLE )) +return false; +if (vma_is_dax (vma) ||is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma)) +return false; +return vma !=get_gate_vma (current->mm); +} +#else /* !CONFIG_MMU */ static inline void unmap_mapping_folio (struct folio *folio) { }static inline void mlock_new_folio (struct folio *folio) { }
mm/mlock.c +6 -4
@@ -472,10 +472,12 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vma_iteratint ret =0 ;vm_flags_t oldflags = vma->vm_flags; -if (newflags == oldflags || (oldflags &VM_SPECIAL ) || -is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma) || vma ==get_gate_vma (current->mm) || -vma_is_dax (vma) ||vma_is_secretmem (vma) || (oldflags &VM_DROPPABLE )) -/* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ +if (newflags == oldflags ||vma_is_secretmem (vma) || + !vma_supports_mlock (vma)) +/* +* Don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count. +* For secretmem, don't allow the memory to be unlocked. +*/ goto out; vma =vma_modify_flags (vmi, *prev, vma, start, end, newflags);
mm/mmap.c +1 -3
@@ -1547,9 +1547,7 @@ expanded:vm_stat_account (mm, vm_flags, pglen);if (vm_flags &VM_LOCKED ) { -if ((vm_flags &VM_SPECIAL ) ||vma_is_dax (vma) || -is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma) || - vma ==get_gate_vma (current->mm)) +if (!vma_supports_mlock (vma))vm_flags_clear (vma,VM_LOCKED_MASK );else mm->locked_vm += pglen;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/215 crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yucheng Lu <[email protected]>
commit 5db6ef9847717329f12c5ea8aba7e9f588a980c0 upstream.
authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least 4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data.
While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create() still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default authsize from that value.
As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access.
Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default authsize.
--- crypto/authencesn.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
crypto/authencesn.c +5 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ static int crypto_authenc_esn_create(str auth =crypto_spawn_ahash_alg (&ctx->auth); auth_base = &auth->base; +if (auth->digestsize >0 && auth->digestsize <4 ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err =crypto_grab_skcipher (&ctx->enc,aead_crypto_instance (inst),crypto_attr_alg_name (tb[2 ]),0 , mask);if (err)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/215 net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
commit 2884bf72fb8f03409e423397319205de48adca16 upstream.
bond_xmit_broadcast() reuses the original skb for the last slave (determined by bond_is_last_slave()) and clones it for others. Concurrent slave enslave/release can mutate the slave list during RCU-protected iteration, changing which slave is "last" mid-loop. This causes the original skb to be double-consumed (double-freed).
Replace the racy bond_is_last_slave() check with a simple index comparison (i + 1 == slaves_count) against the pre-snapshot slave count taken via READ_ONCE() before the loop. This preserves the zero-copy optimization for the last slave while making the "last" determination stable against concurrent list mutations.
The UAF can trigger the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_clone Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ef8d40 by task exploit/147 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 147 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597) skb_clone (include/linux/skbuff.h:1724 include/linux/skbuff.h:1792 include/linux/skbuff.h:3396 net/core/skbuff.c:2108) bond_xmit_broadcast (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5334) bond_start_xmit (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5567 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5593) dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5325 include/linux/netdevice.h:5334 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887) __dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:3601 net/core/dev.c:4838) ip6_finish_output2 (include/net/neighbour.h:540 include/net/neighbour.h:554 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136) ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:208 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:219) ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:250) ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1985) udp_v6_send_skb (net/ipv6/udp.c:1442) udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1733) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) </TASK> Allocated by task 147: Freed by task 147: The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100ef8c80 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of
freed 224-byte region [ffff888100ef8c80, ffff888100ef8d60)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100ef8c00: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888100ef8c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100ef8d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888100ef8d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100ef8e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +8 -4
@@ -5322,18 +5322,22 @@ static netdev_tx_t bond_xmit_broadcast(s struct net_device *bond_dev) {struct bonding *bond =netdev_priv (bond_dev); -struct slave *slave =NULL ; -struct list_head *iter; +struct bond_up_slave *slaves;bool xmit_suc = false;bool skb_used = false; +int slaves_count, i; -bond_for_each_slave_rcu (bond, slave, iter) { + slaves =rcu_dereference (bond->all_slaves); + + slaves_count = slaves ?READ_ONCE (slaves->count) :0 ; +for (i =0 ; i < slaves_count; i++) { +struct slave *slave = slaves->arr[i];struct sk_buff *skb2;if (!(bond_slave_is_up (slave) && slave->link ==BOND_LINK_UP ))continue ; -if (bond_is_last_slave (bond, slave)) { +if (i +1 == slaves_count) { skb2 = skb; skb_used = true; }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/215 driver core: Add kernel-doc for DEV_FLAG_COUNT enum value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
commit 5b484311507b5d403c1f7a45f6aa3778549e268b upstream.
Even though nobody should use this value (except when declaring the "flags" bitmap), kernel-doc still gets upset that it's not documented. It reports:
WARNING: ../include/linux/device.h:519 Enum value 'DEV_FLAG_COUNT' not described in enum 'struct_device_flags'
Add the description of DEV_FLAG_COUNT.
--- include/linux/device.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/device.h +1 -0
@@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ struct device_physical_location {* * @DEV_FLAG_READY_TO_PROBE: If set then device_add() has finished enough * initialization that probe could be called. +* @DEV_FLAG_COUNT: Number of defined struct_device_flags. */ enum struct_device_flags {DEV_FLAG_READY_TO_PROBE =0 ,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/215 ALSA: caiaq: Fix potentially leftover ep1_in_urb at error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 0a7b5221b5b51cc798fcfc3be00d02eade149d69 upstream.
The previous fix for handling the error from setup_card() missed that an internal URB cdev->ep1_in_urb might have been already submitted beforehand. In the normal case, this URB gets killed at the disconnection, but in the error path, we didn't do it, hence there can be a potential leak.
Fix it in the error path for setup_card(), too.
--- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +1 -1
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caia card->private_free = card_free; err =setup_card (cdev);if (err <0 ) -return err; + goto err_kill_urb;return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/215 ALSA: caiaq: Dont abort when no input device is available
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit b32ae47a2b0a1fb4bd4942242847966d9b178222 upstream.
The previous fix to handle the error from setup_card() caused a regression for the models that have no dedicated input device; snd_usb_caiaq_input_init() just returns -EINVAL, and we treat it as a fatal error although it should be ignored.
As a regression fix, change the error code to -ENODEV, and ignore this error in the callee, to continue probing.
--- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 2 +- sound/usb/caiaq/input.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +1 -1
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int setup_card(struct snd_usb_cai#ifdef CONFIG_SND_USB_CAIAQ_INPUT ret =snd_usb_caiaq_input_init (cdev); -if (ret <0 ) { +if (ret <0 && ret != -ENODEV ) {dev_err (dev,"Unable to set up input system (ret=%d)\n" , ret);return ret; }
sound/usb/caiaq/input.c +1 -1
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ int snd_usb_caiaq_input_init(struct snd_default :/* no input methods supported on this device */ - ret = -EINVAL ; + ret = -ENODEV ; goto exit_free_idev; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/215 rxrpc: Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 55b2984c96c37f909bbfe8851f13152693951382 upstream.
Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets and not ACK, ABORT, etc..
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
--- net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/call_event.c +2 -1
@@ -345,7 +345,8 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpcif (skb) {struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp =rxrpc_skb (skb); -if (sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 && +if (sp->hdr.type ==RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA && + sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 &&skb_cloned (skb)) {/* Unshare the packet so that it can be modified for * in-place decryption.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/215 ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 9e6bf146b55999a095bb14f73a843942456d1adc upstream.
ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() decompresses an RFC 6554 Source Routing Header, swaps the next segment into ipv6_hdr->daddr, recompresses, then pulls the old header and pushes the new one plus the IPv6 header back. The recompressed header can be larger than the received one when the swap reduces the common-prefix length the segments share with daddr (CmprI=0, CmprE>0, seg[0][0] != daddr[0] gives the maximum +8 bytes).
pskb_expand_head() was gated on segments_left == 0, so on earlier segments the push consumed unchecked headroom. Once skb_push() leaves fewer than skb->mac_len bytes in front of data, skb_mac_header_rebuild()'s call to:
skb_set_mac_header(skb, -skb->mac_len);
will store (data - head) - mac_len into the u16 mac_header field, which wraps to ~65530, and the following memmove() writes mac_len bytes ~64KiB past skb->head.
A single AF_INET6/SOCK_RAW/IPV6_HDRINCL packet over lo with a two segment type-3 SRH (CmprI=0, CmprE=15) reaches headroom 8 after one pass; KASAN reports a 14-byte OOB write in ipv6_rthdr_rcv.
Fix this by expanding the head whenever the remaining room is less than the push size plus mac_len, and request that much extra so the rebuilt MAC header fits afterwards.
--- net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c +6 -3
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ static int ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv(struct sk_bustruct net *net =dev_net (skb->dev);struct inet6_dev *idev;struct ipv6hdr *oldhdr; +unsigned int chdr_len;unsigned char *buf;int accept_rpl_seg;int i, err;
@@ -594,8 +595,10 @@ looped_back:skb_pull (skb, ((hdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ));skb_postpull_rcsum (skb, oldhdr,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) + ((hdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 )); -if (unlikely (!hdr->segments_left)) { -if (pskb_expand_head (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) + ((chdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ),0 , + chdr_len =sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ) + ((chdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ); +if (unlikely (!hdr->segments_left || +skb_headroom (skb) < chdr_len + skb->mac_len)) { +if (pskb_expand_head (skb, chdr_len + skb->mac_len,0 ,GFP_ATOMIC )) {__IP6_INC_STATS (net,ip6_dst_idev (skb_dst (skb)),IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS );kfree_skb (skb);
@@ -605,7 +608,7 @@ looped_back: oldhdr =ipv6_hdr (skb); } -skb_push (skb, ((chdr->hdrlen +1 ) <<3 ) +sizeof (struct ipv6hdr )); +skb_push (skb, chdr_len);skb_reset_network_header (skb);skb_mac_header_rebuild (skb);skb_set_transport_header (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/215 drm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
commit 095a8b0ad3c3b5cdc3850d961adb8a8f735220bb upstream.
RDNA4 (GFX 12) hardware removes the GDS, GWS, and OA on-chip memory resources. The gfx_v12_0 initialisation code correctly leaves adev->gds.gds_size, adev->gds.gws_size, and adev->gds.oa_size at zero to reflect this.
amdgpu_ttm_init() unconditionally calls amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() for each of these resources regardless of size. When the size is zero, amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() forwards the call to ttm_range_man_init(), which calls drm_mm_init(mm, 0, 0). drm_mm_init() immediately fires DRM_MM_BUG_ON(start + size <= start) -- trivially true when size is zero -- crashing the kernel during modprobe of amdgpu on an RX 9070 XT.
Guard against this by returning 0 early from amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() when size_in_page is zero. This skips TTM resource manager registration for hardware resources that are absent, without affecting any other GPU type.
DRM_MM_BUG_ON() only asserts if CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled in the kernel config. This is apparently rarely enabled as these chips have been in the market for over a year and this issue was only reported now.
Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/bugzilla.korg/221376/report.html
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c +3 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ static int amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip(struc unsigned int type, uint64_t size_in_page) { +if (!size_in_page) +return 0 ; +return ttm_range_man_init (&adev->mman.bdev, type, false, size_in_page); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/215 ALSA: caiaq: fix usb_dev refcount leak on probe failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
commit 7a5f1cd22d47f8ca4b760b6334378ae42c1bd24b upstream.
create_card() takes a reference on the USB device with usb_get_dev() and stores the matching usb_put_dev() in card_free(), which is installed as the snd_card's ->private_free destructor.
However, ->private_free is only assigned near the end of init_card(), after several failure points (usb_set_interface(), EP type checks, usb_submit_urb(), the EP1_CMD_GET_DEVICE_INFO exchange, and its timeout). When any of those fail, init_card() returns an error to snd_probe(), which calls snd_card_free(card). Because ->private_free is still NULL, card_free() never runs, the usb_get_dev() reference is not dropped, and the struct usb_device leaks along with its descriptor allocations and device_private.
syzbot reproduces this with a malformed UAC3 device whose only valid altsetting is 0; init_card()'s usb_set_interface(usb_dev, 0, 1) call fails with -EIO and triggers the leak.
Move the ->private_free assignment into create_card(), immediately after usb_get_dev(), so that every error path reaching snd_card_free() balances the reference. card_free()'s callees (snd_usb_caiaq_input_free, free_urbs, kfree) already tolerate the partially-initialized state because the chip private area is zero-initialized by snd_card_new().
--- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +1 -1
@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static int create_card(struct usb_device cdev =caiaqdev (card); cdev->chip.dev =usb_get_dev (usb_dev); + card->private_free = card_free; cdev->chip.card = card; cdev->chip.usb_id =USB_ID (le16_to_cpu (usb_dev->descriptor.idVendor),le16_to_cpu (usb_dev->descriptor.idProduct));
@@ -511,7 +512,6 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caiascnprintf (card->longname,sizeof (card->longname),"%s %s (%s)" , cdev->vendor_name, cdev->product_name, usbpath); - card->private_free = card_free; err =setup_card (cdev);if (err <0 ) goto err_kill_urb;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/215 net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
commit f9c52a6ba9780bd27e0bf4c044fd91c13c778b6e upstream.
seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking dst_hold() unconditionally.
On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop. Simplified race sequence:
ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X)
----------- --------------------------------
seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb)
dst_cache_get()
-> miss
ip6_route_input(skb)
-> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags)
[RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags]
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N route]
-> rt6_make_pcpu_route()
[creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1]
pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum=W]
-> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu,
NULL, pcpu_rt)
[slot was empty, store succeeds]
-> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst)
[dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1]
rt_genid_bump_ipv6()
-> bumps fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum from W to Z]
ip6_route_output()
-> ip6_pol_route()
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N]
-> rt6_get_pcpu_route()
pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum
[W <> Z, stale]
-> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL)
-> dst_release(prev)
[prev is pcpu_rt,
refcount 1->0, dead]
dst = skb_dst(skb)
[dst is the dead pcpu_rt]
dst_cache_set_ip6(dst)
-> dst_hold() on dead dst
-> WARN / use-after-freeFor the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu entry.
Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before caching.
The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a refcounted dst.
--- net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c | 9 +++++++++ net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c +9 -0
@@ -287,7 +287,16 @@ static int rpl_input(struct sk_buff *skbif (!dst) {ip6_route_input (skb); + +/* ip6_route_input() sets a NOREF dst; force a refcount on it +* before caching or further use. +*/ +skb_dst_force (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb); +if (unlikely (!dst)) { + err = -ENETUNREACH ; + goto drop; + }/* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ if (!dst->error && lwtst != dst->lwtstate) {
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +9 -0
@@ -500,7 +500,16 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *nif (!dst) {ip6_route_input (skb); + +/* ip6_route_input() sets a NOREF dst; force a refcount on it +* before caching or further use. +*/ +skb_dst_force (skb); dst =skb_dst (skb); +if (unlikely (!dst)) { + err = -ENETUNREACH ; + goto drop; + }/* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ if (!dst->error && lwtst != dst->lwtstate) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/215 netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kai Ma <[email protected]>
commit fe11e5c40817b84abaa5d83bfb6586d8412bfd07 upstream.
Reject zero shift operands for nft_bitwise left and right shift expressions during initialization.
The carry propagation logic computes the carry from the adjacent 32-bit word using BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) - shift. A zero shift operand turns this into a 32-bit shift, which is undefined behaviour.
Reject zero shift operands in the control plane, alongside the existing check for values greater than or equal to 32, so malformed rules never reach the packet path.
--- net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c +2 -1
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static int nft_bitwise_init_shift(structif (err <0 )return err; -if (priv->data.data[0 ] >=BITS_PER_TYPE (u32)) { +if (!priv->data.data[0 ] || + priv->data.data[0 ] >=BITS_PER_TYPE (u32)) {nft_data_release (&priv->data, desc.type);return -EINVAL ; }
# Librecast Test Results
020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.12.86-rc1-gfe600ffe8479 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon May 4 14:44:04 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Am 04.05.2026 um 15:50 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
Signature · 8 lines
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge, enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world, not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr. OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244 Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected] https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.86-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Francesco
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.86-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, 04 May 2026 15:50:19 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64, arm64 and riscv64; built-tested for loongarch64:
The Clippy pin-init-related warnings are gone, as expected.
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.86-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:52 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.86-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Tested on my Lenovo ThinkPad T14 Gen 1. Working well, no regressions observed.
Signature · 1 line
-Barry K. Nathan <[email protected]>
Hi Greg,
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.86 release. There are 215 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
No problems seen on x86_64 and aarch64 with our testing.
Thanks,
Harshit