nvme/tcp: handle rejected keys for secure concatenation
PATCH v2 1/1 nvme/tcp: handle rejected keys for secure concatenation
From: Wilfred Mallawa <[email protected]>
The NVMe-TCP specification [1] states that if the PSK retained or generated is not available on the subsystem, the TLS 1.3 handshake shall be aborted with an unknown_psk_identity alert and the connection be closed.
Currently, when an unknown_psk_identity alert is sent from an endpoint, tlshd returns EACCES as the TLS error. On subsequent reconnection attempts, we fail with the same error because we keep attempting to connect with a stale key. This may occur if the endpoint experienced a full reset and lost its PSK.
With support in tlshd to return -EKEYREJECTED when an unknown_psk_identity alert is received [2], the kernel can now detect this condition and revoke the current tls_key. This allows the subsequent reconnect to perform re-authentication via DHCHAP to generate a fresh PSK.
[1] https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-TCP-Transport-Specification-Revision-1.1-2024.08.05-Ratified.pdf
[2] https://github.com/oracle/ktls-utils/pull/149
---
V1 -> V2:
- Typo in commit message
- Re-worded the comment in code
- Added reference to ktls-utils PR (merged) for userspace changes
--- drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +11 -0
@@ -1767,6 +1767,17 @@ static int nvme_tcp_start_tls(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl,dev_err (nctrl->device,"queue %d: TLS handshake complete, error %d\n" , qid, queue->tls_err); + +/* +* If the key is stale, revoke it such that on a +* subsequent reconnect, we will generate a new PSK. +*/ +if (queue->tls_err ==EKEYREJECTED && qid ==0 && + nctrl->opts->concat && nctrl->opts->tls_key) { +nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key (nctrl); +dev_warn (nctrl->device, +"qid 0: revoking stale key\n" ); + } }else {dev_dbg (nctrl->device,"queue %d: TLS handshake complete\n" , qid);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 23 lines · Wilfred Mallawa
From: Wilfred Mallawa <[email protected]>
The NVMe-TCP specification [1] states that if the PSK retained or generated is not available on the subsystem, the TLS 1.3 handshake shall
be aborted with anunknown_psk_identityalert and the connection be closed.Currently, when an
unknown_psk_identityalert is sent from an endpoint,
tlshd returns EACCES as the TLS error. On subsequent reconnection attempts, we fail with the same error because we keep attempting to connect with a stale key. This may occur if the endpoint experienced a
full reset and lost its PSK.With support in tlshd to return
-EKEYREJECTEDwhen anunknown_psk_identity
alert is received [2], the kernel can now detect this condition and revoke
the currenttls_key. This allows the subsequent reconnect to perform re-authentication via DHCHAP to generate a fresh PSK.
Quoted 5 lines
[1]
https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-TCP-Transport-Specification-Revision-1.1-2024.08.05-Ratified.pdf
[2] https://github.com/oracle/ktls-utils/pull/149Signed-off-by Wilfred Mallawa <[email protected]>
Alistair
Quoted 40 lines
---
V1 -> V2:
- Typo in commit message
- Re-worded the comment in code
- Added reference to ktls-utils PR (merged) for userspace
changes
---
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 11 +++++++++++1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +3
-0@@ -1767,6 +1767,17 @@ static int nvme_tcp_start_tls(struct nvme_ctrl *nctrl, dev_err(nctrl->device, "queue %d: TLS handshake complete, error %d\n", qid, queue->tls_err); + +/* +* If the key is stale, revoke it such that on a
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +1
-0+* subsequent reconnect, we will generate a new PSK.
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +2
-0+*/ + if (queue->tls_err == EKEYREJECTED && qid ==0 &&
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +1
-0+ nctrl->opts->concat && nctrl->opts-Quoted 1 line
tls_key) {drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +3
-0+nvme_auth_revoke_tls_key (nctrl); + dev_warn(nctrl->device, + "qid 0: revoking stalekey\n");
drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c +1
-0+ }} else {
dev_dbg(nctrl->device, "queue %d: TLS handshake complete\n", qid);