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io_uring: propagate array_index_nospec opcode into req->opcode

PATCH Applied Michael Bommarito 3 participants 6 messages May 15 – May 16

Subsystems (2)

v1 of 2 Applied Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 io_uring: propagate array_index_nospec opcode into req->opcode

Commit 1e988c3fe126 ("io_uring: prevent opcode speculation") added array_index_nospec() to the local opcode in io_init_req(), but the sanitised value is not written back to req->opcode. The unconditional write at the top of io_init_req() stores the raw byte into the persistent field; the success path of the bounds check leaves it unchanged, and downstream consumers read the raw value.

In io_uring/io_uring.c those consumers are io_issue_sqe(), __io_issue_sqe(), io_wq_submit_work() and io_prep_async_work() (all indexing io_issue_defs[]); io_clean_op(), io_req_defer_failed() and io_req_sqe_copy() (io_cold_defs[]); io_check_restriction() via test_bit() on ctx->restrictions.sqe_op; and the audit hook at the io_issue_sqe entry. io_uring/bpf_filter.c added in v7.0 extends this set with io_uring_populate_bpf_ctx() and __io_uring_run_bpf_filters(), indexing a heap-resident per-filter pointer array sized at allocation to IORING_OP_LAST.

The kernel's spectre_v1 protection is per-site array_index_nospec() annotation, so a site missing the annotation is unprotected regardless of CPU vendor, microarchitecture, or microcode revision. A per-site array_index_nospec() was applied to the same class of gap in io_uring/fdinfo.c recently. Propagating the clamped opcode to req->opcode once, immediately after the existing array_index_nospec(), closes the remaining sites at the source without per-site clamps.

The compiled change is one instruction (a single mov of the clamped byte to req->opcode); the cmp/sbb/and clamp triplet is unchanged. No functional change: array_index_nospec() is a no-op for opcodes in [0, IORING_OP_LAST), and out-of-range opcodes are still rejected at the bounds check above this assignment. Boot-tested under UML (x86_64 defconfig) by building stock and patched kernels and running a 54-test subset of liburing's test suite against each; pass/fail identical on both.

Fixes 1e988c3fe126 ("io_uring: prevent opcode speculation")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -0
index 4ed998d60c09c..7b257a03ef84c 100644
@@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 		return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 	}
 	opcode = array_index_nospec(opcode, IORING_OP_LAST);
+	req->opcode = opcode;
 
 	def = &io_issue_defs[opcode];
 	if (def->is_128 && !(ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQE128)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Bommarito

The compiled change is one instruction (a single mov of the clamped byte to req->opcode); the cmp/sbb/and clamp triplet is unchanged. No functional change: array_index_nospec() is a no-op for opcodes in [0, IORING_OP_LAST), and out-of-range opcodes are still rejected at the bounds check above this assignment.

Since the bounds check above already catches an invalid opcode, why does it need to be re-initialized to the clamped value? Surely it's already the same value if we've taken this path, no?

maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Keith Busch
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Bommarito

The compiled change is one instruction (a single mov of the clamped byte to req->opcode); the cmp/sbb/and clamp triplet is unchanged. No functional change: array_index_nospec() is a no-op for opcodes in [0, IORING_OP_LAST), and out-of-range opcodes are still rejected at the bounds check above this assignment.

Since the bounds check above already catches an invalid opcode, why does it need to be re-initialized to the clamped value? Surely it's already the same value if we've taken this path, no?

It's to avoid speculation values being used. If the ->opcode store is the last one, then it doesn't exist.

It's pretty narrow and mostly theoretical, but does make sense.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Michael Bommarito

io_uring/io_uring.c static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req, · line 1745

Quoted 12 lines · Michael Bommarito
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -0
index 4ed998d60c09c..7b257a03ef84c 100644
@@ -1739,6 +1739,7 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
 		return io_init_fail_req(req, -EINVAL);
 	}
 	opcode = array_index_nospec(opcode, IORING_OP_LAST);
+	req->opcode = opcode;
 
 	def = &io_issue_defs[opcode];
 	if (def->is_128 && !(ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQE128)) {

We could just kill 'opcode' while at it, and just use req->opcode for this. I think that'd end up generating the same code, and avoid having two versions of opcode.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer Applied
#4 lore raw
In reply to Michael Bommarito
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Bommarito

Commit 1e988c3fe126 ("io_uring: prevent opcode speculation") added array_index_nospec() to the local opcode in io_init_req(), but the sanitised value is not written back to req->opcode. The unconditional write at the top of io_init_req() stores the raw byte into the persistent field; the success path of the bounds check leaves it unchanged, and downstream consumers read the raw value.

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: propagate array_index_nospec opcode into req->opcode
(no commit info)

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Jens Axboe
Quoted 7 lines · Michael Bommarito

Commit 1e988c3fe126 ("io_uring: prevent opcode speculation") added array_index_nospec() to the local opcode in io_init_req(), but the sanitised value is not written back to req->opcode. The unconditional write at the top of io_init_req() stores the raw byte into the persistent field; the success path of the bounds check leaves it unchanged, and downstream consumers read the raw value.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line

[...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] io_uring: propagate array_index_nospec opcode into req->opcode
(no commit info)

Oops, was just applied for review, nothing has been applied. Awaiting a v2 based on the feedback.

Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe