drm/vmwgfx: vmw_cmd_draw header.size lower-bound missing - guest-local OOB-read/write
Subsystems (4)
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Hi all,
Following the drm/qxl apply_reloc report from 14 May 2026
(prior thread: https://lore.kernel.org/virtualization/[email protected]/T/),
I audited the DRM cousin-drivers for the same bug-class. vmwgfx exposes a
stronger instance.
Primary site: vmw_cmd_draw in drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c:1558-1607. The verifier does
maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);
if (cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum) return -EINVAL;Commit 32b415a9dc2c ("drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE", Oct 2025) added the upper bound but not the lower bound. With header->size < sizeof(cmd->body) the size_t subtraction wraps, maxnum becomes ~SIZE_MAX, and the loop walks attacker-chosen numVertexDecls entries past the cmd-buffer. Each iteration is a 4-byte OOB-read via vmw_cmd_res_check; on a handle collision vmw_resource_relocation_add records the OOB address as rel->offset (29-bit), and vmw_resource_relocations_apply later does a 32-bit kernel write at cb + rel->offset within a 512 MiB window.
Exploitability split:
- OOB-read at first iteration is deterministic.
- OOB-write requires id_loc to resolve to a valid surface handle; surface-spray makes this practical but the write side is probabilistic.
Two cousin sites share the same root cause (details in BUG.md):
- vmw_cmd_dma (line 1495): pointer underflow -> 4-byte OOB-read of
`suffix->suffixSize`.
- vmw_cmd_shader_define (line 1898): size = header.size - sizeof(body) wraps and reaches vmw_compat_shader_add; ENOMEM-bounded DoS.
Reachability: DRM_VMW_EXECBUF, DRM_RENDER_ALLOW. Any /dev/dri/renderD128 user (default video group) on a VMware or KVM SVGA-II guest. No DRM_AUTH, no DRM_MASTER, no root.
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H -> 7.8 High (deterministic OOB-read, probabilistic 32-bit kernel write within 512 MiB; guest-local LPE, no host escape claimed).
Suggested fix: per-site lower-bound check on header->size before the subtraction, or the safe pattern using check_mul_overflow / check_add_overflow. A draft patch is sent as the follow-up RFC in this thread.
Attachments: BUG.md (full trace) and repro.c (KASAN-trigger PoC, no exploitation).
Happy to follow your standard timeline per Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst (typically <=7 days post-fix-merge).
Berkant Koc <[email protected]>
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Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Berkant Koc
Happy to follow your standard timeline per
Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst(typically <=7 days post-fix-merge).
You sent this to a public list, there is no "timeline" needed.
Just submit a fix for this now please.
thanks,
greg k-h
PATCH 1/1 drm/vmwgfx: validate execbuf header.size lower bound
Commit 32b415a9dc2c ("drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE") added an upper bound on the user-supplied SVGA3dCmdHeader.size field but no matching lower bound. When header->size is smaller than sizeof(cmd->body), the size_t subtraction in expressions like
maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);
underflows. The subsequent bound check
if (cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum) return -EINVAL;
is bypassed because maxnum is ~SIZE_MAX, and the loop walks attacker-chosen entries past the command buffer.
In vmw_cmd_draw this leads to a 4-byte OOB-read per iteration via vmw_cmd_res_check(&decl[i].array.surfaceId, ...); on a surface-handle collision, vmw_resource_relocation_add records the OOB address as rel->offset (29-bit bitfield), and vmw_resource_relocations_apply later performs a 32-bit kernel write at cb + rel->offset.
The same root cause is present in vmw_cmd_dma (suffix pointer-arith underflow leading to OOB-read of suffix->suffixSize) and vmw_cmd_shader_define (size_t wraparound passed to vmw_compat_shader_add).
Reachable via DRM_VMW_EXECBUF (DRM_RENDER_ALLOW). Reject undersized headers at all three sites before the subtraction.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +17 -0
@@ -1506,6 +1506,12 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dma(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,bool dirty; cmd =container_of (header,typeof (*cmd), header); + +if (unlikely (header->size <sizeof (cmd->body) +sizeof (*suffix))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("DMA cmd header.size too small.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + suffix = (SVGA3dCmdSurfaceDMASuffix *)((unsigned long ) &cmd->body + header->size -sizeof (*suffix));
@@ -1572,6 +1578,12 @@ static int vmw_cmd_draw(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,return ret; cmd =container_of (header,typeof (*cmd), header); + +if (unlikely (header->size <sizeof (cmd->body))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("Draw cmd header.size smaller than body.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + maxnum = (header->size -sizeof (cmd->body)) /sizeof (*decl);if (unlikely (cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum)) {
@@ -1915,6 +1927,11 @@ static int vmw_cmd_shader_define(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,if (unlikely (!dev_priv->has_mob))return 0 ; +if (unlikely (cmd->header.size <sizeof (cmd->body))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("Shader define cmd header.size smaller than body.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + size = cmd->header.size -sizeof (cmd->body); ret = vmw_compat_shader_add(dev_priv, vmw_context_res_man(ctx), cmd->body.shid, cmd + 1, cmd->body.type,
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Zack Rusin
maintainerRe: [PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: validate execbuf header.size lower bound
Quoted 80 lines · Berkant Koc
Commit
32b415a9dc2c("drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size againstSVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE") added an upper bound on the user-supplied SVGA3dCmdHeader.size field but no matching lower bound. Whenheader->sizeis smaller thansizeof(cmd->body), thesize_tsubtraction in expressions likemaxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);underflows. The subsequent bound check
if (cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum) return -EINVAL;is bypassed because maxnum is ~SIZE_MAX, and the loop walks attacker-chosen entries past the command buffer.
In
vmw_cmd_drawthis leads to a 4-byte OOB-read per iteration viavmw_cmd_res_check(&decl[i].array.surfaceId, ...); on a surface-handle collision,vmw_resource_relocation_addrecords the OOB address asrel->offset(29-bit bitfield), andvmw_resource_relocations_applylater performs a 32-bit kernel write at cb +rel->offset.The same root cause is present in
vmw_cmd_dma(suffix pointer-arith underflow leading to OOB-read ofsuffix->suffixSize) andvmw_cmd_shader_define(size_twraparound passed tovmw_compat_shader_add).Reachable via
DRM_VMW_EXECBUF(DRM_RENDER_ALLOW). Reject undersized headers at all three sites before the subtraction.Cc [email protected] # v6.18+Fixes 32b415a9dc2c ("drm/vmwgfx: Validate command header size against SVGA_CMD_MAX_DATASIZE")Signed-off-by Berkant Koc <[email protected]>--- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +17
-1@@ -1506,6 +1506,12 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dma(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,bool dirty; cmd =container_of (header,typeof (*cmd), header); + +if (unlikely (header->size <sizeof (cmd->body) +sizeof (*suffix))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("DMA cmd header.size too small.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + suffix = (SVGA3dCmdSurfaceDMASuffix *)((unsigned long ) &cmd->body + header->size -sizeof (*suffix));@@ -1572,6 +1578,12 @@ static int vmw_cmd_draw(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,return ret; cmd =container_of (header,typeof (*cmd), header); + +if (unlikely (header->size <sizeof (cmd->body))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("Draw cmd header.size smaller than body.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + maxnum = (header->size -sizeof (cmd->body)) /sizeof (*decl);if (unlikely (cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum)) {@@ -1915,6 +1927,11 @@ static int vmw_cmd_shader_define(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,if (unlikely (!dev_priv->has_mob))return 0 ; +if (unlikely (cmd->header.size <sizeof (cmd->body))) { +VMW_DEBUG_USER ("Shader define cmd header.size smaller than body.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + size = cmd->header.size -sizeof (cmd->body); ret = vmw_compat_shader_add(dev_priv, vmw_context_res_man(ctx), cmd->body.shid, cmd + 1, cmd->body.type, --
Quoted 2 lines
2.47.3
I think you might have forgotten to disclose the tool/llm you've used for this. Using Claude Opus 4.7 I've found the same issues and the series fixing those bugs is available on dri-devel at
https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/166024/ . If you've used a different llm I'd love to know which one. And if you have a completely different tool for detecting those issues that'd be great to know as well.
z
Re: [PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: validate execbuf header.size lower bound
Thanks for the catch, you're right, I should have flagged the tooling in the patch body. And cross-pollination with your own series on patchwork is a good outcome.
Tooling: berkoc-pipeline, a custom RAG framework on Claude Opus 4.7 (Anthropic CVP cohort, May 2026). Full agentic stack: multi-tool execution (filesystem, web fetch, code execution), parallel subagent orchestration with adaptive task decomposition, extended-thinking integration, retrieval-augmented context over a file-based semantic knowledge base, MCP-style integration patterns. 7-step pre-disclosure validation gate, manual verification on every finding before submit.
v2 of this patch will include the formal trailer:
Happy to send v2 with the trailer formalised, or keep the methodology disclosure to follow-up comments if you prefer.
Berkant