openssh: patch CVE-2026-35385
PATCH 1/3 openssh: patch CVE-2026-35385
From: "Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric)" <[email protected]>
Backport patch from [1] matching CVE description in [2] and change described in release note [3].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/487e8ac146f7d6616f65c125d5edb210519b833a
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35385
[3] https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html#10.3p1
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35385.patch | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35385.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35385.patch new file +47 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 9df287221ad61f6b05b3e80bc57bdaacfa5ab243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 07:42:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when downloading files as root in legacy (-O) mode + and + +without the -p (preserve modes) flag set, clear setuid/setgid bits from +downloaded files as one might expect. + +AFAIK this bug dates back to the original Berkeley rcp program. + +Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and Spearbit. + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49e902fca8dd933a92a9b547ab31f63e86729fa1 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35385 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/487e8ac146f7d6616f65c125d5edb210519b833a] +Signed-off-by: Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric) <[email protected]> +--- + scp.c | 6 ++++-- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 492dace12..2c21fa19a 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.260 2023/10/11 05:42:08 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.273 2026/04/02 07:42:16 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which + * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). +@@ -1682,8 +1682,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) + + setimes = targisdir = 0; + mask = umask(0); +- if (!pflag) ++ if (!pflag) { ++ mask |= 07000; + (void) umask(mask); ++ } + if (argc != 1) { + run_err("ambiguous target"); + exit(1); +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2025-32728.patch \ file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \ file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-35385.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 2/3 openssh: patch CVE-2026-35387
From: "Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric)" <[email protected]>
Backport patch from [1] matching CVE description in [2] and change described in release note [3].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35387
[3] https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html#10.3p1
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35387.patch | 205 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 206 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35387.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35387.patch new file +205 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +From faaf123656513f16994853379c388ad8cc850f8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 07:48:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: correctly match ECDSA signature algorithms against + +algorithm allowlists: HostKeyAlgorithms, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and +HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms. + +Previously, if any ECDSA type (say "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521") was +present in one of these lists, then all ECDSA algorithms would +be permitted. + +Reported by Christos Papakonstantinou of Cantina and Spearbit. + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c790e2687c35989ae34a00e709be935c55b16a86 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35387 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/fd1c7e131f331942d20f42f31e79912d570081fa] +Signed-off-by: Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric) <[email protected]> +--- + auth2-hostbased.c | 9 +++++---- + auth2-pubkey.c | 9 +++++---- + auth2-pubkeyfile.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- + sshconnect2.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- + 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c +index 06bb464ff..02eeed3f0 100644 +--- a/auth2-hostbased.c ++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.52 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.57 2026/04/02 07:48:13 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * +@@ -95,9 +95,10 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) + error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); + goto done; + } +- if (key->type != pktype) { +- error_f("type mismatch for decoded key " +- "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); ++ if (key->type != pktype || (sshkey_type_plain(pktype) == KEY_ECDSA && ++ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(pkalg) != key->ecdsa_nid)) { ++ error_f("key type mismatch for decoded key " ++ "(received %s, expected %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(key), pkalg); + goto done; + } + if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) { +diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c +index 3f49e1df3..1e07ff74e 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkey.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.119 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.126 2026/04/02 07:48:13 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -148,9 +148,10 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) + error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); + goto done; + } +- if (key->type != pktype) { +- error_f("type mismatch for decoded key " +- "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); ++ if (key->type != pktype || (sshkey_type_plain(pktype) == KEY_ECDSA && ++ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(pkalg) != key->ecdsa_nid)) { ++ error_f("key type mismatch for decoded key " ++ "(received %s, expected %s)", sshkey_ssh_name(key), pkalg); + goto done; + } + if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { +diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c +index 31e7481fb..869c8e055 100644 +--- a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c ++++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.4 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.8 2026/04/02 07:48:13 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ + #include "authfile.h" + #include "match.h" + #include "ssherr.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" + + int + auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts, +@@ -146,20 +147,23 @@ auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts, + static int + match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) + { +- char *result; ++ char *list, *olist, *entry; + u_int i; + +- /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ +- +- for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { +- if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], +- principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { +- debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", +- result); +- free(result); +- return 1; ++ olist = list = xstrdup(principal_list); ++ for (;;) { ++ if ((entry = strsep(&list, ",")) == NULL || *entry == '\0') ++ break; ++ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { ++ if (strcmp(entry, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { ++ debug3("matched principal from key i" ++ "options \"%.100s\"", entry); ++ free(olist); ++ return 1; ++ } + } + } ++ free(olist); + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index a5f92f04c..a296c9b8c 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.371 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.385 2026/04/02 07:48:13 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ extern Options options; + static char *xxx_host; + static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; + static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info; ++static int key_type_allowed(struct sshkey *, const char *); + + static int + verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +@@ -100,6 +101,10 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey, + options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key"); ++ if (!key_type_allowed(hostkey, options.hostkeyalgorithms)) { ++ fatal("Server host key %s not in HostKeyAlgorithms", ++ sshkey_ssh_name(hostkey)); ++ } + if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey, + xxx_conn_info) != 0) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); +@@ -1608,34 +1613,37 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id) + } + + static int +-key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) ++key_type_allowed(struct sshkey *key, const char *allowlist) + { +- if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), +- options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) ++ if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), allowlist, 0) == 1) + return 1; + + /* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */ + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: +- if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", +- options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) ++ if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", allowlist, 0) == 1) + return 1; +- if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", +- options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) ++ if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", allowlist, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (match_pattern_list("[email protected]", +- options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) ++ allowlist, 0) == 1) + return 1; + if (match_pattern_list("[email protected]", +- options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1) ++ allowlist, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + } + return 0; + } + ++static int ++key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) ++{ ++ return key_type_allowed(key, options.pubkey_accepted_algos); ++} ++ + /* obtain a list of keys from the agent */ + static int + get_agent_identities(struct ssh *ssh, int *agent_fdp, +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2025-61985.patch \ file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35385.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-35387.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 3/3 openssh: patch CVE-2026-35388
In reply to [email protected]From: "Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric)" <[email protected]>
Backport patch from [1] matching CVE description in [2] and change described in release note [3].
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c805b97b67c774e0bf922ffb29dfbcda9d7b5add
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35388
[3] https://www.openssh.org/releasenotes.html#10.3p1
--- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35388.patch | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35388.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-35388.patch new file +47 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From be42fe5ce64f2798048161a891083ef12780ca2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 07:39:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: add missing askpass check when using + +ControlMaster=ask/autoask and "ssh -O proxy ..."; reported by Michalis +Vasileiadis + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd7b9b96534e9a8726916b96d36bed466d3836a + +CVE: CVE-2026-35388 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/c805b97b67c774e0bf922ffb29dfbcda9d7b5add] +Signed-off-by: Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric) <[email protected]> +--- + mux.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c +index d598a17e2..c841feb79 100644 +--- a/mux.c ++++ b/mux.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.101 2023/11/23 03:37:05 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.113 2026/04/02 07:39:57 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <[email protected]> + * +@@ -1137,6 +1137,16 @@ mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + + debug_f("channel %d: proxy request", c->self); + ++ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || ++ options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { ++ if (!ask_permission("Allow multiplex proxy connection?")) { ++ debug2_f("proxy refused by user"); ++ reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, ++ "Permission denied"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ + c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2025-61984.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35385.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35387.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-35388.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "910211c07255a8c5ad654391b40ee59800710dd8119dd5362de09385aa7a777c"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0