xfs: remove file privileges after XFS_IOC_SWAPEXT
PATCH 1/1 xfs: remove file privileges after XFS_IOC_SWAPEXT
XFS_IOC_SWAPEXT exchanges the data forks of two regular files. This changes file contents and therefore needs the same privilege stripping that ordinary write paths apply.
The legacy ioctl currently completes the exchange without removing SUID/SGID bits or file capabilities. As a result, a privileged inode can retain those attributes after its data fork has been replaced.
Pass the file objects into xfs_swap_extents() and call file_remove_privs() for both files after the exchange commits, before dropping the outer inode and mapping locks. This matches the XFS_IOC_EXCHANGE_RANGE finish path.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.h | 3 ++- fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c +16 -2
@@ -1505,10 +1505,12 @@ xfs_swap_change_owner(int xfs_swap_extents ( -struct xfs_inode *ip,/* target inode */ -struct xfs_inode *tip,/* tmp inode */ +struct file *file, +struct file *tmp_file,struct xfs_swapext *sxp) { +struct xfs_inode *ip =XFS_I (file_inode (file)); +struct xfs_inode *tip =XFS_I (file_inode (tmp_file));struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;struct xfs_trans *tp;struct xfs_bstat *sbp = &sxp->sx_stat;
@@ -1727,10 +1729,22 @@ xfs_swap_extents(xfs_trans_set_sync (tp); error =xfs_trans_commit (tp); +if (error) + goto out_unlock_ilock;trace_xfs_swap_extent_after (ip,0 );trace_xfs_swap_extent_after (tip,1 ); +xfs_iunlock (ip,XFS_ILOCK_EXCL ); +xfs_iunlock (tip,XFS_ILOCK_EXCL ); + + error =file_remove_privs (file); +if (error) + goto out_unlock; +if (file_inode (file) !=file_inode (tmp_file)) + error =file_remove_privs (tmp_file); + goto out_unlock; + out_unlock_ilock:xfs_iunlock (ip,XFS_ILOCK_EXCL );xfs_iunlock (tip,XFS_ILOCK_EXCL );
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.h +2 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@/* Kernel only BMAP related definitions and functions */ +struct file ;struct xfs_bmbt_irec ;struct xfs_extent_free_item ;struct xfs_ifork ;
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ int xfs_insert_file_space(struct xfs_inode *, xfs_off_t offset,bool xfs_can_free_eofblocks (struct xfs_inode *ip);int xfs_free_eofblocks (struct xfs_inode *ip); -int xfs_swap_extents (struct xfs_inode *ip,struct xfs_inode *tip, +int xfs_swap_extents (struct file *file,struct file *tmp_file,struct xfs_swapext *sx);xfs_daddr_t xfs_fsb_to_db (struct xfs_inode *ip,xfs_fsblock_t fsb);
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ xfs_ioc_swapext(if (xfs_is_shutdown (ip->i_mount))return -EIO ; -return xfs_swap_extents (ip, tip, sxp); +return xfs_swap_extents (fd_file (f),fd_file (tmp), sxp); } static int
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 4 lines · Qing Ming
XFS_IOC_SWAPEXTexchanges the data forks of two regular files. This changes file contents and therefore needs the same privilege stripping that ordinary write paths apply.
Quoted 8 lines
The legacy ioctl currently completes the exchange without removing SUID/SGID bits or file capabilities. As a result, a privileged inode can retain those attributes after its data fork has been replaced.
Pass the file objects into
xfs_swap_extents()and callfile_remove_privs()for both files after the exchange commits, before dropping the outer inode and mapping locks. This matches theXFS_IOC_EXCHANGE_RANGEfinish path.
Not sure this makes much sense, as xfs_swap_extents is used for defragmentation, including system-wide one, and this would drop the suid bit from existing suid bit files and break the system.
I don't think there is a security issue as the target file needs to be writable to the user performing the operation, and the owning uid/gid has to match as well.
I think the issue is more that XFS_IOC_COMMIT_RANGE drops the suid and could thus cause problems when used by fsr.