f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
PATCH 1/1 f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()
f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.
Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing -EINVAL path without reading past the copied xattr value.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
--- fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +5 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { -if ((char *)entry > end) +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry_short ) > end) goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_tag =le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag);
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)break ;case ACL_USER : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));break ;case ACL_GROUP : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end) + goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
Signature · 8 lines
2.43.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
Quoted 54 lines · Zhang Cen
f2fs_acl_count()only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still placeACL_USERorACL_GROUPin a slot that only contains structf2fs_acl_entry_shortbytes, andf2fs_acl_from_disk()then readsentry->e_idbefore verifying that a full entry fits.Require a short entry before reading
e_tagande_perm, and require a full entry before readinge_idforACL_USERandACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing-EINVALpath without reading past the copied xattr value.Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>--- fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/f2fs/acl.c +0
-0
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 73
Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { -if ((char *)entry > end) +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry_short ) > end)
unlikely()?
Should return -EFSCORRUPTED instead of -EINVAL?
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 89
Quoted 8 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-0goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_tag =le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag);@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)break ;case ACL_USER : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)
Ditto,
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 98
Quoted 9 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +2
-0+ goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));break ;case ACL_GROUP : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)
Ditto,
Thanks,
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 102
Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-0+ goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
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Hi Chao,
Thanks for the review.
I agree with both points. I sent a v2 which wraps the new ACL entry-size checks in unlikely() and returns -EFSCORRUPTED for malformed on-disk ACL blobs in f2fs_acl_from_disk().
Thanks,
Zhang Cen
Quoted 89 lines · Chao Yu <[email protected]> 于2026年6月11日周四 09:59写道:
Quoted 54 lines · Zhang Cen
f2fs_acl_count()only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still placeACL_USERorACL_GROUPin a slot that only contains structf2fs_acl_entry_shortbytes, andf2fs_acl_from_disk()then readsentry->e_idbefore verifying that a full entry fits.Require a short entry before reading
e_tagande_perm, and require a full entry before readinge_idforACL_USERandACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing-EINVALpath without reading past the copied xattr value.Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5Signed-off-by Zhang Cen <[email protected]>--- fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/f2fs/acl.c +0
-0fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 73
Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-1@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { -if ((char *)entry > end) +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry_short ) > end)
unlikely()?Should return
-EFSCORRUPTEDinstead of-EINVAL?fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 89
Quoted 8 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-0goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_tag =le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag);@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)break ;case ACL_USER : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)Ditto,
fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 98
Quoted 9 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +2
-0+ goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));break ;case ACL_GROUP : +if ((char *)entry +sizeof (struct f2fs_acl_entry ) > end)Ditto,
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks,
Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1
-0+ goto fail; acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id));
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