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f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

PATCH Superseded Zhang Cen 2 participants 3 messages May 24 – Jun 13 F2FS file system

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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Zhang Cen

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing -EINVAL path without reading past the copied xattr value.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0

RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
---
 fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +5 -1
index fa8d81a30fb9..290fee451637 100644
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 
-		if ((char *)entry > end)
+		if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)
 			goto fail;
 
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 			break;
 
 		case ACL_USER:
+			if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)
+				goto fail;
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
 				make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
 			break;
 		case ACL_GROUP:
+			if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)
+				goto fail;
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
 				make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
Signature · 8 lines
2.43.0



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#1 lore raw
Quoted 54 lines · Zhang Cen

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing -EINVAL path without reading past the copied xattr value.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0

RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
---
 fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +0 -0
index fa8d81a30fb9..290fee451637 100644

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 73

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 
-		if ((char *)entry > end)
+		if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)

unlikely()?

Should return -EFSCORRUPTED instead of -EINVAL?

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 89

Quoted 8 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -0
 			goto fail;
 
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 			break;
 
 		case ACL_USER:
+			if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)

Ditto,

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 98

Quoted 9 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +2 -0
+				goto fail;
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
 				make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
 			break;
 		case ACL_GROUP:
+			if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)

Ditto,

Thanks,

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 102

Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -0
+				goto fail;
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
 				make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));

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author
#2 lore raw

Hi Chao,

Thanks for the review.

I agree with both points. I sent a v2 which wraps the new ACL entry-size checks in unlikely() and returns -EFSCORRUPTED for malformed on-disk ACL blobs in f2fs_acl_from_disk().

Thanks,
Zhang Cen

Quoted 89 lines · Chao Yu <[email protected]> 于2026年6月11日周四 09:59写道:
Quoted 54 lines · Zhang Cen

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. This keeps corrupted ACL xattrs on the existing -EINVAL path without reading past the copied xattr value.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0

RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
---
 fs/f2fs/acl.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +0 -0
index fa8d81a30fb9..290fee451637 100644

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 73

Quoted 5 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -1
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 
      for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 
-             if ((char *)entry > end)
+             if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)

unlikely()?

Should return -EFSCORRUPTED instead of -EINVAL?

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 89

Quoted 8 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -0
                      goto fail;
 
              acl->a_entries[i].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
                      break;
 
              case ACL_USER:
+                     if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)

Ditto,

fs/f2fs/acl.c static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) · line 98

Quoted 9 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +2 -0
+                             goto fail;
                      acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
                              make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
                                              le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
                                      sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
                      break;
              case ACL_GROUP:
+                     if ((char *)entry + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)

Ditto,

Quoted 7 lines

Thanks,

Quoted 4 lines
fs/f2fs/acl.c +1 -0
+                             goto fail;
                      acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
                              make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
                                              le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));

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Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel