Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v3 1/1 Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the parser looks at data[i + 1].
---
v3:
- Move the KASAN excerpt earlier in the commit message.
- Add Reviewed-by from Paul Menzel.
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +6 -6
@@ -8638,6 +8638,12 @@ static bool tlv_data_is_valid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u32 adv_flags, u8 *data,if (!cur_len)continue ; +/* If the current field length would exceed the total data +* length, then it's invalid. +*/ +if (i + cur_len >= len) +return false; +if (data[i +1 ] ==EIR_FLAGS && (!is_adv_data ||flags_managed (adv_flags)))return false;
@@ -8654,12 +8660,6 @@ static bool tlv_data_is_valid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u32 adv_flags, u8 *data,if (data[i +1 ] ==EIR_APPEARANCE &&appearance_managed (adv_flags))return false; - -/* If the current field length would exceed the total data -* length, then it's invalid. -*/ -if (i + cur_len >= len) -return false; }return true;
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2.43.0
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Dear submitter,
Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list. This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/bluetooth/list/?series=1102158
---Test result---
Test Summary:
CheckPatch PASS 0.56 seconds VerifyFixes PASS 0.08 seconds VerifySignedoff PASS 0.07 seconds GitLint PASS 0.21 seconds SubjectPrefix PASS 0.07 seconds BuildKernel PASS 27.49 seconds CheckAllWarning PASS 30.32 seconds CheckSparse PASS 28.51 seconds BuildKernel32 PASS 26.71 seconds TestRunnerSetup PASS 596.18 seconds TestRunner_mgmt-tester FAIL 227.64 seconds TestRunner_mesh-tester FAIL 25.88 seconds IncrementalBuild PASS 26.28 seconds
Details
##############################
Test: TestRunner_mgmt-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run mgmt-tester with test-runner Output:
Total: 494, Passed: 489 (99.0%), Failed: 1, Not Run: 4
Failed Test Cases
Read Exp Feature - Success Failed 0.265 seconds
##############################
Test: TestRunner_mesh-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run mesh-tester with test-runner Output:
Total: 10, Passed: 8 (80.0%), Failed: 2, Not Run: 0
Failed Test Cases
Mesh - Send cancel - 1 Timed out 1.836 seconds Mesh - Send cancel - 2 Timed out 1.994 seconds
https://github.com/bluez/bluetooth-next/pull/252
---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth
This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:
Quoted 8 lines · On Thu, 28 May 2026 17:45:06 +0800 you wrote:
tlv_data_is_valid()reads each advertising data field length from data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [v3] Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/899a200a7648
You are awesome, thank you!
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