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libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

PATCH In review Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) 4 participants 7 messages Jun 1 – Jul 20

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch
meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch new file +162 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..827e41b8a0
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+From 286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 07:38:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Address a potential TOCTOU race condition in cap_set_file().
+
+This issue was researched and reported by Ali Raza (@locus-x64). It
+has been assigned CVE-2026-4878.
+
+The finding is that while cap_set_file() checks if a file is a regular
+file before applying or removing a capability attribute, a small
+window existed after that check when the filepath could be overwritten
+either with new content or a symlink to some other file. To do this
+would imply that the caller of cap_set_file() was directing it to a
+directory over which a local attacker has write access, and performed
+the operation frequently enough that an attacker had a non-negligible
+chance of exploiting the race condition. The code now locks onto the
+intended file, eliminating the race condition.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-4878
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596]
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
+(cherry picked from commit 286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596)
+Signed-off-by: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
+---
+ libcap/cap_file.c  | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ progs/quicktest.sh | 14 +++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcap/cap_file.c b/libcap/cap_file.c
+index 0bc07f7..f02bf9f 100644
+--- a/libcap/cap_file.c
++++ b/libcap/cap_file.c
+@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#endif
++
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <byteswap.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -322,26 +327,70 @@ int cap_set_file(const char *filename, cap_t cap_d)
+     struct vfs_ns_cap_data rawvfscap;
+     int sizeofcaps;
+     struct stat buf;
++    char fdpath[64];
++    int fd, ret;
++
++    _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
++    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd >= 0) {
++	ret = cap_set_fd(fd, cap_d);
++	close(fd);
++	return ret;
++    }
+ 
+-    if (lstat(filename, &buf) != 0) {
+-	_cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s]", filename);
++    /*
++     * Attempting to set a file capability on a file the process can't
++     * read the content of. This is considered a non-standard use case
++     * and the following (slower) code is complicated because it is
++     * trying to avoid a TOCTOU race condition.
++     */
++
++    fd = open(filename, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++	_cap_debug("cannot find file at path [%s]", filename);
++	return -1;
++    }
++    if (fstat(fd, &buf) != 0) {
++	_cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s] descriptor %d",
++		   filename, fd);
++	close(fd);
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+     if (S_ISLNK(buf.st_mode) || !S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+-	_cap_debug("file [%s] is not a regular file", filename);
++	_cap_debug("file [%s] descriptor %d for non-regular file",
++		   filename, fd);
++	close(fd);
+ 	errno = EINVAL;
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (cap_d == NULL) {
+-	_cap_debug("removing filename capabilities");
+-	return removexattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
++    /*
++     * While the fd remains open, this named file is locked to the
++     * origin regular file. The size of the fdpath variable is
++     * sufficient to support a 160+ bit number.
++     */
++    if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd)
++	>= sizeof(fdpath)) {
++	_cap_debug("file descriptor too large %d", fd);
++	errno = EINVAL;
++	ret = -1;
++
++    } else if (cap_d == NULL) {
++	_cap_debug("dropping file caps on [%s] via [%s]",
++		   filename, fdpath);
++	ret = removexattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
++
+     } else if (_fcaps_save(&rawvfscap, cap_d, &sizeofcaps) != 0) {
+-	return -1;
+-    }
++	_cap_debug("problem converting cap_d to vfscap format");
++	ret = -1;
+ 
+-    _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
+-    return setxattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap, sizeofcaps, 0);
++    } else {
++	_cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
++	ret = setxattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap,
++		       sizeofcaps, 0);
++    }
++    close(fd);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/progs/quicktest.sh b/progs/quicktest.sh
+index e6c48e6..5dc72f9 100755
+--- a/progs/quicktest.sh
++++ b/progs/quicktest.sh
+@@ -148,7 +148,19 @@ pass_capsh --caps="cap_setpcap=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
+ pass_capsh --strict --caps="cap_chown=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
+ 
+ # change the way the capability is obtained (make it inheritable)
++chmod 0000 ./privileged
+ ./setcap cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ei ./privileged
++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++    echo "FAILED to set file capability"
++    exit 1
++fi
++chmod 0755 ./privileged
++ln -s privileged unprivileged
++./setcap -r ./unprivileged
++if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
++    echo "FAILED by removing a capability from a symlinked file"
++    exit 1
++fi
+ 
+ # Note, the bounding set (edited with --drop) only limits p
+ # capabilities, not i's.
+@@ -246,7 +258,7 @@ EOF
+     pass_capsh --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setpcap,cap_setuid'
+     fail_capsh --mode=PURE1E --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setuid'
+ fi
+-/bin/rm -f ./privileged
++/bin/rm -f ./privileged ./unprivileged
+ 
+ echo "testing namespaced file caps"
+ 
+-- 
meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb +1 -0
index 03975b44a0..43185f027e 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/${BPN}2/${BPN}-${
            file://0001-ensure-the-XATTR_NAME_CAPS-is-defined-when-it-is-use.patch \
            file://0002-tests-do-not-run-target-executables.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-1390.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-4878.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://0001-nativesdk-libcap-Raise-the-size-of-arrays-containing.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
#1 lore raw

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 194 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch
meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch new file +162 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..827e41b8a0
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+From 286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 07:38:05 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Address a potential TOCTOU race condition in cap_set_file().
+
+This issue was researched and reported by Ali Raza (@locus-x64). It
+has been assigned CVE-2026-4878.
+
+The finding is that while cap_set_file() checks if a file is a regular
+file before applying or removing a capability attribute, a small
+window existed after that check when the filepath could be overwritten
+either with new content or a symlink to some other file. To do this
+would imply that the caller of cap_set_file() was directing it to a
+directory over which a local attacker has write access, and performed
+the operation frequently enough that an attacker had a non-negligible
+chance of exploiting the race condition. The code now locks onto the
+intended file, eliminating the race condition.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-4878
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/commit/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596]
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
+(cherry picked from commit 286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596)
+Signed-off-by: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
+---
+ libcap/cap_file.c  | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ progs/quicktest.sh | 14 +++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcap/cap_file.c b/libcap/cap_file.c
+index 0bc07f7..f02bf9f 100644
+--- a/libcap/cap_file.c
++++ b/libcap/cap_file.c
+@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#endif
++
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <byteswap.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+@@ -322,26 +327,70 @@ int cap_set_file(const char *filename, cap_t cap_d)
+     struct vfs_ns_cap_data rawvfscap;
+     int sizeofcaps;
+     struct stat buf;
++    char fdpath[64];
++    int fd, ret;
++
++    _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
++    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd >= 0) {
++	ret = cap_set_fd(fd, cap_d);
++	close(fd);
++	return ret;
++    }
+ 
+-    if (lstat(filename, &buf) != 0) {
+-	_cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s]", filename);
++    /*
++     * Attempting to set a file capability on a file the process can't
++     * read the content of. This is considered a non-standard use case
++     * and the following (slower) code is complicated because it is
++     * trying to avoid a TOCTOU race condition.
++     */
++
++    fd = open(filename, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW);
++    if (fd < 0) {
++	_cap_debug("cannot find file at path [%s]", filename);
++	return -1;
++    }
++    if (fstat(fd, &buf) != 0) {
++	_cap_debug("unable to stat file [%s] descriptor %d",
++		   filename, fd);
++	close(fd);
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+     if (S_ISLNK(buf.st_mode) || !S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+-	_cap_debug("file [%s] is not a regular file", filename);
++	_cap_debug("file [%s] descriptor %d for non-regular file",
++		   filename, fd);
++	close(fd);
+ 	errno = EINVAL;
+ 	return -1;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (cap_d == NULL) {
+-	_cap_debug("removing filename capabilities");
+-	return removexattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
++    /*
++     * While the fd remains open, this named file is locked to the
++     * origin regular file. The size of the fdpath variable is
++     * sufficient to support a 160+ bit number.
++     */
++    if (snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd)
++	>= sizeof(fdpath)) {
++	_cap_debug("file descriptor too large %d", fd);
++	errno = EINVAL;
++	ret = -1;
++
++    } else if (cap_d == NULL) {
++	_cap_debug("dropping file caps on [%s] via [%s]",
++		   filename, fdpath);
++	ret = removexattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
++
+     } else if (_fcaps_save(&rawvfscap, cap_d, &sizeofcaps) != 0) {
+-	return -1;
+-    }
++	_cap_debug("problem converting cap_d to vfscap format");
++	ret = -1;
+ 
+-    _cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
+-    return setxattr(filename, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap, sizeofcaps, 0);
++    } else {
++	_cap_debug("setting filename capabilities");
++	ret = setxattr(fdpath, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &rawvfscap,
++		       sizeofcaps, 0);
++    }
++    close(fd);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --git a/progs/quicktest.sh b/progs/quicktest.sh
+index e6c48e6..5dc72f9 100755
+--- a/progs/quicktest.sh
++++ b/progs/quicktest.sh
+@@ -148,7 +148,19 @@ pass_capsh --caps="cap_setpcap=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
+ pass_capsh --strict --caps="cap_chown=p" --inh=cap_chown --current
+ 
+ # change the way the capability is obtained (make it inheritable)
++chmod 0000 ./privileged
+ ./setcap cap_setuid,cap_setgid=ei ./privileged
++if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
++    echo "FAILED to set file capability"
++    exit 1
++fi
++chmod 0755 ./privileged
++ln -s privileged unprivileged
++./setcap -r ./unprivileged
++if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
++    echo "FAILED by removing a capability from a symlinked file"
++    exit 1
++fi
+ 
+ # Note, the bounding set (edited with --drop) only limits p
+ # capabilities, not i's.
+@@ -246,7 +258,7 @@ EOF
+     pass_capsh --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setpcap,cap_setuid'
+     fail_capsh --mode=PURE1E --iab='!%cap_chown,^cap_setuid'
+ fi
+-/bin/rm -f ./privileged
++/bin/rm -f ./privileged ./unprivileged
+ 
+ echo "testing namespaced file caps"
+ 
+-- 
meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb +1 -0
index 03975b44a0..43185f027e 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/${BPN}2/${BPN}-${
            file://0001-ensure-the-XATTR_NAME_CAPS-is-defined-when-it-is-use.patch \
            file://0002-tests-do-not-run-target-executables.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-1390.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-4878.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://0001-nativesdk-libcap-Raise-the-size-of-arrays-containing.patch \
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · J?r?my Rosen via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

Hello Anil,

Gentle ping for this patch, do you plan to send the needed patch for wrynose?

Thanks!

Quoted 20 lines

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 13 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch
Signature · 1 line
Yoann Congal
#3 lore raw

Hi Yoann,

Anil is on medical leave. I am working on this and will submit the patch for wrynose by tomorrow 9th July.

Thanks & Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2026 10:14 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Quoted 5 lines · J?r?my Rosen via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

Hello Anil,

Gentle ping for this patch, do you plan to send the needed patch for wrynose?

Thanks!

Quoted 20 lines

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 13 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch

--
Yoann Congal

#4 lore raw

Hi Yoann,

I have sent the wrynose patch for this CVE: [email protected] | [wrynose][PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878<https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/topic/120185745>

Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2026 11:50 PM
To: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Hi Yoann,

Anil is on medical leave. I am working on this and will submit the patch for wrynose by tomorrow 9th July.

Thanks & Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2026 10:14 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Quoted 5 lines · J?r?my Rosen via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

Hello Anil,

Gentle ping for this patch, do you plan to send the needed patch for wrynose?

Thanks!

Quoted 20 lines

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 13 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch

--
Yoann Congal

#5 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · On Thu Jul 9, 2026 at 7:10 AM CEST, Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS…

Hi Yoann,

I have sent the wrynose patch for this CVE: [email protected] | [wrynose][PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878<https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/topic/120185745>

Thanks for the wrynose pathc. Now that I can look at CVE-2026-4878 for scarthgap, I noticed that we received an earlier fix here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
The patches are identical, I'll use Hugo's since it came first.

Thanks!

Quoted 59 lines

Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2026 11:50 PM
To: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Hi Yoann,

Anil is on medical leave. I am working on this and will submit the patch for wrynose by tomorrow 9th July.

Thanks & Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2026 10:14 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Quoted 5 lines · J?r?my Rosen via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

Hello Anil,

Gentle ping for this patch, do you plan to send the needed patch for wrynose?

Thanks!

Quoted 20 lines

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 13 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

---
 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch

--
Yoann Congal

Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
#6 lore raw

Thanks, Yoann, for the update.

Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, July 19, 2026 7:37 PM
To: Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Quoted 3 lines · On Thu Jul 9, 2026 at 7:10 AM CEST, Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS…

Hi Yoann,

I have sent the wrynose patch for this CVE: [email protected] | [wrynose][PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878<https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/topic/120185745>

Thanks for the wrynose pathc. Now that I can look at CVE-2026-4878 for scarthgap, I noticed that we received an earlier fix here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
The patches are identical, I'll use Hugo's since it came first.

Thanks!

Quoted 57 lines

Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Deepak Rathore -X (deeratho - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, July 8, 2026 11:50 PM
To: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Hi Yoann,

Anil is on medical leave. I am working on this and will submit the patch for wrynose by tomorrow 9th July.

Thanks & Regards,
Deepak
________________________________
From: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2026 10:14 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: xe-linux-external (Internal Group) <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH] libcap: Fix CVE-2026-4878

Quoted 5 lines · J?r?my Rosen via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Anil

from what I can tell, this CVE was fixed in master but not in wrynose please submit a patch for wrynose then ping this thread so we can apply to scarthgap

Hello Anil,

Gentle ping for this patch, do you plan to send the needed patch for wrynose?

Thanks!

Quoted 20 lines

thanks a lot
Jeremy

Quoted 13 lines · On Mon Jun 1, 2026 at 3:42 PM CEST, Anil Dongare -X (adongare - E INFOCHIPS…

From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>

Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/patch/?id=286ace1259992bd0c5d9016715833f2e148ac596
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4878

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 .../libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch          | 162 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.69.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libcap/files/CVE-2026-4878.patch
Quoted 2 lines

--
Yoann Congal

--
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS