scsi: target: fix CHAP_N handling
Subsystems (2)
cover scsi: target: fix CHAP_N handling
The sashiko bot pointed out issues with CHAP_N handling recently, when reviewing a patch for a separate issue:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru%40gmail.com
Since extract_param() unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'?
I believe this behaviour is contrary to the iSCSI spec. I added some simple libiscsi tests to cover prefix stripping:
https://github.com/sahlberg/libiscsi/pull/472
These patches attempt to fix CHAP_N handling.
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Disseldorp (2):
scsi: target: add extract_param_str() helper
scsi: target: fix auth when CHAP_N carries a hex/b64 prefix
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 8 ++--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
PATCH 1/2 scsi: target: add extract_param_str() helper
The existing extract_param() helper, detects and strips any hex (0x/0X) or base64 (0b/0B). This makes sense for some parameters, but not strings such as CHAP_N.
--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c +37 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,43 @@ int extract_param(return 0 ; } +/* same as extract_param() above, but don't interpret any type-prefix */ +int extract_param_str ( +const char *in_buf, +const char *pattern, +unsigned int max_length, +char *out_buf) +{ +char *ptr; +int len; + +if (!in_buf || !pattern || !out_buf) +return -EINVAL ; + + ptr =strstr (in_buf, pattern); +if (!ptr) +return -ENOENT ; + + ptr =strstr (ptr,"=" ); +if (!ptr) +return -EINVAL ; + + ptr +=1 ; + len =strlen_semi (ptr); +if (len <0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (len >= max_length) { +pr_err ("Length of input: %d exceeds max_length:" +" %d\n" , len, max_length); +return -EINVAL ; + } +memcpy (out_buf, ptr, len); + out_buf[len] ='\0' ; + +return 0 ; +} +static struct iscsi_node_auth *iscsi_get_node_auth (struct iscsit_conn *conn) {struct iscsi_portal_group *tpg;
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct iscsi_np;extern void convert_null_to_semi (char *,int );extern int extract_param (const char *,const char *,unsigned int ,char *,unsigned char *); +extern int extract_param_str (const char *,const char *,unsigned int ,char *);extern int iscsi_target_check_login_request (struct iscsit_conn *,struct iscsi_login *); extern int iscsi_target_locate_portal(struct iscsi_np *, struct iscsit_conn *,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH 1/2] scsi: target: add extract_param_str() helper
Quoted 72 lines · David Disseldorp
The existing
extract_param()helper, detects and strips any hex (0x/0X) or base64 (0b/0B). This makes sense for some parameters, but not strings such asCHAP_N.Signed-off-by David Disseldorp <[email protected]>--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c +37
-0@@ -98,6 +98,43 @@ int extract_param(return 0 ; } +/* same as extract_param() above, but don't interpret any type-prefix */ +int extract_param_str ( +const char *in_buf, +const char *pattern, +unsigned int max_length, +char *out_buf) +{ +char *ptr; +int len; + +if (!in_buf || !pattern || !out_buf) +return -EINVAL ; + + ptr =strstr (in_buf, pattern); +if (!ptr) +return -ENOENT ; + + ptr =strstr (ptr,"=" ); +if (!ptr) +return -EINVAL ; + + ptr +=1 ; + len =strlen_semi (ptr); +if (len <0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (len >= max_length) { +pr_err ("Length of input: %d exceeds max_length:" +" %d\n" , len, max_length); +return -EINVAL ; + } +memcpy (out_buf, ptr, len); + out_buf[len] ='\0' ; + +return 0 ; +} +static struct iscsi_node_auth *iscsi_get_node_auth (struct iscsit_conn *conn) {struct iscsi_portal_group *tpg;drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h +1
-1@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct iscsi_np;extern void convert_null_to_semi (char *,int );extern int extract_param (const char *,const char *,unsigned int ,char *,unsigned char *); +extern int extract_param_str (const char *,const char *,unsigned int ,char *);extern int iscsi_target_check_login_request (struct iscsit_conn *,struct iscsi_login *); extern int iscsi_target_locate_portal(struct iscsi_np *, struct iscsit_conn *, --
Quoted 3 lines
2.51.0
PATCH 2/2 scsi: target: fix auth when CHAP_N carries a hex/b64 prefix
In reply to David DisseldorpAttempting to authenticate using a CHAP username with a '0x' or '0b' prefix currently fails. This is due to extract_param()'s behaviour of stripping these prefixes, and the subsequent (type == HEX) error-path. I believe this behaviour is contrary to the RFC 3720 specification, which states:
5.1. Text Format
...
text-value: A string of zero or more characters that consist of letters, digits, dot, minus, plus, commercial at, underscore, slash, left bracket, right bracket, or colon.
11.1.4. Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
...
CHAP_A=<A> CHAP_I=<I> CHAP_C=<C>
Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator.
In the third step, the initiator MUST continue with:
CHAP_N=<N> CHAP_R=<R>
...
Where N, (A,A1,A2), I, C, and R are (correspondingly) the Name, Algorithm, Identifier, Challenge, and Response as defined in [RFC1994], N is a text string, A,A1,A2, and I are numbers, and C and R are large-binary-values ...
"N is a text string" implies that any hex or base64 encoding prefix should not be interpreted or stripped. Fix this by using the new extract_param_str() helper function to obtain the CHAP_N value as-is.
--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +2 -6
@@ -303,12 +303,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(/* * Extract CHAP_N. */ -if (extract_param (nr_in_ptr,"CHAP_N" ,MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE , chap_n, - &type) <0 ) { -pr_err ("Could not find CHAP_N.\n" ); - goto out; - } -if (type ==HEX ) { + ret =extract_param_str (nr_in_ptr,"CHAP_N" ,MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE , chap_n); +if (ret <0 ) {pr_err ("Could not find CHAP_N.\n" ); goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH 2/2] scsi: target: fix auth when CHAP_N carries a hex/b64 prefix
Quoted 59 lines · David Disseldorp
Attempting to authenticate using a CHAP username with a '0x' or '0b' prefix currently fails. This is due to extract_param()'s behaviour of stripping these prefixes, and the subsequent (type == HEX) error-path. I believe this behaviour is contrary to the RFC 3720 specification, which states:
5.1. Text Format
...
text-value: A string of zero or more characters that consist of letters, digits, dot, minus, plus, commercial at, underscore, slash, left bracket, right bracket, or colon.11.1.4. Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
...CHAP_A=<A> CHAP_I=<I> CHAP_C=<C>Where A is one of A1,A2... that were proposed by the initiator.
In the third step, the initiator MUST continue with:
CHAP_N=<N> CHAP_R=<R>...
Where N, (A,A1,A2), I, C, and R are (correspondingly) the Name, Algorithm, Identifier, Challenge, and Response as defined in [RFC1994], N is a text string, A,A1,A2, and I are numbers, and C and R are large-binary-values ..."N is a text string" implies that any hex or base64 encoding prefix should not be interpreted or stripped. Fix this by using the new
extract_param_str()helper function to obtain theCHAP_Nvalue as-is.Reported-by Sashiko (gemini/gemini-3.1-pro-preview)Signed-off-by David Disseldorp <[email protected]>--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +2
-7@@ -303,12 +303,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(/* * Extract CHAP_N. */ -if (extract_param (nr_in_ptr,"CHAP_N" ,MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE , chap_n, - &type) <0 ) { -pr_err ("Could not find CHAP_N.\n" ); - goto out; - } -if (type ==HEX ) { + ret =extract_param_str (nr_in_ptr,"CHAP_N" ,MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE , chap_n); +if (ret <0 ) {pr_err ("Could not find CHAP_N.\n" ); goto out; } --
Quoted 3 lines
2.51.0
Quoted 6 lines · David Disseldorp
The sashiko bot pointed out issues with
CHAP_Nhandling recently, when reviewing a patch for a separate issue:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://sashiko.dev/*/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru*40gmail.com__;IyU!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGhtTvfTX$
Sinceextract_param()unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'?
is there a real world case or vulnerability being fixed here?
Quoted 18 lines
I believe this behaviour is contrary to the iSCSI spec. I added some simple libiscsi tests to cover prefix stripping:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/sahlberg/libiscsi/pull/472__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGh1A_gMb$These patches attempt to fix
CHAP_Nhandling.----------------------------------------------------------------
David Disseldorp (2):
scsi: target: addextract_param_str()helper
scsi: target: fix auth whenCHAP_Ncarries a hex/b64 prefixdrivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 8 ++--- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Quoted 9 lines · John Garry
Quoted 6 lines · David Disseldorp
The sashiko bot pointed out issues with
CHAP_Nhandling recently, when reviewing a patch for a separate issue:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://sashiko.dev/*/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru*40gmail.com__;IyU!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGhtTvfTX$
Sinceextract_param()unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'?is there a real world case or vulnerability being fixed here?
No vulnerability - the "real world case" is as above: CHAP authentication currently fails if the CHAP username begins with 0x, 0b or the upper case variants. The bug is trivial to reproduce.
Thanks, David
John Garry
Reviewed-byQuoted 10 lines · David Disseldorp
Quoted 8 lines · John Garry
Quoted 6 lines · David Disseldorp
The sashiko bot pointed out issues with
CHAP_Nhandling recently, when reviewing a patch for a separate issue:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://sashiko.dev/*/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru*40gmail.com__;IyU!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGhtTvfTX$Since extract_param() unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
is there a real world case or vulnerability being fixed here?
No vulnerability - the "real world case" is as above: CHAP authentication currently fails if the CHAP username begins with 0x, 0b or the upper case variants. The bug is trivial to reproduce.
Understood.
To me, this is a fix for a problem which does not exist. And even if the spec says it's possible, it does not mean that we need to support it. If 0x prefix is part of the username, I think that problems should be expected.
Anyway, the code itself looks ok, so:
But the maintainer can make the judgement to take this obviously.
Bumping this, as I still think it's worth addressing...
Quoted 17 lines · John Garry
Quoted 10 lines · David Disseldorp
Quoted 8 lines · John Garry
Quoted 6 lines · David Disseldorp
The sashiko bot pointed out issues with
CHAP_Nhandling recently, when reviewing a patch for a separate issue:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://sashiko.dev/*/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru*40gmail.com__;IyU!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGhtTvfTX$Since extract_param() unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
is there a real world case or vulnerability being fixed here?
No vulnerability - the "real world case" is as above: CHAP authentication currently fails if the CHAP username begins with 0x, 0b or the upper case variants. The bug is trivial to reproduce.
Quoted 5 lines
Understood.
To me, this is a fix for a problem which does not exist. And even if the spec says it's possible, it does not mean that we need to support it. If 0x prefix is part of the username, I think that problems should be expected.
IMO it's a real problem, e.g.: 'I changed my username from "bob" to "0bob" and now I can't access my data.'
Quoted 5 lines
Anyway, the code itself looks ok, so:
Reviewed-by John Garry <[email protected]>But the maintainer can make the judgement to take this obviously.
Thanks for the review.