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KVM: arm64: FEAT_{S1POE,ATS1A} support fixes

PATCH In review Marc Zyngier 4 participants 7 messages Jun 2 – Jun 3

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Marc Zyngier

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover KVM: arm64: FEAT_{S1POE,ATS1A} support fixes

Whilst working on a slightly unrelated feature (FEAT_NV3), I found out that an L2 guest wouldn't boot if the host was exposed to FEAT_S1POE.

Upon investigation (and hours wasted in a SW model), it became apparent that while the AT S1E1A code was ready for action, it had never been fully plugged in (blame the usual suspect...).

This resulted in an extremely odd failure mode, with an L2 being unable to make forward progress, but KVM at L1 not taking the hint that something was really wrong. Additionally, an embarrassing typo was spotted in the CPTR_EL2 handling.

With this in, FEAT_S1POE no longer breaks our NV guests.

Marc Zyngier (3):
KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE
KVM: arm64: Wire AT S1E1A in the system instruction handling table
arm64: cpufeature: Expose ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.ATS1A to KVM

 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c          | 1 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c               | 1 +
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE

We propagate CPTR_EL2.E0POE from a L1 into the L0 configuration, but we key this on the L1 guest supporting FEAT_S2POE. This is obviously wrong, as this bit is solely concerned with Stage-1 translation.

Fix this by making the update depend on FEAT_S1POE.

Fixes cd931bd6093cb ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add additional trap setup for CPTR_EL2")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +1 -1
index bf0eb5e434274..161bb2a3e1d90 100644
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static inline void __activate_cptr_traps_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!(SYS_FIELD_GET(CPACR_EL1, ZEN, cptr) & BIT(0)))
 		val &= ~CPACR_EL1_ZEN;
 
-	if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S2POE, IMP))
+	if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1POE, IMP))
 		val |= cptr & CPACR_EL1_E0POE;
 
 	val |= cptr & CPTR_EL2_TCPAC;
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 KVM: arm64: Wire AT S1E1A in the system instruction handling table

In reply to Marc Zyngier

Despite having handling code for AT S1E1A, the instruction was never plugged into the system instruction table, leading to an exception being injected in the guest.

If the guest is Linux and using the __kvm_at() helper, the exception is actually handled in the helper, and KVM continues more or less silently by reentering the guest. Not exactly what you'd expect.

Fix this by plugging the emulation code where required.

Fixes ff987ffc0c18c ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add support for FEAT_ATS1A")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1 -0
index 148fc3400ea81..753fe30d322c3 100644
@@ -4217,6 +4217,7 @@ static struct sys_reg_desc sys_insn_descs[] = {
 	SYS_INSN(AT_S1E0W, handle_at_s1e01),
 	SYS_INSN(AT_S1E1RP, handle_at_s1e01),
 	SYS_INSN(AT_S1E1WP, handle_at_s1e01),
+	SYS_INSN(AT_S1E1A, handle_at_s1e01),
 
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_DC_CSW), access_dcsw },
 	{ SYS_DESC(SYS_DC_CGSW), access_dcgsw },
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 arm64: cpufeature: Expose ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.ATS1A to KVM

In reply to Marc Zyngier

KVM needs to know if the HW implements FEAT_ATS1A in order to correctly sanitise HFGITR_EL2.ATS1E1A, which otherwise defaults to RES0 and AT S1E1A traps are handled as UNDEF.

Solves this by exposing ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.ATS1A to the rest of the kernel.

Fixes ff987ffc0c18c ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add support for FEAT_ATS1A")
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -0
index 6d53bb15cf7bb..62b0d77217eeb 100644
@@ -266,6 +266,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_ATS1A_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_LUT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_CSSC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_RPRFM_SHIFT, 4, 0),
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE

In reply to Marc Zyngier
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] KVM fails to set CPACR_EL1_E0POE in hardware CPTR_EL2 for normal (non-nested) guests, causing all guest EL0 accesses to POR_EL0 to unexpectedly trap to KVM and result in injected UNDEF exceptions.
- [High] KVM breaks host Permission Overlay Extension (POE) usage upon returning from a VHE guest because __deactivate_cptr_traps_vhe() strips CPACR_EL1_E0POE.
--

commit d1828ccf84b404181eed585a3aaf208b36c6b88e
Author: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE

We propagate CPTR_EL2.E0POE from a L1 into the L0 configuration, but we key this on the L1 guest supporting FEAT_S2POE. This is obviously wrong, as this bit is solely concerned with Stage-1 translation.

Fix this by making the update depend on FEAT_S1POE.

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h static inline void __activate_cptr_traps_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 145

Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +1 -1
index 98b2976837b11..4d814ae90613d 100644
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static inline void __activate_cptr_traps_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!(SYS_FIELD_GET(CPACR_EL1, ZEN, cptr) & BIT(0)))
 		val &= ~CPACR_EL1_ZEN;
 
-	if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S2POE, IMP))
+	if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S1POE, IMP))
 		val |= cptr & CPACR_EL1_E0POE;

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this logic apply to normal guests?

Looking at __activate_cptr_traps_vhe(), normal (non-nested) guests bypass this nested trap propagation via:

	if (!vcpu_has_nv(vcpu))
		goto write;

As a result, CPACR_EL1_E0POE is never added to the val written to cpacr_el1, so CPTR_EL2.E0POE is 0. Any guest EL0 access to POR_EL0 will then trap to EL2.

Because SYS_POR_EL0 lacks an access callback in sys_reg_descs[] in arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c, kvm_handle_sys_reg() injects an undefined instruction exception into the guest, crashing guest applications that rely on POE.

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does host POE remain active after running a VHE guest?

Looking at __deactivate_cptr_traps_vhe() in the same file, the host's cpacr_el1 is restored with a hardcoded bitmask (FPEN, ZEN, SMEN), and CPACR_EL1_E0POE is unconditionally stripped:

	u64 val = CPACR_EL1_FPEN;
	
	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE))
		val |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN;
	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
		val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN;
	
	write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);

Since the E0POE bit enabled by the host kernel is overwritten, when the host returns to userspace, EL0 tasks executing POE instructions will trap to EL2.

Because the host kernel has no hook for POR_EL0 in sys64_hooks, do_el0_sys() falls back to do_el0_undef(), sending SIGILL and crashing the userspace task.

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +0 -0
 	val |= cptr & CPTR_EL2_TCPAC;
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
maintainer Reviewed-by on the v1 series
#5 lore raw
In reply to Marc Zyngier
Quoted 12 lines · Marc Zyngier

Whilst working on a slightly unrelated feature (FEAT_NV3), I found out that an L2 guest wouldn't boot if the host was exposed to FEAT_S1POE.

Upon investigation (and hours wasted in a SW model), it became apparent that while the AT S1E1A code was ready for action, it had never been fully plugged in (blame the usual suspect...).

This resulted in an extremely odd failure mode, with an L2 being unable to make forward progress, but KVM at L1 not taking the hint that something was really wrong. Additionally, an embarrassing typo was spotted in the CPTR_EL2 handling.

Quoted 6 lines

With this in, FEAT_S1POE no longer breaks our NV guests.

Marc Zyngier (3):
KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE
KVM: arm64: Wire AT S1E1A in the system instruction handling table
arm64: cpufeature: Expose ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.ATS1A to KVM

Thanks,
Oliver

Quoted 8 lines
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c          | 1 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c               | 1 +
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
reviewer Reviewed-by on the v1 series
#6 lore raw
In reply to Marc Zyngier
Quoted 19 lines · Marc Zyngier

Whilst working on a slightly unrelated feature (FEAT_NV3), I found out that an L2 guest wouldn't boot if the host was exposed to FEAT_S1POE.

Upon investigation (and hours wasted in a SW model), it became apparent that while the AT S1E1A code was ready for action, it had never been fully plugged in (blame the usual suspect...).

This resulted in an extremely odd failure mode, with an L2 being unable to make forward progress, but KVM at L1 not taking the hint that something was really wrong. Additionally, an embarrassing typo was spotted in the CPTR_EL2 handling.

With this in, FEAT_S1POE no longer breaks our NV guests.

Marc Zyngier (3):
KVM: arm64: Key CPTR_EL2.E0POE propagation on FEAT_S1POE
KVM: arm64: Wire AT S1E1A in the system instruction handling table
arm64: cpufeature: Expose ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1.ATS1A to KVM

Quoted 4 lines
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c          | 1 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c               | 1 +
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Thanks,
Joey