ntfs: validate $FILE_NAME length before converting the name
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 ntfs: validate $FILE_NAME length before converting the name
ntfs_is_extended_system_file() walks a base inode's $FILE_NAME attributes and, for a name whose parent is $Extend, converts the on-disk name to the local charset via ntfs_attr_name_get() -> ntfs_ucstonls(). It checks that the resident value [file_name_attr, +value_length) lies within the attribute, but never checks that file_name_length (an on-disk u8) fits inside that value.
ntfs_ucstonls() then reads file_name_length __le16 characters starting at file_name_attr->file_name (offset 66 in the __packed struct), so a crafted $FILE_NAME whose value_length covers just the fixed header but whose file_name_length is 255 drives an out-of-bounds read of up to ~508 bytes past the resident value -- and, when the MFT record buffer is a tight kmalloc (mft_record_size equal to a power-of-two slab bucket), past the allocation itself.
Reject the attribute when file_name_length does not fit within value_length before the name is read.
---
Reproducer omitted on the public list -- available to the maintainers on request. This is a crafted-image filesystem bug; posting publicly per the [email protected] guidance on the sibling fs/ntfs attribute-list fixes that such bugs fall outside the kernel security process's threat model.
The over-read was observed under KASAN by mounting a crafted NTFS image (fs/ntfs built as a module against v7.1-rc5): a $FILE_NAME on a system file in $Extend with value_length 68 and file_name_length 255 trips, during inode read, a slab-out-of-bounds read of size 2 in utf16s_to_utf8s() along the chain
ntfs_ucstonls <- ntfs_attr_name_get <- ntfs_is_extended_system_file <- ntfs_read_locked_inode <- ntfs_iget <- ntfs_fill_super
off the kmalloc-1k MFT record buffer (mft_record_size 1024, allocated by map_mft_record_folio). A benign mkntfs image is clean on the same kernel
(control). With this bound in place the crafted $FILE_NAME is rejected with-EIO ("Corrupt file name attribute") before the conversion, while a benign
name (value_length == 66 + file_name_length * 2) still passes. The bound is arch-independent: struct file_name_attr is __packed, so offsetof(.., file_name) == 66 and the check
decides every case identically built -m32/-m64.
The only other reader of file_name_length for name conversion is under #ifdef DEBUG in fs/ntfs/namei.c (not built in production); it can be guarded the same way if desired.
The flaw is original to the fs/ntfs driver: ntfs_is_extended_system_file() landed with the driver itself (linkinjeon/ntfs, v7.1 merge window). A Fixes:
tag against that introducing commit is appropriate -- I'd appreciate you pinning the exact SHA from your tree, as it is not unambiguously citable from a mainline clone. checkpatch clean.
fs/ntfs/inode.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs/inode.c +11 -0
@@ -581,6 +581,17 @@ static int ntfs_is_extended_system_file(struct ntfs_attr_search_ctx *ctx) p2 = (u8 *)file_name_attr +le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length);if (p2 < (u8 *)attr || p2 > p) goto err_corrupt_attr; +/* +* The name is converted below; file_name_length is an on-disk +* u8 that is not otherwise cross-checked, so make sure the name +* fits within the resident value before it is read. +*/ +if (le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length) < + offsetof(struct file_name_attr , file_name) || + offsetof(struct file_name_attr , file_name) + + file_name_attr->file_name_length *sizeof (__le16) > +le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length)) + goto err_corrupt_attr;/* This attribute is ok, but is it in the $Extend directory? */ if (MREF_LE (file_name_attr->parent_directory) == FILE_Extend) {unsigned char *s;
--
2.43.0
Hyunchul Lee
maintainerHi Bryam,
2026년 6월 4일 (목) 오후 2:39, Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>님이 작성:
Quoted 64 lines
ntfs_is_extended_system_file()walks a base inode's $FILE_NAME attributes and, for a name whose parent is $Extend, converts the on-disk name to the local charset viantfs_attr_name_get()->ntfs_ucstonls(). It checks that the resident value [file_name_attr, +value_length) lies within the attribute, but never checks thatfile_name_length(an on-disk u8) fits inside that value.
ntfs_ucstonls()then readsfile_name_length__le16characters starting atfile_name_attr->file_name(offset 66 in the__packedstruct), so a crafted $FILE_NAME whosevalue_lengthcovers just the fixed header but whosefile_name_lengthis 255 drives an out-of-bounds read of up to ~508 bytes past the resident value -- and, when the MFT record buffer is a tight kmalloc (mft_record_sizeequal to a power-of-two slab bucket), past the allocation itself.Reject the attribute when
file_name_lengthdoes not fit withinvalue_lengthbefore the name is read.Signed-off-by Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>---
Reproducer omitted on the public list -- available to the maintainers on request. This is a crafted-image filesystem bug; posting publicly per the [email protected] guidance on the sibling fs/ntfs attribute-list fixes that such bugs fall outside the kernel security process's threat model.The over-read was observed under KASAN by mounting a crafted NTFS image (fs/ntfs built as a module against v7.1-rc5): a $FILE_NAME on a system file in $Extend with
value_length68 andfile_name_length255 trips, during inode read, a slab-out-of-bounds read of size 2 inutf16s_to_utf8s()along the chain
ntfs_ucstonls<-ntfs_attr_name_get<-ntfs_is_extended_system_file<-ntfs_read_locked_inode<-ntfs_iget<-ntfs_fill_superoff the kmalloc-1k MFT record buffer (
mft_record_size1024, allocated bymap_mft_record_folio). A benign mkntfs image is clean on the same kernel
(control). With this bound in place the crafted $FILE_NAME is rejected with-EIO("Corrupt file name attribute") before the conversion, while a benign
name (value_length== 66 +file_name_length* 2) still passes. The bound is arch-independent: structfile_name_attris__packed, sooffsetof(.., file_name)== 66 and the check
decides every case identically built -m32/-m64.The only other reader of
file_name_lengthfor name conversion is under #ifdef DEBUG infs/ntfs/namei.c(not built in production); it can be guarded the same way if desired.The flaw is original to the fs/ntfs driver:
ntfs_is_extended_system_file()landed with the driver itself (linkinjeon/ntfs, v7.1 merge window). A Fixes:
tag against that introducing commit is appropriate -- I'd appreciate you pinning the exact SHA from your tree, as it is not unambiguously citable from a mainline clone. checkpatch clean.fs/ntfs/inode.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)fs/ntfs/inode.c +1
-0@@ -581,6 +581,17 @@ static int ntfs_is_extended_system_file(struct ntfs_attr_search_ctx *ctx) p2 = (u8 *)file_name_attr +le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length);if (p2 < (u8 *)attr || p2 > p) goto err_corrupt_attr; +/*
fs/ntfs/inode.c static int ntfs_is_extended_system_file(struct ntfs_attr_search_ctx *ctx) · line 594
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ntfs/inode.c +10
-0+* The name is converted below; file_name_length is an on-disk +* u8 that is not otherwise cross-checked, so make sure the name +* fits within the resident value before it is read. +*/ +if (le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length) < + offsetof(struct file_name_attr , file_name) || + offsetof(struct file_name_attr , file_name) + + file_name_attr->file_name_length *sizeof (__le16) > +le32_to_cpu (attr->data.resident.value_length)) + goto err_corrupt_attr;
There is already a patch that validates this in ntfs_attr_lookup(). Please refer to the link below:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ntfs/inode.c +0
-1/* This attribute is ok, but is it in the $Extend directory? */ if (MREF_LE (file_name_attr->parent_directory) == FILE_Extend) {unsigned char *s; --2.43.0
--
Thanks,
Hyunchul
Hi Hyunchul,
Quoted 2 lines
There is already a patch that validates this in
ntfs_attr_lookup().
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Right -- DaeMyung Kang's "[PATCH v4 1/6] ntfs: validate attribute values on lookup" already rejects a $FILE_NAME whose file_name_length overruns the resident value_length (ntfs_file_name_attr_value_is_valid()), and does it in ntfs_attr_lookup() so every caller is covered, not just ntfs_is_extended_system_file(). That subsumes this patch -- please drop it. I'll leave the fs/ntfs attribute-value hardening to that series.
Bryam