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perf tools: Assorted fixes

PATCH Superseded Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 3 participants 29 messages Jun 8 perf events

v3 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v3 cover perf tools: Assorted fixes

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Hi,

Sixth batch of pre-existing bug fixes found by sashiko-bot AI review during the perf-data-validation hardening series. All bugs are latent in existing code — none were introduced by the hardening patches.

Three broad categories:

1. snprintf() accumulation overflows (patches 2, 8, 9, 10):

Several functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(). snprintf() returns the would-have-been-written count, so on truncation ret overshoots the buffer size and the next 'size - ret' underflows to a huge unsigned value, disabling bounds checking. Switched to scnprintf() which returns actual bytes written.

Affected: cpu_map__snprint(), snprintf_hex(), synthesize_bpf_prog_name(), hists__scnprintf_title(), build_id__snprintf(), hwmon_pmu__describe_items().

2. Missing safety checks on untrusted data (patches 1, 3, 5, 6):

- get_max_num(): size_t underflow on empty sysfs file causes heap over-read.
- machine__resolve(): unguarded env->cpu[] access with untrusted CPU index — switched to perf_env__get_cpu_topology() accessor, added bounds check before int16_t truncation.
- timehist: test_bit(prio, ...) without bounds check on untrusted tracepoint priority.
- idle-hist: rb_first_cached() on a tree populated with plain rb_insert_color() — rb_leftmost never set, callchains silently dropped.

3. Resource hygiene (patches 4, 7):

- bitmap_free() without NULLing the pointer (2 call sites).
- O_CLOEXEC missing from open() calls in DSO and ELF code (12 call sites across 2 files).

Also expanded the libperf ABI TODO (tools/lib/perf/TODO) to emphasize the code simplification argument for widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int — the narrow type forces defensive truncation checks at every boundary where wider CPU indices are narrowed.

Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (10):
perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file perf tools: Use scnprintf() in cpu_map__snprint() to prevent overflow perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve() perf tools: NULL bitmap pointers after bitmap_free()
perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name() perf hists: Fix snprintf() in hists__scnprintf_title() UID filter path perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

 tools/lib/perf/TODO          |  7 +++++++
 tools/perf/builtin-record.c  |  1 +
 tools/perf/builtin-sched.c   |  7 +++++--
 tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c  | 11 ++++++-----
 tools/perf/util/build-id.c   |  2 +-
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c     | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
 tools/perf/util/dso.c        |  4 ++--
 tools/perf/util/event.c      | 11 +++++++++--
 tools/perf/util/hist.c       |  7 ++++---
 tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c  | 12 ++++++------
 tools/perf/util/mmap.c       |  1 +
 tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 12 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

Changes since v2:
- Dropped mbind patch (was v2 patch 4): the original code was correct — get_nodes() does --maxnode before computing BITS_TO_LONGS, so bitmap_zalloc(node_index + 1) with maxnode = node_index + 2 already match. The commit message misstated the kernel-side semantics.
- Patch 3 (machine__resolve): bounds-check al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail before truncating to int16_t struct perf_cpu. (Found by sashiko-bot lore review)
- Patch 4 (was v2 patch 5, bitmap_free): reworded from "Three call sites" to "Two call sites" — removed dead store from memory_node__delete_nodes() where NULLing a pointer right before freeing the containing struct was useless. (Found by sashiko-bot lore review)

Changes since v1:
- Patch 5 (was v1 patch 6): fix prio bounds-check logic — the

    v1 condition (prio < 0 || prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(...))
    incorrectly skipped events with unknown priority (prio == -1).
    Changed to (prio >= 0 && (prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(...)))
    to preserve the original pass-through for events without
    priority info.
    (Found by sashiko-bot lore review)

Developed with AI assistance (Claude/sashiko), tagged in commits.

Thanks,

- Arnaldo

author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/11 perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

get_max_num() reads a sysfs file (cpu/possible, cpu/present, or node/possible) and scans backward from the end to find the last number. If the file is empty, filename__read_str() returns num == 0. The loop while (--num) decrements the size_t from 0 to SIZE_MAX, reading backward across the heap until a comma or hyphen is found or unmapped memory is hit.

Add an early return for empty files before the backward scan.

Fixes 7780c25bae59fd04 ("perf tools: Allow ability to map cpus to nodes easily")
Cc Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6 -0
index 21fa781b03cc7409..1fab00ec4a59a0c7 100644
@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max)
 
 	buf[num] = '\0';
 
+	/* empty file — nothing to parse */
+	if (num == 0) {
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* start on the right, to find highest node num */
 	while (--num) {
 		if ((buf[num] == ',') || (buf[num] == '-')) {
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 01/11] perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Buffer underflow and out-of-bounds write when parsing empty PMU sysfs files
- [High] Missing null termination in filename__read_int and filename__read_ull_base leads to uninitialized stack memory read --

commit 8d602fc039d9415d5215be33dc13b838d360d23b
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file

get_max_num() reads a sysfs file (cpu/possible, cpu/present, or node/possible) and scans backward from the end to find the last number. If the file is empty, filename__read_str() returns num == 0. The loop while (--num) decrements the size_t from 0 to SIZE_MAX, reading backward across the heap until a comma or hyphen is found or unmapped memory is hit.

Add an early return for empty files before the backward scan.

Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +0 -0
index 21fa781b03cc7..1fab00ec4a59a 100644
@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max)
 
 	buf[num] = '\0';

tools/perf/util/cpumap.c static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max) · line 459

Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6 -0
 
+	/* empty file — nothing to parse */
+	if (num == 0) {
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* start on the right, to find highest node num */
 	while (--num) {
 		if ((buf[num] == ',') || (buf[num] == '-')) {

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but do similar underflows occur in other files when parsing empty PMU sysfs files?

In tools/perf/util/pmu.c:pmu_id():

	str[len - 1] = 0; /* remove line feed */

If len is 0, this writes a null byte at str[-1].

Also in tools/perf/util/pmu.c:perf_pmu__parse_scale():

	if (scale[sret - 1] == '\n')
		scale[sret - 1] = '\0';
	else
		scale[sret] = '\0';

When sret is 0, this reads and potentially writes to scale[-1].

And in tools/perf/util/pmu.c:perf_pmu__parse_unit():

	if (alias->unit[sret - 1] == '\n')
		alias->unit[sret - 1] = '\0';
	else
		alias->unit[sret] = '\0';

When sret is 0, this accesses index -1 of the struct array field.

Could this corrupt heap metadata or memory when perf runs against empty sysfs files?

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed another potential read issue. Does filename__read_int() read uninitialized memory?

tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c:filename__read_int() {
	...
	if (read(fd, line, sizeof(line)) > 0) {
		*value = atoi(line);
	...
}

Since read() doesn't append a null terminator, if the file doesn't end with a non-digit character or if the contents reach 64 bytes, could atoi() read past the valid data into uninitialized stack memory?

Similarly, in tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c:filename__read_ull_base():

	if (read(fd, line, sizeof(line)) > 0) {
		*value = strtoull(line, NULL, base);

Could strtoull() also read out of bounds here for the same reason?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 1/11
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 01/11] perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Quoted 10 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

get_max_num() reads a sysfs file (cpu/possible, cpu/present, or node/possible) and scans backward from the end to find the last number. If the file is empty, filename__read_str() returns num == 0. The loop while (--num) decrements the size_t from 0 to SIZE_MAX, reading backward across the heap until a comma or hyphen is found or unmapped memory is hit.

Quoted 8 lines

Add an early return for empty files before the backward scan.

Fixes 7780c25bae59fd04 ("perf tools: Allow ability to map cpus to nodes easily")
Cc Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 24 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6 -1
index 21fa781b03cc7409..1fab00ec4a59a0c7 100644
@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max)
 
        buf[num] = '\0';
 
+       /* empty file — nothing to parse */
+       if (num == 0) {
+               err = -1;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
        /* start on the right, to find highest node num */
        while (--num) {
                if ((buf[num] == ',') || (buf[num] == '-')) {
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/11 perf tools: Use scnprintf() in cpu_map__snprint() to prevent overflow

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

cpu_map__snprint() accumulates snprintf() return values in ret. snprintf() returns the number of characters that *would have been written* on truncation, not the actual count. When a fragmented CPU list exceeds the buffer, ret grows past size, causing size - ret to underflow (both are size_t), and subsequent snprintf() calls write past the end of the caller's stack buffer.

Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of characters written, making ret accumulation safe by construction.

Fixes a24020e6b7cf6eb8 ("perf tools: Change cpu_map__fprintf output")
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +9 -9
index 1fab00ec4a59a0c7..23ebe9b97f8e58af 100644
@@ -692,21 +692,21 @@ size_t cpu_map__snprint(struct perf_cpu_map *map, char *buf, size_t size)
 		if (start == -1) {
 			start = i;
 			if (last) {
-				ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-						"%s%d", COMMA,
-						perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, i).cpu);
+				ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+						 "%s%d", COMMA,
+						 perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, i).cpu);
 			}
 		} else if (((i - start) != (cpu.cpu - perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu)) || last) {
 			int end = i - 1;
 
 			if (start == end) {
-				ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-						"%s%d", COMMA,
-						perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu);
+				ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+						 "%s%d", COMMA,
+						 perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu);
 			} else {
-				ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-						"%s%d-%d", COMMA,
-						perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu, perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, end).cpu);
+				ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+						 "%s%d-%d", COMMA,
+						 perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu, perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, end).cpu);
 			}
 			first = false;
 			start = i;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 2/11
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 02/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in cpu_map__snprint() to prevent overflow

Quoted 13 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

cpu_map__snprint() accumulates snprintf() return values in ret. snprintf() returns the number of characters that *would have been written* on truncation, not the actual count. When a fragmented CPU list exceeds the buffer, ret grows past size, causing size - ret to underflow (both are size_t), and subsequent snprintf() calls write past the end of the caller's stack buffer.

Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of characters written, making ret accumulation safe by construction.

Quoted 6 lines
Fixes a24020e6b7cf6eb8 ("perf tools: Change cpu_map__fprintf output")
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 42 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +9 -10
index 1fab00ec4a59a0c7..23ebe9b97f8e58af 100644
@@ -692,21 +692,21 @@ size_t cpu_map__snprint(struct perf_cpu_map *map, char *buf, size_t size)
                if (start == -1) {
                        start = i;
                        if (last) {
-                               ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-                                               "%s%d", COMMA,
-                                               perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, i).cpu);
+                               ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+                                                "%s%d", COMMA,
+                                                perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, i).cpu);
                        }
                } else if (((i - start) != (cpu.cpu - perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu)) || last) {
                        int end = i - 1;
 
                        if (start == end) {
-                               ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-                                               "%s%d", COMMA,
-                                               perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu);
+                               ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+                                                "%s%d", COMMA,
+                                                perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu);
                        } else {
-                               ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
-                                               "%s%d-%d", COMMA,
-                                               perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu, perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, end).cpu);
+                               ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret,
+                                                "%s%d-%d", COMMA,
+                                                perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, start).cpu, perf_cpu_map__cpu(map, end).cpu);
                        }
                        first = false;
                        start = i;
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/11 perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read.

Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.

Fixes 0c4c4debb0adda4c ("perf tools: Add processor socket info to hist_entry and addr_location")
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/event.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/event.c +9 -2
index 66f4843bb235df53..001db00be1073ad4 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include "cpumap.h"
 #include "dso.h"
+#include "env.h"
 #include "event.h"
 #include "debug.h"
 #include "hist.h"
@@ -836,8 +837,14 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,
 	if (al->cpu >= 0) {
 		struct perf_env *env = machine->env;
 
-		if (env && env->cpu)
-			al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id;
+		/* bounds-check before truncating to struct perf_cpu (int16_t) */
+		if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) {
+			struct cpu_topology_map *topo;
+
+			topo = perf_env__get_cpu_topology(env, (struct perf_cpu){ al->cpu });
+			if (topo)
+				al->socket = topo->socket_id;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Account for possible out-of-order switch events. */
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 03/11] perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()

Quoted 34 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read.

Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds.

Fixes 0c4c4debb0adda4c ("perf tools: Add processor socket info to hist_entry and addr_location")
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/event.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/event.c +1 -0
index 66f4843bb235df53..001db00be1073ad4 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include "cpumap.h"
 #include "dso.h"
+#include "env.h"
 #include "event.h"
 #include "debug.h"
 #include "hist.h"

tools/perf/util/event.c int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al, · line 841

Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +2 -2
@@ -836,8 +837,14 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,
        if (al->cpu >= 0) {
                struct perf_env *env = machine->env;
 
-               if (env && env->cpu)
-                       al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id;
+               /* bounds-check before truncating to struct perf_cpu (int16_t) */
+               if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) {

Isn't this already covered by the test in perf_env__get_cpu_topology?

https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools-next.git/tree/tools/perf/util/env.h?h=perf-tools-next#n199

```
if (env->cpu && cpu.cpu >= 0 && cpu.cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail)
  return &env->cpu[cpu.cpu];
return NULL;
```

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +6 -1
+                       struct cpu_topology_map *topo;
+
+                       topo = perf_env__get_cpu_topology(env, (struct perf_cpu){ al->cpu });
+                       if (topo)
+                               al->socket = topo->socket_id;
+               }
        }
 
        /* Account for possible out-of-order switch events. */
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/11 perf tools: NULL bitmap pointers after bitmap_free()

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Two call sites free bitmaps without NULLing the pointer, risking double-free if the structure is reused or cleanup is called twice:

- mmap__munmap(): map->affinity_mask.bits
- record__mmap_cpu_mask_free(): mask->bits

Set each pointer to NULL after bitmap_free().

Fixes 8384a2600c7ddfc8 ("perf record: Adapt affinity to machines with #CPUs > 1K")
Fixes f466e5ed6c356d1d ("perf record: Extend --threads command line option")
Cc Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Cc Alexey Bayduraev <[email protected]>
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/builtin-record.c | 1 +
 tools/perf/util/mmap.c      | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1 -0
index a33c78f030d91012..e915390556752b9e 100644
@@ -3084,6 +3084,7 @@ static int record__mmap_cpu_mask_alloc(struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask, int nr_bits)
 static void record__mmap_cpu_mask_free(struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask)
 {
 	bitmap_free(mask->bits);
+	mask->bits = NULL;
 	mask->nbits = 0;
 }
 
tools/perf/util/mmap.c +1 -0
index d64aec6c7c843e81..c6bd4c37d50ee57e 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static void perf_mmap__aio_munmap(struct mmap *map __maybe_unused)
 void mmap__munmap(struct mmap *map)
 {
 	bitmap_free(map->affinity_mask.bits);
+	map->affinity_mask.bits = NULL;
 
 	zstd_fini(&map->zstd_data);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 4/11
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/11] perf tools: NULL bitmap pointers after bitmap_free()

Quoted 11 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Two call sites free bitmaps without NULLing the pointer, risking double-free if the structure is reused or cleanup is called twice:

- mmap__munmap(): map->affinity_mask.bits
- record__mmap_cpu_mask_free(): mask->bits

Set each pointer to NULL after bitmap_free().

Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 8384a2600c7ddfc8 ("perf record: Adapt affinity to machines with #CPUs > 1K")
Fixes f466e5ed6c356d1d ("perf record: Extend --threads command line option")
Cc Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
Cc Alexey Bayduraev <[email protected]>
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Perhaps there's a need for bitmap_zfree.

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 32 lines
---
 tools/perf/builtin-record.c | 1 +
 tools/perf/util/mmap.c      | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1 -0
index a33c78f030d91012..e915390556752b9e 100644
@@ -3084,6 +3084,7 @@ static int record__mmap_cpu_mask_alloc(struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask, int nr_bits)
 static void record__mmap_cpu_mask_free(struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask)
 {
        bitmap_free(mask->bits);
+       mask->bits = NULL;
        mask->nbits = 0;
 }
 
tools/perf/util/mmap.c +1 -1
index d64aec6c7c843e81..c6bd4c37d50ee57e 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static void perf_mmap__aio_munmap(struct mmap *map __maybe_unused)
 void mmap__munmap(struct mmap *map)
 {
        bitmap_free(map->affinity_mask.bits);
+       map->affinity_mask.bits = NULL;
 
        zstd_fini(&map->zstd_data);
 
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/11 perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

timehist_skip_sample() reads prio from untrusted tracepoint data via perf_sample__intval(sample, "prev_prio") without bounds validation. A crafted perf.data with prev_prio >= MAX_PRIO (140) causes test_bit() to read past the end of the prio_bitmap, which is only MAX_PRIO bits.

Add a prio >= 0 && prio < MAX_PRIO check before the test_bit() call. This also makes the != -1 sentinel check explicit as >= 0.

Fixes 9b3a48bbe20d9692 ("perf sched timehist: Add --prio option")
Cc Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +3 -1
index 1ff01f03d2ad1ad3..ded511d8518803a0 100644
@@ -2645,7 +2645,9 @@ static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched,
 		else if (evsel__name_is(sample->evsel, "sched:sched_switch"))
 			prio = perf_sample__intval(sample, "prev_prio");
 
-		if (prio != -1 && !test_bit(prio, sched->prio_bitmap)) {
+		/* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */
+		if (prio >= 0 &&
+		    (prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(prio, sched->prio_bitmap))) {
 			rc = true;
 			sched->skipped_samples++;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 5/11
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 05/11] perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist

Quoted 8 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

timehist_skip_sample() reads prio from untrusted tracepoint data via perf_sample__intval(sample, "prev_prio") without bounds validation. A crafted perf.data with prev_prio >= MAX_PRIO (140) causes test_bit() to read past the end of the prio_bitmap, which is only MAX_PRIO bits.

Quoted 8 lines

Add a prio >= 0 && prio < MAX_PRIO check before the test_bit() call. This also makes the != -1 sentinel check explicit as >= 0.

Fixes 9b3a48bbe20d9692 ("perf sched timehist: Add --prio option")
Cc Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 22 lines
---
 tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +3 -2
index 1ff01f03d2ad1ad3..ded511d8518803a0 100644
@@ -2645,7 +2645,9 @@ static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched,
                else if (evsel__name_is(sample->evsel, "sched:sched_switch"))
                        prio = perf_sample__intval(sample, "prev_prio");
 
-               if (prio != -1 && !test_bit(prio, sched->prio_bitmap)) {
+               /* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */
+               if (prio >= 0 &&
+                   (prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(prio, sched->prio_bitmap))) {
                        rc = true;
                        sched->skipped_samples++;
                }
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/11 perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

timehist_print_idlehist_callchain() calls rb_first_cached() on sorted_root, but the sort function (callchain_param.sort) populates it via rb_insert_color() on the plain rb_root member — not the cached variant. This means rb_leftmost is never set, so rb_first_cached() always returns NULL and the entire callchain summary is silently dropped from --idle-hist output.

The original code in ba957ebb54893aca ("perf sched timehist: Show callchains for idle stat") was correct — it used struct rb_root and rb_first(). The bug was introduced when sorted_root was converted to rb_root_cached without converting the sort insertion path to use rb_insert_color_cached().

Use rb_first(&root->rb_root) to match how the tree was populated.

Fixes cb4c13a5137766c3 ("perf sched: Use cached rbtrees")
Cc Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +2 -1
index ded511d8518803a0..85f11d388392d316 100644
@@ -3130,7 +3130,8 @@ static size_t timehist_print_idlehist_callchain(struct rb_root_cached *root)
 	size_t ret = 0;
 	FILE *fp = stdout;
 	struct callchain_node *chain;
-	struct rb_node *rb_node = rb_first_cached(root);
+	/* sort() uses rb_insert_color() on rb_root, not rb_root_cached */
+	struct rb_node *rb_node = rb_first(&root->rb_root);
 
 	printf("  %16s  %8s  %s\n", "Idle time (msec)", "Count", "Callchains");
 	printf("  %.16s  %.8s  %.50s\n", graph_dotted_line, graph_dotted_line,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer Acked-by on v3 6/11
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 06/11] perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant

Quoted 16 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

timehist_print_idlehist_callchain() calls rb_first_cached() on sorted_root, but the sort function (callchain_param.sort) populates it via rb_insert_color() on the plain rb_root member — not the cached variant. This means rb_leftmost is never set, so rb_first_cached() always returns NULL and the entire callchain summary is silently dropped from --idle-hist output.

The original code in ba957ebb54893aca ("perf sched timehist: Show callchains for idle stat") was correct — it used struct rb_root and rb_first(). The bug was introduced when sorted_root was converted to rb_root_cached without converting the sort insertion path to use rb_insert_color_cached().

Quoted 8 lines

Use rb_first(&root->rb_root) to match how the tree was populated.

Fixes cb4c13a5137766c3 ("perf sched: Use cached rbtrees")
Cc Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 21 lines
---
 tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +2 -2
index ded511d8518803a0..85f11d388392d316 100644
@@ -3130,7 +3130,8 @@ static size_t timehist_print_idlehist_callchain(struct rb_root_cached *root)
        size_t ret = 0;
        FILE *fp = stdout;
        struct callchain_node *chain;
-       struct rb_node *rb_node = rb_first_cached(root);
+       /* sort() uses rb_insert_color() on rb_root, not rb_root_cached */
+       struct rb_node *rb_node = rb_first(&root->rb_root);
 
        printf("  %16s  %8s  %s\n", "Idle time (msec)", "Count", "Callchains");
        printf("  %.16s  %.8s  %.50s\n", graph_dotted_line, graph_dotted_line,
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH v3 7/11 perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

open() calls in dso.c and symbol-elf.c omit O_CLOEXEC, which leaks file descriptors to child processes spawned during symbol resolution (e.g., addr2line, objdump). This can exhaust the fd limit during long profiling sessions or when processing many DSOs.

Add O_CLOEXEC to all open() calls in both files (12 call sites).

Fixes cdd059d731eeb466 ("perf tools: Move dso_* related functions into dso object")
Fixes e5a1845fc0aeca85 ("perf symbols: Split out util/symbol-elf.c")
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/dso.c        |  4 ++--
 tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +2 -2
index 7dced896c64eafd7..fb2e78fe2aa8eb94 100644
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname,
 	 * descriptor to the uncompressed file.
 	 */
 	if (!compressions[comp].is_compressed(name))
-		return open(name, O_RDONLY);
+		return open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 
 	fd = mkstemp(tmpbuf);
 	if (fd < 0) {
@@ -1911,7 +1911,7 @@ static const u8 *__dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,
 	int saved_errno;
 
 	nsinfo__mountns_enter(dso__nsinfo(dso), &nsc);
-	fd = open(symfs_filename, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(symfs_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	nsinfo__mountns_exit(&nsc);
 	if (fd < 0) {
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +10 -10
index 186e6d92ac3d7742..c2bdfd0003df2abe 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ bool filename__has_section(const char *filename, const char *sec)
 	GElf_Shdr shdr;
 	bool found = false;
 
-	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		return false;
 
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)
 	if (size < BUILD_ID_SIZE)
 		goto out;
 
-	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ int sysfs__read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)
 	size_t size = sizeof(bid->data);
 	int fd, err = -1;
 
-	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ int filename__read_debuglink(const char *filename, char *debuglink,
 	if (err >= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int symsrc__init(struct symsrc *ss, struct dso *dso, const char *name,
 
 		type = dso__symtab_type(dso);
 	} else {
-		fd = open(name, O_RDONLY);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 		if (fd < 0) {
 			*dso__load_errno(dso) = errno;
 			return -1;
@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int kcore__open(struct kcore *kcore, const char *filename)
 {
 	GElf_Ehdr *ehdr;
 
-	kcore->fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+	kcore->fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (kcore->fd == -1)
 		return -1;
 
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass,
 	if (temp)
 		kcore->fd = mkstemp(filename);
 	else
-		kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0400);
+		kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, 0400);
 	if (kcore->fd == -1)
 		return -1;
 
@@ -2461,11 +2461,11 @@ static int kcore_copy__compare_files(const char *from_filename,
 {
 	int from, to, err = -1;
 
-	from = open(from_filename, O_RDONLY);
+	from = open(from_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (from < 0)
 		return -1;
 
-	to = open(to_filename, O_RDONLY);
+	to = open(to_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (to < 0)
 		goto out_close_from;
 
@@ -2883,7 +2883,7 @@ int get_sdt_note_list(struct list_head *head, const char *target)
 	Elf *elf;
 	int fd, ret;
 
-	fd = open(target, O_RDONLY);
+	fd = open(target, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		return -EBADF;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/11] perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] Incomplete fix: The patch introduces an inconsistency where uncompressed DSOs are protected from…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Incomplete fix: The patch introduces an inconsistency where uncompressed DSOs are protected from FD leaks via O_CLOEXEC, but compressed DSOs and temporary files using mkstemp() still leak. --

commit 3d059467c232a3fc60a5f840954aaa8bdad70992
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code

This commit adds O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in dso.c and symbol-elf.c to prevent file descriptors from leaking to child processes during symbol resolution.

tools/perf/util/dso.c int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname, · line 349

Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.c +1 -1
index 7dced896c64ea..fb2e78fe2aa8e 100644
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname,
 	 * descriptor to the uncompressed file.
 	 */
 	if (!compressions[comp].is_compressed(name))
-		return open(name, O_RDONLY);
+		return open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 
 	fd = mkstemp(tmpbuf);

[Severity: Medium]
Is this fix incomplete for compressed DSOs? The open() call for uncompressed files now has O_CLOEXEC, but the mkstemp() call directly below it does not set the close-on-exec flag. Should mkostemp() with O_CLOEXEC be used here to prevent leaking the compressed DSO file descriptors to child processes?

Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +0 -0
index 186e6d92ac3d7..c2bdfd0003df2 100644

[ ... ]

tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass, · line 1989

Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +1 -1
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass,
 	if (temp)
 		kcore->fd = mkstemp(filename);
 	else
-		kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0400);
+		kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, 0400);
 	if (kcore->fd == -1)

[Severity: Medium]
Does the temporary file branch also need similar protection? The else branch now correctly uses O_CLOEXEC, but mkstemp() in the if (temp) branch will still leak its file descriptor.

Additionally, there appears to be another mkstemp() call without O_CLOEXEC in read_gnu_debugdata() in the same file. Do all instances of mkstemp() creating temporary files for debugging need to be updated to mkostemp() to fully address the leak?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 7/11
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/11] perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Quoted 10 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

open() calls in dso.c and symbol-elf.c omit O_CLOEXEC, which leaks file descriptors to child processes spawned during symbol resolution (e.g., addr2line, objdump). This can exhaust the fd limit during long profiling sessions or when processing many DSOs.

Add O_CLOEXEC to all open() calls in both files (12 call sites).

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes cdd059d731eeb466 ("perf tools: Move dso_* related functions into dso object")
Fixes e5a1845fc0aeca85 ("perf symbols: Split out util/symbol-elf.c")
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

and Sashiko is asking for more of this goodness.

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 120 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/dso.c        |  4 ++--
 tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +2 -2
index 7dced896c64eafd7..fb2e78fe2aa8eb94 100644
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname,
         * descriptor to the uncompressed file.
         */
        if (!compressions[comp].is_compressed(name))
-               return open(name, O_RDONLY);
+               return open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 
        fd = mkstemp(tmpbuf);
        if (fd < 0) {
@@ -1911,7 +1911,7 @@ static const u8 *__dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,
        int saved_errno;
 
        nsinfo__mountns_enter(dso__nsinfo(dso), &nsc);
-       fd = open(symfs_filename, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(symfs_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        saved_errno = errno;
        nsinfo__mountns_exit(&nsc);
        if (fd < 0) {
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +10 -11
index 186e6d92ac3d7742..c2bdfd0003df2abe 100644
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ bool filename__has_section(const char *filename, const char *sec)
        GElf_Shdr shdr;
        bool found = false;
 
-       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd < 0)
                return false;
 
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)
        if (size < BUILD_ID_SIZE)
                goto out;
 
-       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd < 0)
                goto out;
 
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ int sysfs__read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)
        size_t size = sizeof(bid->data);
        int fd, err = -1;
 
-       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd < 0)
                goto out;
 
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ int filename__read_debuglink(const char *filename, char *debuglink,
        if (err >= 0)
                goto out;
 
-       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd < 0)
                goto out;
 
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int symsrc__init(struct symsrc *ss, struct dso *dso, const char *name,
 
                type = dso__symtab_type(dso);
        } else {
-               fd = open(name, O_RDONLY);
+               fd = open(name, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
                if (fd < 0) {
                        *dso__load_errno(dso) = errno;
                        return -1;
@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int kcore__open(struct kcore *kcore, const char *filename)
 {
        GElf_Ehdr *ehdr;
 
-       kcore->fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+       kcore->fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (kcore->fd == -1)
                return -1;
 
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass,
        if (temp)
                kcore->fd = mkstemp(filename);
        else
-               kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0400);
+               kcore->fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, 0400);
        if (kcore->fd == -1)
                return -1;
 
@@ -2461,11 +2461,11 @@ static int kcore_copy__compare_files(const char *from_filename,
 {
        int from, to, err = -1;
 
-       from = open(from_filename, O_RDONLY);
+       from = open(from_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (from < 0)
                return -1;
 
-       to = open(to_filename, O_RDONLY);
+       to = open(to_filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (to < 0)
                goto out_close_from;
 
@@ -2883,7 +2883,7 @@ int get_sdt_note_list(struct list_head *head, const char *target)
        Elf *elf;
        int fd, ret;
 
-       fd = open(target, O_RDONLY);
+       fd = open(target, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
        if (fd < 0)
                return -EBADF;
 
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH v3 8/11 perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Both functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, ...). If the buffer is too small and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, ret exceeds size and the next 'size - ret' underflows, causing snprintf() to write past the buffer end.

Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of bytes written, making the accumulation safe.

Fixes 7b612e291a5affb1 ("perf tools: Synthesize PERF_RECORD_* for loaded BPF programs")
Cc Song Liu <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +6 -5
index a27945c279efb779..2c09842469f1f28c 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int snprintf_hex(char *buf, size_t size, unsigned char *data, size_t len)
 	size_t i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-		ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, "%02x", data[i]);
+		ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, "%02x", data[i]);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
 	const struct btf_type *t;
 	int name_len;
 
-	name_len = snprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
+	name_len = scnprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
 	name_len += snprintf_hex(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
 				 prog_tags[sub_id], BPF_TAG_SIZE);
 	if (btf) {
@@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
 			short_name = info->name;
 	} else
 		short_name = "F";
-	if (short_name)
-		name_len += snprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
-				     "_%s", short_name);
+	if (short_name) {
+		name_len += scnprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
+				      "_%s", short_name);
+	}
 	return name_len;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 08/11] perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing bounds and presence validation for prog_tags and func_info array offsets allows arbitrary out-of-bounds reads when parsing untrusted perf.data files. --

commit 9c1b3631942199b0637789f3499c7dffed3b90c6
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()

Both functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, ...). Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of bytes written, making the accumulation safe.

Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +0 -0

[ ... ]

tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size, · line 145

Quoted 8 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +1 -1
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
 	const struct btf_type *t;
 	int name_len;
 
-	name_len = snprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
+	name_len = scnprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
 	name_len += snprintf_hex(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
 				 prog_tags[sub_id], BPF_TAG_SIZE);

[Severity: Critical]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is it possible for the unconditionally dereferenced prog_tags pointer to trigger an out-of-bounds read when analyzing untrusted perf.data files?

When reading perf.data files, bpil_offs_to_addr() in tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c adds an offset read from the file directly to the heap allocation pointer without bounds checking against data_len:

bpil_offs_to_addr() {
        ...
        offs = bpf_prog_info_read_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
                                             desc->array_offset);
        addr = offs + ptr_to_u64(info_linear->data);
        bpf_prog_info_set_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
                                     desc->array_offset, addr);
        ...
}

If the PERF_BPIL_PROG_TAGS bit is missing from the arrays mask, info->prog_tags remains untranslated and points to whatever attacker-controlled value was provided in the file.

When synthesize_bpf_prog_name() dereferences prog_tags[sub_id], could this leak arbitrary memory into the output buffer? Does this require bounds and presence validation for the prog_tags offset during parsing?

Quoted 14 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +4 -3
 	if (btf) {
@@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
 			short_name = info->name;
 	} else
 		short_name = "F";
-	if (short_name)
-		name_len += snprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
-				     "_%s", short_name);
+	if (short_name) {
+		name_len += scnprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
+				      "_%s", short_name);
+	}
 	return name_len;
 }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 8/11
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 08/11] perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Quoted 8 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Both functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, ...). If the buffer is too small and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, ret exceeds size and the next 'size - ret' underflows, causing snprintf() to write past the buffer end.

Quoted 8 lines

Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of bytes written, making the accumulation safe.

Fixes 7b612e291a5affb1 ("perf tools: Synthesize PERF_RECORD_* for loaded BPF programs")
Cc Song Liu <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 43 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +6 -6
index a27945c279efb779..2c09842469f1f28c 100644
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int snprintf_hex(char *buf, size_t size, unsigned char *data, size_t len)
        size_t i;
 
        for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-               ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, "%02x", data[i]);
+               ret += scnprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, "%02x", data[i]);
        return ret;
 }
 
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
        const struct btf_type *t;
        int name_len;
 
-       name_len = snprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
+       name_len = scnprintf(buf, size, "bpf_prog_");
        name_len += snprintf_hex(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
                                 prog_tags[sub_id], BPF_TAG_SIZE);
        if (btf) {
@@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,
                        short_name = info->name;
        } else
                short_name = "F";
-       if (short_name)
-               name_len += snprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
-                                    "_%s", short_name);
+       if (short_name) {
+               name_len += scnprintf(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
+                                     "_%s", short_name);
+       }
        return name_len;
 }
 
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH v3 9/11 perf hists: Fix snprintf() in hists__scnprintf_title() UID filter path

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

hists__scnprintf_title() accumulates formatted output into a buffer using scnprintf() for all filter clauses except the UID filter, which uses snprintf(). If the buffer fills up and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, printed exceeds size and the next 'size - printed' underflows, causing later scnprintf() calls to write past the buffer.

Switch the UID filter clause to scnprintf() to match the rest of the function.

Fixes 25c312dbf88ca402 ("perf hists: Move hists__scnprintf_title() away from the TUI code")
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/hist.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/hist.c +4 -3
index 811d68fa6770c5b7..df978c996b6c2262 100644
@@ -2963,9 +2963,10 @@ int __hists__scnprintf_title(struct hists *hists, char *bf, size_t size, bool sh
 			   ev_name, sample_freq_str, enable_ref ? ref : " ", nr_events);
 
 
-	if (hists->uid_filter_str)
-		printed += snprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
-				    ", UID: %s", hists->uid_filter_str);
+	if (hists->uid_filter_str) {
+		printed += scnprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
+				     ", UID: %s", hists->uid_filter_str);
+	}
 	if (thread) {
 		if (hists__has(hists, thread)) {
 			printed += scnprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
reviewer Reviewed-by on v3 9/11
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 09/11] perf hists: Fix snprintf() in hists__scnprintf_title() UID filter path

Quoted 10 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

hists__scnprintf_title() accumulates formatted output into a buffer using scnprintf() for all filter clauses except the UID filter, which uses snprintf(). If the buffer fills up and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, printed exceeds size and the next 'size - printed' underflows, causing later scnprintf() calls to write past the buffer.

Quoted 8 lines

Switch the UID filter clause to scnprintf() to match the rest of the function.

Fixes 25c312dbf88ca402 ("perf hists: Move hists__scnprintf_title() away from the TUI code")
Cc Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 25 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/hist.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/hist.c +4 -4
index 811d68fa6770c5b7..df978c996b6c2262 100644
@@ -2963,9 +2963,10 @@ int __hists__scnprintf_title(struct hists *hists, char *bf, size_t size, bool sh
                           ev_name, sample_freq_str, enable_ref ? ref : " ", nr_events);
 
 
-       if (hists->uid_filter_str)
-               printed += snprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
-                                   ", UID: %s", hists->uid_filter_str);
+       if (hists->uid_filter_str) {
+               printed += scnprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
+                                    ", UID: %s", hists->uid_filter_str);
+       }
        if (thread) {
                if (hists__has(hists, thread)) {
                        printed += scnprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
--

2.54.0

author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH v3 10/11 perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

build_id__snprintf() and hwmon_pmu__read_events() accumulate formatted output via snprintf(), which returns the would-have-been-written count on truncation. In build_id__snprintf(), this inflates the return value beyond the buffer size. In hwmon_pmu__read_events(), len overshoots out_buf_len and the next 'out_buf_len - len' underflows.

Switch both to scnprintf() which returns actual bytes written.

Fixes fccaaf6fbbc59910 ("perf build-id: Change sprintf functions to snprintf")
Fixes 53cc0b351ec99278 ("perf hwmon_pmu: Add a tool PMU exposing events from hwmon in sysfs")
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/build-id.c  |  2 +-
 tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +1 -1
index 8c0a9ae932aa5798..a3b92108f96263c6 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size
 	}
 
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < build_id->size && offs < bf_size; ++i)
-		offs += snprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);
+		offs += scnprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);
 
 	return offs;
 }
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +6 -6
index fb3ffa8d32ad2a93..dbf6a71af47f9a42 100644
@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si
 
 				buf[read_len] = '\0';
 				val = strtoll(buf, /*endptr=*/NULL, 10);
-				len += snprintf(out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len, "%s%s%s=%g%s",
-						len == 0 ? " " : ", ",
-						hwmon_item_strs[bit],
-						is_alarm ? "_alarm" : "",
-						(double)val / 1000.0,
-						hwmon_units[key.type]);
+				len += scnprintf(out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len, "%s%s%s=%g%s",
+						 len == 0 ? " " : ", ",
+						 hwmon_item_strs[bit],
+						 is_alarm ? "_alarm" : "",
+						 (double)val / 1000.0,
+						 hwmon_units[key.type]);
 			}
 			close(fd);
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 10/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Low] The early termination condition `offs < bf_size` is rendered ineffective by the switch to…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The early termination condition offs < bf_size is rendered ineffective by the switch to scnprintf. --

commit 0dbaa7b9065f01d9d8a6117248bffa97b3021ddf
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

This commit replaces snprintf() with scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon_pmu__describe_items() to prevent accumulated lengths from exceeding the allocated buffer size and underflowing the remaining size.

tools/perf/util/build-id.c int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size · line 97

Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +1 -1
index 8c0a9ae932aa5..a3b92108f9626 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size
 	}
 
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < build_id->size && offs < bf_size; ++i)
-		offs += snprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);
+		offs += scnprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);

[Severity: Low]
Does this change neutralize the early termination condition in the loop?

Since scnprintf() returns the number of characters written excluding the null terminator, offs will reach at most bf_size - 1 and never equals bf_size.

Once the buffer is full (bf_size - offs == 1), scnprintf() will only write a null terminator, returning 0. Because offs stops increasing, the condition offs < bf_size remains true. This causes the loop to continue writing nothing for the remaining build_id->size iterations instead of exiting early.

Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +0 -0
 	return offs;
 }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=10
reviewer
#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 10/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 1:51 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The early termination condition offs < bf_size is rendered ineffective by the switch to scnprintf. --

commit 0dbaa7b9065f01d9d8a6117248bffa97b3021ddf
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()

This commit replaces snprintf() with scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon_pmu__describe_items() to prevent accumulated lengths from exceeding the allocated buffer size and underflowing the remaining size.

tools/perf/util/build-id.c int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size · line 97

Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +1 -1
index 8c0a9ae932aa5..a3b92108f9626 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size
      }
 
      for (size_t i = 0; i < build_id->size && offs < bf_size; ++i)
-             offs += snprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);
+             offs += scnprintf(bf + offs, bf_size - offs, "%02x", build_id->data[i]);

[Severity: Low]
Does this change neutralize the early termination condition in the loop?

Quoted 7 lines

Since scnprintf() returns the number of characters written excluding the null terminator, offs will reach at most bf_size - 1 and never equals bf_size.

Once the buffer is full (bf_size - offs == 1), scnprintf() will only write a null terminator, returning 0. Because offs stops increasing, the condition offs < bf_size remains true. This causes the loop to continue writing nothing for the remaining build_id->size iterations instead of exiting early.

Looks like a "-1" is needed to address this.

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 7 lines

tools/perf/util/build-id.c int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_size · line 100

Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +0 -0
      return offs;
 }

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=10

author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH v3 11/11 libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int: the narrow type forces defensive truncation checks at every boundary where wider CPU indices are narrowed, and values > 32767 silently wrap past bounds validation without them.

Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
---
 tools/lib/perf/TODO | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
tools/lib/perf/TODO +7 -0
index 486dd95dc57208a8..1a3644aa1f38dde4 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ together.
      (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep
      growing.  perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a
      safety net.
+   - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation
+     checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from
+     sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu.
+     Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to small
+     positive numbers, bypassing bounds validation.  Widening to int
+     eliminates this entire class of silent truncation bugs and
+     removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp in set_max_cpu_num().
    - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(),
      perf_cpu_map__min(), perf_cpu_map__max(), perf_cpu_map__has(), the
      for_each_cpu macros, and all internal callers.  The perf_cpu_map
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 11/11] libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Low] The documentation added to `tools/lib/perf/TODO` incorrectly states that narrowing values > 32767…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The documentation added to tools/lib/perf/TODO incorrectly states that narrowing values > 32767 to int16_t wraps them to 'small positive numbers'. In two's complement arithmetic, values from 32768 to 65535 wrap to negative numbers (-32768 to -1) when truncated to a signed 16-bit integer. --

commit e8f5b26d672396c3173a77e6aaeee613f6d309bd
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int.

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 18

Quoted 13 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +5 -0
index 486dd95dc5720..1a3644aa1f38d 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ together.
      (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep
      growing.  perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a
      safety net.
+   - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation
+     checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from
+     sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu.
+     Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to small
+     positive numbers, bypassing bounds validation.  Widening to int
       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but is the arithmetic description accurate here?

In two's complement arithmetic, truncating values between 32768 and 65535 into a signed 16-bit integer (int16_t) wraps them to negative numbers (-32768 to -1), rather than small positive numbers.

The overall conclusion remains correct since negative values trivially bypass bounds checks, but the description of the wrapping behavior appears mathematically inaccurate.

Quoted 3 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +2 -0
+     eliminates this entire class of silent truncation bugs and
+     removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp in set_max_cpu_num().
    - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(),
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=11
reviewer
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 11/11] libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Quoted 14 lines · On Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 1:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The documentation added to tools/lib/perf/TODO incorrectly states that narrowing values > 32767 to int16_t wraps them to 'small positive numbers'. In two's complement arithmetic, values from 32768 to 65535 wrap to negative numbers (-32768 to -1) when truncated to a signed 16-bit integer. --

commit e8f5b26d672396c3173a77e6aaeee613f6d309bd
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int.

Quoted 9 lines

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 14

Quoted 9 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +1 -0
index 486dd95dc5720..1a3644aa1f38d 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ together.
      (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep
      growing.  perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a
      safety net.
+   - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation

I think Sashiko just wants this to be uint16_t :-)

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 24 lines

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 18

Quoted 4 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +4 -0
+     checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from
+     sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu.
+     Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to small
+     positive numbers, bypassing bounds validation.  Widening to int
       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but is the arithmetic description accurate here?

In two's complement arithmetic, truncating values between 32768 and 65535 into a signed 16-bit integer (int16_t) wraps them to negative numbers (-32768 to -1), rather than small positive numbers.

The overall conclusion remains correct since negative values trivially bypass bounds checks, but the description of the wrapping behavior appears mathematically inaccurate.

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 21

Quoted 3 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +2 -0
+     eliminates this entire class of silent truncation bugs and
+     removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp in set_max_cpu_num().
    - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(),

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=11

author maintainer
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 11/11] libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Quoted 15 lines · Ian Rogers
Quoted 14 lines · On Mon, Jun 8, 2026 at 1:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The documentation added to tools/lib/perf/TODO incorrectly states that narrowing values > 32767 to int16_t wraps them to 'small positive numbers'. In two's complement arithmetic, values from 32768 to 65535 wrap to negative numbers (-32768 to -1) when truncated to a signed 16-bit integer. --

commit e8f5b26d672396c3173a77e6aaeee613f6d309bd
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu

Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 14

Quoted 9 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +1 -0
index 486dd95dc5720..1a3644aa1f38d 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ together.
      (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep
      growing.  perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a
      safety net.
+   - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation

I think Sashiko just wants this to be uint16_t :-)

That would buy us some more decades, maybe. :-)

- Arnaldo

Quoted 27 lines

Thanks,
Ian

Quoted 24 lines

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 18

Quoted 4 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +4 -0
+     checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from
+     sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu.
+     Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to small
+     positive numbers, bypassing bounds validation.  Widening to int
       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but is the arithmetic description accurate here?

In two's complement arithmetic, truncating values between 32768 and 65535 into a signed 16-bit integer (int16_t) wraps them to negative numbers (-32768 to -1), rather than small positive numbers.

The overall conclusion remains correct since negative values trivially bypass bounds checks, but the description of the wrapping behavior appears mathematically inaccurate.

tools/lib/perf/TODO together. · line 21

Quoted 3 lines
tools/lib/perf/TODO +2 -0
+     eliminates this entire class of silent truncation bugs and
+     removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp in set_max_cpu_num().
    - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(),

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=11