ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()
PATCH 1/1 ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()
The comment above bounce_error_event() documents that user clients should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the original event embedded as variable-length data, while kernel clients should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with a quoted kernel pointer.
However, the implementation unconditionally uses SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with data.quote.event set to the raw struct snd_seq_event pointer for all clients. When a bounce error event is delivered to a USER_CLIENT via snd_seq_read(), the kernel heap address in data.quote.event is exposed to userspace through copy_to_user() in the fixed-length branch.
This is a distinct leak path from the one addressed by commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read"), which sanitizes data.ext.ptr in the variable-length branch of snd_seq_read(). The bounce_error_event() leak uses fixed-length events that take the else branch where no sanitization occurs.
Differentiate the bounce event by client type. For USER_CLIENT, send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE and data.ext pointing to the original event. The variable-length path in snd_seq_event_dup() copies the event data into chained cells, and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the content -- never the pointer -- to userspace. For KERNEL_CLIENT, keep the existing SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR behavior with the quoted pointer.
--- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +27 -5
@@ -538,16 +538,38 @@ static int bounce_error_event(struct snd_seq_client *client,/* set up quoted error */ memset (&bounce_ev,0 ,sizeof (bounce_ev)); - bounce_ev.type =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR ; - bounce_ev.flags =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_FIXED ; + +if (client->type ==USER_CLIENT ) { +/* +* For user clients, send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the +* original event embedded as variable-length data. This +* avoids exposing data.quote.event (a kernel pointer) to +* userspace. The variable-length path in snd_seq_event_dup() +* copies the event data from data.ext.ptr into chained cells, +* and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the data content +* -- never the pointer -- to userspace. +*/ + bounce_ev.type =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE ; + bounce_ev.flags =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE ; + bounce_ev.data.ext.len =sizeof (struct snd_seq_event ); + bounce_ev.data.ext.ptr = (char *)event; + }else { +/* +* For kernel clients, quote the event pointer directly. +* Kernel consumers can safely dereference the pointer. +*/ + bounce_ev.type =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR ; + bounce_ev.flags =SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_FIXED ; + bounce_ev.data.quote.origin = event->dest; + bounce_ev.data.quote.event = event; + bounce_ev.data.quote.value = -err;/* use positive value */ + } + bounce_ev.queue =SNDRV_SEQ_QUEUE_DIRECT ; bounce_ev.source.client =SNDRV_SEQ_CLIENT_SYSTEM ; bounce_ev.source.port =SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SYSTEM_ANNOUNCE ; bounce_ev.dest.client = client->number; bounce_ev.dest.port = event->source.port; - bounce_ev.data.quote.origin = event->dest; - bounce_ev.data.quote.event = event; - bounce_ev.data.quote.value = -err;/* use positive value */ result =snd_seq_deliver_single_event (NULL , &bounce_ev, atomic, hop +1 );if (result <0 ) { client->event_lost++;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Takashi Iwai
AppliedQuoted 28 lines · HanQuan
The comment above
bounce_error_event()documents that user clients should receiveSNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCEwith the original event embedded as variable-length data, while kernel clients should receiveSNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERRORwith a quoted kernel pointer.However, the implementation unconditionally uses
SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERRORwith data.quote.event set to the raw structsnd_seq_eventpointer for all clients. When a bounce error event is delivered to aUSER_CLIENTviasnd_seq_read(), the kernel heap address in data.quote.event is exposed to userspace throughcopy_to_user()in the fixed-length branch.This is a distinct leak path from the one addressed by commit
705dd6dcbc0e("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read"), which sanitizes data.ext.ptr in the variable-length branch ofsnd_seq_read(). Thebounce_error_event()leak uses fixed-length events that take the else branch where no sanitization occurs.Differentiate the bounce event by client type. For
USER_CLIENT, sendSNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCEwithSNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLEand data.ext pointing to the original event. The variable-length path insnd_seq_event_dup()copies the event data into chained cells, andsnd_seq_expand_var_event()copies only the content -- never the pointer -- to userspace. ForKERNEL_CLIENT, keep the existingSNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERRORbehavior with the quoted pointer.
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by HanQuan <[email protected]>
Applied to for-next branch now. Thanks.
Takashi