libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9150
PATCH 1/2 libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9150
From: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the CVE advisory shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/c5b5db52aebde00bdeacecf4d0569c217ab3187d
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9150
--- .../libsolv/0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch new file +71 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From 5393983e5b71808151fea4b895a0952ab6bd8a48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Písař <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 09:18:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix a buffer overflow when copying SHA-384/512 checksum + from a Debian repository + +When parsing Debian repository, control2solvable() copies a package +checksum string from the repository into a stack-allocated "char +checksum[32 * 2 + 1]" array. + +If the repository defined a SHA384 or SHA512 tag, a buffer overflow +occured (as can be seen when compiling libsolv with CFLAGS='-O0 -g +-fsanitize=address') because those tag values are longer: + + $ cat /tmp/Packages + Package: p + Version: 1 + Architecture: all + SHA512: 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 + + $ /tmp/b/tools/deb2solv -r /tmp/Packages + ================================================================= + ==3695==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7b685ecf0071 at pc 0x7f6861683722 b + p 0x7fff37e3e7a0 sp 0x7fff37e3df60 + WRITE of size 129 at 0x7b685ecf0071 thread T0 + #0 0x7f6861683721 in strcpy.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x83721) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7f6861d7f34d in control2solvable /home/test/libsolv/ext/repo_deb.c:491 + #2 0x7f6861d804ea in repo_add_debpackages /home/test/libsolv/ext/repo_deb.c:622 + #3 0x000000400fd5 in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/deb2solv.c:134 + #4 0x7f686123c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x7f686123c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #6 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/deb2solv+0x400694) (BuildId: a3350337819a51edd0c75293970d3458b5033bc9) + + Address 0x7b685ecf0071 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 113 in frame + #0 0x7f6861d7de2a in control2solvable /home/test/libsolv/ext/repo_deb.c:365 + + This frame has 1 object(s): + [48, 113) 'checksum' (line 371) <== Memory access at offset 113 overflows this variable + +This patch fixes it by enlarging the buffer to accomodate the longest +supported digest string. + +This flaw was introduced with c8164bfecf2ba8bcf4c24329534d3104f19da73c +commit ("[ABI BREAKAGE] add support for SHA224/384/512"). + +Reported by Aisle Research. + +CVE: CVE-2026-9150 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/c5b5db52aebde00bdeacecf4d0569c217ab3187d] + +(cherry picked from commit c5b5db52aebde00bdeacecf4d0569c217ab3187d) +Signed-off-by: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]> +--- + ext/repo_deb.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ext/repo_deb.c b/ext/repo_deb.c +index d400f959..25eaf8cb 100644 +--- a/ext/repo_deb.c ++++ b/ext/repo_deb.c +@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ control2solvable(Solvable *s, Repodata *data, char *control) + char *p, *q, *end, *tag; + int x, l; + int havesource = 0; +- char checksum[32 * 2 + 1]; ++ char checksum[64 * 2 + 1]; + Id checksumtype = 0; + Id newtype; + +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +1 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-utils-Conside-musl-when-wrapping-qsort_r.patch \ + file://0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch \ " SRCREV = "c8dbb3a77c86600ce09d4f80a504cf4e78a3c359"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
PATCH 2/2 libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
From: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the CVE advisory shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9149
--- .../libsolv/0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch | 152 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch new file +152 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From 175bd2008d3b3a4b54253bd6657cc46948360534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Písař <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 18:04:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Cope with integer overflow in data size arithmetics in + repo_add_solv() + +When parsing solv files with maliciously large "maxsize" or "allsize" +data size, e.g. this maxsize value at offset 0x29--0x2E: + + 00000000 53 4f 4c 56 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 |SOLV............| + 00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 |................| + 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8f ff ff bf 77 86 8d |.............w..| + 00000030 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | ...............| + 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| + * + 00002030 00 |.| + 00002031 + +read_id() function will decode and return 4294959095 value, and a subsequent +assignment: + + int maxsize; + [...] + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +will experience an integer overflow on plaforms where signed int has 4-byte +size (e.g. x86_64). + +The same flaw is possible at the next line: + + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +Subsequent arithmetics will interpreter the value as a very large negative +number, possibly doing wrong decisions: + + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; + +and finally, the negative value passed to solv_calloc(): + + buf = solv_calloc(maxsize + DATA_READ_CHUNK + 4, 1); /* 4 extra bytes to detect overflows */ + +will be coerced to an unsigned type (size_t) leading to allocating a smaller +buffer then intended. Then writing to the small buffer will experience a heap +buffer overflow: + + l = maxsize; + if (l < DATA_READ_CHUNK) + l = DATA_READ_CHUNK; + if (l > allsize) + l = allsize; + if (!l || fread(buf, l, 1, data.fp) != 1) + +This flaw can be demostrated by passing that solv file to the dumpsolv tool which +will crash if compiled with ASAN: + + $ /tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv /tmp/vuln_1_101_1_negative_maxsize.solv + ================================================================= + ==17608==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c0a2ede00b1 at pc 0x7fea30451468 b + p 0x7ffe07220a50 sp 0x7ffe07220220 + WRITE of size 8192 at 0x7c0a2ede00b1 thread T0 + #0 0x7fea30451467 in fread.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x51467) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01 + e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea3028eef1 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 + #2 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #3 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #4 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + 0x7c0a2ede00b1 is located 0 bytes after 1-byte region [0x7c0a2ede00b0,0x7c0a2ede00b1) + allocated by thread T0 here: + #0 0x7fea304ef41f in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xef41f) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea302e4b4c in solv_calloc /home/test/libsolv/src/util.c:77 + #2 0x7fea3028ee38 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1025 + #3 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #4 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #6 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 in repo_add_solv + +This patch catches the integer overflow, sets an error and jumps to the end of +the function just after deallocation of the buffer (which would contain an +undefined pointer). This patch also handles a possible integer overflow at +"maxsize += 5" line. + +I originally wanted to replace read_id() with read_u32(), but +complemtary repowriter_write() function also stored the value as +a signed integer, so I guess the the Id type is inteded there. + +There are probably other ways how to fix it, like passing INT_MAX-5 +limit to read_id(), though the error message would be less +understandable. + +It's also possible to reject this patch with an explanation that loading +untrusted solv files is not supported. Though some kind of +fortification would be welcomed by people who debug solver problems +from reported solv files. + +Reported by Aisle Research. + +CVE: CVE-2026-9149 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b] + +(cherry picked from commit 210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b) +Signed-off-by: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]> +--- + src/repo_solv.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/repo_solv.c b/src/repo_solv.c +index 629ac683..00639aa0 100644 +--- a/src/repo_solv.c ++++ b/src/repo_solv.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <unistd.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + #include "repo_solv.h" + #include "util.h" +@@ -1078,6 +1079,18 @@ repo_add_solv(Repo *repo, FILE *fp, int flags) + + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); ++ if (maxsize < 0 || allsize < 0) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_CORRUPT, "negative data size in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } ++ if (maxsize > INT_MAX - 5) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_OVERFLOW, "data size overflow in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; +@@ -1403,6 +1416,7 @@ printf("=> %s %s %p\n", pool_id2str(pool, keys[key].name), pool_id2str(pool, key + } + solv_free(buf); + ++data_error: + if (data.error) + { + /* free solvables */ +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-utils-Conside-musl-when-wrapping-qsort_r.patch \ file://0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch \ + file://0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch \ " SRCREV = "c8dbb3a77c86600ce09d4f80a504cf4e78a3c359"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6
Re: [OE-core] [scarthgap] [PATCH 2/2] libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
Quoted 8 lines · Shubham Pushpkar via lists.openembedded.org
From: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the CVE advisory shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9149Signed-off-by Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>---
Hello,
Looks to me that this patch is also needed on wrynose. Can you send it there, and then, send a v2 of this patch?
Thanks!
Quoted 1 line
.../libsolv/0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch | 152 ++++++++++++++++++
Those patch are usually named "CVE-2026-9149.patch"
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" · line 13
Quoted 12 lines
.../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch[...]
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +0
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-utils-Conside-musl-when-wrapping-qsort_r.patch \ file://0001-Fix-CVE-2026-9150.patch \
CVE-2026-9150 was already fixed by a very similar patch sent earlier so you will need to rebase once it merges.
Quoted 4 lines
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +1
-0+ file://0002-Fix-CVE-2026-9149.patch \ " SRCREV = "c8dbb3a77c86600ce09d4f80a504cf4e78a3c359"
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
Re: [scarthgap] [PATCH 2/2] libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
Hi Yoann,
I have submitted v2 patch for this after rebase.
[email protected] | [scarthgap][PATCH v2] libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149 ( https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/topic/120425119 )
Please review.
Regards,
Deepak
PATCH v2 1/1 libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
In reply to Shubham Pushpkar -X (spushpka - E INFOCHIPS PRIVATE LIMITED at Cisco)From: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the CVE advisory shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9149
---
- Changes from v1 to v2: Rebased on top of latest merge commit of scarthgap and cherry pick it from wrynose
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch new file +152 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From 175bd2008d3b3a4b54253bd6657cc46948360534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Písař <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 18:04:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Cope with integer overflow in data size arithmetics in + repo_add_solv() + +When parsing solv files with maliciously large "maxsize" or "allsize" +data size, e.g. this maxsize value at offset 0x29--0x2E: + + 00000000 53 4f 4c 56 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 |SOLV............| + 00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 |................| + 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8f ff ff bf 77 86 8d |.............w..| + 00000030 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | ...............| + 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| + * + 00002030 00 |.| + 00002031 + +read_id() function will decode and return 4294959095 value, and a subsequent +assignment: + + int maxsize; + [...] + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +will experience an integer overflow on plaforms where signed int has 4-byte +size (e.g. x86_64). + +The same flaw is possible at the next line: + + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +Subsequent arithmetics will interpreter the value as a very large negative +number, possibly doing wrong decisions: + + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; + +and finally, the negative value passed to solv_calloc(): + + buf = solv_calloc(maxsize + DATA_READ_CHUNK + 4, 1); /* 4 extra bytes to detect overflows */ + +will be coerced to an unsigned type (size_t) leading to allocating a smaller +buffer then intended. Then writing to the small buffer will experience a heap +buffer overflow: + + l = maxsize; + if (l < DATA_READ_CHUNK) + l = DATA_READ_CHUNK; + if (l > allsize) + l = allsize; + if (!l || fread(buf, l, 1, data.fp) != 1) + +This flaw can be demostrated by passing that solv file to the dumpsolv tool which +will crash if compiled with ASAN: + + $ /tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv /tmp/vuln_1_101_1_negative_maxsize.solv + ================================================================= + ==17608==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c0a2ede00b1 at pc 0x7fea30451468 b + p 0x7ffe07220a50 sp 0x7ffe07220220 + WRITE of size 8192 at 0x7c0a2ede00b1 thread T0 + #0 0x7fea30451467 in fread.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x51467) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01 + e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea3028eef1 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 + #2 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #3 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #4 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + 0x7c0a2ede00b1 is located 0 bytes after 1-byte region [0x7c0a2ede00b0,0x7c0a2ede00b1) + allocated by thread T0 here: + #0 0x7fea304ef41f in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xef41f) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea302e4b4c in solv_calloc /home/test/libsolv/src/util.c:77 + #2 0x7fea3028ee38 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1025 + #3 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #4 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #6 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 in repo_add_solv + +This patch catches the integer overflow, sets an error and jumps to the end of +the function just after deallocation of the buffer (which would contain an +undefined pointer). This patch also handles a possible integer overflow at +"maxsize += 5" line. + +I originally wanted to replace read_id() with read_u32(), but +complemtary repowriter_write() function also stored the value as +a signed integer, so I guess the the Id type is inteded there. + +There are probably other ways how to fix it, like passing INT_MAX-5 +limit to read_id(), though the error message would be less +understandable. + +It's also possible to reject this patch with an explanation that loading +untrusted solv files is not supported. Though some kind of +fortification would be welcomed by people who debug solver problems +from reported solv files. + +Reported by Aisle Research. + +CVE: CVE-2026-9149 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b] + +(cherry picked from commit 210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b) +Signed-off-by: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]> +--- + src/repo_solv.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/repo_solv.c b/src/repo_solv.c +index 629ac683..00639aa0 100644 +--- a/src/repo_solv.c ++++ b/src/repo_solv.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <unistd.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + #include "repo_solv.h" + #include "util.h" +@@ -1078,6 +1079,18 @@ repo_add_solv(Repo *repo, FILE *fp, int flags) + + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); ++ if (maxsize < 0 || allsize < 0) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_CORRUPT, "negative data size in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } ++ if (maxsize > INT_MAX - 5) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_OVERFLOW, "data size overflow in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; +@@ -1403,6 +1416,7 @@ printf("=> %s %s %p\n", pool_id2str(pool, keys[key].name), pool_id2str(pool, key + } + solv_free(buf); + ++data_error: + if (data.error) + { + /* free solvables */ +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-utils-Conside-musl-when-wrapping-qsort_r.patch \ file://CVE-2026-9150.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-9149.patch \ " SRCREV = "c8dbb3a77c86600ce09d4f80a504cf4e78a3c359"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.6