fsck.f2fs: sanity check i_inline_xattr_size correctly
PATCH 1/2 fsck.f2fs: sanity check i_inline_xattr_size correctly
Corrupted inode may contain invalid i_inline_xattr_size field, when F2FS_FEATURE_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR is enabled, and inode has not F2FS_INLINE_XATTR flag, fsck.f2fs won't check its validation, however we will still use i_inline_xattr_size field via get_inline_xattr_addrs(), it may cause potential heap buffer underflows and out-of-bound read/write.
In addition, we missed to check i_inline_xattr_size w/ lower boundary MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE like we did in kernel side.
This patch fixes above two issues.
--- fsck/fsck.c | 10 ++++++---- fsck/xattr.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fsck/fsck.c +6 -4
@@ -1063,14 +1063,16 @@ check_next: } } -if ((c.feature &F2FS_FEATURE_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR ) && - (node_blk->i.i_inline &F2FS_INLINE_XATTR )) { +if (c.feature &F2FS_FEATURE_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR ) {unsigned int inline_size =le16_to_cpu (node_blk->i.i_inline_xattr_size);if (time_to_inject (FAULT_INODE ) || - (!inline_size || - inline_size >MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE )) { + inline_size >MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE || + (inline_size !=0 && + inline_size <MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE ) || + ((node_blk->i.i_inline &F2FS_INLINE_XATTR ) && + !inline_size)) {ASSERT_MSG ("[0x%x] wrong inline_xattr_size:%u" , nid, inline_size);if (c.fix_on) {
fsck/xattr.h +2 -0
@@ -200,4 +200,6 @@ static inline int f2fs_acl_count(int size) F2FS_TOTAL_EXTRA_ATTR_SIZE / sizeof(__le32) - \ DEF_INLINE_RESERVED_SIZE - \ MIN_INLINE_DENTRY_SIZE / sizeof(__le32)) +#define MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE \ + (sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_header) / sizeof(__le32))#endif
Signature · 8 lines
2.49.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
PATCH 2/2 fsck.f2fs: add bounds checking for orphan entry_count
In fsck_chk_orphan_node(), entry_count is read directly from the on-disk orphan block footer. If an attacker or corrupted filesystem sets this to an excessive value (e.g., 0xFFFFFFFF), it can cause a massive loop leading to out-of-bounds memory reads and out-of-bounds writes into the newly allocated orphan repair block.
Fix this by ensuring entry_count does not exceed F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK. If an invalid entry_count is encountered, safely reset it to 0 and write the repaired orphan block to disk when running with auto-fix enabled.
--- fsck/fsck.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fsck/fsck.c +11 -0
@@ -2275,6 +2275,17 @@ int fsck_chk_orphan_node(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)ASSERT (ret >=0 ); entry_count =le32_to_cpu (F2FS_ORPHAN_BLOCK_FOOTER (orphan_blk)->entry_count); +if (entry_count >F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK ) { +ASSERT_MSG ("wrong orphan entry_count: %u" , entry_count); + entry_count =0 ; +if (f2fs_dev_is_writable () && c.fix_on) { +FIX_MSG ("reset orphan entry_count to 0" ); +F2FS_ORPHAN_BLOCK_FOOTER (new_blk)->entry_count =0 ; + ret =dev_write_block (new_blk, start_blk + i, +WRITE_LIFE_NONE ); +ASSERT (ret >=0 ); + } + }for (j =0 ; j < entry_count; j++) {nid_t ino =le32_to_cpu (orphan_blk->ino[j]);
Signature · 8 lines
2.49.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel