ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
Subsystems (2)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH v2 2/2 ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
From: Haofeng Li <[email protected]>
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth) originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE with break rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() -> set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[] is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
--- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +5 -0
@@ -745,9 +745,14 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (nt_ace_size > aces_size)break ; +if (ntace->sid.num_subauth ==0 || + ntace->sid.num_subauth >SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ) + goto next; +memcpy ((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);if (check_add_overflow (size, nt_ace_size, &size))break ; +next: aces_size -= nt_ace_size; ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size); num_aces++;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/2 ksmbd: reject undersized DACLs before parsing ACEs
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Haofeng Li <[email protected]>
parse_dacl() limits the attacker-controlled ACE count by comparing it with the number of minimal ACEs that fit in the DACL size. The DACL size field is 16 bits, but the expression subtracts sizeof(struct smb_acl). Because sizeof() is unsigned, a DACL size smaller than the ACL header underflows to a large size_t.
A malicious client can reach this with:
SMB2_SET_INFO (InfoType=SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY)
-> smb2_set_info_sec()
-> set_info_sec()
-> parse_sec_desc()
-> parse_dacl()
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> kmalloc_objs(..., 0xffff)Thus a malformed security descriptor can make num_aces pass the guard and drive large temporary ACL state and pointer-array allocations.
Reject DACLs smaller than struct smb_acl before doing the subtraction, so the ACE count check cannot be bypassed by the underflow.
--- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +6 -1
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, {int i, ret;u16 num_aces =0 ; +u16 dacl_size;unsigned int acl_size;char *acl_base;struct smb_ace **ppace;
@@ -403,7 +404,11 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,if (num_aces <=0 )return ; -if (num_aces > (le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size) -sizeof (struct smb_acl )) / + dacl_size =le16_to_cpu (pdacl->size); +if (dacl_size <sizeof (struct smb_acl )) +return ; + +if (num_aces > (dacl_size -sizeof (struct smb_acl )) / (offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + offsetof(struct smb_sid , sub_auth) +sizeof (__le16)))return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1