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KVM: arm64: pKVM vCPU state management at EL2 (series A)

PATCH Superseded Fuad Tabba 3 participants 17 messages Jul 6 – Jul 14

Subsystems (2)

v4 of 7 Superseded Latest is v7 →

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Fuad Tabba

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

v4 cover KVM: arm64: pKVM vCPU state management at EL2 (series A)

Hi folks,

Changes since v3 [1]:
- Rebased onto v7.2-rc2. No code changes.
- Carried Vincent's Reviewed-by.

Building on Will's pKVM infrastructure series [2], this series reworks how pKVM moves vCPU state between the host and EL2, and stops copying a non-protected guest's state on every world switch.

EL2 gains proper primitives for the state it transfers: vCPU lookup helpers, and VGIC flush/sync that reduces how much host state EL2 dereferences. The series also moves some preparatory code (such as sys reg access and PSCI helpers) to shared headers and HYP, and implements lazy copying of a non-protected guest's register state back to the host until the host actually needs it, instead of on every exit.

This is the first of two series moving pKVM vCPU state management to EL2. The follow-up completes the job for protected VMs: state isolation, PSCI handling at EL2, and the resulting API behaviour.

The series is structured as follows:

01-04: Preparatory refactoring (MPIDR, sys reg access, vCPU reset, PSCI
helpers) to shared headers and HYP.

  05:     Host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives.
  06-07:  VGIC: reduce EL2's exposure to host state, add flush/sync primitives.
  08:     Lazy state sync for non-protected guests.

Based on v7.2-rc2 (8cdeaa50eae8d).

Cheers,
/fuad

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Fuad Tabba (5):
KVM: arm64: Extract MPIDR computation into a shared header
KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code
KVM: arm64: Factor out reusable vCPU reset helpers
KVM: arm64: Move PSCI helper functions to a shared header
KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

Marc Zyngier (3):
KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives
KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world
switch
KVM: arm64: Add primitives to flush/sync the VGIC state at EL2

 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h     |  12 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |  79 +++++++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |   2 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c                 |   7 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c         |  23 +++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c       |  34 +---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c   | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c                |  30 +---
 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c               |  60 +------
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c            |  14 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h            |  19 ++
 include/kvm/arm_psci.h               |  27 +++
 13 files changed, 403 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-)

base-commit: 8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8dda

Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/8 KVM: arm64: Extract MPIDR computation into a shared header

Extract the vCPU MPIDR computation embedded in reset_mpidr() into a kvm_calculate_mpidr() inline in sys_regs.h, so it can be computed without duplicating the logic. A follow-up series reuses it to reset protected vCPUs at EL2.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 14 +-------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1 -13
index 5d5c579d45790..08ba882799d48 100644
@@ -976,21 +976,9 @@ static u64 reset_actlr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
 
 static u64 reset_mpidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
 {
-	u64 mpidr;
+	u64 mpidr = kvm_calculate_mpidr(vcpu);
 
-	/*
-	 * Map the vcpu_id into the first three affinity level fields of
-	 * the MPIDR. We limit the number of VCPUs in level 0 due to a
-	 * limitation to 16 CPUs in that level in the ICC_SGIxR registers
-	 * of the GICv3 to be able to address each CPU directly when
-	 * sending IPIs.
-	 */
-	mpidr = (vcpu->vcpu_id & 0x0f) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(0);
-	mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >> 4) & 0xff) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(1);
-	mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >> 12) & 0xff) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(2);
-	mpidr |= (1ULL << 31);
 	vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, mpidr, MPIDR_EL1);
-
 	return mpidr;
 }
 
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.h +19 -0
index 2a983664220ce..bd56a45abbf9c 100644
@@ -222,6 +222,25 @@ find_reg(const struct sys_reg_params *params, const struct sys_reg_desc table[],
 	return __inline_bsearch((void *)pval, table, num, sizeof(table[0]), match_sys_reg);
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_calculate_mpidr(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 mpidr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Map the vcpu_id into the first three affinity level fields of
+	 * the MPIDR. We limit the number of VCPUs in level 0 due to a
+	 * limitation to 16 CPUs in that level in the ICC_SGIxR registers
+	 * of the GICv3 to be able to address each CPU directly when
+	 * sending IPIs.
+	 */
+	mpidr = (vcpu->vcpu_id & 0x0f) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(0);
+	mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >> 4) & 0xff) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(1);
+	mpidr |= ((vcpu->vcpu_id >> 12) & 0xff) << MPIDR_LEVEL_SHIFT(2);
+	mpidr |= (1ULL << 31);
+
+	return mpidr;
+}
+
 const struct sys_reg_desc *get_reg_by_id(u64 id,
 					 const struct sys_reg_desc table[],
 					 unsigned int num);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/8 KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

In reply to Fuad Tabba

The vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() accessors are host-only, so helpers built on them such as kvm_vcpu_set_be()/kvm_vcpu_is_be() cannot be shared with hyp code. exception.c already wraps them in __vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg(), which pick the host- or hyp-side accessor via has_vhe() and so are valid in any context.

Move those wrappers to kvm_emulate.h as kvm_vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() and switch the callers over, so a follow-up series can share that emulation code at EL2.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 22 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c       | 34 ++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +19 -3
index 5bf3d7e1d92c7..80b30fead3d16 100644
@@ -506,6 +506,22 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+	if (has_vhe())
+		return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val, int reg)
+{
+	if (has_vhe())
+		vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, val, reg);
+	else
+		__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, reg, val);
+}
+
 static inline void kvm_vcpu_set_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu)) {
@@ -516,9 +532,9 @@ static inline void kvm_vcpu_set_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		r = vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) ? SCTLR_EL2 : SCTLR_EL1;
 
-		sctlr = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, r);
+		sctlr = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, r);
 		sctlr |= SCTLR_ELx_EE;
-		vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, sctlr, r);
+		kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, sctlr, r);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -533,7 +549,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_is_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	r = is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu) ? SCTLR_EL2 : SCTLR_EL1;
 	bit = vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu) ? SCTLR_ELx_EE : SCTLR_EL1_E0E;
 
-	return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, r) & bit;
+	return kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, r) & bit;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long vcpu_data_guest_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c +9 -25
index bef40ddb16dbc..2cb68dc7d441e 100644
@@ -20,22 +20,6 @@
 #error Hypervisor code only!
 #endif
 
-static inline u64 __vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
-{
-	if (has_vhe())
-		return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
-
-	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
-}
-
-static inline void __vcpu_write_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val, int reg)
-{
-	if (has_vhe())
-		vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, val, reg);
-	else
-		__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, reg, val);
-}
-
 static void __vcpu_write_spsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long target_mode,
 			      u64 val)
 {
@@ -101,14 +85,14 @@ static void enter_exception64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long target_mode,
 
 	switch (target_mode) {
 	case PSR_MODE_EL1h:
-		vbar = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL1);
-		sctlr = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
-		__vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, *vcpu_pc(vcpu), ELR_EL1);
+		vbar = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL1);
+		sctlr = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
+		kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, *vcpu_pc(vcpu), ELR_EL1);
 		break;
 	case PSR_MODE_EL2h:
-		vbar = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL2);
-		sctlr = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL2);
-		__vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, *vcpu_pc(vcpu), ELR_EL2);
+		vbar = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL2);
+		sctlr = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL2);
+		kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, *vcpu_pc(vcpu), ELR_EL2);
 		break;
 	default:
 		/* Don't do that */
@@ -185,7 +169,7 @@ static void enter_exception64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long target_mode,
  */
 static unsigned long get_except32_cpsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mode)
 {
-	u32 sctlr = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
+	u32 sctlr = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
 	unsigned long old, new;
 
 	old = *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu);
@@ -281,7 +265,7 @@ static void enter_exception32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mode, u32 vect_offset)
 {
 	unsigned long spsr = *vcpu_cpsr(vcpu);
 	bool is_thumb = (spsr & PSR_AA32_T_BIT);
-	u32 sctlr = __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
+	u32 sctlr = kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, SCTLR_EL1);
 	u32 return_address;
 
 	*vcpu_cpsr(vcpu) = get_except32_cpsr(vcpu, mode);
@@ -305,7 +289,7 @@ static void enter_exception32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mode, u32 vect_offset)
 	if (sctlr & (1 << 13))
 		vect_offset += 0xffff0000;
 	else /* always have security exceptions */
-		vect_offset += __vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL1);
+		vect_offset += kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, VBAR_EL1);
 
 	*vcpu_pc(vcpu) = vect_offset;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/8 KVM: arm64: Factor out reusable vCPU reset helpers

In reply to Fuad Tabba

Pull the reusable pieces out of kvm_reset_vcpu(): expose the reset PSTATE values in kvm_arm.h, and split the core register reset and the PSCI-driven reset into kvm_reset_vcpu_core() and kvm_reset_vcpu_psci(). A follow-up series reuses these to reset protected vCPUs at EL2.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h     | 12 ++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c               | 60 ++--------------------------
 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h +12 -0
index 3f9233b5a1308..aba4ec09acd23 100644
@@ -348,4 +348,16 @@
 	{ PSR_AA32_MODE_UND,	"32-bit UND" },	\
 	{ PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS,	"32-bit SYS" }
 
+/*
+ * ARMv8 Reset Values
+ */
+#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL1	(PSR_MODE_EL1h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \
+				 PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT)
+
+#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_EL2	(PSR_MODE_EL2h | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | \
+				 PSR_F_BIT | PSR_D_BIT)
+
+#define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC	(PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \
+				 PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT)
+
 #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_ARM_H__ */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +57 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +3 -57

85 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/8 KVM: arm64: Move PSCI helper functions to a shared header

In reply to Fuad Tabba

Move kvm_psci_valid_affinity() and kvm_psci_narrow_to_32bit() from psci.c to include/kvm/arm_psci.h, and move psci_affinity_mask() there too, renaming it kvm_psci_affinity_mask() now that it is no longer file-local. A follow-up series handles some protected-guest PSCI calls at EL2 using these helpers.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c  | 30 +-----------------------------
 include/kvm/arm_psci.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c +1 -29
index 3b5dbe9a0a0ea..e3db84400d1f8 100644
@@ -21,16 +21,6 @@
  * as described in ARM document number ARM DEN 0022A.
  */
 
-#define AFFINITY_MASK(level)	~((0x1UL << ((level) * MPIDR_LEVEL_BITS)) - 1)
-
-static unsigned long psci_affinity_mask(unsigned long affinity_level)
-{
-	if (affinity_level <= 3)
-		return MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK & AFFINITY_MASK(affinity_level);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	/*
@@ -51,12 +41,6 @@ static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return PSCI_RET_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_psci_valid_affinity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					   unsigned long affinity)
-{
-	return !(affinity & ~MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK);
-}
-
 static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_on(struct kvm_vcpu *source_vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_reset_state *reset_state;
@@ -135,7 +119,7 @@ static unsigned long kvm_psci_vcpu_affinity_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Determine target affinity mask */
-	target_affinity_mask = psci_affinity_mask(lowest_affinity_level);
+	target_affinity_mask = kvm_psci_affinity_mask(lowest_affinity_level);
 	if (!target_affinity_mask)
 		return PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
@@ -220,18 +204,6 @@ static void kvm_psci_system_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
 }
 
-static void kvm_psci_narrow_to_32bit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	/*
-	 * Zero the input registers' upper 32 bits. They will be fully
-	 * zeroed on exit, so we're fine changing them in place.
-	 */
-	for (i = 1; i < 4; i++)
-		vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, i, lower_32_bits(vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, i)));
-}
-
 static unsigned long kvm_psci_check_allowed_function(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 fn)
 {
 	/*
include/kvm/arm_psci.h +27 -0
index cbaec804eb839..f86a006d67136 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,33 @@ static inline int kvm_psci_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return KVM_ARM_PSCI_0_1;
 }
 
+/* Narrow the PSCI register arguments (r1 to r3) to 32 bits. */
+static inline void kvm_psci_narrow_to_32bit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Zero the input registers' upper 32 bits. They will be fully
+	 * zeroed on exit, so we're fine changing them in place.
+	 */
+	for (i = 1; i < 4; i++)
+		vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, i, lower_32_bits(vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, i)));
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_psci_valid_affinity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					   unsigned long affinity)
+{
+	return !(affinity & ~MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long kvm_psci_affinity_mask(unsigned long affinity_level)
+{
+	if (affinity_level <= 3)
+		return MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK &
+			~((0x1UL << (affinity_level * MPIDR_LEVEL_BITS)) - 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 int kvm_psci_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/8 KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives

In reply to Fuad Tabba

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

The nVHE hypervisor repeatedly resolves a host vCPU into the EL2 address space and validates that the loaded hyp vCPU matches it, with that logic open-coded in each handler.

Add __get_host_hyp_vcpus() and the get_host_hyp_vcpus() macro, which translate the host vCPU into the hypervisor's address space and, when pKVM is enabled, also return the loaded hyp vCPU if it matches. If pKVM is enabled but the loaded hyp vCPU does not correspond to the requested host vCPU, both the host and hyp vCPU are returned as NULL. Convert handle___kvm_vcpu_run() to use it.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +38 -14
index d3c69de698f48..45d717889f6ea 100644
@@ -214,14 +214,45 @@ static void handle___pkvm_vcpu_put(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 		pkvm_put_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
 }
 
-static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
+static struct kvm_vcpu *__get_host_hyp_vcpus(struct kvm_vcpu *arg,
+					     struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu **hyp_vcpup)
 {
-	DECLARE_REG(struct kvm_vcpu *, host_vcpu, host_ctxt, 1);
-	int ret;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = kern_hyp_va(arg);
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu = NULL;
 
 	if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled())) {
-		struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu = pkvm_get_loaded_hyp_vcpu();
+		hyp_vcpu = pkvm_get_loaded_hyp_vcpu();
 
+		if (!hyp_vcpu || hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu != host_vcpu) {
+			hyp_vcpu = NULL;
+			host_vcpu = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*hyp_vcpup = hyp_vcpu;
+	return host_vcpu;
+}
+
+#define get_host_hyp_vcpus(ctxt, regnr, hyp_vcpup)			\
+	({								\
+		DECLARE_REG(struct kvm_vcpu *, __vcpu, ctxt, regnr);	\
+		__get_host_hyp_vcpus(__vcpu, hyp_vcpup);		\
+	})
+
+static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
+{
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu;
+	int ret;
+
+	host_vcpu = get_host_hyp_vcpus(host_ctxt, 1, &hyp_vcpu);
+
+	if (!host_vcpu) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(hyp_vcpu)) {
 		/*
 		 * KVM (and pKVM) doesn't support SME guests for now, and
 		 * ensures that SME features aren't enabled in pstate when
@@ -233,23 +264,16 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (!hyp_vcpu) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
 		flush_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
 
 		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
 
 		sync_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);
 	} else {
-		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu);
-
 		/* The host is fully trusted, run its vCPU directly. */
-		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
-		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(vcpu);
-		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu);
+		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(host_vcpu);
+		ret = __kvm_vcpu_run(host_vcpu);
+		fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(host_vcpu);
 	}
 out:
 	cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) =  ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/8 KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch

In reply to Fuad Tabba

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

The host passes a vgic_v3_cpu_if pointer to the __vgic_v3_save_aprs and __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs hypercalls, which EL2 dereferences wholesale. That exposes the host's full VGIC emulation state to the hypervisor, against pKVM's isolation goals.

Recover the host vCPU from the supplied cpu_if via container_of() and copy only vgic_vmcr and the active priority registers between EL2's hyp-side state and the host vCPU, so EL2 no longer dereferences the host's vgic_v3_cpu_if directly.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +63 -4
index 45d717889f6ea..f3233ee343a39 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
 #include <hyp/switch.h>
 
+#include <linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h>
+
 #include <asm/pgtable-types.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
@@ -239,6 +241,16 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *__get_host_hyp_vcpus(struct kvm_vcpu *arg,
 		__get_host_hyp_vcpus(__vcpu, hyp_vcpup);		\
 	})
 
+#define get_host_hyp_vcpus_from_vgic_v3_cpu_if(ctxt, regnr, hyp_vcpup)		\
+	({									\
+		DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cif, ctxt, regnr);\
+		struct kvm_vcpu *__vcpu = container_of(cif,			\
+						       struct kvm_vcpu,		\
+						       arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);	\
+										\
+		__get_host_hyp_vcpus(__vcpu, hyp_vcpup);			\
+	})
+
 static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 {
 	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
@@ -508,16 +520,63 @@ static void handle___vgic_v3_init_lrs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 
 static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 {
-	DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1);
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu;
 
-	__vgic_v3_save_aprs(kern_hyp_va(cpu_if));
+	host_vcpu = get_host_hyp_vcpus_from_vgic_v3_cpu_if(host_ctxt, 1,
+							   &hyp_vcpu);
+	if (!host_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	if (unlikely(hyp_vcpu)) {
+		struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *hyp_cpu_if, *host_cpu_if;
+		int i;
+
+		hyp_cpu_if = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+		__vgic_v3_save_aprs(hyp_cpu_if);
+
+		host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+		host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r); i++) {
+			host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i];
+			host_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i];
+		}
+	} else {
+		__vgic_v3_save_aprs(&host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
+	}
 }
 
 static void handle___vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 {
-	DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1);
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu;
 
-	__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs(kern_hyp_va(cpu_if));
+	host_vcpu = get_host_hyp_vcpus_from_vgic_v3_cpu_if(host_ctxt, 1,
+							   &hyp_vcpu);
+	if (!host_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	if (unlikely(hyp_vcpu)) {
+		struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *hyp_cpu_if, *host_cpu_if;
+		int i;
+
+		hyp_cpu_if = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+		host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+
+		hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr = host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
+		/* Should be a one-off */
+		hyp_cpu_if->vgic_sre = (ICC_SRE_EL1_DIB |
+					ICC_SRE_EL1_DFB |
+					ICC_SRE_EL1_SRE);
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r); i++) {
+			hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i] = host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i];
+			hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i] = host_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i];
+		}
+
+		__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs(hyp_cpu_if);
+	} else {
+		__vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs(&host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
+	}
 }
 
 static void handle___pkvm_init(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#13 lore raw

PATCH v4 7/8 KVM: arm64: Add primitives to flush/sync the VGIC state at EL2

In reply to Fuad Tabba

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

pKVM performs its own world switch for protected VMs but has no primitives to move the per-vCPU VGIC state between the host and hypervisor vCPU contexts.

Add flush_hyp_vgic_state() and sync_hyp_vgic_state(). Flush copies vgic_hcr, the in-use list registers and used_lrs from the host into the hyp vCPU and pins vgic_sre to a fixed value; sync copies vgic_hcr, vgic_vmcr and the in-use list registers back. The active priority registers are handled separately by the save/restore-aprs path.

Bound used_lrs by hyp_gicv3_nr_lr, the cached implemented-LR count, instead of reading ICH_VTR_EL2 on each entry. That clamps the host-supplied value and avoids a per-entry sysreg read that is costly under NV.

---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +41 -14
index f3233ee343a39..2db56146ec493 100644
@@ -104,6 +104,45 @@ static void fpsimd_sve_sync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
 }
 
+static void flush_hyp_vgic_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
+	struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if, *hyp_cpu_if;
+	unsigned int used_lrs, i;
+
+	host_cpu_if	= &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+	hyp_cpu_if	= &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+
+	used_lrs	= host_cpu_if->used_lrs;
+	used_lrs	= min(used_lrs, hyp_gicv3_nr_lr);
+
+	hyp_cpu_if->vgic_hcr	= host_cpu_if->vgic_hcr;
+	/* Should be a one-off */
+	hyp_cpu_if->vgic_sre	= (ICC_SRE_EL1_DIB |
+				   ICC_SRE_EL1_DFB |
+				   ICC_SRE_EL1_SRE);
+	hyp_cpu_if->used_lrs	= used_lrs;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < used_lrs; i++)
+		hyp_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i] = host_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i];
+}
+
+static void sync_hyp_vgic_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
+	struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if, *hyp_cpu_if;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	host_cpu_if	= &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+	hyp_cpu_if	= &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+
+	host_cpu_if->vgic_hcr = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_hcr;
+	host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hyp_cpu_if->used_lrs; i++)
+		host_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i];
+}
+
 static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
@@ -152,13 +191,7 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vsesr_el2	= host_vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
 
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3 = host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
-
-	/* Bound used_lrs by the number of implemented list registers. */
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3.used_lrs =
-		min_t(unsigned int,
-		      hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3.used_lrs,
-		      hyp_gicv3_nr_lr);
+	flush_hyp_vgic_state(hyp_vcpu);
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.pid = host_vcpu->arch.pid;
 }
@@ -166,9 +199,6 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
-	struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *hyp_cpu_if = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
-	struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
-	unsigned int i;
 
 	fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
 	sync_debug_state(hyp_vcpu);
@@ -181,10 +211,7 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 
 	host_vcpu->arch.iflags		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags;
 
-	host_cpu_if->vgic_hcr		= hyp_cpu_if->vgic_hcr;
-	host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr		= hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
-	for (i = 0; i < hyp_cpu_if->used_lrs; ++i)
-		host_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_lr[i];
+	sync_hyp_vgic_state(hyp_vcpu);
 }
 
 static void handle___pkvm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
author reviewer
#14 lore raw

PATCH v4 8/8 KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

In reply to Fuad Tabba

pKVM copies a non-protected guest's register context between the host and the hypervisor on every world switch, even when the host never inspects it. Defer the copy: on entry, flush the host context into the hyp vCPU only when the host marked it dirty (PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY); on exit, leave it in the hyp vCPU and copy it back only when the host needs it, via a __pkvm_vcpu_sync_state hypercall or at vcpu put. A protected guest's context is copied as before, since lazy sync only helps where the host is trusted to see the guest's registers.

PC and PSTATE are the exception: they are copied back on every exit so the kvm_exit tracepoint reports the guest's real exit PC, and the run loop's vcpu_mode_is_bad_32bit() and SError-masking checks evaluate the guest's current PSTATE rather than the value left by the previous sync.

The host needs the full context when it is about to read it (trap handling) or write it (the SError injection that writes ESR_EL1). Sync both from handle_exit_early(), which runs non-preemptible so the loaded hyp vCPU is stable without a preempt guard.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h   |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h  |  2 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c               |  7 +++
 arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c       | 23 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +1 -0
index 043495f7fc78b..6e1135b3ded44 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ enum __kvm_host_smccc_func {
 	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_finalize_teardown_vm,
 	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_load,
 	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_put,
+	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_vcpu_sync_state,
 	__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC___pkvm_tlb_flush_vmid,
 
 	MARKER(__KVM_HOST_SMCCC_FUNC_MAX)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index bae2c4f92ef5c..86d45bc8f4959 100644
@@ -1051,6 +1051,8 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
 #define INCREMENT_PC		__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(1))
 /* Target EL/MODE (not a single flag, but let's abuse the macro) */
 #define EXCEPT_MASK		__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, GENMASK(3, 1))
+/* Host-set: the hyp flushes the non-protected vCPU state in on entry */
+#define PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY	__vcpu_single_flag(iflags, BIT(4))
 
 /* Helpers to encode exceptions with minimum fuss */
 #define __EXCEPT_MASK_VAL	unpack_vcpu_flag(EXCEPT_MASK)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +7 -0
index 50adfff75be82..ace7b67fe1cc8 100644
@@ -735,6 +735,10 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
 		kvm_call_hyp(__vgic_v3_save_aprs, &vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
 		kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_put);
+
+		/* __pkvm_vcpu_put implies a sync of the state */
+		if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
 	}
 
 	kvm_vcpu_put_debug(vcpu);
@@ -966,6 +970,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_pid_change(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
+		/* Start with the vcpu in a dirty state */
+		if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+			vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
 		ret = pkvm_create_hyp_vm(kvm);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +23 -0
index 54aedf93c78b6..29108e5c0206e 100644
@@ -486,9 +486,32 @@ int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
 	}
 }
 
+static void handle_exit_pkvm_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
+{
+	int exception_code = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
+
+	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sync the context back when the host will read (trap) or write
+	 * (SError) it. Preempt-off here, so the loaded hyp vCPU is stable.
+	 */
+	if (exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP ||
+	    exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR ||
+	    ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
+		kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_sync_state);
+		vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
+	} else {
+		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
+	}
+}
+
 /* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
 void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
 {
+	handle_exit_pkvm_state(vcpu, exception_index);
+
 	if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
 		if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
 			u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +81 -5

117 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

In reply to Fuad Tabba
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg() and kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg() are fundamentally unsafe for nVHE EL2 emulation (e.g., during fixup_guest_exit), despite the commit claiming they are "valid in any context". --

commit 61ee8756572b776a9170ae13bb7ede91ed5afb18
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

This commit moves the wrappers for vcpu_read_sys_reg and vcpu_write_sys_reg from exception.c to kvm_emulate.h as kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg and kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg. This makes them available to all hyp code so that emulation logic can be shared at EL2.

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +0 -0
index 5bf3d7e1d92c7..80b30fead3d16 100644

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 515

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +7 -0
@@ -506,6 +506,22 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+	if (has_vhe())
+		return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but are these accessors actually safe for nVHE EL2 emulation? The commit message claims they are valid in any context, but during early exit handling (like fixup_guest_exit), the live guest state is still in hardware registers.

Because has_vhe() evaluates to false in nVHE EL2, kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg() falls back to reading the memory context via __vcpu_sys_reg(). This means it reads stale state until __sysreg_save_state_nvhe() runs.

For example, when an exception is injected into a protected guest via inject_sync64(), enter_exception64() uses this helper to read SCTLR_EL1 and computes the new PSTATE from it. This reads a stale SCTLR_EL1, potentially corrupting the injected PSTATE.SPAN and PSTATE.SSBS bits.

Could exposing these as generic helpers lead to more traps where EL2 code accidentally reads stale memory-backed sysregs before they are synced?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch

In reply to Fuad Tabba
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] Userspace KVM_SET_ONE_REG modifications to ICC_VMCR_EL1 and Active Priority Registers (APRs) are…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Userspace KVM_SET_ONE_REG modifications to ICC_VMCR_EL1 and Active Priority Registers (APRs) are silently overwritten and lost on vcpu_put() under pKVM. --

commit 8bda67fe364c44ad574acb3da5de4bf16e0ccbbf
Author: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch

This commit avoids exposing the host's entire vgic_v3_cpu_if to EL2 by copying only the necessary vgic_vmcr and active priority registers during save and restore operations.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
index 45d717889f6ea..f3233ee343a39 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 15 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -2
@@ -508,16 +520,63 @@ static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 {
-	DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1);
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu;
 
-	__vgic_v3_save_aprs(kern_hyp_va(cpu_if));
+	host_vcpu = get_host_hyp_vcpus_from_vgic_v3_cpu_if(host_ctxt, 1,
+							   &hyp_vcpu);
+	if (!host_vcpu)
+		return;
+
+	if (unlikely(hyp_vcpu)) {
+		struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *hyp_cpu_if, *host_cpu_if;
+		int i;

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) · line 541

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -0
+
+		hyp_cpu_if = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+		__vgic_v3_save_aprs(hyp_cpu_if);
+
+		host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+		host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r); i++) {
+			host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i];
+			host_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i];
+		}

[Severity: High]
Does this sequence risk clobbering userspace writes to ICC_VMCR_EL1 and the Active Priority Registers?

When userspace modifies the GIC CPU interface via KVM_SET_ONE_REG, the ioctl is wrapped by vcpu_load() and vcpu_put().

Under pKVM, vcpu_load() calls __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs, which restores the hardware with the current values.

The ioctl then updates host_cpu_if in memory with the new userspace values.

Finally, vcpu_put() issues the __vgic_v3_save_aprs hypercall.

Since the hardware and hyp_cpu_if only have the pre-ioctl stale values, will this explicit copy back to host_cpu_if overwrite the new values set by userspace? This could cause state restoration or live migration to silently lose these register updates.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +3 -0
+	} else {
+		__vgic_v3_save_aprs(&host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
+	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=6
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

In reply to Fuad Tabba
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:

New issues:
- [High] The commit silently removes the synchronization of hcr_el2 from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU on guest exit, breaking host-injected runtime signals like virtual SErrors.
- [High] Host-side modifications to a non-protected guest's system registers via asynchronous KVM requests (e.g. KVM_REQ_PMU) are silently discarded because the dirty flag is cleared on IRQ exits.

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] pKVM completely fails to isolate the register state of protected guests by unconditionally copying the full execution context between the untrusted host and the hypervisor on every world switch. --

commit 417bef11bf8b55291221bae4776c5695349c903d
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

pKVM copies a non-protected guest's register context between the host and the hypervisor on every world switch, even when the host never inspects it. Defer the copy: on entry, flush the host context into the hyp vCPU only when the host marked it dirty (PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY); on exit, leave it in the hyp vCPU and copy it back only when the host needs it, via a __pkvm_vcpu_sync_state hypercall or at vcpu put.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +0 -0
index 54aedf93c78b6..29108e5c0206e 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +8 -0
@@ -486,9 +486,32 @@ int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
 	}
 }
 
+static void handle_exit_pkvm_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
+{
+	int exception_code = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
+
+	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	/*

arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index) · line 506

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +10 -0
+	 * Sync the context back when the host will read (trap) or write
+	 * (SError) it. Preempt-off here, so the loaded hyp vCPU is stable.
+	 */
+	if (exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP ||
+	    exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR ||
+	    ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
+		kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_sync_state);
+		vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
+	} else {
+		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);

[Severity: High]
Does clearing the dirty flag on other exits (like IRQ) blind the lazy sync to subsequent host-side state modifications?

If a non-protected guest exits due to a physical IRQ, the PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY flag is cleared here. If the host IRQ handler then updates guest state (e.g. via PMU overflow) and queues an asynchronous KVM request, the next time the guest is entered, flush_hyp_vcpu() will skip flush_hyp_vcpu_state() because the dirty flag is clear.

Will this result in the guest running with stale state, discarding the host's modifications?

Quoted 16 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +5 -0
+	}
+}
+
 /* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
 void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
 {
+	handle_exit_pkvm_state(vcpu, exception_index);
+
 	if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
 		if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
 			u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
index 2db56146ec493..4a8445b636e60 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -1
@@ -172,7 +214,17 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 	fpsimd_sve_flush();
 	flush_debug_state(hyp_vcpu);
 
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt	= host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 226

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -0
+	/*
+	 * If we deal with a non-protected guest and the state is potentially
+	 * dirty (from a host perspective), copy the state back into the hyp
+	 * vcpu.
+	 */
+	if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
+		if (vcpu_get_flag(host_vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY))
+			flush_hyp_vcpu_state(hyp_vcpu);
+	} else {
+		hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but pKVM seems to completely fail to isolate the register state of protected guests by unconditionally copying the untrusted host context into the protected hyp vCPU context here on every world switch.

Can this allow the host kernel, which is treated as an adversary against guest confidentiality and integrity, to arbitrarily inject state into the protected VM?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 259

Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +3 -3
+	}
 
 	/* __hyp_running_vcpu must be NULL in a guest context. */
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL;
@@ -203,9 +255,13 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 	fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
 	sync_debug_state(hyp_vcpu);
 
-	host_vcpu->arch.ctxt		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;
-
-	host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2;
+	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
+		host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but similar to the copy on entry, unconditionally copying the protected hyp vCPU context back to the untrusted host context here leaks the guest's execution context.

Does this break the core pKVM confidentiality guarantees by allowing the host to read all guest registers?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 264

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +5 -0
+	} else {
+		/* Keep PC (tracepoint) and PSTATE (vcpu_mode_is_bad_32bit) current. */
+		host_vcpu->arch.ctxt.regs.pc = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.regs.pc;
+		host_vcpu->arch.ctxt.regs.pstate = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.regs.pstate;
+	}

[Severity: High]
Does removing the synchronization of hcr_el2 from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU break host-injected runtime signals like virtual SErrors?

When a virtual SError is injected via HCR_VSE, the guest hardware clears the bit upon delivery. Previously, this cleared state was synced back to the host here in sync_hyp_vcpu().

Since the sync is now removed, won't the host's hcr_el2 retain the stale HCR_VSE bit forever? On every subsequent guest entry, flush_hyp_vcpu() will OR this stale bit back into the hyp vCPU's hcr_el2, which seems like it would cause an infinite loop of spurious virtual SError injections into the guest.

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
 	host_vcpu->arch.fault		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fault;
 
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8
author reviewer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 6 Jul 2026 at 11:25, <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg() and kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg() are fundamentally unsafe for nVHE EL2 emulation (e.g., during fixup_guest_exit), despite the commit claiming they are "valid in any context".

    https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

/fuad

Quoted 48 lines

--

commit 61ee8756572b776a9170ae13bb7ede91ed5afb18
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

This commit moves the wrappers for vcpu_read_sys_reg and vcpu_write_sys_reg from exception.c to kvm_emulate.h as kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg and kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg. This makes them available to all hyp code so that emulation logic can be shared at EL2.

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +0 -0
index 5bf3d7e1d92c7..80b30fead3d16 100644

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 515

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +7 -0
@@ -506,6 +506,22 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
      return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+     if (has_vhe())
+             return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+     return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+}

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but are these accessors actually safe for nVHE EL2 emulation? The commit message claims they are valid in any context, but during early exit handling (like fixup_guest_exit), the live guest state is still in hardware registers.

Because has_vhe() evaluates to false in nVHE EL2, kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg() falls back to reading the memory context via __vcpu_sys_reg(). This means it reads stale state until __sysreg_save_state_nvhe() runs.

For example, when an exception is injected into a protected guest via inject_sync64(), enter_exception64() uses this helper to read SCTLR_EL1 and computes the new PSTATE from it. This reads a stale SCTLR_EL1, potentially corrupting the injected PSTATE.SPAN and PSTATE.SSBS bits.

Could exposing these as generic helpers lead to more traps where EL2 code accidentally reads stale memory-backed sysregs before they are synced?

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2

author reviewer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 3 lines · On Mon, 6 Jul 2026 at 11:28, <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Userspace KVM_SET_ONE_REG modifications to ICC_VMCR_EL1 and Active Priority Registers (APRs) are silently overwritten and lost on vcpu_put() under pKVM.

The vcpu_load/vcpu_put path under pKVM uses the same direct __vgic_v3_save_aprs / __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs on the host cpu_if as non-pKVM nVHE, not the hyp-main.c wrappers.

/fuad

Quoted 70 lines

--

commit 8bda67fe364c44ad574acb3da5de4bf16e0ccbbf
Author: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch

This commit avoids exposing the host's entire vgic_v3_cpu_if to EL2 by copying only the necessary vgic_vmcr and active priority registers during save and restore operations.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
index 45d717889f6ea..f3233ee343a39 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 15 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -2
@@ -508,16 +520,63 @@ static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
 {
-     DECLARE_REG(struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *, cpu_if, host_ctxt, 1);
+     struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
+     struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu;
 
-     __vgic_v3_save_aprs(kern_hyp_va(cpu_if));
+     host_vcpu = get_host_hyp_vcpus_from_vgic_v3_cpu_if(host_ctxt, 1,
+                                                        &hyp_vcpu);
+     if (!host_vcpu)
+             return;
+
+     if (unlikely(hyp_vcpu)) {
+             struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *hyp_cpu_if, *host_cpu_if;
+             int i;

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void handle___vgic_v3_save_aprs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) · line 541

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -0
+
+             hyp_cpu_if = &hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+             __vgic_v3_save_aprs(hyp_cpu_if);
+
+             host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
+             host_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_vmcr;
+             for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r); i++) {
+                     host_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap0r[i];
+                     host_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i] = hyp_cpu_if->vgic_ap1r[i];
+             }

[Severity: High]
Does this sequence risk clobbering userspace writes to ICC_VMCR_EL1 and the Active Priority Registers?

When userspace modifies the GIC CPU interface via KVM_SET_ONE_REG, the ioctl is wrapped by vcpu_load() and vcpu_put().

Under pKVM, vcpu_load() calls __vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs, which restores the hardware with the current values.

The ioctl then updates host_cpu_if in memory with the new userspace values.

Finally, vcpu_put() issues the __vgic_v3_save_aprs hypercall.

Since the hardware and hyp_cpu_if only have the pre-ioctl stale values, will this explicit copy back to host_cpu_if overwrite the new values set by userspace? This could cause state restoration or live migration to silently lose these register updates.

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void handle___vgic_v3_init_lrs(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) · line 547

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +3 -0
+     } else {
+             __vgic_v3_save_aprs(&host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3);
+     }
 }

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=6

author reviewer
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 2 lines · On Mon, 6 Jul 2026 at 11:36, <[email protected]> wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+EHjTyEikgroi9a9vhtv-pixBj_21RC=4d4EnsfxFk10WCnwA@mail.gmail.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+EHjTx_sf1n2cakTCt==tp5y9L2ZS0qGMA9KGUCQrwd=aXz_A@mail.gmail.com/

Quoted 2 lines

New issues:
- [High] The commit silently removes the synchronization of hcr_el2 from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU on guest exit, breaking host-injected runtime signals like virtual SErrors.

VSE is synced back selectively.

Quoted 1 line

- [High] Host-side modifications to a non-protected guest's system registers via asynchronous KVM requests (e.g. KVM_REQ_PMU) are silently discarded because the dirty flag is cleared on IRQ exits.

Injection flags and HCR_VSE are flushed unconditionally, not gated by DIRTY. The one real case (SError ESR) was found and fixed.

Quoted 2 lines

Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] pKVM completely fails to isolate the register state of protected guests by unconditionally copying the full execution context between the untrusted host and the hypervisor on every world switch.

Pre-existing upstream placeholder; per-field marshalling is added by the follow-up series.

Cheers,
/fuad

Quoted 147 lines

--

commit 417bef11bf8b55291221bae4776c5695349c903d
Author: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>

KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests

pKVM copies a non-protected guest's register context between the host and the hypervisor on every world switch, even when the host never inspects it. Defer the copy: on entry, flush the host context into the hyp vCPU only when the host marked it dirty (PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY); on exit, leave it in the hyp vCPU and copy it back only when the host needs it, via a __pkvm_vcpu_sync_state hypercall or at vcpu put.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +0 -0
index 54aedf93c78b6..29108e5c0206e 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +8 -0
@@ -486,9 +486,32 @@ int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
      }
 }
 
+static void handle_exit_pkvm_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
+{
+     int exception_code = ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(exception_index);
+
+     if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
+             return;
+
+     /*

arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index) · line 506

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +10 -0
+      * Sync the context back when the host will read (trap) or write
+      * (SError) it. Preempt-off here, so the loaded hyp vCPU is stable.
+      */
+     if (exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP ||
+         exception_code == ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR ||
+         ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
+             kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_sync_state);
+             vcpu_set_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);
+     } else {
+             vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY);

[Severity: High]
Does clearing the dirty flag on other exits (like IRQ) blind the lazy sync to subsequent host-side state modifications?

If a non-protected guest exits due to a physical IRQ, the PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY flag is cleared here. If the host IRQ handler then updates guest state (e.g. via PMU overflow) and queues an asynchronous KVM request, the next time the guest is entered, flush_hyp_vcpu() will skip flush_hyp_vcpu_state() because the dirty flag is clear.

Will this result in the guest running with stale state, discarding the host's modifications?

Quoted 16 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c +5 -0
+     }
+}
+
 /* For exit types that need handling before we can be preempted */
 void handle_exit_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int exception_index)
 {
+     handle_exit_pkvm_state(vcpu, exception_index);
+
      if (ARM_SERROR_PENDING(exception_index)) {
              if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN)) {
                      u64 disr = kvm_vcpu_get_disr(vcpu);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
index 2db56146ec493..4a8445b636e60 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -1
@@ -172,7 +214,17 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
      fpsimd_sve_flush();
      flush_debug_state(hyp_vcpu);
 
-     hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt        = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 226

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +10 -0
+     /*
+      * If we deal with a non-protected guest and the state is potentially
+      * dirty (from a host perspective), copy the state back into the hyp
+      * vcpu.
+      */
+     if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
+             if (vcpu_get_flag(host_vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY))
+                     flush_hyp_vcpu_state(hyp_vcpu);
+     } else {
+             hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but pKVM seems to completely fail to isolate the register state of protected guests by unconditionally copying the untrusted host context into the protected hyp vCPU context here on every world switch.

Can this allow the host kernel, which is treated as an adversary against guest confidentiality and integrity, to arbitrarily inject state into the protected VM?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 259

Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +3 -3
+     }
 
      /* __hyp_running_vcpu must be NULL in a guest context. */
      hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL;
@@ -203,9 +255,13 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
      fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
      sync_debug_state(hyp_vcpu);
 
-     host_vcpu->arch.ctxt            = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;
-
-     host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2         = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2;
+     if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
+             host_vcpu->arch.ctxt = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;

[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but similar to the copy on entry, unconditionally copying the protected hyp vCPU context back to the untrusted host context here leaks the guest's execution context.

Does this break the core pKVM confidentiality guarantees by allowing the host to read all guest registers?

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 264

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +5 -0
+     } else {
+             /* Keep PC (tracepoint) and PSTATE (vcpu_mode_is_bad_32bit) current. */
+             host_vcpu->arch.ctxt.regs.pc = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.regs.pc;
+             host_vcpu->arch.ctxt.regs.pstate = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.regs.pstate;
+     }

[Severity: High]
Does removing the synchronization of hcr_el2 from the hyp vCPU back to the host vCPU break host-injected runtime signals like virtual SErrors?

When a virtual SError is injected via HCR_VSE, the guest hardware clears the bit upon delivery. Previously, this cleared state was synced back to the host here in sync_hyp_vcpu().

Since the sync is now removed, won't the host's hcr_el2 retain the stale HCR_VSE bit forever? On every subsequent guest entry, flush_hyp_vcpu() will OR this stale bit back into the hyp vCPU's hcr_el2, which seems like it would cause an infinite loop of spurious virtual SError injections into the guest.

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) · line 267

Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +0 -0
      host_vcpu->arch.fault           = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fault;
 

--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8

maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

In reply to Fuad Tabba

Hi Fuad,

Quoted 33 lines · Fuad Tabba

The vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() accessors are host-only, so helpers built on them such as kvm_vcpu_set_be()/kvm_vcpu_is_be() cannot be shared with hyp code. exception.c already wraps them in __vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg(), which pick the host- or hyp-side accessor via has_vhe() and so are valid in any context.

Move those wrappers to kvm_emulate.h as kvm_vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() and switch the callers over, so a follow-up series can share that emulation code at EL2.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 22 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c       | 34 ++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +6 -0
index 5bf3d7e1d92c7..80b30fead3d16 100644
@@ -506,6 +506,22 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+	if (has_vhe())
+		return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+	return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 524

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +10 -0
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val, int reg)
+{
+	if (has_vhe())
+		vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, val, reg);
+	else
+		__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, reg, val);
+}
+

Can you instead name the wrappers vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() and rename the current implementations, like __vcpu_{read,write}_sysreg_vhe()?

Just want to avoid confusion between kvm_vcpu_ and vcpu_

Thanks,
Oliver

author reviewer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code

Quoted 51 lines · Oliver Upton

Hi Fuad,

Quoted 33 lines · Fuad Tabba

The vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() accessors are host-only, so helpers built on them such as kvm_vcpu_set_be()/kvm_vcpu_is_be() cannot be shared with hyp code. exception.c already wraps them in __vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg(), which pick the host- or hyp-side accessor via has_vhe() and so are valid in any context.

Move those wrappers to kvm_emulate.h as kvm_vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() and switch the callers over, so a follow-up series can share that emulation code at EL2.

No functional change intended.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 22 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c       | 34 ++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +6 -0
index 5bf3d7e1d92c7..80b30fead3d16 100644
@@ -506,6 +506,22 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
      return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
+static inline u64 kvm_vcpu_read_sys_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int reg)
+{
+     if (has_vhe())
+             return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
+
+     return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 524

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +10 -0
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_vcpu_write_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val, int reg)
+{
+     if (has_vhe())
+             vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, val, reg);
+     else
+             __vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, reg, val);
+}
+

Can you instead name the wrappers vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg() and rename the current implementations, like __vcpu_{read,write}_sysreg_vhe()?

Quoted 1 line

Just want to avoid confusion between kvm_vcpu_ and vcpu_

Will do, thanks!
/fuad

Quoted 3 lines

Thanks,
Oliver