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vfio/pci: Reject invalid MSI-X Table and PBA BIR values

PATCH Superseded Cédric Le Goater 2 participants 2 messages Jul 6

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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PATCH 1/1 vfio/pci: Reject invalid MSI-X Table and PBA BIR values

The 3-bit MSI-X BIR fields permit values 0-7, but VFIOPCIDevice::bars[] only contains BAR0-BAR5 (6 entries). An invalid BIR value of 6 or 7 can cause an out-of-bounds array access (CWE-129) in vfio_msix_early_setup().

Add range checks immediately after extracting the BIR values.

Fixes 65501a745dba ("vfio: vfio-pci device assignment driver")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3878

---
 hw/vfio/pci.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
hw/vfio/pci.c +8 -0
index 67d9d9e846446577e8de7a8c588165c6f38c3bee..324e3f5d98206ccb64963ee232f69d3ada422ef5 100644
@@ -1762,6 +1762,14 @@ static bool vfio_msix_early_setup(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, Error **errp)
     msix->pba_offset = pba & ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_BIRMASK;
     msix->entries = (ctrl & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE) + 1;
 
+    if (msix->table_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1 ||
+        msix->pba_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "invalid MSI-X BIR, table_bar=%d pba_bar=%d",
+                   msix->table_bar, msix->pba_bar);
+        g_free(msix);
+        return false;
+    }
+
     ret = vfio_device_get_irq_info(&vdev->vbasedev, VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX,
                                    &irq_info);
     if (ret < 0) {
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
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Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 6 Jul 2026 16:31:24 +0200 Cédric Le Goater <[email protected]> wrote:

The 3-bit MSI-X BIR fields permit values 0-7, but VFIOPCIDevice::bars[] only contains BAR0-BAR5 (6 entries). An invalid BIR value of 6 or 7 can cause an out-of-bounds array access (CWE-129) in vfio_msix_early_setup().

Add range checks immediately after extracting the BIR values.

A compliant PCI device used for traditional device assignment is not susceptible to this without a malicious intermediary. The primary exposure seems to be a vfio-user server, maliciously or inadvertently exposing bogus BIR values, which appears to introduce a DoS vector without any reliable further exploit.

Quoted 17 lines
Fixes 65501a745dba ("vfio: vfio-pci device assignment driver")

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3878

---
 hw/vfio/pci.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
hw/vfio/pci.c +1 -0
index 67d9d9e846446577e8de7a8c588165c6f38c3bee..324e3f5d98206ccb64963ee232f69d3ada422ef5 100644
@@ -1762,6 +1762,14 @@ static bool vfio_msix_early_setup(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, Error **errp)
     msix->pba_offset = pba & ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_BIRMASK;
     msix->entries = (ctrl & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE) + 1;
 
+    if (msix->table_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1 ||

hw/vfio/pci.c static bool vfio_msix_early_setup(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, Error **errp) · line 1775

Quoted 10 lines
hw/vfio/pci.c +7 -0
+        msix->pba_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "invalid MSI-X BIR, table_bar=%d pba_bar=%d",
+                   msix->table_bar, msix->pba_bar);
+        g_free(msix);
+        return false;
+    }
+
     ret = vfio_device_get_irq_info(&vdev->vbasedev, VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX,
                                    &irq_info);
     if (ret < 0) {

Note that the vulnerability is an out-of-bounds index on vdev->bars, so we could test >= ARRAY_SIZE(vdev->bars), which is sized as (PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1). Either way...